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The Times

HISTORY OF THE WAR

VOL. X.

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CHAPTER CLI.

VICTORIA CROSSES OF THE WAR.—I.

DECORATIONS GRANTED DURING TWO YEARS OF WAR—THE ARMY—CAPTAIN GRENFELL WINS THE FIRST V.C.—THE GREAT RETREAT—HEROIC STAND OF "L" BATTERY AT NERY—LE CATEAU—MICHAEL O'LEARY—POTTS AT HILL 70—SERGEANT BROOKS'S INVESTITURE—THE AUSTRALIANS IN GALLIPOLI—LANCE-CORPORAL JACKA—THE HEROES OF LONE PINE—A NEW ZEALANDER—INDIAN V.C.'s—THE NAVY—SUBMARINE EXPLOITS—HOLBROOK—NASMITH—BOYLE—THE RIVER CLYDE LANDING—THE R.A.M.C.—MARTIN-LEAKE—A CLASP TO THE V.C.—THE CANADIANS—THE AIR SERVICE—WARNEFORD DESTROYS A ZEPPELIN—PIPER LAIDLAW—REV. NOEL MELLISH—ISOLATED EXPLOITS.

DURING the first two years of the war 160 Victoria Crosses were awarded to members of the Navy and the Army for valour, compared with the awards of 182 in all for the Indian Mutiny, 111 for the Crimean War, and 78 for the South African War.

In the earlier days of 1914–15 the Cross was won by officers and men of the old Regular Army which gained lasting fame by its valiant rearguard actions ending at the Marne; and the deeds were of the same heroic nature as those which marked the campaigns in the Crimea, India, South Africa, and many other lands.

From the time when the first Victoria Cross was granted to Mr., subsequently Rear-Admiral, Lucas, mate of H.M.S. Hecla, for picking up a live shell from the deck and throwing it overboard, until the earlier stages of the war there had been but little variation in the nature of the deeds for which the greatest and most coveted of all military honours was given. There were well defined circumstances which governed the recommendation to confer the honour, conditions almost as unchanging as the order of naval warfare which prevailed till Rodney broke the line; then arose the amazing and the unforeseen—at times almost incredible—developments of the gigantic struggle. A new system of battle on sea and land had come into being and had produced new types of fighters—the airman, the submarine man, the bomber, the trenchman, doers of "things unattempted yet in prose or rhyme." The achievements of Shaw, the Lifeguardsman, at Waterloo were overshadowed by the acts of men like Michael O'Leary and Albert Jacka, both of whom won the Cross by prodigies of prowess. O'Leary, single-handed, slew eight Germans and took two prisoners, incidentally capturing a position. That was in France. In Gallipoli Jacka, also single-handed, killed the whole of a party of seven Turks, five by rifle fire and two with the bayonet.

O'Leary was an Irish Guardsman, a professional soldier, who had previously served in the Navy; Jacka was what might be called a civilian of the New Army, an Australian, and the first of his countrymen to win the Cross. And in that term "civilian" could be found one of the most remarkable characteristics of the conflict. Just as in the days of Cromwell there arose men who, though not trained as soldiers, and not loving war, yet

Pte. E. BARBER,
1st Bn. Grenadier Gds.
(Neuve Chapelle).

Lce.-Corp. D. W. BELCHER,
London Rifle Brigade,
(Near St. Julien).

Drummer S. J. BENT,
1st Bn. E. Lancs. Regt.
(Near Le Gheer).

[*Lafayette.*

Capt. E. K. BRADBURY,
"L" Battery, R.H.A.
(Nery).

conquered the Cavaliers, whom God made "as stubble to their swords," so there flocked to the New Army the mere civilian—the curate, the lawyer, the actor, the writer, the elementary teacher, the newsvendor, the greengrocer's boy, the physically big and the man of small stature. To many such as these was given the Victoria Cross. To aristocrats and reformatory lads, and to all the ranks and stations that came between these great social extremes, the honour was awarded, and such was the divergence of condition and age of the fighters that the Cross was given to an elderly married man with nine children and a boy of sixteen who, mortally wounded, died at his post in the Battle of Jutland Bank.

For amazing exploits on the field, in submarines and aeroplanes, for unparalleled skill and daring in getting above and destroying a Zeppelin by bombing—these were amongst the deeds that won the Victoria Cross during the first two years of war. And all these exceptional acts of heroism were apart and distinct from achievements which in lesser times would almost surely have been acknowledged by the award of the same distinction.

It was stated by Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons on July 26, 1916, that up to that time—almost two years from the beginning of the war—the total number of decorations issued and in course of issue up to date was :—Victoria Cross, 160 ;* Distinguished Service Order, 1,676 ; Military Cross, 3,851 ; Distinguished Conduct Medal, 6,279 ; Military Medal, already issued, 2,046, making a total of 14,012. Approved, but not notified from the War Office, Military Medals, 8,000.

A remarkable feature of the awards of the Victoria Cross in the Great War was the large number gazetted at one time and the great proportion of dead heroes who were honoured. The very first awards were made on November 16, 1914, and these numbered nine. They were given to officers, non-commissioned officers and men for their "conspicuous bravery whilst serving with the Expeditionary Force," and they proved that the British Army had been true to its glorious traditions. On November

* The Victoria Cross was instituted in 1856 ; the Distinguished Service Order in 1886 ; the Military Cross on January 1, 1915 ; the Distinguished Conduct Medal in 1853 ; the Military Medal in April, 1916.

Lce.-Sergt. O. BROOKS,
3rd Bn. Coldstream Guards
(Near Loos).

Pte. W. BUCKINGHAM,
2nd Leicestershire Regt.
(Neuve Chapelle).

Corp. A. BURT,
1st Herts (T.F.)
(Cuinchy).

Pte. H. CHRISTIAN,
2nd Royal Lanc.
(Western Front).

Lce.-Corp. W. R. COTTER,
6th East Kents
(Western Front).

Sergt.-Maj. H. DANIELS,
2nd Rifle Brigade
(Neuve Chapelle).

[*Lafayette.*

Lieut. W. DARTNELL,
Royal Fusiliers
(East Africa).

Corp. J. DAWSON,
Royal Engineers
(Hohenzollern Redoubt).

26, 1914, eight further awards were notified, and subsequently there were numerous batches as well as individual announcements.

First of all the winners to be named was Captain Francis O. Grenfell, 9th Lancers, for a double act of gallantry on the same day, August 24, 1914. The brief official record stated that the Cross had been given for "gallantry in action against unbroken infantry at Andregnies, Belgium, on 24th August, 1914, and for gallant conduct in assisting to save the guns of the 119th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, near Doubon the same day." Captain Grenfell was wounded in the legs and a hand and was invalided home. While in London he was received at Buckingham Palace by the King, who decorated him with the Cross. Subsequently this officer returned to the front. He was killed in action on May 24, 1915. His twin brother Riversdale, to whom he was deeply attached, and who also was an officer in the 9th Lancers, was killed in action, too. Both were nephews of Field-Marshal Lord Grenfell. Captain Grenfell was devoted to his profession and his corps and in his will he directed that his Cross should be given to the 9th, "to whom the honour of my gaining the V.C. was entirely due, thanks to the splendid discipline and traditions which exist in this magnificent regiment." To his illustrious uncle he paid an affectionate tribute, and added, "I have endeavoured to base my career on his example."

"He was mortally wounded while assisting wounded men into shelter" was the conclusion of the brief official record of the act for which Captain Theodore Wright, R.E., was awarded the Cross, one of the first nine. At Mons, on August 23, he tried to connect up the lead to demolish a bridge, and he made the attempt under a heavy fire. He was wounded in the head, but undaunted he made a second effort. It was afterwards, at Vailly, on September 14, while assisting the passage of the 5th Cavalry Brigade over the pontoon bridge that Captain Wright received his mortal wounds.

Wright's gallantry was accompanied on the same day by the act of another Royal Engineer —Lance-Corporal Charles Alfred Jarvis—who, in full view of the enemy, and for an hour and a half under heavy fire, succeeded in firing

Lieut. J. DIMMER,
2nd Bn. K.R.R.C.
(Klein Zillebeke).

[*Swaine.*

Battery-Sergt.-Maj. DORRELL,
"L" Battery R.H.A.
(Nery).

Lce.-Corp. F. DOBSON,
Coldstream Guards
(Chavanne).

Driver J. DRAIN,
37th Battery R.F.A.
(Le Cateau).

PRIVATE GEORGE WILSON HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY.

Awarded the V.C. for gallantry on September 14, 1914, near Verneuil. He attacked a hostile machine-gun, accompanied by only one man. When the latter was killed, he shot the officer and six men working the gun, which he captured.

charges which destroyed a bridge. Half a dozen more Crosses were to go to the Corps: to Captain W. H. Johnston, who at Missy on September 14, 1914, personally worked two rafts throughout the day, bringing back wounded across the river and returning with ammunition, and so enabling the advanced brigade to maintain its position; Lieutenant Philip Neame, for rescuing many wounded men near Neuve Chapelle on December 19, 1914; Lieutenant Cyril G. Martin, D.S.O., who on March 12, 1915, displayed great heroism when in command of six grenade-throwers, and, though wounded, led his party into the enemy's trenches; Captain L. G. Hawker, D.S.O., for a triumphant flying achievement—he had been transferred to the R.F.C.—on July 25, 1915; Temporary Second-Lieutenant F. H. Johnson, for the courage and initiative he showed in the attack on Hill 70 on September 25, 1915; and to Corporal J. L. Dawson, who, during an assault on the Hohenzollern Redoubt on October 13, 1915, performed many acts of courage, chief amongst them being finding three leaking gas cylinders and rolling them away to a safe place, then firing rifle bullets into them to let the gas escape, and so saving many men from being gassed. Hawker's feat, which should be credited to the R.F.C., was due to his very great personal bravery and skill. While flying alone he saw and attacked in succession three German aeroplanes. The first escaped, the second was damaged and forced to descend, the third was assailed by Hawker at a height of 10,000 ft., and was brought down in the British lines, the pilot and observer being killed. The performance was uncommonly splendid, for the German craft were armed with machine guns and each "carried a passenger as well as the pilot."

"He died of his wounds." Such was the end of Lieutenant Maurice James Dease, 4th Battalion The Royal Fusiliers. "Though two or three times badly wounded he continued to control the fire of his machine guns at Mons, on August 23, until all his men were shot. He died of his wounds." That is all the story, as the *Gazette* published it; yet no more splendid tribute was ever paid to a little band of British heroes.

Again—"(He has since died of his wounds.)" That was Captain Harry Sherwood Ranken, Royal Army Medical Corps. Here, too, the tale was told in few but moving words:—"For tending wounded in the trenches under rifle and shrapnel fire at Hautvesnes on September 19, and on September 20, continuing to attend to wounded after his thigh and leg had been shattered. (He has since died of his wounds.)"

Corporal Charles Ernest Garforth, 15th Hussars, was awarded the Cross for these exploits:—"At Harmignies, on August 23, volunteered to cut wire under fire, which enabled his squadron to escape. At Dammartin he carried a man out of action. On September 3, when under Maxim fire, he extricated a sergeant whose horse had been shot, and by opening fire for three minutes enabled the sergeant to get away safely."

Seven of the first batch of nine awards have been dealt with; two remain to be described, and this pair concern a deed which thrilled the Empire—the heroic stand of "L" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, an act which may well be compared with the famous affair of "Q" Battery at Sanna's Post, on March 31, 1900, for which four Victoria Crosses were given.

"L" Battery had greatly distinguished itself at Mons, and in helping to cover the retreat fought a heavy rearguard action. On September 1, 1914, the last day of the retirement, in a morning mist, the battery, at close range, unexpectedly came into action with a vastly superior German force. A fire was brought to bear on the battery which was so destructive that only one British gun was left in action, and this was served, until all the ammunition was expended, by Battery-Sergeant-Major George Thomas Dorrell, Sergeant David Nelson, Gunner H. Darbyshire and Driver Osborne; all the rest of the officers and men of the battery having been killed or wounded. The Queen's Bays and "I" Battery came to the rescue at the close of the terrible artillery duel and what was left of "L" Battery came out of action. Dorrell and Nelson received the Victoria Cross and commissions; Darbyshire and Osborne were awarded the Médaille Militaire of France; it was publicly stated, though erroneously, that they also had been granted the Cross.

The first nine awards contained the brief details of the acts of Dorrell and Nelson. On November 26, 1914, when eight Crosses were awarded, the list contained the following:

Captain Edward Kinder Bradbury (deceased), "L" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery.

For gallantry and ability in organizing

Corp. A. DRAKE,
Rifle Brigade
(La Brique)

Pte. E. DWYER,
1st East Surrey
(" Hill 60 ").

the defence of "L" Battery against heavy odds at Nery on September 1.

A detailed story of the event was told by Gunner Darbyshire after the battle. Darbyshire, a man of some years' service, calm and observant, had kept a record of the principal circumstances, and from this he refreshed his memory as he told the tale, from which extracts are given here :

"All through the retreat we had been fighting heavily, and throughout the day on August 31 we fought till four o'clock in the afternoon ; then we were ordered to retire to Compiègne. It was a long march, and when we got to Nery, near Compiègne, early in the evening, both horses and men were utterly exhausted and very hungry. As soon as we got in we gave the horses some food. . . .

"Outposts were put out by the officers, and the cavalry who were with us, the 2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen's Bays), were in a small field on the side of a road which was opposite to us. That road was really a deep cutting. . . .

"Having made all our dispositions, we went to sleep, and rested till half-past three in the morning, when we were roused and told to get ready to march at a moment's notice.

"The darkness seemed to hang about more than usual, and the morning was very misty ; but we did not pay much attention to that, and we breakfasted and fed the horses. We expected to be off again, but the battery was ordered to stand fast until further notice. : :

"Sergeant-Major Dorrell thought that this would be a good opportunity to water the horses, so he ordered the right half-battery to water, and the horses were taken behind a sugar factory which was a little distance away. The horses were watered and brought back and hooked into the guns and wagons ; then the left half-battery went to water. . . .

"All was well, it seemed, and we were now expecting to move off. . . . Then, without the slightest warning, a 'ranging' shot was dropped into the battery, and we knew instantly that the Germans were on us and had fired this trial shot to get the range of us. . . .

Sec.-Lieut. A. FLEMING-SANDES,
2nd East Surrey
(Hohenzollern Redoubt).

Lieut. W. FORSHAW,
1/9th Bn. Manchester Regt.
(T.F.)
(Dardanelles).

"We were taken completely by surprise, and at first could do nothing, for the 'ranging' shot was followed by an absolute hail of shrapnel, which almost blew the battery to pieces. . . .

"'Who'll volunteer to get the guns into action ?' shouted Captain Bradbury.

"Every man who could, stand and fight said 'Me !' and there was an instant rush for the guns. . . .

"The first gun came to grief through the terrified horses bolting and overturning it on the steep bank of the road in front of us ; the second gun had the spokes of a wheel blown out by one of the very first of the German shells, the third was disabled by a direct hit with a shell which killed the detachment ;

Capt. C. FOSS,
2nd Bn. Bedford Regt.
(Neuve Chapelle).

Lce.-Corp. W. FULLER,
1st Bn. Grenadier Guards
(Neuve Chapelle).

the fourth was left standing, though the wheels got knocked about and several holes were made in the limber, and all the horses were shot down. The fifth gun was brought into action, but was silenced by the detachment being killed, and the sixth gun, our own, remained the whole time, though the side of the limber was blown away, the wheels were severely damaged, holes were blown in the shield, and the buffer was badly peppered by shrapnel bullets. The gun was a wreck. . . .

"As soon as we got Number Six gun into action I jumped into the seat and began firing, but so awful was the concussion of our own explosions and the bursting German shells that I could not bear it for long. I kept it up for about twenty minutes, then my nose and ears were bleeding because of the concussion and I could not fire any more, so I left the seat and got a change by fetching ammunition. . . .

Corp. C. GARFORTH,
15th Hussars
(Harmignies).

Sec.-Lieut B. GEARY,
1st East Surrey
("Hill 60").

"When I felt a little better I began to help Driver Osborne to fetch ammunition from the wagons. I had just managed to get back to the gun with an armful of ammunition, when a lyddite shell exploded behind me, threw me to the ground, and partly stunned me. I was on the ground for what seemed to be about five minutes and thought I was gone; but when I came round I got up and found that I was uninjured. On looking round, however, I saw that Captain Bradbury, who had played a splendid part in getting the guns into action, had been knocked down by the same shell that floored me. I had been thrown on my face, Captain Bradbury had been knocked down backwards, and he was about two yards away from me. When I came to my senses I went up to him and saw that he was mortally wounded.

Pte. S. GODLEY,
4th Royal Fusiliers
(Mons).

Capt. F. O. GRENFELL,
9th Lancers
(Near Andregnies).

He expired a few minutes afterwards. Though the captain knew that death was very near, he thought of his men to the last, and repeatedly begged to be carried away, so that they should not be upset by seeing him or hearing the cries which he could not restrain. Two of the men who were wounded, and were lying in the shelter of a neighbouring haystack, crawled up and managed to take the captain back with them; but he died almost as soon as the haystack was reached. . . ."

Such was the end of the heroic Bradbury, and such was the fight of "L" Battery in the morning mist on the last day of the Great Retreat.

The tenth Victoria Cross was announced on November 19, 1914. It was awarded to Lieutenant John Henry Stephen Dimmer, 2nd Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps. He served his machine gun during the attack, on November 12, at Klein Zillebeke until he had been shot five times—three times by shrapnel and twice by bullets—and he continued at his post until his gun was destroyed. In a letter to his mother the modest soldier said that at about one o'clock they were suddenly attacked by the Prussian Guards, who shelled them un-

Sec.-Lieut. R. HALLOWES,
4th Bn. Middlesex Regt.

[Lafayette.

Capt. P. HANSEN,
6th Lincolnshire
(Gallipoli).

BATTERY-SERGEANT-MAJOR DORRELL AND SERGEANT DAVID NELSON, "L" BATTERY, ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY,
Who were awarded Victoria Crosses and Commissions for remaining alone to the last gun of the "L" Battery at Nery, September 1, 1914.

mercifully and poured in a perfect hail of bullets at a range of about a hundred yards. Dimmer got his guns going, but the Germans smashed one up almost immediately and then turned all their attention on the gun he was with and smashed that, too; but before they did so he had been twice wounded, and was finally knocked out with the gun. "My face is spattered with pieces of my gun and pieces of shell," he added, "and I have a bullet in my face and four small holes in my right shoulder. It made rather a nasty mess of me at first, but now that I am washed and my wounds dressed I look quite all right."

The next Cross to be gazetted—on November 23, 1914—was given to a reformatory lad—Lance-Corporal William Fuller, 2nd Battalion the Welsh Regiment—for conspicuous gallantry on September 14 near Chivy, on the Aisne, by advancing about 100 yards to pick up Captain Mark Haggard, who was mortally wounded, and carrying him back to cover under very heavy rifle and machine-gun fire. As a private, Fuller had been mentioned in Sir John French's dispatches.

One of Fuller's comrades, Private C. Derry, gave some details of Captain Haggard's end which showed how hard the fight was in which he lost his life. The affair began on a Sunday, a day on which so many momentous battles took place in the earlier period of the war. The Germans were in overwhelming force, yet the "Old Contemptibles" were checking them and holding them in hand. Four officers of the battalion were lost in twenty minutes and men had fallen in proportion. Still the shattered remnant held to its task, fortified by news which had been passed along the battlefield of glorious successes. Monday came and the 2nd Welsh got nearer to their goal behind a hill crest. They struggled on, they got within a score of yards of the crest; then they were ordered to lie down and Haggard's figure was seen standing in outline on the ridge. He saw the Germans and shouted "Fix bayonets, boys! Here they are!" The order was obeyed. "My brother Ernest and myself," said Derry, "stood up to have a fair peep, but we got it; he in the left arm and thigh, and I straight through the knee-joint. . . . About three o'clock in the afternoon, just as our artillery had got up ready to cover us, the Germans found our range with artillery, and down came the 'coal-boxes.' Just near me was lying our brave captain, mortally wounded. As the shells burst over us he would occasionally open his eyes and call out, 'Stick it, Welsh! Stick it!'. . . Captain Haggard died that evening." Subsequently, in a letter to *The Times*, the fallen officer's uncle, Sir H. Rider Haggard, supplemented Derry's account with some details which had been collected from Lieut. Somerset, who lay wounded by him when he died. It seemed that after the order was given to fix bayonets Haggard headed his company in a charge upon the German Maxims. He and his soldier servant overran the other men. Haggard had seized a rifle, and with this he shot and killed three of the Germans who were serving the first Maxim that was reached; then, with the butt of the empty weapon, he was seen "fighting and laying out" the Germans, "laughing" as he did so, until he fell mortally wounded in the body, and was carried away by his servant. Well might Sir Rider Haggard, while deploring the loss of a beloved nephew, add as a thought of consolation to those who had suffered the same bereavement, "that of a truth these do not vainly die."

On that "most critical day of all," August 26, at Le Cateau, the day of the "glorious stand of the British troops"—both quotations are from Sir John French's dispatch of September 7—when the enemy in overwhelming force was keeping up the pursuit, many acts of valour and devotion were performed by the British troops of all arms. The artillery, although "outmatched by at least four to one," fought magnificently and caused havoc in the German ranks. In those first days of the war, when the German legions were hurled against the British with prodigal disregard of life, repeated and savage assaults were made upon the British batteries, and so determined and well maintained were some of these that German infantry actually succeeded in getting to within a hundred yards of our batteries, amongst them the 37th Battery Royal Field Artillery. In dense formation the Germans swept in clouds towards the guns of the 37th, and it seemed as if the weapons would fall into the hands of the assailants and remain with them as trophies. It was clear that if the guns were to be saved some unexpected means would have to be discovered to get them away. Captain Douglas Reynolds and volunteers rushed up with two teams and, in spite of the withering German fire and the enemy's desperate efforts to frustrate them, limbered up two guns and managed to save one of them. It was an uncommonly

Bomb. E. HARLOCK,
113th Battery,
(Near Festubert).

Pte. Samuel HARVEY,
1st Bn. York and Lancs.
(" Big Willie " Trench).

Sergt. J. HOGAN,
2nd Bn. Manchester Regt.
(Near Festubert).

Lce.-Corp. F. W. HOLMES,
2nd Yorkshire L.I.
(Le Cateau).

hazardous achievement, and it was all the more difficult of execution because our men were utterly worn out by prolonged fighting and fatigue, and the outstanding merit of it was recognized by the bestowal of the Cross upon Reynolds, who was afterwards severely wounded, and two members of the battery, Driver Job Henry Charles Drain and Driver Frederick Luke—three in all, the same as the number of Crosses awarded to " L " Battery. The official record of this gallant event was contained in just over a score words : " At Le Cateau, on August 26, as volunteers, helping to save guns under fire from hostile infantry who were one hundred yards away." Not a few of the official details at this period were inadequate and did but poor justice to the nature of the acts for which the Victoria Cross was given. Subsequently there was a very marked improvement in this respect.

On that memorable day two more Crosses were given for valour at Le Cateau, one to Major Charles Allix Lavington Yate, the other to Lance-Corporal Frederick William Holmes, both of the 2nd Battalion The King's Own (Yorkshire Light Infantry). The major and the corporal were fine examples of the members of the old Regular regiments. Holmes had served seven years with the Colours, had been drafted to the Reserve, and a fortnight later was recalled for active service. His achievement was one of several which at that time deeply impressed the public mind, and he was much honoured in his native parish of Bermondsey. And, indeed, there was just cause for all this recognition, for Holmes, under a very heavy fire, had carried a wounded man out of the trenches for a long distance, and after doing that he had helped to drive a gun out of action by taking the place of a driver who had been wounded. For another act of courage and resource he had been awarded, by France, the high honour of the Médaille Militaire.

Major Yate's exploit was of the highest order of chivalry and courage. Holmes, in describing in detail his own doings at Le Cateau, said of the major that he joined the battalion and took command of B Company just before they went out to the war. At Le Cateau he was in the trenches, not very far from Holmes. On going into action he had 220 men, but so terrible was the fire which was directed upon them and some artillery in their rear that he lost all his men except nineteen. Yate was surrounded ; all the other officers were either killed

Pte. C. HULL,
21st Lancers.

Sec.-Lieut. H. JAMES,
4th Bn. Worcestershire Regt.
(Gallipoli).

Lce.-Corp. C. JARVIS,
57th Field Coy. R.E.
(Jemappes).

Sec.-Lieut. F. JOHNSON,
73rd Field Coy. R.E.
(" Hill 70 ").

or wounded, and the ammunition was exhausted. Yet no thought of surrender affected the gallant officer—only on the day before he had declared that if it came to the pinch and they were surrounded he would not surrender, and in the hour of trial he was true to his word. Regardless of the hopeless odds against him, he determined at whatever cost to guard the honour of his regiment. Relying on the valour and devotion of the remnant of Regulars who were left to him, he rallied his little handful of survivors, nineteen in all of them, and, as a forlorn hope, hurled himself at their head in a charge against the foe. It was a noble enterprise; it merited the crown of victory; but the odds were hopeless, and when the rush was over and the fierce, short fight was done, only three members of the brave B Company could be formed up. All the rest had perished or were wounded or had been taken prisoners—though few captives were made that day at Le Cateau. The major was one of them. He had been severely wounded in the charge and had fallen into the hands of the Germans. He was made a prisoner of war and as such he died in a foreign land and in the midst of foes. To the honour of his memory, fittingly enough, there was paid the tribute of the Cross. He was a great favourite with his men, "An absolute gentleman," said Corporal Holmes. "He was always in front, and his constant cry was 'Follow me!'"

Another man who at this period won the Cross was George Wilson, an Edinburgh newsboy who, up to within two days of the declaration of war was selling papers in the city. He had been a soldier, and when the call to arms came he rejoined the Army. As a private in the 2nd Battalion The Highland Light Infantry, Wilson won the Cross on September 14, 1914, near Verneuil, for one of those acts which seem to be peculiarly characteristic of the British soldier and appear almost incredible of accomplishment. Accompanied by only one man, Wilson attacked a hostile machine gun. It was a desperate enterprise, for the odds against the pair were overwhelming. By all the rules of chance the two reckless fellows should have been swept out of existence; in fact, Wilson's comrade was speedily shot down and killed. Undaunted, Wilson went on alone; he made his way up to the very firing-line of the Germans and there he, single-handed, shot an officer and half a dozen men who were working the gun. Not content with that, he captured the weapon and turned it on the Germans, and, finding a soldier of the King's Royal Rifles who was badly wounded, he picked him up and brought him into safety. Subsequently, having been "gassed" and wounded at Loos, and having received his discharge, Wilson resumed selling newspapers in the High Street, Edinburgh.

The achievement of Lance-Corporal O'Leary seized the public imagination in an extraordinary manner. It was at Cuinchy, on February 1, 1915, that O'Leary, when forming one of the

Pte. W. KENEALLY,
1st Bn. Lancs. Fus.
(Gallipoli).

Pte. T. KENNY,
13th Bn. Durham L.I.
(Near La Houssoie).

Lce.-Corp. L. KEYWORTH,
24th Bn. London Regt.
(Givenchy).

Sec.-Lieut. J. LEACH,
2nd Bn. Manchester Regt.
(Near Festubert).

[Lafayette

Capt. A. MARTIN-LEAKE,
R.A.M.C.
(Zonnebeke).

Driver F. LUKE,
37th Battery, R.F.A.
(Le Cateau).

THE HEROIC DEATH OF CAPTAIN MARK HAGGARD, WHO WAS BROUGHT BACK, MORTALLY WOUNDED, BY LANCE-CORPORAL WILLIAM FULLER.

Captain Haggard, of the 2nd Welsh Regiment, who, at the time of his fall at the Battle of the Aisne, September 14, 1914, called to Fuller: "I'm done, get back!" Fuller obeyed, but subsequently returned and carried him back to the lines, an act for which he was awarded the V.C.

storming party which advanced against the enemy's barricades, rushed to the front and himself killed five Germans who were holding the first barricade. Having done this, he attacked a second barricade about 60 yards farther on, and this he took, after killing three of the enemy and making prisoners of two more. O'Leary thus practically captured the enemy's position by himself and prevented the rest of the attacking party from being fired upon—so that he had killed eight Germans, taken two prisoners and, single-handed, made an important capture of territory. The intrepid Irishman was promptly promoted sergeant, and on coming home on leave he was made the hero of a great demonstration in Hyde Park on Saturday, July 10, 1915. Soon afterwards he was promoted lieutenant and went to Ireland on a recruiting mission, having visited his native village of Inchigeela, County Cork. During that Irish tour a remarkable incident occurred which caused a question to be asked in the House of Commons on December 6, 1915. Mr. Ginnell inquired why the magistrates at Ballaghaderrin had cancelled permission for the Irish Volunteers to drill. Mr. Birrell, who was at that time the Irish Secretary, answered: "The magistrates acted on their own initiative and on account of the Irish Volunteers hooting a very distinguished Irish soldier, Lieutenant Michael O'Leary, V.C., on the occasion of a recent recruiting visit to Ballaghaderrin." The incident was deplorable, and the conduct of some of his own countrymen contrasted most unfavourably with that of the enthusiastic and admiring crowd which welcomed O'Leary, then a sergeant, as he drove into Hyde Park in a carriage.

The first Territorial to receive the Cross was 2nd Lieutenant Geoffrey Harold Woolley, 9th Battalion, The London Regiment, T.F., for his conduct on "Hill 60" during the night of April 20–21, 1915. Though he was the only officer on the hill at the time, with very few men, he successfully resisted all attacks on his trench, and continued his bomb-throwing and encouraging his men until he was relieved. His courage and endurance were severely tested by a continuous and heavy shell and machine-gun fire and bombing.

Another Territorial, Corporal Alfred Alexander Burt, 1st Battalion, The Hertfordshire Regiment, T.F., was next awarded the Cross for his bravery at Cuinchy on September 27, 1915. An attack was to be made and Burt's company had lined the front trench preparatory to its delivery when a large *minenwerfer* bomb dropped in the trench. It would have been easy for Burt to shelter behind a traverse, but he instantly rushed forward, put his foot on the fuse, wrenched it out of the bomb, and threw it over the parapet. In this way he made the bomb harmless and saved the lives of others in the traverse.

Territorials, indeed, greatly distinguished themselves. Sec. Lieut. A. V. Smith, 1/5 East Lancashire Regiment, T.F., was throwing a grenade when it slipped from his hand and fell to the bottom of the trench, close to several of our officers and men. He shouted a warning and jumped to safety; but, knowing that the grenade was due to explode and seeing that his comrades could not escape, he instantly returned and flung himself upon it. As he did so the grenade exploded and the brave young subaltern was killed instantaneously. In Gallipoli, on August 7–9, 1915, there was the wonderful exhibition of endurance of Lieut. W. T. Forshaw, another Territorial, 1/9 Battalion, Manchester Regiment. For forty-one hours continuously he threw bombs; he shot three Turks with his revolver; he was gassed by bomb fumes, bruised by shrapnel, and could scarcely lift his arm because of his exertions; but he never wavered, and by his heroic example maintained a hold upon the important corner called "The Vineyard."

The first Yeoman to be awarded the Victoria Cross was Private Frederick William Owen Potts, of the Berkshire Yeomanry. He won the honour by an act which had no parallel, and which stood out prominently even in the many remarkable deeds for which the Cross was given. The trooper had gone out to Egypt with his regiment, and from that country had proceeded to Gallipoli, where he took part in the operations near Suvla Bay. On August 21, 1915, an attack was made on a very strongly fortified Turkish position, a sector stretching from Hill 70 to Hill 112. Potts was advancing on that terrible day on Hill 70. The heat was intense, the country was uncommonly difficult, largely sand and scrub, the scrub being so parched that it took fire in many places from the sun and from shell fire, and in crossing the blazing patches men were wounded and were burned to death. The Yeomanry were ascending Hill 70 in short spurts, making occasional halts. After sheltering in a little gulley the order was given to charge, and Potts rushed

Pte. J. LYNN,
2nd Lancs. Fus. (Near Ypres).

Lieut. E. McNAIR,
9th Royal Sussex.

forward with his comrades; but he had not gone more than about a score yards when he was shot down, a bullet having entered the left thigh. At this time Potts was about a quarter of a mile from the top of the hill. He was fortunate enough to be lying in a little thicket formed of the scrub, and this gave him some sort of shelter and hid him from view. Not long after he fell there crawled towards him a fellow-townsman who was badly wounded. Potts recognized him. "Is that you, Andrews?" he said. The feeble answer was, "Yes," "I'm jolly pleased you've come," said Potts; and Andrews, having dragged himself as close as he could get—he had been shot through the groin—they lay perfectly still for some minutes, fully expecting that the Turks would find and kill them. Very soon a third trooper who had been wounded made his way to the thicket, and with great difficulty room was found for him. Andrews moved his position so that the newcomer could be accommodated, and he had scarcely done that when a bullet mortally wounded the stranger. He cried piteously for water, but there was not a drop to be had, and the three wounded troopers endured the agonies of thirst throughout an afternoon of intense heat. Bitter cold came with the night and increased the sufferings of the men. A full moon made the night as clear as day, and every time a movement was made in the thicket the Turks fired. A bullet grazed Potts' left ear as he lay flat on the ground, with his face buried in the dust. The wounded stranger survived the dreadful night; then death came to him as a merciful release, for to the end he murmured, "Water! Water!"

Throughout the whole of the next day the two survivors lay hidden in the burning scrub, not daring to move, tortured by thirst, suffering acutely from their wounds, and trying, unsuccessfully, to get relief by sucking bits of stalks which they managed to pick from the shrubs. Again night came, and as the only hope of salvation was to get away they began to crawl off,

Lieut. G. MALING,
R.A.M.C.
(Near Fauquissart).

Pte. W. MARINER,
2nd Bn. K.R.R.C.
(Cambrin).

Potts leading and Andrews following. They lay perfectly flat, and literally wriggled. From six at night—when darkness fell—till three in the morning they dragged themselves, weak and wounded, dust-choked, a distance of about three hundred yards—as Potts calculated afterwards, thirty-three yards an hour. A bit of burnt scrub near at hand afforded slight

Lieut. C. MARTIN,
56th Field Coy. R.E.
(Spanbroek Molen).

Corp. S. MEEKOSHA,
West Yorks.
(Yser).

Rev. E. NOEL MELLISH,
Chaplain to the Forces.

Sec.-Lieut. G. D. MOOR,
3rd Bn. Hampshire Regt.
(Dardanelles).

protection; this was taken, and the troopers tried to sleep, but the extreme cold made rest impossible. When daylight came, some water was obtainable, but only by crawling to men who had fallen and whose bottles could be reached. This dreadful day passed, Potts doing his best to stanch his comrade's bleeding wounds, and the third night on the hill came. The two men tried once more to get away and reach the British lines. Potts attempted to carry Andrews; but he was too weak and the effort failed. Then, when hope itself seemed to be abandoned, an amazing inspiration came, and it was suggested by an ordinary entrenching shovel, one of many which were lying on the hill. Potts wriggled to the shovel, managed to support Andrews on it, stood up, and dragged desperately—all the more so because as soon as he rose the Turks opened fire. Famished and exhausted, he could not do more than pull his burden over the rough ground for about six yards; then he collapsed. Andrews, too, had suffered severely under the strain; but as soon as it was dark Potts resumed his forlorn hope. He had his comrade on the shovel, lying flat; he supported him as best he could, and Andrews held grimly on to his rescuer's wrists. For more than three hours, in the bright moonlight, down the scrub-infested stony, dusty hillside, Private Potts dragged his helpless burden on the shovel; then came a sentry's challenge, "Halt!" Inexpressibly joyful was the sound of the British voice to the two poor worn-out Yeomen; grimly humorous the sentry's question, "What are you doing? Are you burying the dead?" No, it was not that. "I've got a chap here wounded," Private Potts explained. "And I've dragged him down the hill on a shovel. Can you give me a hand?" Give a hand! Many a willing hand was given that night, by Inniskilling Fusiliers, at the foot of that fatal hill which had been the scene of so much tragedy, yet relieved by the wondrous act of heroism and resource which gave the Cross to the twenty-two-year-old trooper of the Berkshire Yeomanry.

Lieut. P. NEAME,
R.E.
(Neuve Chapelle).

Sergt. D. NELSON,
"L" Battery, R.H.A.
(Nery).

The right of selection which is authorized by the Victoria Cross Warrants was exercised in connexion with the performance of many officers and men of the 1st Battalion The Lancashire Fusiliers on April 25, 1915. Three companies and the headquarters, while landing at Gallipoli, to the west of Cape Helles, were met by a very deadly fire from hidden machine-guns which caused a great number of casualties. The survivors rushed up and cut the wire entanglements, in spite of a terrific fire from the enemy, and, after "supreme difficulties," the cliffs were gained and the position maintained. This was one of the cases in which many men perform many acts of valour, when, indeed, all participants deserve the decoration of the Cross. Not all, however, could have the distinction awarded to them, and accordingly it was left to the survivors to select the recipients, and their choice fell on a

Pte. G. PEACHMENT,
2nd Bn. K.R.R.C.
(Hulluch).

Pte. F. POTTS,
1st B rks Yeomanry
(Gallipoli).

Act.-Sergt. J. RAYNES,
"A" Battery R.F.A.
(Fosse 7 de Bethune).

Capt. A. READ,
1st Bn. Northamptonshire Regt.
(Near Hulluch).

CAPTAIN FRANCIS O. GRENFELL, 9th (QUEEN'S ROYAL) LANCERS.

Awarded the V.C. for gallantry in action against unbroken Infantry at Andregnies, Belgium, on August 24, 1914, and for gallant conduct in assisting to save the guns of the 119th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, near Doubon, the same day.

gallant trio composed of Captain Richard Raymond Willis, Sergeant Alfred Richards and Private William Keneally, all of the 1st Battalion of the fine old 20th Regiment of Foot.

Corporal James Upton, a native of Nottingham, became known as the "Bantam V.C." Returning to his native city after he had been awarded the Cross, he addressed a meeting in support of recruiting, and humorously took his hearers into his confidence. "When I enlisted," he said, "I was 5 feet 2½ inches. Don't I look bad? Don't I look ill?" Upton belonged to the 1st Battalion The Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment), and distinguished himself on May 9, 1915, near Rouges Bancs. He spent the whole of that day under constant artillery and rifle fire in rescuing the wounded, and in doing so he went close to the enemy's parapet. When he was not actually carrying the wounded he was bandaging and dressing serious cases in front of our parapet, exposed to the enemy's fire, and one wounded man was killed by a shell while Upton was carrying him.

A singularly touching act was performed by the King in conferring the Cross on one of the recipients—Lance-Sergeant Oliver Brooks, 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards. Brooks won his decoration on October 8, 1915, by a courageous bombing act near Loos. A strong party of the enemy had succeeded with the help of grenades and bombs in securing a lodgment in about 200 yards of our trenches. Brooks fearlessly led a party of bombers to the attack, under a constant and heavy fusillade, and regained the lost ground. The undertaking was one of extreme peril, and the complete success of the operation was very greatly due to the sergeant's resourcefulness and bravery.

His Majesty, who had been visiting the front, had suffered his regrettable accident through the strange horse he was riding rearing and falling upon him, and he was on his journey home. It was while in the hospital train, "on the other side," that the King, though lying helpless in bed, resolved personally to invest Brooks with the Cross. The official details stated that "The new V.C. was conducted to the hospital train at ——, and was taken to the side of the bed upon which his Majesty was lying. He knelt on the floor of the saloon and bent over the prostrate monarch. Even so his Majesty found that he had overrated his strength, and could not manage to get the pin through the thick khaki. Assistance had to be given before the operation could be completed."

For the first time an actor was to perform an act of heroism which was rewarded with the Cross. This was Temporary Lieutenant Wilbur Dartnell, by birth an Australian, who had served in the South African campaign and had become well known as an actor. On September 3, 1915, during a mounted infantry engagement near Maktau, East Africa, the enemy made a determined attack upon our men and succeeded in getting so close—within a few yards—to them that it was impossible to get the more severely wounded away. Dartnell had been wounded in the leg, and he was being carried away, and could have secured his own safety if he had allowed himself to be removed; but, realizing the peril of the helpless wounded, owing to the fact that the enemy's black troops murdered any they found, he insisted on being left behind, in the hope of being able to save their lives. It was in making this noble and unselfish effort that he gave his own life, and his noble sacrifice was recognized by the posthumous award of the Victoria Cross.

Jacka's glorious deed and its recognition were a matter of the deepest pride to all Australians, one of whom, Mr. John Wren, sent him £500 and a gold medal which he had offered to give to the first Australian recipient. Lance-Corporal Albert Jacka, 14th Battalion, Australian Imperial Force, showed extraordinary bravery on the night of May 19–20, 1915,—at Courtney's Post, Gallipoli. It was there, while holding a portion of the trench with only four men, three of whom were killed or wounded, that seven Turks rushed into and occupied the trench. Jacka, single-handed, instantly attacked them and killed the whole party. There was a break before Australia was again to get the honour, then a batch of no fewer than eight Crosses went to Australians, and New Zealand got its first Cross. An exceptional feature of these awards was that seven were given for the magnificent stand which was made at Lone Pine trenches, in the Gallipoli Peninsula, on August 9, 1915. On that terrible night, when so many glorious acts were done which were put on lasting record, when many men stood out even amongst the number who had done so well, there were still examples of courage

Bandsman T. RENDLE,
1st Bn. Duke of Cornwall's L.I.
(Wulverghem).

Capt. D. REYNOLDS,
37th Battery R.F.A.
(Le Cateau).

Sergt. A. RICHARDS,
1st Bn. Lancs Fus.
(Gallipoli).

Pte. J. RIVERS,
1st Bn. Sherwood Foresters
(Neuve Chapelle).

which seemed almost unbelievable. Two Australians—an officer and a corporal—gave their lives to duty. Captain Alfred John Shout, 1st Battalion Australian Imperial Force, with a very small party, charged down some trenches which were strongly occupied by the enemy, and personally threw four bombs amongst them, killing eight of his opponents and routing the rest. On that same day, in the afternoon, from the position which had been gained in the morning, he resumed his bombing with so much success that he added to his gains another length of trench. He was all the time in furious conflict with the enemy, at close range. Finally, he was terribly wounded, losing his left eye and his right hand, injuries from which he died.

Companion to that truly valiant conduct was the bravery of Corporal Alexander Stewart Burton, 7th Battalion Australian Imperial Force, in conjunction with Lieutenant Frederick Harold Tubb and Corporal William Dunstan, of the same battalion. These three, each of whom won the Cross, were holding, with a few men, a newly captured trench on the centre of which the enemy made a determined counter-attack. The attackers forced their way up to a sap and blew in a sandbag barricade, of which only a foot was left standing. Tubb and the two corporals did the seemingly impossible—they drove the enemy away and rebuilt the barricade. But the assailant was resolute, and supported by strong bombing parties he returned and twice again blew in the barricade; yet each time the enemy was repulsed and the barricade was rebuilt. In doing this Tubb was wounded in the head and arm, and the gallant Burton, while building up the parapet, was killed by one of the bombs which were hailing upon the defenders.

A fourth Cross went to the honour of the 7th for the stand at Lone Pine, this recipient being Lieutenant William John Symons. Early in the morning on the 9th the enemy made a succession of attacks on an isolated sap, part of which was lost, after six officers in succession had been killed or severely wounded; then Symons led a charge, shot two Turks with his revolver and retook the sap. He was forced, however, to withdraw a little, as the three sides of the sap were being fired on by the enemy, and going fifteen yards he got some overhead cover, where he built up a sand barricade. The Turks managed to set fire to the fascines and woodwork of the head cover, but Symons put out the flames, rebuilt the barricade and at last compelled the enemy to discontinue his attacks.

Three Crosses were won by the 1st Battalion—Captain Shout's fellow-heroes being Private John Hamilton and Private Leonard Keyzor, both of whom, utterly regardless of personal safety, performed prodigies of valour in bomb-throwing. Hamilton recklessly exposed himself on the parados; Keyzor not only hurled his own bombs, but he also snatched up two live bombs which had fallen and hurled them back at the Turks, and he held on although he was wounded. That was on the 7th; on the 8th, at the same place, he bombed the enemy out of a position and was again wounded. He refused to go to hospital, and actually volunteered to throw bombs for another company which had lost its bomb-throwers.

The exploit of the New Zealander—Corporal Cyril Royston Guyton Bassett, New Zealand Divisional Signal Company—took place on August 7 on the Chanuk Bair ridge, Gallipoli. In full daylight, under constant heavy fire, after the New Zealand Infantry Brigade had established itself on the ridge, Bassett succeeded in laying a telephone line from the old position to a new one on the ridge. That, however, was but

one of his many cool and courageous acts in connexion with telephone work and the repair of lines by day and night in circumstances of great peril.

Second Lieutenant Hugo Vivian Hope Throssell, 10th Light Horse Regiment, Australian Imperial Force, won the Cross by his courage and endurance in holding to his post when severely wounded in Gallipoli on August 29–30, 1915. Even when his wounds had been dressed he returned to his place in the firing-line, and only left it when the medical officer ordered him out of action.

Gallipoli gave three more Crosses for the middle months of 1915, one to Captain Gerald Robert O'Sullivan, 1st Battalion The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, who, on the night of July 1–2, hurled bombs from a parapet, completely exposed to the enemy's fire, and set an inspiriting and splendid example to his men until he was wounded; another to Second-Lieutenant Herbert James, 4th Battalion The Worcestershire Regiment, who also showed the most resolute courage as a bomb-thrower, under a murderous fire, and after nearly all his companions had been killed or wounded, remained alone at the head of a trench and single-handed kept back the enemy until a barrier had been built behind him and the trench secured. He distinguished himself twice in the southern zone—on June 28 and July 3. Then on the night of July 1–2, also in the southern zone, Sergeant James Somers, 1st Battalion The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, won the Cross for his great gallantry and coolness as a bomber. Before enlisting Somers, a light, wiry young man of twenty-two, full of good spirits, was a footman in Ireland. It was told of him that he had put 50 Turks out of action with his bombs, and that opposite his trench 30 Turks were found shot.

At the time of its performance there was told* the story of the winning of the Cross by Sepoy Khudadad, the first member of the Indian contingent to be awarded the honour. This was early in the war—October 31, 1914, at Hollebeke, Belgium. This brave private belonged to the 129th Duke of Connaught's Own Baluchis.

A rifleman of the 3rd (Queen Alexandra's Own) Gurkha Rifles, Kulbir Thapa, was awarded the Cross for an act which showed how strong was the tie which bound the Indian warriors to their British brethren and how hopelessly astray the Germans had gone in supposing that loyalty was lacking in the King-Emperor's native forces. Operations were in progress on September 25, 1915, against the German trenches south of Mauquissart. The rifleman was himself wounded when he found a badly wounded British soldier behind the first-line German trench. The Briton urged the Indian to save himself, but the rifleman resolutely refused and remained all day and night with the man who was in worse case than he. In the early morning, mercifully favoured by misty weather, he brought the soldier through the enemy's wire entanglements and putting him in a comparatively safe place returned to the danger zone and rescued two wounded Gurkhas, one after the other. Not satisfied with this, Kulbir Thapa went back—it was now broad daylight—and brought in the British comrade whom he had so well protected through the weary night. For most of the way he carried him, and for most of the time he was under the Germans' fire.

A jemadar at Ypres was next to win the Cross. This was Jemadar Mir Dast, I.O.M., 55th Coke's Rifles (Frontier Force), who, on April 26, 1915, showed uncommon bravery and ability in leading his platoon in an attack. Afterwards, when no British officers were left, he collected various parties of the regiment and kept them under his command until an order for retirement came. Later in the day the jemadar performed the remarkably courageous acts of helping to carry, under very heavy fire, no fewer than eight British and Indian officers into safety.

Great distinction was to be the fortune of the 39th Garhwal Rifles, for two of its members were to win the Cross in France, one, Naik Darwan

[Lafayette.

Lieut. G. ROUPELL,
1st Bn. East Surrey Regt.
(" Hill 60 ").

Act.-Corp. Issy SMITH,
1st Bn. Manchester Regt.
(Near Ypres).

* Vol. II, Chap. XLII.

LANCE-CORPORAL MICHAEL O'LEARY, 1st BATTALION IRISH GUARDS.

Awarded the V.C. for bravery at Cuinchy, February 1, 1915. He formed one of the storming party which advanced against the enemy's barricades. O'Leary rushed to the front and himself killed five Germans who were holding the first barricade, after which he attacked and captured a second barricade after killing three of the enemy and making prisoners of two more.



SECOND-LIEUTENANT JAMES LEACH AND SERGEANT JOHN HOGAN,

Recapture a trench from the enemy near Festubert, October 29, 1914. After their trench had been taken by the Germans, Second-Lieutenant Leach and Sergeant Hogan of the 2nd Battalion Manchester Regiment, worked from traverse to traverse at close quarters, and gradually succeeded in regaining possession, killing eight of the enemy, wounding two, and taking sixteen prisoners. Both the officer and the sergeant were awarded the Victoria Cross.

Pte. J. SMITH,
3rd Bn. Border Regt.
(Rouges Bancs).

Sec.-Lieut. A. V. SMITH,
1/5th Bn. E. Lancs Regt.

Lce.-Corp. J. TOMBS,
1st Bn. Liverpool Regt.
(Rue du Bois).

Sec.-Lieut. A. TURNER,
1st Bn. Royal Berkshire Regt.
(near Vermelles).

Sing Negi, of the 1st Battalion, near Festubert, on the night of November 23–24, 1914, and the other, Rifleman Gobar Sing Negi, 2nd Battalion, on March 10, 1915, at Neuve Chapelle. The corporal, though wounded in two places in the head and also in the arm, was one of the first to push round each successive traverse when the regiment was retaking and clearing the enemy out of our trenches, and this he did in spite of a severe fire, at the closest range, from bombs and rifles. At Neuve Chapelle, during our attack on the German position, the rifleman was one of a bayonet party with bombs which entered their main trench, and he was the first man to go round each traverse, driving back the enemy until they were forced to surrender. The gallant rifleman was killed in this furious encounter.

Other noble acts were to be put to the account of Europeans of the Indian Army, but the doers of them were not to live to learn how highly they had been honoured. There was Major George Godfrey Massy Wheeler, 7th (Hariana) Lancers, who was killed while leading his squadron to the attack of the "North Mound" at Shaiba, Mesopotamia, on April 13, 1915. "He was seen far ahead of his men riding single-handed straight for the enemy's standards"—one of the finest sentences ever written in the official records of the Cross. Only on the previous day Wheeler had asked to be allowed to lead his squadron in an effort to capture a flag which was the centre-point of an enemy group who were firing on one of our picquets. With the lance he swept upon the opposing infantry, and having done considerable execution amongst them he retired, while the foes swarmed out of hidden ground; but only to form a splendid target for our own horse-gunners. Another Indian Army officer — Lieutenant Frank Alexander de Pass, 34th Prince Albert Victor's Own Poona Horse—lost his life in an affair which won for him the Cross. It was at Festubert, on November 24, 1914, and de Pass was entering a German sap and destroying a traverse in face of the enemy's bombs. The lieutenant crowned this very gallant deed by rescuing a wounded man who was lying in the open under a pitiless fire. It was a noble day's work; but de Pass did not survive to see it recognized, for next day he was killed in making a second attempt to take the sap, which had been reoccupied by the Germans.

On May 13, 1916, the award was announced of a Cross to Lance-Naik Lala, 41st Dogras, Indian Army, and in the following June another Cross for Sepoy Chatta Singh, 9th Bhopal Infantry, Indian Army, was gazetted. The lance-naik heard cries for help from his adjutant, who was severely wounded. In the face of what seemed certain death he insisted on going to the adjutant, and when not allowed to crawl back with him stayed until dusk, having stripped off his own clothing to keep the officer warm. He then returned to shelter, but after dark went back with a stretcher and the adjutant was brought in. The sepoy also left cover to assist his wounded and helpless commanding officer. He bound up the officer's wound, and dug cover for him. For five hours he remained with the officer, "shielding him with his own body on the exposed side." Then, under cover of darkness, he too sought help and brought the officer into safety

The amazing exploits for which the Victoria Cross had been given to members of all ranks

of the Army seemed impossible of eclipse, yet it might almost be said that members of the Navy occasionally excelled their brethren of the sister service. There were on record many instances of the display of sheer valour, the courage for which the Cross had been so often given in the days of the Crimea and the Mutiny, when warfare had but few complications and simple personal bravery ranked high; but the terrible devices of the war which had come into being at sea demanded for the accomplishment of many naval duties the very highest courage and endurance. It was especially with regard to submarine work that these qualities were demanded, and they were promptly furnished. They were shown in connexion with the first naval V.C. to be gazetted, and that was to Lieutenant Norman Douglas Holbrook, R.N., for taking his submarine, B 11, on December 13, 1914, up the Dardanelles; and, in spite of the very difficult current, diving his vessel under five rows of mines and torpedoing the Turkish battleship Messudiyeh, which was guarding the minefield. Holbrook not only did this, but he also brought the submarine safely back, despite gun-fire and torpedo boats and a submersion of nine hours.* There was a notable sequel to the affair on July 24, 1916, when, in the Prize Court, before Sir Samuel Evans, President, there was a motion on behalf of Holbrook and the ship's company of B 11 for a declaration that they were entitled to prize bounty for the destruction of the Messudiyeh; that at the time there were 700 persons on board, and that the prize bounty at the rate of £5 a head amounted to £3,500. Holbrook himself was called, and said he received information that a Turkish battleship was in Dardan Bay, and was being used as the headquarters in the Dardanelles of the German Naval Staff. He understood that there was a minefield from Kephez Bay to Kephez Point, consisting of five rows of mines extending the width of the channel. He applied to the senior submarine officer, and obtained permission to make an attempt to get through and under the minefield, and on December 13 he went up the Dardanelles in charge of the B 11, dived under the lines of mines, and about noon sighted the Messudiyeh at anchor off Chanak. At about 800 yards a torpedo was fired at her, and after it had been heard to explode, the submarine put up her periscope and the battleship was seen to be sinking by the stern, her quarter-deck being awash. It was afterwards reported by officers of the Royal Flying Corps that the Messudiyeh was sunk. When the lieutenant had told his modest tale, unique in a British court of law, the President observed, "All I can say to you is that you showed splendid courage." In declaring that the complement of the battleship at the time of her destruction was 700, and the amount of prize bounty payable was £3,500, the President remarked, "Nobody can say that I am wrong, and I hope I am right."

Another remarkable submarine feat was gazetted late in June, 1915. The winner of the V.C. this time was Lieutenant-Commander Martin Eric Nasmith, R.N., who, while reconnoitring in the Sea of Marmora and in the presence of great danger, destroyed a large Turkish gunboat, two transports, an ammunition ship and three store ships, in addition to driving one ship ashore. When he had safely passed the most difficult part of his homeward journey, he returned to torpedo a Turkish transport.

Though Holbrook's was the first of the naval Crosses to be gazetted, yet two weeks earlier

* See Vol. III., Chapter LIII.

Capt. J. VALLENTIN,
1st. Bn. South Staffs
(Zillebeke).

Pte. A. VICKERS.
2nd Bn. Royal Warwicks
(Hulluch).

Sec.-Lieut. C. VICKERS,
Sherwood Foresters
(Hohenzollern Redoubt).

Capt. G. WALFORD,
Royal Artillery
(Seddul Bahr).

a deed had been performed by Commander H. P. Ritchie, R.N., which gained for him the same distinction. This officer's exploit consisted of raiding the harbour of Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of German East Africa, in three small boats and sinking all the German vessels that were in it. This task of search and demolition was one of great hazard, in view of the stubbornness of the enemy's defence, and Ritchie was severely wounded. He endured until he became unconscious, and by that time he had been wounded no fewer than eight times, the interval between his first and last severe wound being about twenty minutes.

Holbrook's feat was paralleled at the same period by the performance of Lieutenant-Commander Edward Courtney Boyle, R.N., when in command of Submarine E14. Boyle dived his vessel under the enemy's minefields and entered the Sea of Marmora, on April 27, 1915. Here again there were not only the ordinary risks of submarining to encounter, but also the perils of strong and treacherous currents, and the constant danger of attack from hostile patrols; yet Boyle successfully met them all, and his operations in the narrow waters of the Straits ended in the sinking of two Turkish gunboats and one large military transport.

The disappointments and losses which had characterised the operations at the Dardanelles had been softened by these triumphs of junior submarine officers; further satisfaction was to be afforded in connexion with the famous landing from the River Clyde at V Beach, in the Gallipoli Peninsula, on April 25, 1915.* Here was one of the rare cases that claimed a cluster of crosses, and three were given, one to Commander Edward Unwin, R.N., one to Midshipman George L. Drewry, Royal Naval Reserve, and one to Midshipman Wilfred St. A. Malleson, R.N. The commander was in the River Clyde, and seeing that the lighters which were to form the bridge to the shore had broken adrift he left the transport. At that time a very dangerous fire was being directed upon the vessel, but Unwin paid no heed to it. He worked on, resolutely attempting to get the lighters into position, and managed by sheer force of will to keep going until he could go no longer, because cold and immersion mastered him so much that he was forced to return to the ship, where he was wrapped in blankets. He was suffering and exhausted, the doctor forbade him to return to his task—yet he went, and he finished it. But in carrying out his resolution he was wounded by three bullets and had to return to the doctor for attention. Again he left the ship, this time in a lifeboat, so that he could save some wounded men who were lying helpless in shallow water near the beach. The commander continued this heroic task under constant fire, and stopped at last only through sheer physical exhaustion. It was a noble display of heroism, and was well supported by his subordinates of every rank. Conspicuous by their conduct were Drewry and Malleson, the former helping the commander to secure the lighters, under the deadly rifle and Maxim fire, although he was wounded in the head. Twice afterwards he tried, but in vain, to swim with a line from lighter to lighter. Where Drewry failed through complete exhaustion Malleson succeeded. He took the line, and swam with it to the lighter that it was wished to reach. This line subsequently broke, and Malleson made two more attempts, without success, to carry out the task which he had imposed on himself. Drewry, who was in his teens, had served with the P. and O. Company, and was the first officer of the R.N.R. to win the Victoria Cross.

At the time his honour was gazetted there was announced the first award of the distinction to a seaman of the Royal Naval Reserve—George McKenzie Samson, who "worked on a lighter all day under fire, attending wounded and getting out lines; he was eventually dangerously wounded by Maxim fire." With Samson was bracketed Able Seaman William Charles Williams, who "held on to a line in the water for over an hour under heavy fire, until killed" —brief but impressive record of a gallant sailor's death. At this time also the Cross was given to Lieutenant-Commander Eric Gascoigne Robinson, R.N., for a very fine achievement ashore. On February 26, 1915, he advanced alone, under heavy fire, into an enemy's gun position, and having destroyed a four-inch gun he returned to his party for another charge, with which the second gun was destroyed. The officer would not let the members of his demolition party go with him, on the ground that their white uniforms would make them conspicuous. He took part in four attacks on the minefields, each time under heavy fire.

That landing from the River Clyde was to give the Cross to the first member of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve to win it. This was Sub-Lieutenant Arthur Waldene St. Clair

* Described in Vol. V., Chapter XCIV.

PIPER DANIEL LAIDLAW,
7th Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers, at Loos, September 25, 1915.

Tisdall. More than a year elapsed between the performance of his special act and the announcement of the bestowal of the Cross for it, the delay being caused by the fact that Tisdall and the platoon under his orders were on detached service at the time and that he was killed in action on May 6, eleven days after his gallant conduct in connexion with the landing from the River Clyde. In that wonderful enterprise there were many unexpected situations, many

calls for help from men in peril, and amongst the most ready to respond was Tisdall. Hearing wounded men on the beach calling for help he jumped into the water, and pushing a boat in front of him began the task of rescue. Unable single-handed to carry out his purpose he sought help and took with him on two of his trips Leading Seaman Malia and on other trips Chief Petty Officer Perring and Leading Seamen Curtiss and Parkinson. Tisdall altogether made four or five trips between the transport and the shore, all the time under a heavy and accurate fire, and in this way he rescued several wounded men. Of the brave little band who helped him Curtiss was a few weeks afterwards reported missing.

An officer who had already proved his mettle and had received the D.S.O. was to be added to the roll of naval V.C.'s by the performance of one of those acts which seem to be peculiarly associated with the British fighting man. This was Lieutenant-Commander Edgar Christopher Cookson, R.N. During the advance on Kut-el-Amara, on September 28, 1915, the river gunboat Comet and other gunboats had been ordered to examine and if possible destroy three vessels forming an obstruction which the Turks had placed across the river. From both banks of the river, as the gunboats neared the obstacle, a very heavy fire was opened on them from machine-guns and rifles. There was in the centre of the obstruction a dhow and an attempt was made to sink it by gunfire. This effort failed, and Cookson ordered the Comet to be placed alongside. This dangerous and difficult task having been accomplished, he sprang on to the dhow and with an axe tried to cut the wire hawsers which connected it with the other two craft. In doing this Cookson inevitably made himself an outstanding figure, and he had no sooner jumped on to the dhow and set to work than he was shot in several places. Within a few minutes he was dead.

NAIK DARWAN SING NEGI, GARHWAL RIFLES, AT FESTUBERT.

Awarded the V C. for great gallantry on the night of November 23-24, 1914, when his regiment was engaged in retaking and clearing the enemy out of the British trenches, and although wounded in two places in the head, and also in the arm, Naik Darwan Sing Negi was one of the first to push round each successive traverse, in the face of severe fire from bombs and rifles at the closest range.

Such were the deeds for which, during the first two years of war, twelve Victoria Crosses were announced for naval officers and men, though there were actually won in that period three more in the Battle of Jutland Bank—by Commander the Hon. E. B. S. Bingham, Major F. J. W. Harvey, R.M.L.I., and Boy John Travers Cornwell.*

"If there be degrees of chivalry the highest award should be accorded to the medical profession," wrote Lord Northcliffe in dealing, in *The Times*, in October, 1916, with the war doctors' work under fire. . . . "For the last three months in the Royal Army Medical

* Vol. IX., Chapter CXL.

Corps *alone*, I account them, according to the figures published in *The Times* from day to day:

Officers:	
Killed	53
Wounded	208
Missing	4
N.C.O.'s and men (R.A.M.C. only):	
Killed	260
Wounded	1,212
Missing	3 "

Those figures, clear and impressive, showed at a glance what the R.A.M.C. was doing, and they were representative of the work of that wonderful band during the first two years of war. First amongst these exploits stood forth the case of Lieutenant Arthur Martin-Leake, R.A.M.C., for to him was given the exceptional award of a clasp to the Victoria Cross which he already possessed, granted to him for great devotion to duty and self-sacrifice in the South African War. During the strenuous and anxious days of the latter part of 1914, in the Ypres region, Lieutenant Martin-Leake rescued "a large number of wounded," the rescues being "especially during the period October 29 to November 8, 1914, near Zonnebeke," while exposed to constant fire. Lieutenant Martin-Leake's bar was announced at the same time as O'Leary's Cross, and these two awards, representing acts which were in some ways of opposite characteristics, profoundly moved, and filled with pride, the British public.

It was in the neighbourhood of Ypres, too, on the afternoon of April 25, 1915, that an officer of the Canadian Army Medical Service won the Cross by precisely the same conduct as that which had distinguished Leake. This was Captain Francis Alexander Caron Scrimger, 14th Battalion Royal Montreal Regiment, who was in charge of an advanced dressing station in some farm buildings which were

Pte. E. WARNER,
1st Bn. Bedfordshire Regt.
(near " Hill 60 ").

Sec.-Lieut. S. C. WOODROFFE,
8th Bn. Rifle Brigade
(Hooge).

being heavily shelled. Scrimger not only directed the removal of the wounded, despite the deadly fire, but he himself took up a severely wounded officer who was lying helpless in a stable and bore him off in search of a safer place. The effort was too much for him; he could no longer carry his heavy burden, yet he refused to leave his charge and insisted on remaining until help could be obtained. That noble act was but part of the most courageous conduct which Scrimger had displayed continuously, day and night, in attending to the wounded during the heavy fighting between April 22 and 25.

Captain Scrimger's act was fit companion to the deeds which gave the Cross to three other fighters from Canada—Colour-Sergeant William Frederick Hall, 8th Canadian Battalion; Lance-Corporal Frederick Fisher, 13th Canadian Battalion; and Lieutenant F. W. Campbell, 1st Canadian Battalion. Hall was another of those noble heroes whose lives have been given in trying to save others. While in battle in the neighbourhood of Ypres, on April 24, 1915, he made a resolute attempt to reach a wounded man who was crying for help. His first effort failed

Sec.-Lieut. G. WOOLLEY,
9th Bn. London Regt.
(" Hill 60 ").

Lce.-Corp. G. H. WYATT,
3rd Bn. Coldstream Guards
(Landrecies).

[*Elliott & Fry.*
Maj. C. YATE,
2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry
(Le Cateau).

Pte. W. YOUNG,
8th East Lancs



LANCE-CORPORAL CHARLES ALFRED JARVIS, 57th FIELD COMPANY, ROYAL ENGINEERS,
who received the V.C. for great gallantry on August 23, 1914, at Jemappes, in working for 1½ hours under heavy fire in full view of the enemy, and in successfully firing charges for the demolition of a bridge.

and a non-commissioned officer and private who were helping the wounded man were themselves wounded; then Hall again rushed forward under a deadly fire and was actually lifting up the wounded man, to take him to shelter, when he was mortally wounded in the head. Fisher, too, gave his life, on April 23, 1915, near St. Julien, for he was killed while showing the utmost courage and resource in getting his machine gun into action. Campbell distinguished himself at Givenchy on June 15, 1915, also as a machine gunner. In his case, as in that of Fisher, heavy losses had been suffered by the detachment and the situation was one of great peril. Campbell survived that danger and won the Cross by his heroism, but later he was wounded and died.

It almost seemed as if the unflinching courage and fortitude of men like Leake and Scrimger had become a tradition amongst the "war doctors," for another hero arose in Temporary Lieutenant George Allan Maling, M.B., of the R.A.M.C. It was during the heavy fighting near Fauquissart, on September 25, 1915, that Maling worked hard and incessantly, under the unceasing shell fire which characterised the operations in that region at the time. He began his task at 6.15 in the morning, collecting and treating more than 300 men in the open and exposed to merciless fire. Throughout the whole of that day, during the evening, all through the night, without a break till eight o'clock next morning —twenty-six unbroken hours—reckless of shell and bullet, he held as grimly to his task as Grenville did off the Azores in his fight with the one and the fifty-three; and the simile holds good, for as Grenville fought on though wounded, so this temporary lieutenant in the ranks of the "war doctors" went about his duty of succouring and saving when it seemed impossible that human strength could endure. Eleven o'clock came, then a large high explosive shell burst and did dreadful havoc. It killed several of his patients, it wounded his only assistant, and it flung Maling down and temporarily stunned him. Yet no sooner had the shock and horror of the shell-burst passed than Maling pulled himself together and resumed his work. How long he would have kept it up no man can tell, but it happened that very soon a second shell came and exploded, covering both Maling and his instruments with *débris*; yet, even so, he had not finished, for, says the official record, "his high courage and zeal never failed him, and he continued his gallant work single-handed."

The Indian Medical Service, in the person of Captain John Alexander Sinton, M.B., claimed a Cross to add to its already honourable record. This recipient was decorated "for most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty. Although shot through both arms and through the side, he refused to go to the hospital, and remained, as long as daylight lasted, attending to his duties under very heavy fire. In three previous actions Captain Sinton displayed the utmost bravery."

It was inevitable that some time should pass from the beginning of the war until the Allied airmen should be masters of the new conditions of their warfare. There were many serious defects to remedy, numerous deficiencies to make good; but British airmen lost no time in showing their daring and resourcefulness. The first Cross to be given for an air-bombing enterprise was won by Second Lieutenant William Barnard Rhodes-Moorhouse, Special Reserve, Royal Flying Corps, for a splendid and successful flight to Courtrai. On April 26, 1915, he started on a bombing expedition. Having dropped bombs on the lines near Courtrai railway station he began his return journey, and in the course of it was mortally wounded by the enemy's fire. Despite his injuries he managed to fly, at a very low altitude, to his destination, a distance of thirty-five miles. He was able to report the successful accomplishment of his journey, but he did not long survive his injuries. In recognition of his courageous achievement he was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.

Second on the airmen's roll of honour was Flight Sub-Lieutenant R. A. J. Warneford, Royal Naval Air Service, who not only performed an act of extraordinary courage but also demonstrated the helplessness and vulnerability of the Zeppelin when in conflict with aeroplanes. Warneford had been trained in the merchant service and had proved to be a flyer of uncommon merit. On June 7, 1915, at dawn, he and two more aviators started on an expedition the object of which was to bomb Zeppelin sheds which had been located at Evere, near Brussels. That raid was successfully accomplished; but Warneford was not satisfied. He longed to do more, to carry out an object which was dear to his heart, and that was to meet and destroy an enemy airship. Fortune favoured him and justified the caution he had shown in

reserving bombs for his huge prey. Soon after daybreak, sweeping the sky, he saw a Zeppelin at a height of some six thousand feet. The airship was travelling rapidly and was about halfway between Brussels and the old city of Ghent. Instantly Warneford put his purpose into execution, and with amazing skill and utter fearlessness he got his machine, a Morane monoplane, almost over the enemy craft. Then he descended about fifteen yards and flung six bombs. The sixth missile struck the vast bulk in the middle and there was a terrible explosion. "The displacement of the air around me," to use Warneford's own words, "was so great that a tornado seemed to have been produced. My machine was tossed upward, and then flung absolutely upside down. I was forced to loop the loop in spite of myself." By a wonderful stroke of luck the machine was righted and Warneford, whom trouble forced to descend, landed safely in enemy country. He was able, however, to restart his engine within fifteen minutes and ascended safely and made off towards his base, which he reached. Meanwhile, the Zeppelin, wrecked, was falling in a flaming mass to earth, watched by transfixed but exulting Belgians. Unfortunately it crashed on to a nunnery in Ghent and the building took fire, and loss of life was caused amongst the nuns and children who were in the nunnery. The crew were destroyed with their airship, and in their work of salvage the Germans had evidence of the completeness with which one of their most cherished beliefs had been shattered. The annihilation of machine and men by one British aviator, single-handed and unsupported, was the sinister forerunner of similar disasters over the London area itself.

A wave of pride and joy swept through the Empire on hearing of the airman's splendid achievement, and there was universal satisfaction when it was known that the King had telegraphed his congratulations to Warneford and announced that he had conferred upon him the honour of the Victoria Cross. He was also awarded, on the recommendation of General Joffre, the Cross of the Legion of Honour. Warneford's well-won glory was short-lived—in ten days he was dead, having met his fate in a shocking accident. On June 17, while flying with Mr. Henry Needham, an American writer, at Buc Aerodrome, Paris, he and his passenger were killed. Warneford had been ordered to fly back to Dunkirk, where he was to resume duty. He had risen to about 700 feet when the machine, after wobbling violently, overturned and threw out the two men, both of whom were killed instantly. The story was told that on the day before his death Warneford had been given a bunch of roses in a restaurant, and someone said to him, "What rejoicings there will be when you return to London and see your mother again!" To this the young officer answered sadly, "I feel that I shall die before I return home." When he fell he was wearing his Cross of the Legion of Honour; and this was found embedded in his chest. The body was brought home and was buried at Brompton Cemetery, the mourners including Mrs. Corkery, his mother, to whom, on October 5, 1915, the King wrote saying that it was to him a matter of sincere regret that the death of the officer had deprived him of the "pride of personally conferring upon him the Victoria Cross, the greatest of all naval distinctions."

The achievements of the airmen had been consistently wonderful; yet there came to light a performance which must doubtless stand for all time by itself—the astounding feat of Squadron-Commander Richard Bell Davies, D.S.O., R.N., and Flight Sub-Lieutenant Gilbert Formby Smylie, R.N., who, on November 19, 1915, carried out an air attack on Ferrijik Junction. Smylie's machine was received by very heavy fire and brought down. The pilot planed down over the station and from a very low altitude simultaneously released all his bombs except one, which failed to drop. Having done this he continued his descent into the marsh. With astonishing presence of mind, on alighting he set fire to his machine, having seen the unexploded bomb, and knowing that it would surely destroy the aeroplane; then he went towards Turkish territory. At this moment he saw Davies descending, and again showed the most astonishing courage and resourcefulness, for fearing that the squadron-commander would come down near the burning machine and so risk death from the exploding bomb, Smylie rushed back and from a short distance exploded the bomb with a pistol bullet. The act was sufficiently astounding as it stood; but the drama was not complete. Descending at a safe distance from the burning machine the squadron-commander took up the sub-lieutenant in the very presence of a party of the enemy, and soared away with him in safety to the aerodrome—an unrivalled feat and one which

the most imaginative novelist would scarcely have dared to invent. To Davies, who already had the D.S.O., the Victoria Cross was granted, and to his brave companion in the marvellous adventure there was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

Another Cross for a truly splendid flying performance was given to Captain John Aidan Liddell, 3rd Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and R.F.C. He was severely wounded on July 31, 1915, when on a flying reconnaissance over Ostend-Bruges-Ghent. His right thigh was broken, causing momentary unconsciousness, but in spite of that he managed to recover partial control of his machine after it had dropped nearly 3,000 feet. Though continually fired at and in a state of collapse yet he succeeded in completing his course and brought his machine into our lines, half an hour after he had received his terrible wound. The control-wheel and throttle-control were smashed, and one of the under-carriage struts ; and, said the official story, " It would seem incredible that he could have accomplished his task."

One more wonderful deed completes the list for which the Cross was given to airmen. The recipient was Second-Lieutenant Gilbert Stuart Martin Insall, No. 11 Squadron, Royal Flying Corps, for conspicuous bravery, skill, and determination in France on November 7, 1915. He was patrolling in a Vickers Fighting Machine, with First-Class Air-Mechanic T. H. Donald as gunner, when a German machine was seen and pursued and attacked near Achiet. The Vickers machine was led over a rocket battery by the German pilot, but Insall dived and got to close range and Donald stopped the German's engine by firing a drum of cartridges. Then the German pilot dived through a cloud ; but Insall would not let him escape and followed him. Again fire was opened and the enemy machine was brought down heavily in a ploughed field four miles south-east of Arras. Instantly the Germans scrambled out of their machine and prepared to fire ; but Insall was too quick for them and diving to 500 ft. he enabled Donald to fire heavily on them. At this the Germans fled, one, who was evidently wounded, being helped by the other. More Germans then began a heavy fire, but in spite of all Insall turned again and dropped an incendiary bomb on the enemy machine, which became wreathed in smoke. Then the lieutenant headed west, to get back over the German trenches ; but being only

Squad-Com. R. DAVIES, R.N.A.S. (Farrijik Junction).

Capt. L. HAWKER, R.F.C.

Sec.-Lieut. G. INSALL, R.F.C. (Near Achiet).

Capt. J. A. LIDDELL, R.F.C. (Ostend—Bruges—Ghent).

Sec.-Lieut. RHODES-MOOR-HOUSE. R.F.C. (Courtrai).

Sub-Lieut. R. WARNEFORD, R.N.A.S. (Ghent).

THE AIR SERVICES.

2,000 feet up he dived across the trenches for greater speed, Donald firing into them as the Vickers passed over. The petrol-tank, however, had been damaged by the German fire ; but Insall managed to land under cover of a wood 500 yards inside our lines. No fewer than 150 shells were fired at the machine while it was on the ground, but the Germans failed to cause material damage. Much damage, however, had been done by rifle-fire ; but this

SECOND-LIEUTENANT G. H. WOOLLEY, 9th (COUNTY OF LONDON) BATTALION, THE LONDON REGIMENT (TERRITORIAL FORCE)

Awarded the V.C. for bravery on "Hill 60" during the night of April 20-21, 1915. Although he was the only officer on the hill at the time, and with very few men, he resisted all attacks on his trench, and continued throwing bombs and encouraged his men till relieved. His trench during all this time was being heavily shelled and bombed, and was subjected to heavy machine-gun fire by the enemy.

was made good during the night, behind screened lights, and at dawn Insall triumphantly flew his well-named Fighting Machine home, with Donald as a passenger.

Musicians shared the honour of the Cross with the men of the actual fighting line. Standing forth amongst them was Piper Daniel Laidlaw, 7th Battalion the King's Own Scottish Borderers, who repeated the performance of Piper Findlater, V.C., at Dargai—and both unconsciously were copyists of the Highland piper who in earlier days had rallied his kilted comrades to the tune of "Up, an' waur them a', Willy." Laidlaw, on September 25, 1915, when an attack was about to begin on German trenches near Loos and Hill 70, and during the worst of the bombardment, saw that his company was somewhat shaken from the effects of gas. He sprang upon the parapet, and marching up and down, played his company out of the trench to the rousing skirl of "Blue Bonnets over the Border" and "The Standard on the Braes of Mar." The effect of the wild music was instant and electrical—the company swept on to the assault and the piper continued playing until he was wounded. The pipes, which were smashed in the fight, were repaired and silver mounted.

The Cross was conferred on Drummer Spencer John Bent, 1st Battalion the East Lancashire Regiment, who, on the night of November 1–2, 1914, near Le Gheer, did an extraordinary thing, peculiarly so for a lad in his teens. His officer, platoon sergeant, and section commander had been struck down, and the situation was one which might well have dumfounded a soldier of much more than the drummer lad's experience; but Bent saw his chance, and he took it — he coolly assumed command and by his remarkable presence of mind held the position. It was for this rare display of courage and resourcefulness that he was awarded the Cross, although on several occasions he had distinguished himself by bringing up ammunition under heavy fire and rescuing wounded men who were lying exposed in the open. Then came the case of Bandsman Thomas Edward Rendle, 1st Battalion The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, to whom the Cross was given for attending wounded under fire at Wulverghem on November 20, 1914. Rendle's act, which was performed under very heavy shell and rifle fire, was rescuing men from the trenches in which they had been buried by the blowing in of the parapets by the enemy's heavy howitzers.

The Church had sent lavishly of her sons to take their part in the terrific conflict, and repeatedly they proved that their spirit was the equal of any combatant's. There was the quiet heroism of burying the dead under heavy fire, comforting the dying in situations of the utmost danger, and of performing many acts which were not expected from the members of a peaceful calling. The second year of war was to bring to prominence a modest curate who had shown a courage worthy of any recipient of the Cross. This was the Rev. Edward Noel Mellish, temporary chaplain to the forces. His heroic work of rescuing wounded under fire has been described in Vol. VIII., Chapter CXXXII.

It was impossible to read, without emotion and the deepest pride, the official records of the many deeds which meant the saving of life for which the Cross was given. There were many instances of the simple display of wonderful devotion, apart from originality or resourcefulness. Take the case of Private William Young, 8th (Service) Battalion East Lancashire Regiment. He was in his trench, but on seeing that his sergeant had been wounded he left it, under very heavy fire, to attend to him. The sergeant requested him to get under cover; Young refused, and almost immediately both his jaws were shattered by a shot. Young had set his mind upon a rescue, and horribly wounded though he was he carried out his purpose, with another soldier's help. Then, unaided, he staggered to the dressing-station—and it was found that he had been also wounded by a rifle bullet in the chest. The Cross was given to him, nor could it have been withheld from such a valiant fighting man.

Contemporaneously with the gazetting of Young's honour was the awarding of the Cross to Private Henry Kenny, 1st Battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, for going out six times during one day, always under deadly fire of gun, machine-gun, and rifle, and each time securing a wounded man who lay helpless in the open, and carrying him to safety—being himself shot in the neck whilst handing the last man over the parapet.

Amongst the gunners was Acting-Sergeant John C. Raynes, R.F.A., whose battery, at Fosse 7 de Bethune, on October 11, 1915, was being heavily bombarded by armour-piercing and

Com. Hon. E. BINGHAM,
H.M.S. "Nestor"
(Jutland).

Lieut.-Com. E. BOYLE,
Submarine E14
(Dardanelles).

Lieut.-Com. COOKSON,
"Comet"
(Kut-el-Amara).

J. T. CORNWELL,
H.M.S. "Chester"
(Jutland).

Mid. G. DREWRY,
R.N.R.
(Dardanelles).

Lieut. N. HOLBROOK,
Submarine B11
(Dardanelles).

Maj. F. HARVEY,
R.M.L.I.
(Jutland).

Mid. W. St. A. MALLESON,
R.N.
(Dardanelles).

Lieut.-Com. M. NASMITH,
(Sea of Marmora).

Com. H. RITCHIE,
H.M.S. "Goliath"
(East Africa).

Lieut.-Com. Eric ROBINSON,
R.N.
(Dardanelles).

Seaman G. SAMSON,
R.N.R.
(Dardanelles).

Sub-Lieut. A. TISDALL,
R.N.V.R.
(Gallipoli).

Com. E. UNWIN,
"River Clyde"
(Dardanelles).

gas shells. When "Cease Fire" was ordered Raynes went out into a deadly area to rescue a wounded sergeant, who was forty yards away. He called on two gunners to help him. The gallant men obeyed—both were quickly killed; but Raynes got the sergeant to safety in a dug-out. Then a gas-shell burst at the mouth of the dug-out, and Raynes once more dashed across the fatal open, fetched his own smoke-helmet, put it on the rescued wounded sergeant, and then, though badly gassed himself, "staggered back to serve his gun." That is only part of the courageous conduct for which the acting-sergeant was awarded the Cross.

At Neuve Chapelle, on March 12, 1915, Lance-Corporal Wilfred D. Fuller, 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards, seeing a band of Germans trying to escape along a communication trench, ran towards them and killed the leader with a bomb, and such was the effect of his performance, single-handed and alone, that the rest of the enemy, a round half-hundred, gave themselves up to him. On that day, also at Neuve Chapelle, Private Edward Barber, of the same battalion, ran ahead of his grenade company and hurled bombs at the Germans with so much success that a "very great number of them" surrendered on the spot, and when the grenade party reached the grenadier they found him "quite alone and unsupported, with the enemy surrendering all about him."

Lance-Corporal G. H. Wyatt, 3rd Coldstream Guards, at Landrecies, on the night of August 25–26, 1914, saved a momentous situation by rushing to a spot only twenty-five yards away and putting out a dangerous fire which had been started by German incendiary bombs. Second-Lieutenant G. A. Boyd Rochfort, Scots Guards, saved the lives of many men when, at 2 a.m. on August 3, 1915, a German trench-mortar bomb came into the trenches between Cambrin and La Bassée. He shouted to warn his men, then rushed at the bomb, seized it, and hurled it over the parapet, where it instantly exploded. The exploit of Lance-Corporal W. R. Cotter, 6th Battalion East Kent Regiment, was a glorious one. He, though wounded in both arms, and with his right leg blown off at the knee, crawled unaided to a crater fifty yards away, steadied the men there, carried on for two hours, then, with wounds but roughly dressed, endured for fourteen hours longer, and despite his suffering and peril, "had a cheery word for all who passed him." Four wounded men, one of them severely wounded, were rescued by Lance-Corporal J. Tombs, 1st Battalion Liverpool Regiment, on June 16, 1915, near Rue du Bois. Tombs dragged the severely wounded soldier back by means of a rifle sling, which he placed round his own neck and the man's body.

Coy.-Sergt.-Maj. F. BARTER,
Attached 1st Bn. R.W.F.
(Festubert).

Corp. W. COSGROVE,
1st Bn. Roy. Munster Fus.
(Gallipoli).

Lce.-Corp. MICHAEL O'LEARY,
Irish Guards
(Cuinchy).

Pte. R. MORROW,
1st Bn. Royal Irish Fus.
(Near Messines).

Sergt. J. SOMERS,
1st Bn. Royal Innis. Fus.
(Gallipoli).

IRISH AND WELSH HEROES.

Captain P. H. Hansen, Adjutant of the 6th Battalion Lincolnshire Regiment at Yilghin Burnu, Gallipoli, on August 9, 1915, when some wounded had been left behind in the burning scrub, refused to leave them to a dreadful end, and made several rushes forward, over exposed ground which was swept by a terrific fire, and rescued six men from certain death by burning. The exploit of Captain C. C. Foss, D.S.O., 2nd Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment, was another remarkable one. At Neuve Chapelle on March 12, 1915, he rushed forward under heavy fire with eight men, attacking the enemy with bombs and capturing a most important position and fifty-two Germans who were occupying it. Private J. Lynn, 2nd Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers, on May 2, 1915, near Ypres, showed the most resolute courage in repelling German attacks with his machine-gun. The assaults were made under cover of asphyxiating gas, and Lynn died from the effects of the poison next day. At Festubert, on May 16, 1915, Company Sergeant-Major F. Babtie, 1st Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers, with eight volunteers, attacked a German position with bombs and captured three officers and 102 men, with 500 yards of trenches.

Then take the case of Captain A. F. G. Kilby, 2nd Battalion South Staffordshire Regiment, who attacked a strong enemy redoubt. His company charged along a narrow towpath and he was wounded, but he continued to lead his men up to the enemy. He was shot down and his foot was blown off; but his courage and determination never faltered, and even then he inspired his men and used a rifle. He was reported missing and his death was presumed. Again, there was the achievement of Second-Lieutenant James Leach and Sergeant John Hogan, 2nd Battalion Manchester Regiment, on October 29, 1914, near Festubert. They retook a trench from the Germans, of whom they killed eight, wounded two, and took sixteen prisoners. Private R. Tollerton, 1st Battalion Cameron Highlanders, at the Aisne, on September 14, 1914, carried a wounded officer to a place of greater safety. He was himself wounded in the head, but he struggled back to the firing-line and remained there until his battalion retired. Then he returned to the wounded officer and remained with him for three days, until they were both rescued. That noble spirit of devotion was shown also by the gallant Corporal A. G. Drake, 8th Battalion Rifle Brigade, who, on the night of November 23, 1915, near La Brique, France, went on patrol, one of a party of four, reconnoitring towards the German lines. When near the enemy a heavy fire was opened on them by rifles and a machine-gun, and the officer and a man were wounded. The man was carried back by the last remaining man; but the corporal remained with the officer. When last seen he was kneeling beside him, bandaging his wounds. Later, when a rescue party crawled towards the German lines, they found the officer alive but unconscious, and Drake's bullet-riddled body. "He had given his own life and saved his officer."

Such were the achievements of the men who won the Cross in those two years of unexampled warfare, near at hand and far afield, who fought on Flanders' sodden fields, on the pitiless North Sea, in the Mediterranean, in populous and cultivated lands, in the remote and lonely desert.

The following is a list of the recipients of the Victoria Cross whose awards were definitely announced during the first two years of war. Other Crosses were won in that period, but they were not gazetted until later. When death was officially announced it is indicated in parentheses. In a number of cases promotions followed the bestowal of the Cross and these are given:

ACTON, Pte. A., 2nd Bn. Border Regt.
ALEXANDER, Lieut.-Colonel E. W., R.F.A.
ANDERSON, Corpl. W., Yorkshire Regt.
ANGUS, Lce.-Corpl. W., 8th Bn. Highland L.I.

BABTIE, Coy.-Sergt.-Maj., 1st Bn. R.W. Fus.
BARBER, Pte. E., Grenadier Gds.
BARTER, 2nd Lieut. (temp. Lieut.) F., 3rd Bn. R.W. Fus.
BASSETT, Corpl. C. R. G., N.Z. Mil. Forces.
BELCHER, 2nd Lieut. (on prob.) D. W., 9th Bn. London Regt.
BENT, Drummer S. J., E. Lancs Regt.
BOYLE, Lieut.-Commander E. C., R.N.
BRADBURY, Capt. E. K., R.H.A. (killed).
BRODIE, Capt. W. L., Highland L.I.
BROOKE, Lieut. J. A. O., 2nd Bn. Gordon H. (killed).
BROOKS, Lce.-Sergt. O., 3rd Bn. Coldstream Gds.
BUCKINGHAM, Pte. W., Leicester Regt.
BURT, Corpl. A. A., Herts Regt. (T.F.).

Corp. C. BASSETT,
N.Z. Div. Signal Coy.
(Gallipoli).

Corp. A. BURTON,
7th Bn. Australian Imperial Force
(Gallipoli).

Pte. J. HAMILTON,
1st Bn. Australian Imperial Force
(Gallipoli).

Lce.-Corp. A. JACKA,
14th Australian Infantry,
(Gallipoli).

Pte. L. KEYZOR,
1st Bn. Australian Imperial Force
(Gallipoli).

Sepoy KHUDADAD,
1.9th Baluchis,
(Hollebeke).

Lce.-Naik LALA,
41st Dogras, Indian Army.

Lieut. F. de PASS,
Poona Horse
(Near Festubert).

Lieut. J. G. SMYTH,
Ludhiana Sikhs
(Richebourg L'Avoue).

[*Swaine.*

Capt. F. SCRIMGER,
Canadian A.M.S.
(Near Ypres).

Capt. J. SINTON,
Indian Medical Service.

Lieut. F. TUBB,
Australian Imperial Force
(Gallipoli).

Sec.-Lieut. H. THROSSELL,
Australian Imperial Force
(Gallipoli).

Maj. G. WHEELER,
7th (Hariana) Lancers
(Mesopotamia).

V.C. HEROES: THE INDIAN AND COLONIAL FORCES.

BURTON, Corpl. A. S., 7th Bn. Aus. Inf. F. (killed).

CAFFREY, Pte. J., York and Lanc Regt.
CAMPBELL, Lieut. F. W., 1st Canadian Bn. (died of wounds).
CHRISTIAN, Pte. H., R. Lancaster Regt.
COOKSON, Lieut.-Commander E. C., D.S.O., R.N. (killed).
COSGROVE, Corpl. W., R. Muns. Fus.
COTTER, Lce.-Corpl. (Acting Corpl.) W. R., 6th Bn. E. Kent Regt.

DANIELS, 2nd Lieut. H., M.C., Rifle Brig.
DARTNELL, Temp. Lieut. W., 25th (Service) Bn. (Frontiersmen), R. Fus.
DAVIES, Squad.-Commander R. B., D.S.O., R.N.
DAWSON, Temp. 2nd Lieut. J. L., R.E.
DEASE, Lieut. M. J., 4th Bn. R.F. (died of wounds).
DE PASS, Lieut. F. A., 34th Poona Horse (killed).
DIMMER, Capt. J. H. S., M.C., K.R.R.C.
DOBSON, Lce.-Corpl. F. W., Coldstream Gds.
DORRELL, Lieut. (temp. Capt.) G. T., R.F.A.
DOUGHTY-WYLIE, Lieut.-Colonel C. H. M., C.B., C.M.G., R.W. Fus., H.Q. Staff, Med. Ex. F. (killed).
DRAIN, Driver J. H. C., R.F.A.
DRAKE, Corpl. A. G., 8th Bn. R.B. (killed).
DREWRY, Midn. G. L., R.N.R.
DUNSIRE, Pte. R., 13th Bn. R. Scots.
DOUGLAS-HAMILTON, Lieut.-Colonel A. F., Res. of Off. Com. 6th Bn. Cam. H. (killed).
DUNSTAN, Corpl. W., Commonwealth Mil. F.
DWYER, Pte. E., E. Surrey Regt.

FINLAY, Lce.-Corpl. D., R. Highlanders.
FISHER, Lce.-Corpl. F., 13th Canadian Bn. (killed).
FLEMING-SANDES, Temp. 2nd Lieut. A. J. T., E. Surrey Regt.
FORSHAW, Lieut. W. T., 9th Bn. Manchester Regt. (T.F.)
FOSS, Bt.-Maj. C. C., D.S.O., Bedford Regt.
FULLER, Lce.-Corpl. W., Welsh Regt.
FULLER, Lce.-Corp. W. D., Grenadier Gds.

GARFORTH, Corpl. C. E., 15th Hussars.
GEARY, Lieut. B. H., 4th Bn. E. Surrey Regt.
GODLEY, Pte. S. F., R.F.
GRENFELL, Capt. F. O., 9th Lancers (killed).

HALL, Col.-Sergt. F. W., 8th Canadian Bn. (mortally wounded).
HALLOWES, Temp. 2nd Lieut. R. P., 4th Bn. Middlesex Regt. (mortally wounded).
HAMILTON, Pte. J., Commonwealth Mil. Forces.
HANSEN, Capt. P. H., M.C., Lincoln Regt.
HARLOCK, Sergt. E. G., R.F.A.
HARVEY, Pte. S., York and Lanc. Regt.
HAWKER, Lieut. (Temp. Maj.) L. G., D.S.O., R.E.
HOGAN, Sergt. J., Manchester Regt.
HOLBROOK, Lieut. N. D., R.N.
HOLMES, Lce.-Corpl. F. W., Yorkshire L.I.
HULL, Pte. (Shoeing-Smith) C., 21st Lancers.

INSALL, Lieut. G. S. M., R.F.C. Special Reserve.

JACKA, Lce.-Corpl. A., Commonwealth Mil. F.
JAMES, Lieut. H., Worcester Regt.
JARVIS, Lce.-Corpl. C. A., R.E.
JOHNSTON, Capt. W. H., R.E.
JOHNSON, Temp. Lieut. (temp. Capt.) F.H., R.E.

KENEALLY, Pte. W., 1st Bn. Lanc. Fus. (? d.).
KENNY, Pte. H., L.N. Lancs Regt.
KENNY, Pte. T., 13th (Service) Bn. Durham L.I.
KENNY, Drummer W., Gordon Highlanders.
KEYWORTH, Lce.-Corpl. L. J., 24th Bn. London Regt. (killed).
KEYZOR, Pte. L., Commonwealth Mil. F.
KHUDADAD, Sepoy, 129th Baluchis.
KILBY, Capt. A. F. G., 2nd Bn. S. Staffs Regt. (death presumed).

LAIDLAW, Piper D., 7th Bn. K.O.S. Borderers.
LALA, Lance-Naik, 41st Dogras, Ind. Army.
LEACH, Lieut. J., Manchester Regt.
LIDDELL, Capt. J. A., 3rd Bn. A. & S. High.
LUKE, Driver F., R.F.A.
LYNN, Pte. J., 2nd Bn. Lancs Fus. (died from gas poisoning).

MACKENZIE, Pte. J., 2nd Bn. Scots Gds. (killed).
MCNAIR, Temp. Lieut. E. A., 9th Bn. R. Sussex Regt.
MALING, Temp. Capt. G. A., M.B., R.A.M.C.
MALLESON, Midn. W. ST. A., R.N.
MARINER, Pte. W., K.R.R.C.
MARTIN, Lieut. C. G., D.S.O., R.E.
MARTIN-LEAKE, Surg.-Capt. A., F.R.C.S. Indian Vols. (temp. Maj., R.A.M.C.).
MAY, Pte. H., Scottish Rifles.
MEEKOSHA, Corpl. S., 6th Bn. W. Yorks Regt.
MELLISH, Rev. E. N., Temp. Chaplain to the Forces, 4th Class.
MIR DAST, Jemadar, 55th Coke's Rifles (Frontier Force).

Lce.-Corp. W. ANGUS,
8th Bn. H.L.I. (T.F.)
(Givenchy).

[Elliott & Fry.

Maj. A. DOUGLAS-HAMILTON.
6th Bn. Q.O. Cameron Hghdrs.
(" Hill 70 ").

Pte. R. DUNSIRE,
13th Bn. Royal Scots
(" Hill 70 ").

Lce.-Corp. D. FINLAY,
2nd Bn. Black Watch
(Rue du Bois).

Drummer W. KENNY,
2nd Bn. Gordon Hghdrs.
(near Ypres).

[Swaine.

Pte. H. MAY,
Scottish Rifles
(near La Boutillerie).

Pte. G. WILSON,
H.L.I.
(Verneuil).

Pte. J. MACKENZIE.
2nd Bn. Scots Guards
(Rouges Bancs).

Corp. James POLLOCK,
5th Bn. Q.O. Cameron Hghdrs.
(near Hohenzollern Redoubt).

Corp. J. RIPLEY,
1st Bn. Black Watch
(Rue du Bois).

[Swaine.

Pte. H. ROBSON,
2nd Bn. Royal Scots
(near Kemmel).

[Lafayette.

Sec.-Lieut. G. ROCHFORT,
Scots Guards
(Cambrin).

Pte. R. TOLLERTON,
1st Bn. Q.O. Cameron Hghdrs.
(Aisne).

MOOR, 2nd Lieut. G. R. D., Hampshire Regt.
MORROW, Pte. R., R. Irish Fus.

NASMITH, Lieut.-Commander M. E., R.N.
NEAME, Capt. P., D.S.O., R.E.
NELSON, Lieut. D., R.A.
NOBLE, Acting-Corpl. C. R., 2nd Bn. R.B. (died of wounds).
NEGI, Naik DARWAN SING, 1st Bn. 39th Garhwal Rifles.
NEGI, Rifleman GOBAR SING, 2nd Bn. 39th Garhwal Rifles (killed).

O'LEARY, 2nd Lieut. M., Connaught Rangers.
O'SULLIVAN, Capt. G. R., 1st R. Inn. Fus.

PEACHMENT, Pte. G., 2nd Bn. K.R.R.C. (mortally wounded).
POLLOCK, Temp. 2nd Lieut. (on prob.) J. D., 8th Bn. Cameron Highlanders.
POTTS, Pte. F. W. O., Berks Yeomanry.

RANKEN, Capt. H. S., R.A.M.C. (died of wounds).
RAYNES, Acting-Sergt. J. C., R.F.A.
READ, Capt. A. M., 1st Bn. Northants Regt. (mortally wounded).
RENDLE, Bandsman T. E., D. of Cornwall L.I.
REYNOLDS, Capt. D., R.F.A.
RICHARDS, Sergt. A., Lancs Fus.
RHODES-MOORHOUSE, 2nd Lieut. W. B., R.F.C.
RIPLEY, Corpl. J., R. Highlanders.
RITCHIE, Com. H. P., R.N.
RIVERS, Pte. J., 1st Bn. Sherwood For. (killed).
ROBINSON, Lieut.-Commander E. G., R.N.
ROBSON, Pte. H. H., R. Scots.
ROCHFORT, 2nd Lieut. G. A. B., 1st Bn. (Special Reserve) Scots Gds.
ROUPELL, Capt. G. R. P., E. Surrey Regt.

SAMSON, Seaman G. McK., R.N.R.
SAUNDERS, Sergt. A. F., 9th Bn. Suffolk Regt.
SCRIMGER, Capt. F. A. C., Cape Local Forces.
SHARPE, Acting-Corpl. C., Lincoln Regt.
SHOUT, Capt. A. J., 1st Bn. Aus. Imp. F. (died of wounds).
SINGH, Sepoy Chatta, 9th Bhopal Inf., Ind. Army.
SINTON, Capt. J. A., M.B., Indian Med. Serv.
SMITH, 2nd Lieut. A. V., 1/5th Bn. E. Lancs Regt. (T.F.) (killed).
SMITH, Acting-Corpl. I., Manchester Regt.
SMITH, Pte. J., 3rd Bn. Border Regt.
SMYLIE, Flight Sub-Lieut. G. F., R.N.
SMYTH, Lieut. J. G., 15th Sikhs.
SOMERS, Sergt. J., R. Inn. Fus.
SYMONS, Lieut. W. J., Commonwealth Mil. F.

THAPA, Rifleman KULBIR, 2nd Bn. 3rd Gurkha Rifles.
THROSSELL, 2nd Lieut. H. V. H., Commonwealth Mil. F.
TISDALL, Sub-Lieut. A. W. ST. C., R.N.V.R. (killed).
TOMBS, Lce.-Corpl. J., Liverpool Regt.
TOLLERTON, Pte. R., Cameron Highlanders.
TUBB, Lieut. F. H., Commonwealth Mil. F.
TURNER, 2nd Lieut. A. B., R. Berks Regt. (died of wounds).

UNWIN, Com. E., R.N.
UPTON, Corpl. J., Notts and Derby Regt.

VALLENTIN, Capt. J. F., 1st Bn. S. Staffs Regt. (killed).
VICKERS, Pte. A. R., Warwick Regt.
VICKERS, 2nd Lieut. (temp. Capt.) C. G., 7th Bn. Notts and Derby Regt.

WALFORD, Capt. G. N., R.A. (killed).
WARNER, Pte. E., 1st Bedford Regt. (died from gas poisoning).
WELLS, Sergt. H., 2nd Bn. R. Sussex Regt. (killed).
WARNEFORD, Flight Sub-Lieut. R. A. J., R.N.A.S.
WHEELER, Major G. G. M., 7th (Hariana) Lancers (killed).
WILLIAMS, Able-Seaman W. C. (killed).
WILLIS, Major R. R., Lancs Fus.
WILSON, Pte. G., Highland L.I.
WOODROFFE, 2nd Lieut. S. C., 8th Bn. R.B. (killed).
WOOLLEY, Lieut. (temp. Capt.) G. H., 9th Bn. London Regt. (T.F.)
WRIGHT, Capt. T., R.E. (mortally wounded).
WYATT, Lce.-Corpl. G. H., 3rd Bn. Coldstream Gds.

YATE, Major C. A. L., 2nd Bn. Yorkshire L.I. (severely wounded. Died as prisoner of war).
YOUNG, Pte. W., 8th Bn. E. Lancs Regt.

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CHAPTER CLIII.

THE NAVY'S WORK IN 1916.

DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE SECOND YEAR OF WAR—STRATEGY AND POLICY OF THE BELLIGERENTS—NAVAL CONSTRUCTION—LOSS OF THE KING EDWARD VII.—THE ARETHUSA—THE HAMPSHIRE—LORD KITCHENER'S DEATH AT SEA—SUBMARINE WARFARE—GERMAN USE OF TORPEDO CRAFT—MURDER OF CAPTAIN FRYATT—GERMAN RAIDS IN THE NORTH SEA—BRITISH AIR WORK—THE BLOCKADE—GERMAN SUBMARINE EXPLOITS—THE MEDITERRANEAN—GALLIPOLI AND SALONIKA—LOSS OF THE RUSSELL—BULGARIA—EGYPT AND SYRIA—THE ADRIATIC—THE BALTIC—THE RUSSIAN FLEET—THE OUTER OCEANS—THE DRESDEN—CAMPAIGNS AGAINST GERMAN COLONIES—THE ROYAL NAVY'S PART IN THE WAR.

THE duties imposed upon the Allied Fleets during the second year of the war were mainly of a defensive character. No aggressive enterprises of the kind for which Mr. Churchill indicated that vast preparations had been made were undertaken. Offensive operations, for the most part, were maintained by torpedo vessels and aircraft. During the same period, however, there was continuous manifestation of the influence of sea power and of the ubiquity of its exercise. The distinctive features of naval policy were compression and containment.

So far as compression was exerted, the strangle-hold of the commercial blockade was drawn tighter as restrictions which had been laid upon the Admiralty by Orders in Council were relaxed or withdrawn. The pressure of the Allied control upon oversea traffic, as it was made more stringently compelling, slowly diminished the enemy's power of endurance. It was not to be expected that naval compression alone would win the war, but, apart from the deprivation of material essential for military purposes, the troubles caused by a shortage of food supplies produced a distinctly oppressive effect on the economic life of the Central Powers.

Similarly, while the Austrian and German fleets were left at liberty to come out of their strongholds, they were strategically contained—that is to say, measures were taken to force them to fight at a disadvantage if they made the attempt. When the long-continued passivity of the High Sea Fleet was temporarily exchanged on May 31, 1916, for "an enterprise directed northward," Vice-Admiral Scheer's force was promptly brought to an engagement off the Jutland Bank in circumstances described in an earlier chapter.* On the second anniversary of the British declaration of war, the First Lord of the Admiralty said of this battle that it would be an error to suppose that it had changed the situation. What it did was to confirm it:

> Before Jutland, as after it, the German Fleet was imprisoned. The battle was an attempt to break the bars and burst the confining gates. It failed, and with its failure the High Sea Fleet sank again into impotence.

The essence of the naval strategy of the Central Powers may be described as erosion, or attrition—a wearing away of the naval and mercantile resources of the Allies by sallies and raids. Combined with this policy were exhibitions of "frightfulness," designed to influence public opinion and cause divided counsels. With mine and torpedo endeavours were made to reduce the preponderance of sea fighting strength possessed by the Allies, to whittle away

* Chapter CXL.



THE CAPTURED GERMAN SUBMARINE OF THE MINE-LAYING TYPE—"UC 5"
Alongside Temple Pier, July, 1916.

their commercial carrying power by the destruction of merchant shipping, and generally to deprive them of the advantages derived from maritime supremacy. The submarine campaign against cargo and passenger ships was extended to neutrals trading with Great Britain, in order to stir up bad feeling, to enhance the price of foodstuffs and other commodities, and to diminish the tonnage afloat in the interests of Germany after the war. All the movements of the German Navy may be traced to this policy of erosion by raid. If their seamen appeared to be more daring in the second year of war, it was because they hoped, by offering their ships as a bait, to entice the British Fleet into mined areas or over waters in which groups of submarines waited to torpedo them. An example of these tactics may be found in the action of August 19 in the North Sea. Other sporadic acts of aggression, such as the Yarmouth raid of April 25, might raise the hopes of the German people, but were not attempts to challenge the sea command, and had no effect upon the balance of naval strength. Moreover, the enemy torpedo craft, although they achieved some minor advantages by the exercise of the strategic element of surprise, were far from having a monopoly of success. The destroyers and submarines of the Allies also reaped the harvest of their energy, skill, and enterprise in full measure.

The submarine campaign directed against the Mercantile Marine had developments which were most marked during the later months of the year. Towards the end of 1915, the activities of the "U"-boats, foiled in home waters by the resourcefulness and ingenuity of the British seamen, had been transferred to the Mediterranean. In those waters, although the war vessels and transports supplied few victims, the cargo boats and passenger ships suffered considerably. Measures were taken, however, to cope with the new form of menace, and as a consequence by the summer it had been fairly met. The hostile submarines then in use had not a large radius of action, and were chiefly dependent upon local sources of supply of fuel for their enduring mobility. By the establishment of an effective control over the Greek ports and those on the coasts of Africa and Asia Minor, the submarines were deprived of their bases in the neighbouring waters, and their depredations were checked. As, too, the raider was harried himself, he was given little time for harrying others. Later on in the year the campaign assumed a more

intensive form. Submarines of a larger class, in greater numbers, were let loose to prey upon commerce. Neutrals as well as Allied ships suffered impartially. Merchant vessels were constantly attacked on sight and sunk without warning, showing how worthless were all the promises and pledges of the German Government. Outrages on the high seas were continued without regard to the promptings of law and humanity. A new antidote had to be found.

As a demonstration of the long range of the new boats and the disregard of the German Government to the protests of the President of the United States, a special dose of frightfulness was arranged to take place, and was carried out with dramatic effect, off the Nantucket lightship, in the track of vessels to and from New York. On October 8 Commander Hans Roze, in U 53 sank six Allied and neutral ships in the presence of American destroyers, explaining that his orders were to make an indiscriminate attack upon all vessels trading with British ports. Similar doses of German brutality were adminstered to Norway, Denmark, and Holland, with the object of exhibiting the ubiquity and ruthlessness of the "mailed fist" in enforcing the "freedom of the seas." The repressive measures taken in narrow waters at home, and those which had proved effective in the Eastern Mediterranean, did not have the same success in curbing the efforts of these new long-range submarines. It was conclusively shown, however, that they could be countered by merchantmen carrying guns, and vessels so armed in a number of engagements proved their ability to drive off and sometimes to account for their assailants. In this direction, and also by the





A STORE OF MINES WASHED ASHORE ON THE DUTCH COAST.
Smaller picture: Launching a German Mine.

2 1 3

ADMIRAL JELLICOE'S FAREWELL TO LORD KITCHENER, JUNE, 1916.

Lord Kitchener (3) and his staff about to start on the voyage to Russia. In the above illustration Admiral Jellicoe (1) is seen shaking hands with Mr. J. J. O'Beirne (2).

wider adoption of the system of convoy, relief was sought. The danger of this new attempt to enforce a submarine blockade upon Great Britain was not under-rated, and the actual losses would not have been so serious but for the fact that a very large number of ships were required for the service of the armies. Speaking at Glasgow in September, Mr. Balfour said that although we owned half the mercantile tonnage of the world, half of that half was earmarked either for military puposes by ourselves or by our Allies for what were practically military purposes. The President of the Board of Trade, speaking on October 17, in the House of Commons, said :

> We have actually lost by enemy action and by marine risks no less than 2,000,000 gross tons of shipping since the war began. That is more than the whole mercantile marine of France, or of Spain, or of Italy before the war. Is it possible to lose all that vast amount of shipping without its creating, along with all the Government requirements, a most serious shortage ? I suppose that comes to pretty nearly 3,000,000 tons dead weight. When you come to the Allied fleets, the same has happened there. Heavy losses by enemy action have penalised consumers in every part of the world.

In addition to the losses of British and Allied mercantile shipping, the neutrals also suffered considerably. Great Britain was affected in a far greater degree than other countries by the diminution of carrying tonnage, because more than half of her food supply had to be brought oversea. In these circumstances it was not surprising that *The Times* should state, in a leading article on November 11, 1916, that : "The submarine menace, which was 'well in hand' in August, 1915, is at least as serious at this moment as it was in the worst period of last year."

In all the theatres of naval war during the year under review there was a certain amount of desultory fighting and cross-raiding, principally executed by small craft. Bombardments of the enemy's coast ports, and local offensive operations for the support of military movements were also duties which fell to the Navy in its *rôle* of auxiliary weapon in conjunction with the land forces. This most useful and arduous work was carried out both by ships and by aircraft, and, although these enterprises were not productive of decisive results, their importance from the point of view of the Allied commanders should not be underestimated. The situation in the southern portion of the North Sea, where the Germans had made Zeebrugge a protected base for submarines and destroyers, was typical of that which obtained both in the higher Adriatic and in parts of the Baltic. In favouring circumstances the torpedo craft on both sides made sallies, and neither side maintained an undisputed command of communications. This state of affairs, however, was confined to strictly localized areas, and in no sense conflicted with that larger control exercised by the superior Fleet. The mastery of the seas remained unchallenged, and the trade routes practically free of interference for the transport of armies and their supply and reinforcement with vast quantities of munitions—both our own troops and those of our Allies. The immunity of our shores from invasion was also guaranteed. Thus the supremacy of the Allied Fleets supplied a dominant factor in all the land fighting, and formed the basis of every offensive operation.

There were many indications during the year that the naval yards and engineering establishments in Germany were being utilised to their fullest extent and capacity. Constructive effort, as far as it was revealed, was in a large measure concentrated upon the production of torpedo craft, principally submarines. It was announced, however, that two battle-cruisers had been launched, and one battleship, the Wilhelm II., was mentioned as having been commissioned. It may be assumed that all the heavier vessels which were in hand at the beginning of the war were completed during 1916. The later destroyers, which appeared in several engagements during the year, were much heavier and faster than their predecessors, and carried a more formidable armament of automatic 4-in. guns. The submarines, as has been said, had a larger range of action. greater speed on the surface, and carried heavier guns than those of earlier types. But, as Mr. Churchill said in the *communiqué* issued by the Admiralty, the Battle of Jutland showed there were no surprises. The events of the war, indeed, were of a nature to strengthen opinion in regard to the types of ships and weapons which had previously been regarded as essential to the efficiency of naval organisation.

The navies of the Allies, without exception, were largely increased both in quantity and quality during 1916. The *Petit Parisien* was permitted to state on August 26, 1916, that France had not only kept her Fleet intact but had increased it by several fresh units, all perfectly trained. This journal said :

> The French have only lost the old battleship Bouvet, which was of no military value. The Jean Bart, which

was torpedoed at Cattaro, was speedily and carefully repaired. The Fleet has been enriched by the addition of five new Dreadnoughts, the France, Paris, Bretagne, Lorraine, and Provence—ships of 23,540 tons, with ten 13·5-in. guns. With the Jean Bart, the Courbet, six battleships of the Danton class, and five of the Vérité and Patrie classes, this makes a very powerful naval force.

Similarly, Admiral Akiyama, of the Imperial Japanese Navy, who was the Chief of the Japanese Mission to Europe, was allowed to state, on his arrival in Paris in July, 1916, that at the time of his visit to the Russian Fleet he was surprised to see the considerable progress which had been made in one year. Russia, he said, had constructed ships of all sorts, and he could state that her Fleet "had been doubled." Three of the four battle-cruisers of the 32,200-ton class—the Navarin, Borodino, Ismail and Kinburn—were said to have joined the Baltic Fleet during the previous four months. In regard to our own Fleet, Mr. Balfour, in his Estimates speech on March 7, 1916, said that the Navy had been enormously expanded since the outbreak of hostilities. The personnel for the Navy had, broadly speaking, doubled since the war began. In the Navy Estimates for 1914 the number of men voted was about 140,000 with reserves. Including the Royal Naval Division, it stood at the time Mr. Balfour spoke at about 300,000, and power had been taken to raise it to 350,000. He also said that as regards the tonnage of the Navy, including auxiliary cruisers and all ships under the white ensign actually used as ships of war, the increase was well over 1,000,000 tons since hostilities began. Speaking again, at Glasgow, on September 6, 1916, Mr. Balfour said:

> We started the war more powerful than any of our enemies; indeed, more powerful than all our enemies combined. Since the war broke out the Fleet has not only increased absolutely in number, in power, and in efficiency, but, to the best of my belief, as compared with the capital ships of our opponents, it has increased relatively also. If we were strong in capital ships at the beginning of the war, we are yet stronger, and in regard to cruisers and destroyers there is absolutely no comparison between our strength at that time and our strength now. So far as my knowledge goes, there is no part of our naval strength in which we have not got at this moment a greater supply, and in some departments an incomparably greater supply than we had on August 4, 1914.

The prospect of the sea war undoubtedly underwent a change in 1916, and the policy of the Admiralty was not unchallenged. But so far as the Service afloat was concerned, it continued with unabated skill and spirit to fulfil its task, novel in character though this was, and unexampled in magnitude

INSPECTION OF LIFE-SAVING COLLARS
On a Hospital Ship in the North of France.

IN A BRITISH SUBMARINE.

An officer of a submerged submarine scanning the surface of the sea through a periscope.

The year 1916 opened somewhat inauspiciously for the Grand Fleet by the loss of one of its famous battleships, the King Edward VII., which the Admiralty announced on January 9 had struck a mine and sunk. Owing to the heavy sea running at the time the vessel had to be abandoned, and foundered soon after the crew had been taken off, the only casualties being three men injured. The destruction of this fine ship, which had had her first keel-plate laid by King Edward himself in 1902, and had been launched in the following year by Queen Mary, then Princess of Wales, came as a forcible reminder that the German war of attrition by mine and submarine would be systematically pursued into the third year of the war. As the year advanced it became clear that there was practically no portion of the seas around the British Isles and in the Mediterranean where mines had not been strewn through the agency of submarines. The employment of "U" boats in this direction



THE MOLE, ZEEBRUGGE, THE SEAPORT OF BRUGES,
The notorious German torpedo-craft base on the Belgian coast.

naturally complicated the problem of dealing with what Mr. Asquith once called "the murderous menace of the mine," and the seamen again found themselves thrown back upon their own resourcefulness to defeat this new development of the enemy. As regards the destruction of the King Edward VII., the Germans claimed that this was brought about by a mine dropped by the armed raider Möwe, which was stated to have laid these machines at several points off the British coast.

Little more than a month later another ship well known to the public, the light cruiser Arethusa, flying the broad pennant of Commodore Tyrwhitt, also fell a victim to the mine. Her loss was officially announced on February 14. It occurred off the East Coast, and about ten men lost their lives. The month of March also brought its toll of mine victims. On the 10th the Admiralty stated that the destroyer Coquette, Lieutenant Vere Seymour, R.N.R., in command, and torpedo boat No. 11, commanded by Lieutenant John A. P. Legh, had been struck off the East Coast and had sunk. Lieutenant Seymour and 21 of his men were lost from the Coquette, and, although Lieutenant Legh was saved from the torpedo boat, three other officers and 20 men were killed or drowned in that vessel. On March 12 the mercantile fleet auxiliary Fauvette, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Henry J. T. Wilson, R.N.R., was also destroyed by a mine off the East Coast, taking down with her two officers and 12 men. She was formerly in the service of the General Steam Navigation Company.

That the effect of this wholesale scattering of mines—serious though it undoubtedly was—did not come up to German expectations was indicated by the exaggerated reports of losses in the German Press. Thus on April 3 the Secretary of the Admiralty found it necessary to deny a statement in the German Wireless Press of that day, circulated on the authority of the *Cologne Gazette*, that a British cruiser of the "County" class, apparently the Donegal, had struck a mine and sunk in the middle of February. There was no truth whatever, declared the Admiralty, in this assertion.

The next casualty of the mines was to be deplored the whole world over, for it involved the death of the distinguished soldier who had held since the conflict began the post of Secretary of State for War. At 7.30 p.m., on the night of June 5, the armoured cruiser Hamp-

shire, Captain H. J. Savill, was proceeding along the west coast of the Orkneys on her way to Russia, which country Lord Kitchener and his staff were about to visit on an official mission. The party included Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. FitzGerald, Lord Kitchener's Personal Military Secretary; Brigadier-General W. Ellershaw, R.A., an officer who had distinguished himself in France in the first months of war and had subsequently been employed on special duties at the War Office; Mr. H. J. O'Beirne, of the Diplomatic Service, formerly Counsellor of Embassy in Petrograd and for a brief period in 1915 Minister at Sofia; and Sir H. F. Donaldson and Mr. L. S. Robertson, of the Ministry of Munitions. They had bade farewell but a short time before to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe on the deck of his flagship, the Iron Duke, which, with the rest of the Fleet, had returned to her base only three days before from the naval battle off Jutland. About 7.45 p.m. the Hampshire struck a mine, and began to settle by the bows, heeling over to starboard. It was at once evident that the cruiser was vitally injured, and Captain Savill ordered all hands to go to their established stations for abandoning ship. Some of the hatches were opened, for, owing to the very heavy gale which was blowing, with large seas breaking over the ship, it had been necessary for her to be partially battened down, and the ship's company went quickly to their stations. Efforts were made, but without success, to lower some of the boats, one of them being broken in half during the process, and the occupants thrown into the water. It was unfortunate that two destroyers which had been detailed to accompany the Hampshire had left her nearly an hour before, Captain Savill being compelled to detach them about 7 p.m. on account of the very heavy seas. By 8 o'clock, or within 15 minutes of striking the mine, the Hampshire went down. Immediately on the receipt of the news by the naval authorities, destroyers and patrol boats were despatched to the scene, and search parties in motor cars were sent to work along the coast. In spite of all the measures taken, however, Sir John Jellicoe had to report with deep regret that the only survivors were one warrant officer and eleven men, who were washed ashore on a raft. These twelve men were all examined at the official inquiry. It was subsequently announced that Lord Kitchener did not leave the ship. He was last seen on the quarter-deck, talking to two of his officers,

CAPTAIN CHARLES FRYATT.
Commanded the "Brussels." He was alleged by the Germans to have made an attempt on March 28, 1915, to ram the "U 33." He was brought before a German Court-martial, condemned to death, and shot.

and calmly awaiting the preparations for abandoning ship. The Admiralty stated, on the conclusion of the inquiry, that "as the men were moving up one of the hatchways to their stations, Lord Kitchener, accompanied by a naval officer, appeared. The latter called out, 'Make way for Lord Kitchener,' and they both went up on to the quarter-deck, and subsequently four military officers were seen on the quarter-deck walking aft on the port side. The captain called out for Lord Kitchener to come up to the fore bridge near where the captain's boat was hoisted; he was also heard calling for Lord Kitchener to get into the boat, but no one is able to say whether Lord Kitchener got into the boat or not, nor what occurred to this boat, nor did anyone see any of the boats get clear of the ship." Three rafts, each with about fifty to seventy men, got clear of the Hampshire, but from the exhaustion, exposure, and cold, those on board them gradually dropped off or died. From one raft, with over seventy on it, only six survived. Some of the crew evidently perished in trying to land on the rocky coast of the Orkneys after their long exposure; some even

died after landing. In forwarding the inquiry report, Sir John Jellicoe said: "I cannot adequately express the sorrow felt by me personally and by the officers and men of the Grand Fleet generally at the fact that so distinguished a soldier and so great a man should have lost his life whilst under the care of the Fleet."

The employment of submarines to lay mines received confirmation and illustration when one of the actual boats used by the Germans, UC 5, was captured off the East Coast in April, 1916. The occurrence was announced by the Admiralty on April 28, when it was stated that the boat had been sunk on the previous day, and that one officer and 17 men of her crew, on surrendering, were made prisoners. Later, the vessel was salved and brought into Sheerness Dockyard, where a party of journalists were allowed to inspect her on July 20. She proved to be of a small size, only 110 ft. long, with a diameter at the widest part of nearly 10 ft. The draught of water, when running awash, was about 9 ft. 10 in., and the measurement from the keel to the top of the conning tower was about 20 ft. On the surface the boat had a displacement of 190 tons, and submerged of 210 tons. In the after part were the two-cylinder Diesel engines for surface propulsion, giving the submarine a speed of about six knots; the electric motors for under-water propulsion being placed just before them. The quarters for the crew were very cramped, as about one-third of the entire hull space was needed for the mines, of which 12 were carried, a full cargo being found when the boat was captured. The mines were spherical in shape, and with the sinking apparatus weighed about 16 cwt. each, the charge consisting of 280 lbs. of trinitrotoluene. Boats of this character could, of course, be easily multiplied, the various parts being manufactured at engineering works inland and sent to a port, like Antwerp, to be fitted together. The large number of mines laid in the southern area of the North Sea must have been strewn by them. UC 5, for instance, was reported to have made twenty trips before being captured.

From July 26 to August 15 the boat was open to public view off the Temple Pier, London, and 302,960 people passed through the turnstile to get a close view of her. A small charge was made in aid of naval charities, and the total receipts were £3,650 15s. 7d.

On July 11, three British armed trawlers were sunk after an action with German submarines. The former vessels were on patrol duty, off the Scottish coast, and although they put up a gallant fight with the "U"-boats, the heavier guns in the latter overpowered them. As soon as one of the trawlers was seen to be on fire and sinking, the other two en-



BRITISH MONITORS IN ACTION AND UNDER FIRE.

IN THE NORTH SEA.

A British torpedo-boat (in foreground) comes to the rescue of the crew of a schooner.

deavoured to retire, but the submarines pursued them, concentrating their fire first on one boat and then on the other, until they were all sunk. It was reported unofficially that the trawlers were called the Onward, Era, and Nellie Nutton, of which the first-named went down with all her crew. In the *London Gazette*, on October 25, Skipper Charles Angus, R.N.R., was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross "in recognition of his conduct in an engagement with enemy submarines on July 11, 1916, and of the skilful and seamanlike manner in which he manœuvred his vessel when she was disabled by gunfire, thereby saving practically the whole of his ship's company."

The new class of mine-sweeping sloops provided another victim to the "U"-boats. On July 4, it had been claimed in a German *communiqué* that one of the submarines had sunk on that day "an enemy submarine-destroyer in the southern part of the North Sea," but the British Admiralty declared that it was a mine-sweeping vessel which was hit by the torpedo fired from the submarine, and although slightly damaged, the vessel was able to return safely to harbour. On October 23, however, the mine-sweeping sloop Genista, Lieutenant-Commander John White, was torpedoed and sunk. All her officers and 73 men were lost, only 12 men being saved. When last seen, added the official announcement, the ship was sinking, but was still engaged with the enemy submarine.

Another useful craft lost in the war of attrition was the destroyer Lassoo, which foundered off the Dutch coast on August 13 after being either torpedoed or mined. Six of her crew were missing, including Sub-Lieutenant H. O'B. Thornhill, R.N., and two of the engine-room staff, one of whom was Engineer-Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Rice, were wounded. Some wreckage from the destroyer, among which were two of her boats, was taken into Ymuiden by Dutch torpedo boats. The German submarines scored again on August 24, when one of them torpedoed and sank the armed boarding steamer Duke of Albany. Commander George N. Ramage, R.N.R. This vessel, formerly in the railway steamer service of the Lancashire and Yorkshire and the North Western Companies, took down with her the commander, Engineer-Lieutenant A. G. G. Maskell, and 22 men; but eleven officers and 76 men were saved.

THE GERMAN BOMBARDMENT OF LOWESTOFT, APRIL 25, 1916.
A damaged house.

There was another phase of the war of attrition which was more pronounced in 1916 than it had been in the two previous years. This was the use of torpedo craft in night raids by the Germans. It coincided with, as it was largely dependent upon, the rise of Zeebrugge as a naval base, and although it achieved very little practical result, may have had a value in the eyes of the German Admiralty Staff as a means of keeping alive the offensive spirit among the personnel, and of impressing neutrals with the dexterity of German seamen. The first notable incident in this connection was the destruction of the Arabis, a vessel of a new class of mine-sweeping sloops already referred to. In company with three others of her class, the Arabis was on patrol duty on the night of February 10, in the neighbourhood of the Dogger Bank, when a flotilla of new and well-armed German destroyers came on the scene at high speed. The Berlin official account said that "during an advance of our torpedo boats, our boats met on the Dogger Bank, some 120 miles east of the British coast, several British cruisers, which at once fled. Our boats pursued them, sank the new cruiser Arabis, and hit a second cruiser with a torpedo. Our torpedo boats rescued the commander of the Arabis, two other officers, and 21 men. Our forces suffered no damage and no losses." The only information issued by the British Admiralty was by way of correction of the German version, the "cruisers" mentioned in which were stated to be four mine-sweeping vessels, three of which had returned safely. The doctor of the Arabis, Surgeon-Probationer John Hughes, R.N.V.R., was among those picked up by the Germans, but he died from exposure, and was buried with military honours in the Naval Garrison Cemetery at Wilhelmshaven on February 23.

In the week before the sinking of the Arabis, the significant discovery was made that a flotilla of German torpedo craft had been operating within 70 miles of the coast of Essex with apparent immunity. On February 2 the Dutch tank steamer Artemis was stopped shortly after midnight by four German torpedo boats, about four miles from the North Hinder lightship. Her master was ordered by the Germans to proceed at full speed for one hour, in a direction south by east, and then to drop anchor. Arriving there, the Artemis was held up by two other torpedo boats, and ordered to proceed to Zeebrugge, her request for a pilot being refused. The captain of the Artemis was

then informed that, having disobeyed orders, his ship would be torpedoed within five minutes. Within this time, and before the lowering of the boats was completed, a torpedo was fired and hit the vessel, which listed heavily, and the torpedo craft made off. After spending the rest of the night in their boats, the men of the Artemis returned to the steamer, as she was still afloat, and on the afternoon of the next day were able to bring her to Rotterdam. This high-handed proceeding towards a neutral trading vessel proved to be the forerunner of many outrages committed by the German submarines against Dutch ships, but as far as published information showed, the torpedo boats did not repeat their raid into the North Sea for some months, at least not with a successful result. Their next coup occurred on June 24, when the Great Eastern Railway steamer Brussels was captured by destroyers, and taken into Zeebrugge. It was at 2 a.m. on the 24th that some twelve destroyers came up on either side of the Brussels. Armed parties immediately boarded the steamer, one surrounding the officers on the deck, another proceeding to the cabins, a third to the engine-room, and so on. Thirty escaped Russian prisoners were roughly hustled on board one of the destroyers, and the ship was then headed for Ostend, where the Germans made a triumphal entry. Thence the Brussels was taken to Zeebrugge and unloaded, the passengers and crew being sent to Bruges. Next day, the women and children were allowed to return home.

There was a horrible sequel to the falling into German hands of this steamer and her crew. Captain Charles Fryatt, her master, had become known for his coolness and courage in the face of the operations of enemy submarines. On one occasion especially, some fifteen months before, he had saved the vessel and the lives of her passengers and crew by skilfully avoiding an attack, and in recognition of his coolness and judgment the Admiralty made him a presentation. On July 27, this gallant and capable seaman was brought before a court-martial at Bruges, and condemned to death "because, although he was not a member of a combatant force, he made an attempt on the



THE GERMAN BOMBARDMENT OF LOWESTOFT.
Interior of a Women's Convalescent House.

BRITISH MINE-SWEEPERS AT WORK.

Exploding by gun and rifle fire enemy mines brought to the surface by cables between trawlers. The trawlers work in couples, with a steel cable attached between them for cutting through the moorings of a mine and thus causing it to rise to the surface. When hit by gun or rifle fire the mine either explodes or sinks.

afternoon of March 28, 1915, to ram the German submarine U 33 near the Maas lightship. The accused," continued the German official account, " as well as the first officer and the chief engineer of the steamer, received at the time from the British Admiralty a gold watch as a reward for his brave conduct on that occasion, and his action was mentioned with praise in the House of Commons." The sentence being confirmed, Captain Fryatt was shot the same afternoon, and the German statement concluded : " One of the many nefarious *franctireur* proceedings of the British merchant marine against our war vessels has thus found a belated but merited expiation." Since the execution of Miss Cayell, nothing had occurred to stir the indignation of the civilized world so much as this " atrocious crime against the law of nations and the usages of war," as Mr. Asquith described it in the House of Commons.. " His Majesty's Government," said the Premier, " desire to repeat emphatically that they are resolved that such crimes shall not, if they can help it, go unpunished. When the time arrives they are determined to bring to justice the criminals, whoever they may be, and whatever their station. In such cases as this the man who authorises the system under which such crimes are committed may well be the most guilty of all. The question of what immediate action should be taken is engaging the earnest consideration of the Government." Mr. Asquith added that the Government would certainly consider the claims of Captain Fryatt's widow and seven children to some recognition at the hands of the nation.

In other enterprises into the North Sea, the German destroyers captured the steamer Lestris on July 5; and the Colchester on September 21. On the night of October 26, however, they attempted the most daring venture of any when they raided the cross-channel transport service. It was a very dark night, and slipping down the Belgian coast from Zeebrugge, they pushed through the Dover Straits to the line from Folkestone to Boulogne. Six drifters which were on guard in the Channel were surprised and quickly sunk, and the enemy boats, ten in number of the latest type, and commanded by Captain Michelsen, then attacked and overwhelmed the destroyer Flirt, Lieutenant R. P. Kellett, a small boat of only 380 tons, armed with one 12-pounder and five 6-pounder guns, and launched in 1897. They also met, near the Varne lightship, according to the German official report, a number of hospital ships, and finally overhauled the mail steamer Queen, which was sunk after her crew had been given time to leave. The destroyer Nubian, Commander Montague Bernard, belonging to the force which tried to intercept the raiders, got into touch with the enemy, but was disabled by a torpedo and taken in tow, and owing to the bad weather the tow parted, the vessel going aground. In returning, two of the enemy destroyers were believed to have been destroyed by striking mines. There was a large element of luck for both sides in this affair, therefore, for it would have been more serious had the German flotilla encountered some loaded transports and sunk them, and on the other hand surprise was expressed that the raiders did not pay more heavily for their temerity.

Up to this time, the cross-channel traffic had experienced complete immunity from attack by above-water vessels. In his despatch dated May 29, 1916, Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, commanding the Dover Patrol, was able to show that over 21,000 merchant ships, apart from men-of-war and auxiliaries, had passed through the Patrol in the previous six months, of which only 21 had been lost or seriously damaged by the enemy, or less than one per thousand. To effect this security, over four per cent. of the patrol vessels were sunk and the lives of 77 officers and men lost to the nation. As regards the work of the Patrol in protecting the flank of all the sea transport to and from the Army in France, so thoroughly had this been performed that not one single life had been lost during the sea passage. The Admiral also recorded that the work of the Destroyer Flotilla throughout the winter had been incessant and arduous, and thoroughly well carried out. Among the losses incurred was that of the Viking, a destroyer of the Tribal class, built in 1910, which was sunk whilst convoying a trooper across the Channel, presumably by a mine, on January 29, 1916. Commander T. C. H. Williams went down with his ship. Another destroyer lost in the cross-channel service during the year was the Eden, of the River class, which the Admiralty announced on June 17 had sunk the night before after a collision. Her commanding officer, Lieutenant Alastair C. N. Farquhar, was also lost with his boat, and about half the crew.

Only on two occasions during the period under survey (apart from the movement which led

CAPTAIN PAUL KÖNIG
The German Commander of the under-water liner "Deutschland."

to the battle off Jutland Bank) did the larger vessels of the German Navy put in a *genuine* appearance in the North Sea. The qualifying adjective is necessary because the German Admiralty Staff constantly reported operations by their "High Sea forces," but what they thought fit to call an "advance" or a "search" was in reality nothing more than a tactical movement within easy reach of the protected waters of the Heligoland Bight, with aircraft aloft to give timely warning of the enemy. On April 25, however, to synchronise with the rebellious movement in Ireland, the German battle-cruiser squadron came out for a cruise, for the first time since the drubbing it had received fifteen months earlier at the hands of Sir David Beatty off the Dogger Bank. Accompanied by light cruisers and destroyers, it appeared off Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth about 4.30 a.m., and bombarded these places for twenty minutes, when it headed for home at full speed. It was engaged by the local naval forces, of which two British light cruisers and a destroyer were hit, but not sunk. The Germans claimed, however, that the light cruiser Penelope was damaged beyond repair, and that a destroyer and two patrol boats were sunk, one of the last-named being the trawler King Stephen, which a few weeks earlier had seen the Zeppelin "L. 19" in a sinking condition in the North Sea, but had refused to take off her men, as they outnumbered her own crew and could have overpowered them. After the raid, Mr. Balfour received a deputation from the towns which had been shelled, and outlined to the local Mayors new dispositions and accessions in our maritime position which enabled us "to bring important forces to the south without in the least imperilling our naval preponderance elsewhere." The First Lord also referred to submarines and monitors, which formed no portion of the Grand Fleet, and which were then "available in growing numbers for coast defence."

The second occasion of activity on the part of the High Sea Fleet was on August 19, or about eleven weeks after Admiral Scheer's squadrons had been put to flight off Jutland. They came out this time with considerable caution, and learning from their scouts that the British forces were present in force, they avoided an engagement, and returned to port. In searching for the enemy, the British light cruiser screen lost two vessels of the "City" class, the Nottingham, Captain C. B. Miller, and Falmouth, Captain J. D. Edwards, both by submarine attack. All the officers of the former were saved, but 38 of the crew were missing; of the Falmouth, all the officers and men were saved, but one leading stoker died of injuries. The British claimed that one enemy submarine was destroyed and another rammed and possibly sunk.

Another injury inflicted on the Germans, which later reports showed, however, was not decisive, gave great pleasure at the time. This was the torpedoing of the Dreadnought battleship Westfalen by submarine E. 23, Lieutenant-Commander Robert R. Turner. One torpedo hit the German ship, and later on, while she was being escorted by five destroyers back to harbour in a damaged condition, she was again attacked with a second torpedo, which was believed to have struck. The Germans, in a report on August 23, declared that the ship reached port safely, and would soon be repaired, the second torpedo having missed. On October 25,

Lieutenant-Commander Turner was awarded the D.S.O.

This cruise of August 19 might be considered as a development of the attrition policy, which, as has been shown, was no more successful in 1916 than it had been earlier. A very effective check upon one source of the enemy's power to conduct such a war of attrition was provided by the work of the British squadron off the Belgian coast, which was well maintained. Vice-Admiral Bacon said in his despatch of May 29, 1916:

Certain opportunities have arisen of bombarding the enemy's positions in Belgium. On these occasions the necessary minor operations have been carried out. In addition to the daily reconnaissance and protective work performed by the Royal Naval Air Service on the coast, eleven organised attacks against the enemy's aerodromes and thirteen attacks on enemy vessels have been carried out. Nine enemy machines and one submarine have been destroyed by air attack, and appreciable damage has been inflicted on military adjuncts. . . . The advent of spring weather has lately enabled me to take measures to limit the extent to which the submarine and other vessels of the enemy had free access to the waters off the Belgian coast. The success achieved has, so far, been considerable, and the activities of submarines operating from the Belgian coast have been much reduced. We have destroyed several of the enemy's submarines and some of his surface vessels.

Sir Reginald expressed his cordial thanks to Rear-Admiral de Marliave, of the French Navy, for the hearty co-operation he had afforded.

An example of the air attacks referred to by Admiral Bacon may be cited from what occurred on March 20, 1916. In the early hours of that day, a combined force of approximately fifty British, French, and Belgian aeroplanes and seaplanes, accompanied by 15 fighting machines, left various bases and attacked the German seaplane station at Zeebrugge, and the aerodrome at Houttave, near Zeebrugge. Considerable damage was reported to have been done. The machines on an average carried 200 lbs. of bombs, and all returned safely. The British machines engaged were all naval. This was the largest air raid, so far as the numbers of machines engaged were concerned, reported up to that time. Bombed out apparently by the hail of ammunition which was poured upon Zeebrugge during this attack, three German destroyers were found at sea off the port later in the day. They were brought to action by four British destroyers, and at once turned and ran for harbour. Two of the German



THE COMMANDER OF THE "U 53."
Lieutenant-Commander Hans Roze (on left) and two officers of the German submarine.

boats were observed to be hit, but were able to make good their escape. This brief running fight was typical of other skirmishes off the coast of Belgium. In this locality, too, there took place, especially during the spring and summer, a large number of bomb attacks from Allied aircraft, which served a useful purpose in curbing the enemy's preparations and in harassing his personnel.

One in particular may be mentioned for the incidents connected with its naval support. On March 25, an attack by British seaplanes was delivered upon the German airship sheds at Tondern, in Schleswig-Holstein, east of the island of Sylt. Commodore R. Y. Tyrwhitt, with a light cruiser and destroyer force, escorted the aircraft to their rendezvous near the German coast. They got away successfully and flew to their objective, but three had the misfortune to be brought down by the enemy and their five occupants taken prisoners. The others came back to the warships, which had steamed to and fro off the coast awaiting their return. A change for the worse in the weather, however, caused the loss of a destroyer from the escorting force, the Medusa, which came into collision with the Laverock, and in the stormy seas which prevailed she foundered. It was then that a fine piece of seamanship was displayed by Lieutenant-Commander V. S. Butler and the crew of the destroyer Lassoo. That vessel was skilfully placed alongside the sinking Medusa, and every man of the latter's company was taken off, without a single casualty, a feat which elicited the commendation of the Admiralty. In the course of the day, a division of British destroyers sighted two German armed patrol vessels, the Otto Rudolf and Braunschweig, overhauled and sank them. Four men were rescued from the former and sixteen from the latter. While engaged with these small craft, the British boats were attacked by German aircraft, but they received no damage of any kind. There was a further exciting incident at night to complete a round of unusual experiences. The British light cruisers encountered a division of German destroyers, one of which was rammed and sunk by the Cleopatra, Captain F. P. Loder-Symonds. It was not until a claim for bounty came before the Prize Court on July 17 that the facts of this occurrence became known. At 10.15 p.m. on the night of March 25 the Cleopatra was cruising with other ships in the North Sea and was leading the column, when those on board saw sparks, which appeared to issue from a coal-burning



GERMAN SUBMARINE AND CREW.
The "U 53" at Newport, Rhode Island, October 7, 1916.

vessel close on the port bow. The helm of the Cleopatra was immediately put over in order to ram, and two enemy destroyers were then seen. Steaming at 20 knots, the Cleopatra hit the rear enemy boat, cutting her in halves, and the two parts were seen to pass one on each side of the cruiser. It was impossible to rescue any survivors. It was ascertained that the vessel sunk was the G194, and the German casualty list showed that 93 persons were lost in the sinking of the boat, the prize bounty awarded at £5 a head being therefore £465.

Yet another phase of the Navy's work in or about the North Sea was connected with the blockade of Germany. To the London correspondent of the *Brooklyn Eagle*, Rear-Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair, who commanded the Tenth Cruiser (Blockade) Squadron from the outbreak of war to March 6, 1916, when he became Naval Adviser to the Foreign Office, gave a description of the machinery by which all the oversea traffic of Germany was intercepted. The Admiral showed how the blockade was gradually pulled very much tighter than it was at first. The number of patrolling ships increased month by month, until there was a complicated network of cruisers scattered over the North Sea areas, through which it was almost impossible, he declared, for any steamer, sailing ship, or trawler to pass without coming under direct observation. Usually the cruisers were about twenty miles apart, and as each cruiser was afforded a clear view of fifteen miles to the horizon, no blockade runner could pass between them without being seen by one or both. The type of warship chosen to maintain the blockade was known as an auxiliary armed cruiser—usually a converted passenger ship or merchant trader, and the great majority of the blockade officers were drawn from the Mercantile Marine, as being accustomed to manifests and ship's papers they were peculiarly fitted for such work. Most of the ships remained at sea continuously for fifty days before going into port to recoal and re-provision. The following is the Admiral's picture of a blockade ship at work :

You must imagine us steaming a beaten track up and down a bit of open sea : in total darkness at night and during the day keeping a sharp look-out for mines and submarines of the enemy. The weather in the North Atlantic in mid-winter is very severe, and most of our ships remain at sea continuously for fifty days before proceeding to port to recoal and reprovision.

Sometimes nothing happens for days on end. At eleven o'clock every night, if our wireless is not too busy, we pick up the day's war bulletins from Poldhu, and the Eiffel Tower, or some German station.

Finally, one day there is a blotch of smoke on the horizon. As we keep in touch with our neighbouring units by wireless, we know that this cannot be from the funnels of one of our own cruisers. Word passes that a ship is sighted perhaps attempting to elude our blockade. It is the duty of the patrolling cruiser to investigate. Overhauling the merchantman, the cruiser's gun fires two blank charges to draw attention to the line of signal flags which have been run up to the mast-head. This is a necessary step, for often there is but one man on the bridge of the merchantman, and he might easily fail to observe us—unintentionally or otherwise.

REAR-ADMIRAL S. R. FREMANTLE
(on right) with Vice-Admiral Sir J. M. de Robeck.

The cruiser's signals announce that an officer will be sent aboard to examine the ship's manifests. Accompanied by an armed guard of five men, the boarding officer goes over the cruiser's side, and often at some peril to life and limb manages somehow to clamber up to the tramp's deck. I have often seen the cruiser's dory stove in, and the boarding party thrown into the water.

Our boarding-officer interviews the captain of the merchantman, who states his port of origin, his destination, his cargo, the length of his voyage, and whether or not he stands in need of any assistance. The crew is sometimes mustered in suspicious cases to determine whether any German subjects are aboard. Finally, the manifests are carefully examined.

In many cases the neutral ship is quite innocent, and is allowed immediately to proceed ; in fact, whenever there is fair doubt about the cargo, we are lenient in releasing our temporary capture. In the case of fishing trawlers, which swarm the North Sea, it is possible to examine the cargo immediately, and where ships are partly in ballast the examination may also be done quickly.

I cannot emphasise too strongly that it is altogether safer and more humane for the neutral to be examined



ENTRANCE TO A DIVING-BELL.

An air-compression vessel, used for laying moorings for battleships, fitted with a diving-bell, the entrance to which is down the big funnel amidships.

in a protected harbour. There seem to be two methods of dealing with a suspected blockade runner. Our method is to take the neutral to the nearest British port for examination. The German method is to torpedo at sight. Between these two extremes, there should be the alternative of examination at sea, but *it is obviously quite impossible to discharge an entire ship's cargo upon her own decks with heavy weather likely to develop at any moment.*

My experience as commander of the North Sea blockade for twenty months is that all neutral captains invariably prefer to be sent into a British harbour. The delay is reduced to a minimum, and the inspection is accomplished with safety and dispatch.

A TRANSPORT'S FALSE SPEED.

British transport with a huge bow-wave painted on her sides to deceive the German submarines.

In an earlier chapter,* it has been shown how the original menace of the submarine attack on commerce was effectively handled by the Board of Admiralty under Mr. Churchill and Lord Fisher. In the autumn of 1915 the submarines appeared to have been cleared out of the narrow waters around the British Isles, but a few of the newer and larger boats were at work in the Mediterranean. On December 30, 1915, the P. & O. liner Persia was torpedoed and sunk off Crete, with a loss of about 200 lives, and,

* Chapter CXI., page 146.

influenced by previous attacks of a similar kind, certain foreign steamship companies, notably Dutch and Japanese, had decided to transfer their steamers from the Suez Canal to the Cape route. In the spring of 1916 the menace broke out again in more virulent form than ever, and continued fitfully throughout the year. No statistics of losses were issued by the Admiralty, but on October 17, 1916, Mr. Runciman announced in the House of Commons that Great Britain had actually lost, by enemy action and by marine risks, no less than 2,000,000 gross tons of shipping since the war began. (Lloyd's Register in 1914 showed a gross tonnage of 21,045,049 in the British Mercantile Marine.) The numbers of ships destroyed, of course, ran into hundreds, and the toll of life was also a heavy one. The Germans advertised a new submarine campaign to begin on March 1, giving as a reason for it a number of alleged illegalities, in arming merchantmen and so on, by the British Government. The provision of guns for merchant ships is, of course, an ancient right, accepted by the nations for many centuries. On March 2 the Admiralty published in full the instructions in force governing the conduct of merchant ships armed with guns for defensive purposes. Another document made public by the Admiralty showed the degree of reliance to be placed upon German promises to abate the virulence of the "U"-boat methods. This was a list of forty British and fourteen neutral ships, all of which were unarmed, but which had been torpedoed on sight by enemy submarines without any warning during 1915.

A feature of the renewed submarine campaign in 1916 was the manner in which the enemy craft returned to their old haunts. Ships began again to be destroyed in the English Channel. On March 24 the cross-channel steamer Sussex was torpedoed, but not sunk, the ship reaching Boulogne with a loss of 100 lives out of the 380 passengers and crew on board at the time. Fragments of the torpedo which struck the vessel were examined by American naval *attachés*, who were satisfied that it was of German make, but the Berlin authorities disclaimed all responsibility for the attack, even after the submarine which carried it out had been captured on April 5 by an Anglo-French flotilla, and the French Government were in possession of the commander's name and confirmatory evidence. It was not until May 10 that the Germans admitted having torpedoed the Sussex, and the American Secretary of State then inquired what punishment would be meted out to the submarine commander, in accordance with a German promise, but there was apparently no satisfactory reply to this. In other cases of wrongful attacks, such as those on the Dutch steamers Tubantia and Palembang, the German method was to endeavour to evade responsibility, and at length to promise to submit the matter to an international court *after* the war! In a message on the second anniversary of the British declaration of war, Mr. Balfour said that the advantage of submarine attacks on commerce was that they could not be controlled by superior fleet power in the same way as attacks by cruisers. The disadvantage was that they could not be carried out on a large scale consistently with the laws of war or the requirements of humanity. They made, therefore, a double appeal to German militarism; an appeal to its prudence and an appeal to its brutality. "What blunderers they are!" said Mr. Balfour of the organizers of this campaign. "I doubt not their ability to manipulate machines. But of managing men, unless it be German men, they know less than nothing. They are always wrong; and they are wrong because they always suppose that if they behave like brutes they can cow their enemies into behaving like cowards. Small is their knowledge of our merchant seamen."

With improved boats, the submarine warfare naturally—in fact necessarily—extended the area of its operations. On June 21, U 35, under the command of Captain von Arnauld de la Perière, arrived at Cartagena, to deliver an autograph letter to the King of Spain from the Kaiser, thanking the former for the welcome given to the defeated Germans from Cameroon on arrival in Spanish territory. The submarine, after taking in supplies from the German interned ship Roma, left within twenty-four hours, and having thus established the right of German under-water craft to use neutral ports, proceeded to sink a number of vessels in the Mediterranean. On July 6 the German Admiralty announced her safe return to Germany, and added that in the course of the cruise she had sunk the French armed steamer Herault. Shortly after this another attempt was made to establish the principle of submarines using neutral ports by the dispatch of vessels to the United States. On July 9 a so-called commercial submarine, or under-water liner,

ON THE CLAN LINERS

The officers and engineers of the "Lindsay." Smaller picture: Captain Miller on the "Macfadyen."

the Deutschland, arrived at Norfolk, Virginia with a cargo of dyes, etc., having left Heligoland on June 23. Captain Paul König, a merchant officer, was in command. The vessel left on August 1, and anchored in the Weser River on the 23rd. Her second voyage began in October. and she reached New London, Connecticut, on November 1. Meantime, a war submarine, U 53, was also dispatched to America, arriving at Newport, Rhode Island, on October 7. under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Hans Roze. The boat left in about three hours, and next day sank six merchant ships, four British, one Dutch, and one Norwegian, off the Nantucket lightship, in the direct route of the trade to and from New York. One of the victims, the Stephano, had passengers on board, including thirty Americans, some belonging to the Red Cross. The Stephano was fired upon without warning, and stopped when attacked. Her passengers and crew took to the boats, and the vessel was then sunk by gunfire and a torpedo. When the Stephano sent out her wireless call for help, the American destroyer Benham left Newport, and arrived on the scene as the submarine was about to sink another victim, the Dutch freighter Bloomersdijk. The destroyer being in the way of the submarine's aim, the German captain asked her to move out of the way. The request was complied with, and the Bloomersdijk was sent to the bottom. An

VICE-ADML. KANIN.
Late Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Baltic Fleet.

VICE-ADML. D'ARTIGE DU FOURNET.
The French Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean

VICE-ADML. H.R.H. THE DUKE OF THE ABRUZZI
The Italian Commander-in-Chief in the Adriatic.

officer of the Benham confirmed this in an interview. On October 31 it was officially announced from Berlin that the U 53 had returned safely to Germany. Many diplomatic and legal questions were raised by these three exploits—the visit of the U 35 to Cartagena, the treatment accorded to the Deutschland, and the destruction of shipping by U 53 off the American coast, but this aspect of the matter need not here be dealt with. Their naval significance was not great, as it was merely a matter of engineering development, and the endurance of the crews, to make voyages across the Atlantic.

In addition to their submarine warfare, the Germans made at least two attempts early in 1916 to place cruisers on the trade routes. The first of these, which proved successful, was made with a converted fruit trader which was renamed the Möwe. Commanded by Captain the Burgrave Count von und zu Dohna-Schlodien, this vessel took advantage of a dark, squally night towards the end of December, 1915, to rush the British patrol. By the middle of January she was operating in mid-Atlantic, where she intercepted the Elder Dempster liner Appam, put a prize crew on board, and sent the ship to the United States. Fourteen other vessels, twelve of which were British, were sunk, including the Clan MacTavish, which, being armed with a small gun for defence against submarines, put up a fight. On March 4 the Möwe returned to Germany. Her daring feat had resulted in the destruction of 50,000 tons of Allied shipping, and had disturbed the floating trade over a wide area. It was evidently the German intention to maintain a succession of such blockade-runners, for on February 29 a second raider, the Greif, was overhauled in the North Sea by the auxiliary cruiser Alcantara, Captain T. E. Wardle. A duel ensued, in which the German vessel was disabled, but before sinking she managed to get off a torpedo which destroyed the Alcantara. The latter, however, had by then been joined by the Andes, another auxiliary cruiser, which assisted to complete the destruction of the Greif. After this event, no further attempts of the kind were reported, and the Germans resumed their submarine warfare with redoubled energy.

There were no events of decisive naval importance in the Mediterranean theatre of war during the first ten months of 1916. Although the Dardanelles expedition had been abandoned, there were still the Salonika and Mesopotamia undertakings in hand, and the protection of three thousand miles of sea transport was no light task for the Navy, especially as the enemy submarines made the most of their opportunities in this connexion.

On February 23, 1916, Mr. Balfour was asked for information relating to the Allied naval commands in the Mediterranean, and he replied that it would be inadvisable to describe these in detail, but the general command was in the hands of the French Commander-in-Chief, Admiral d'Artige du Fournet. The command of the Adriatic and its approaches, added the First Lord, was in the hands of the Italian Commander-in-Chief, H.R.H. the Duke of the Abruzzi, and other local commands were assigned to British officers. "The best general indication," said Mr. Balfour, "of the work performed by the Allied Fleets in the Mediterranean is the successful transport of large

military forces to Salonika, Valona, and Egypt, the successful evacuation of the Allied expedition from the Dardanelles; and last, but not least, the transportation of the Serbian Army from Albania—a result chiefly due to the ability and energy displayed by the Italian Fleet."

The complete evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula was effected on January 8, 1916, and Sir Charles Monro acknowledged that the successful accomplishment of this most delicate and difficult task was due largely to the invaluable assistance rendered by Admiral de Robeck and the Royal Navy. The cruiser fire from the left flank was mentioned as being most accurate. The French embarkations were carried out by their own Navy, and the French seamen also greatly assisted by embarking some of the British animals. From this time, a patrol was still maintained off the peninsula, to prevent the establishment of submarine bases by the enemy, but the centre of naval interest shifted to Salonika. Here the nature of the work demanded of the Fleet was somewhat different. Ships were not needed for bombarding purposes, to provide artillery support to the troops, but the protection of the communications by water was very similar, and as at Gallipoli there was the submarine peril to be guarded against.

The operations of the "U"-boats in the waters forming the approaches to Salonika led to the seizure of the forts of Kara Burnu and Kum Kale, on either side of the bay, in January, 1916, the occupation being announced on January 31 as having been effected without incident. Apparently by way of a reprisal for this precautionary movement on the part of the Allies, a Zeppelin appeared over Salonika in the early morning of February 1 and dropped sixteen bombs on the town and harbour. On the next occasion when such a raid was made, the airship making it was brought down in flames.*

The counter-measures necessitated by the submarine menace in the Mediterranean were of a far-reaching and complicated character. They involved the occupation of several strategic points for use as bases by the small craft flotillas engaged in hunting the enemy boats; the searching of many miles of coastline and numerous islands for possible sources of supply; and other work which it was not possible to make known. The island of Crete became one of the chief centres in this anti-submarine war. Towards the end of March, 1916, an Allied squadron proceeded to Suda Bay, and on April 18 it was announced from

* See Vol. VIII., page 192.



PART OF THE ALLIED FLEET OFF SALAMIS.

French vessels in the foreground.

Athens that the British Minister there had communicated to the Greek Premier the reasons for the occupation of this harbour. Simultaneously, the British Consul at Canea notified the new regulations which had been drawn up in connexion with the establishment of a naval base at Suda Bay. The Allied Ministers at Athens also informed the Greek Premier of the intention of their Governments to land forces in Cephalonia, especially at the harbour of Argostoli, and to create naval bases at certain points in the Ionian Islands and the Ægean Sea. This measure was declared to be dictated by urgent necessity, and would in no wise infringe the sovereign rights or the territorial integrity of Greece. Certain territory which for other reasons had been temporarily occupied by the Allies also had a value in connexion with the suppression of the submarines. The island of Castellorizo, for instance, had been seized by French troops on December 29, 1915, when it was reported that the object was to facilitate Allied action against Adalia. Then on January 11, 1916, French troops landed at Corfu to prepare for the transfer there of the remnant of the Serbian Army from Albania. The Legations at Athens of the Allied Powers issued a declaration showing that their Governments "deemed it an obligation of humanity" to transfer to Corfu that portion of the Serbian Army which was then in Albania. The task of revictualling these troops would thus be simplified. The Powers took this step in the belief that Greece would not feel compelled to oppose a measure that would redound to the benefit of her Ally, and would in any case be of brief duration. Among the buildings utilized for the Serbians was the Kaiser's villa, the Achilleion, which was converted into a hospital for the wounded.

To turn now to the effect of the submarine war on the fighting fleets, the principal loss to be recorded is that of the battleship Russell. Flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Sydney R. Fremantle, and commanded by Captain W. Bowden-Smith, this vessel was reported to have struck a mine on April 26. She sank with a loss of 124 officers and men, but the admiral, captain, commander and about 700 officers and men were rescued. In Germany it was asserted that the Russell was not destroyed by a mine, but by a submarine, as there were no mine-sowers at all in the Mediterranean, the laying of these machines being very difficult on account of the depth of the water. However, within a week, confirmatory evidence of the use of mines there was forthcoming when the Admiralty, on May 1, announced the loss of the armed yacht Ægusa, Captain T. P. Walker, R.N.R. (retired Vice-Admiral), and the mine-sweeper Nasturtium, Lieutenant-Commander Robin W. Lloyd, R.N., both of which sank after striking mines. Seven men were lost from the Nasturtium and six from the Ægusa. The latter was formerly Sir Thomas Lipton's yacht Erin.

There had been earlier losses from submarine attack among the Allied warships in the Mediterranean. On February 8 the French cruiser Amiral Charnier was struck, and sank within a few minutes, off the coast of Syria. There was a doubt about the agency which caused her destruction, the Germans claiming to have torpedoed her, but the statements of the one survivor rather pointed to a floating mine from the Dardanelles having blown her up. The vessel foundered very quickly, and the one seaman saved was picked up from a raft on which there were fourteen others, all of whom had died. On February 26 the French auxiliary cruiser Provence II, temporarily engaged in transporting troops and equipment to Salonika, was torpedoed in mid-Mediterranean, with the loss of 1,000 lives, the ship going down in fifteen minutes. On March 1 the Primula, a British mine-sweeper carrying out patrol duties, was torpedoed and sunk, her crew, except three men, being saved and landed at Port Said.

Another warship loss shortly afterwards was that of the monitor M.30. This was one of the smaller vessels of this novel type engaged in watching the Gallipoli Peninsula and blockading the Straits. Vice-Admiral de Robeck reported that on the night of May 13 she was struck by the enemy's artillery; and, taking fire, was subsequently destroyed. Two men were killed and two wounded. The M.30 was commanded by Lieutenant-Commander E. L. B. Lockyer, R.N., who as first and gunnery lieutenant of the Carmania was present in the action with the German raider Cap Trafalgar in September, 1914, and was awarded the D.S.O. for his services. Nearly three months elapsed before another loss was reported from the Mediterranean, and then on August 3 the auxiliary mine-sweeping vessel Clacton was torpedoed and sunk in the Levant. The casualties reported in connexion with this loss included five missing, including Engineer-Lieutenant F. E. Mortimore and Engineer-Sub-Lieutenant C. J. McKelvey, both of the Royal Naval

BRITISH TROOPS LANDING AT SALONIKA.



CORFU,
Where the French troops landed, January 11, 1916.

Reserve. On the 25th of the same month the Admiralty announced that the armed yacht Zaida, which had been on detached service in the Gulf of Alexandretta, destroying petrol stores, etc., was reported considerably overdue. A recent German *communiqué* had stated that a patrol boat had been sunk in those waters, and the Admiralty said that this information no doubt referred to the Zaida, as news had been received through Turkish sources that four officers and 19 men of her crew had been taken prisoners. There was no information as to the fate of the remainder of the crew, two officers and eight men, and it was therefore assumed that they were lost. In Lloyd's Register the Zaida was shown to have belonged to Lord Rosebery. There was a batch of ships destroyed in the early part of October by the submarines. On the 2nd a German submarine fired two torpedoes at the small French cruiser Rigel, said by the enemy to have been "built as a submarine-destroyer," and sank her. The first hit was scored about nine o'clock in the morning, and seriously damaged the vessel, one of her stokeholds being flooded and thirteen men killed or blown into the sea. In spite of this, the vessel showed fight, and shelled the submarine each time the latter appeared on the surface. An hour and a half later two French trawlers on patrol came on the scene, and the submarine disappeared, but at 1.30 p.m. the "U"-boat fired a second torpedo at the Rigel, which carried away the greater portion of the vessel abaft, and killed four more of her crew. The Rigel remained afloat, however, and continued to fire at the submarine whenever the wake of the latter was seen.

On October 4 there was a double submarine score to the enemy, when the French transport Gallia and the ex-Cunard liner Franconia were sunk. The Gallia was an auxiliary cruiser in use as a transport, and had on board about 2,000 French and Serbian soldiers, as well as a large crew. In all, about 1,374 men were saved. Of the officers, all but one perished. The torpedo caused an explosion in the powder magazine, and the wireless installation was smashed instantly, thus isolating the cruiser, and it was not until another French vessel came upon some rafts and boats next day that news of the loss was obtained. Two boats were reported by the Ministry of Marine on October 9 to have reached the south coast of Sardinia. The Franconia was likewise employed upon transport duty, but was carrying no troops at the time. Twelve of her crew were missing, and 302 were saved.

When Bulgaria entered the war against the Allies in October, 1915, she was soon made to feel the power of the guns of the combined fleets off the Macedonian coast, and of the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea. These bombardments

were continued at irregular intervals whenever occasion demanded. On January 18, for instance, five Allied warships, including the Italian cruiser Piemonte, bombarded Dedeagatch and Porto Lagos, and it was reported that a detachment landed for reconnoitring purposes at the latter place. In the Bulgarian official report twenty-four units were mentioned as having appeared off Dedeagatch and sixteen off Porto Lagos, these figures doubtless including the auxiliaries and sweepers, etc. On February 2 it was reported from Sofia that attacks from the sea were of almost daily occurrence along this coast, the Bulgarian batteries replying.

When the Bulgarians, in spite of their promises to Greece, entered Kavala on August 25, 1916, they were again quickly harassed by the Fleet. On the same day two British monitors and a cruiser bombarded the forts in the town which the Bulgarians had seized, and on August 28 it was further announced that British monitors had bombarded enemy forces, the presence of which had been reported at the mouth of the Struma. The district behind Kavala was also raided by British naval aircraft. In the first week of the Bulgarian occupation eight attacks with bombs were reported officially by the Admiralty.

Simultaneously with these operations in the air, the Allied Fleet was reported by the enemy to be cruising daily along the Ægean coast before Kavala and Electheran, in the Gulf of Orfano. The ships also had a part to play in the offensive undertaken from Salonika. On several occasions during September, and afterwards, they shelled the enemy in the neighbourhood of Neohori, at the mouth of the river, with satisfactory results. On September 20 it was announced that the Admiral Commanding the Allied Fleet had notified the existence of a blockade between the mouth of the Nestos and the village of Chaiaghizi, which, of course, included the Gulf of Kavala.

As off the coast of Macedonia, so along the Egyptian and Syrian seaboards naval effort was called for on more than one occasion during the year to assist military operations. On May 18 a squadron of ships, in conjunction with aircraft, attacked the town of El Arish, an important post on the enemy line of communications from Syria to Egypt. The fire of the warships was believed to have reduced the fort to the south-west of the town to ruins, and both the ships and aircraft returned safely. There were frequent bombardments of Smyrna. On March 31 forts St. George and Sandjak, with other coastal defences, were reported to have been reduced in an attack lasting three hours by a British warship, to which the Turks made no reply. Add to this the occasional shelling of



FRENCH TROOPS LANDING IN GREECE.
Flags erected on the coast indicated the point of disembarkation for each company.

Sedd-ul-Bahr and other points in the Dardanelles, and it will be seen that, taken all round, the work of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean was considerable in extent and diverse in character.

In the Adriatic Sea no naval operations of first-class importance took place, as the Austro-Hungarian Fleet remained in its protected anchorages, and only the small vessels and aircraft of the enemy undertook operations of an offensive character. In the capture by the Austrians of Mount Lovtchen on January 11 it was reported that several warships participated. The forts and mobile batteries of the Bocche di Cattaro naval base had shelled the height for several days, as had some cruisers in the bay, but it was also reported that two of the Austrian Dreadnoughts were brought into action, the fire from their heavy guns being of great assistance to the enemy.

A few of the chief incidents in the war of attrition, both by sea and air, may be enumerated. On January 13 the French submarine Foucault, working with the Italian forces in the Lower Adriatic, torpedoed and sank an Austrian cruiser of the Novara type in the neighbourhood of Cattaro. On September 17, 1916, the Foucault herself was sunk off the enemy coast after an attack by Austrian seaplanes, her crew being saved by an Austrian torpedo boat. On February 6 a British cruiser and French torpedo boat, engaged in covering the retirement of the Serbian Army, met four enemy destroyers, but as soon as the latter were fired upon they fled towards Cattaro. Next day the same two Allied vessels were attacked by submarine off Durazzo, but the torpedo missed its mark. On February 27 the Austrians took possession of Durazzo, after having been kept back for a little time by the fire of the Allied ships. In spite of bad weather, the Italian Fleet kept the coast roads under fire until all the Italian troops which had been sent there to cover the evacuation of the Serbians were embarked without mishap and taken to Valona. Not a single Italian gun was left behind at Durazzo. On March 18 the French destroyer Renaudin was torpedoed and sunk by a hostile submarine; and on May 4 an Austrian destroyer was likewise accounted for by the French submarine Bernouilli. On June 9 the Italian transport Principe Umberto was sunk by submarine in the Lower Adriatic, with the loss of about half the troops on board, the number of whom was not revealed. On July 10 the Italian destroyer Impetuoso was torpedoed and sunk by a submarine in the Lower Adriatic, nearly all her crew being saved. On August 2 the Austrian torpedo gunboat Magnet was torpedoed in the Upper Adriatic by an Italian submarine, but was able, according to the enemy report, to reach harbour. Next day the loss of the Italian submarine Giacinto Pullino was officially reported. So the guerilla warfare proceeded, with no apparent advantage on either side, the relative position of the opposed fleets being much as it was before.

The Austrians were not able, however, to gain much from the immense advantages which Nature had conceded to the Dalmatian coast for such operations. With its numerous bays, gulfs, islands, and deep waters, this seaboard presented opportunities for torpedo work denied to the Italians. As Rear-Admiral Mazzinghi wrote in describing the work of the Royal Italian Navy:

> The chain of islands which extends along the Dalmatian coast permits the Austrian ships to leave from that point of their own coast nearest that portion of the opposing coast which they wish to attack, to arrive in less than three hours at the point designated, and in another three hours to be secure in their own base. . . . Nor is it necessary that the enemy ships return to the same points of the coast from which they set out. Ships that sailed from Sebenico, for instance, may re-enter by a large number of different routes, or they may go to Pola, Spalato, Zara, in the Quarnarolo, or put themselves in safety behind the Curzolari, or enter at Cattaro. Instead, our ships can only go out or come in from Venice or Brindisi. It is clear how all this constitutes a very great advantage for Austria, a real disadvantage for us. Should we wish to lay snares for the enemy ships, we should be compelled to disseminate mines and submarines on every point of the enemy's coast. Austria, with a much smaller number of these arms, can strongly threaten the movements of our ships. And we have already said how much more easily the submarine can lie in wait on our coasts than on those of our enemy.

Evidence of the daring and skill of the Italian seamen was afforded by two raids into the enemy's bases. On May 28 an Italian torpedo boat approached the entrance to the port of Trieste, which must have necessitated a strong mine belt being negotiated in the Gulf of Trieste. Penetrating into the harbour, the boat torpedoed and sank a large transport. The Austrians at once turned on their shore searchlights, but failed to detect the raider while she was within range, and the torpedo boat returned without a scratch. The second raid was even more bold in conception. On the night of November 1, said the Italian official statement, some torpedo boats, after having successfully crossed the mined zone, and razed with admirable coolness the solid obstruc-



PROTECTION AGAINST SUBMARINE MENACE.
Guns in Liners.

tions defending the Fasana Straits—the approach from the north to Pola—succeeded in entering the usual anchorage of part of the Austrian Fleet. Two torpedoes were then discharged against one of the large enemy units, but they were seen to be caught in the vessel's torpedo nets. For two hours the torpedo boats remained reconnoitring a few hundred yards from the powerful forts of Pola, only retiring after having accomplished a very delicate mission. In the same announcement as that in which the foregoing exploit was revealed, mention was made of a curious encounter between an armoured train and

VICE-ADMIRAL A. V. KOLCHAK,
Russian Commander-in-Chief in the Black Sea.

three Austrian destroyers. The latter appeared before Sant Elpidio (south of Ancona) at dawn on November 5 and opened fire on this tract of coast. An Italian armoured train was rushed to the scene and compelled them to retire, two destroyers being hit.

The only British warship losses reported from the Adriatic during the first two years of war were two drifters employed on patrol duties. The British Admiral reported that on July 9, 1916, the Austrian cruiser Novara came upon a group of such drifters, of which the Astrum Spei and the Clavis were sunk and the Frigate Bird and Ben Bui damaged, but not sufficiently to prevent them returning to port. The crew of the Astrum Spei were made prisoners by the Austrians, and among the other boats there were ten killed and eight wounded.

On August 2, 1916, the Italians sustained a serious misfortune when their Dreadnought battleship Leonardo da Vinci was destroyed by fire and explosion in Taranto harbour. The warship was moored in a position sheltering her from all possibility of hostile attack, when fire broke out near the aft magazine, and although the flooding of the magazine prevented the entire destruction of the vessel, a series of explosions occurred, and she foundered in about three-quarters of an hour, about 250 lives being lost.

In the Baltic the year 1916 was less eventful than its predecessor. There was no renewal of the German amphibious operations in the Riga sector, and the Allied submarines, having called down upon themselves the feverish and frantic efforts of the enemy, were less able to score against his warships or commercial vessels. The Russian Fleet, however, fulfilled completely all the tasks demanded of it, and, as already stated, its strength was augmented. In the course of an interview which was quoted at length in the Russian Supplement of *The Times* on March 25, Vice-Admiral Kanin, then Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Baltic Fleet, said that the fundamental strategic picture was amply clear, his Fleet being a continuation of the extreme flank of the Army, protecting it against envelopment by the German Fleet. As Paris was saved on the Marne, so in the Riga Gulf the struggle for the approaches to Petrograd terminated in favour of the Russians. "What would be the situation of the Army," asked the Admiral, "if the Germans now occupied Riga and the entire Gulf of Riga?" Vice-Admiral Kanin also commended the services of the British submarines, and remarked on the excellent bearing and coolness of their officers.

There was an indication that winter conditions, which, of course, precluded a good many movements in the Baltic, were passing when it was reported on March 19 that British submarines were going through the Cattegat on their way to the Baltic. One of them on this day stopped the Norwegian steamer Kong Inge, off Falkenberg, and put a prize crew on board her—the first time, it was understood, that an under-water craft had adopted this method prescribed by the law of detaining and searching a ship for contraband. The steamer was ordered to Leith for examination in the Prize Court, and arrived there on the 22nd. On May 16 three steamers were sunk by a Russian submarine, the Hera, Kollga, and Bianca, all trading from Hamburg. On the 22nd three more steamers, the Pera, Hebe, and Worms, were reported sunk. On May 17 the German steamer Trave, from Lübeck to Norway with coal, was torpedoed off Kullen, in the Cattegat, by an Allied submarine, her crew being saved, as were those of all the other vessels destroyed. The extensive use of mines by the Germans, in their efforts to curb the submarine activity, led to international questions arising with the Scandinavian Powers. In the middle of February the enemy began to lay a new minefield along the Falsterbo reef, and several

Swedish vessels suffered loss or damage in consequence. On March 15 it was reported that a minefield was to be laid down to the south-west of the Drogdens lightship, at the south end of the Sound; and in the following month Norwegian journals stated that the German Navy had stopped the international passage south of the Sound, not merely by the usual mine obstructions, but also by steel nets designed to entrap submarines going through to the Baltic. Danish torpedo craft were set to watch that the obstructions were not placed in their territorial waters.

In the main, the naval operations in the Baltic divided themselves into three phases—the work of the submarines on either side, those of Germany including minelaying in the Gulf of Bothnia and elsewhere among their activities; cross-raiding by the opposed naval aircraft; and the assistance rendered to the armies in the coast region. In all three categories there were no events of exceptional importance to chronicle. The Russians proved their efficiency in all respects. On July 2 certain of their ships, including the Slava, supported the right wing of the Army near Riga, shelling the enemy's lines to good purpose, in spite of aircraft attacks. Early in September, too, the Germans reported that Russian vessels had bombarded the north coast of Courland.

There were two events in June which came outside the ordinary work just referred to. One was an action on June 30, fifteen miles off Landsort, between Russian and German light craft and destroyers. The Russians announced that a detachment of several of their cruisers and torpedo boats, searching for enemy forces between the island of Gothland and the Swedish coast, discovered no big naval unit, but at daybreak they were attacked by a flotilla of torpedo boats, which were easily driven off. Attacks by German submarines were likewise unsuccessful, and the Russians returned to their base without loss and without having been damaged. The affair was thus of an indecisive character, but demonstrated afresh the capable handling of the ships by the seamen under Vice-Admiral Kanin. In October it was revealed that this officer had relinquished command in the Baltic. He was appointed a member of the Council of the Empire. He was succeeded by Vice-Admiral Nepenin. The second occurrence referred to was a daring attack on a German convoy on June 13. The convoy consisted of thirteen or fourteen merchantmen. and was escorted

VIEW OF THE HARBOUR OF TREBIZOND,
Showing Russian ships and captured Turkish vessels.



[Heath

CAPTAIN CYRIL FULLER.
Awarded the D.S.O. for distinguished service in Cameroon. He also received the C.M.G.

LIEUT. H. FIRMAN.
Killed in a gallant attempt to get through with a relief ship to Kut-el-Amara.

VICE-ADMIRAL SIR R. WEMYSS.
Mentioned in Sir Percy Lake's despatch, Persian Gulf. He gave much useful advice and cooperation.

by the auxiliary cruiser Herrmann and some torpedo boats. The cruiser and four of the torpedo boats were destroyed, as well as four or five of the merchantmen, the rest taking shelter in Swedish waters. The Germans, in admitting the loss of the Herrmann, said that she was attacked by four Russian destroyers and set on fire, when her own crew blew her up to avoid capture. About one-third of those on board were rescued and made prisoners.

In the Black Sea the Russian Fleet fully maintained the ascendency it had established over the naval forces of Turkey and Bulgaria. In the few encounters which took place, mostly between small craft, the enemy's vessels were invariably outclassed and frequently suffered loss; while in the advance of the Army of the Caucasus, under the Grand Duke Nicholas, the Fleet cooperated very effectively along the coast, and by turning the enemy's flank made possible the capture of Trebizond. The Goeben made occasional appearances, but her menace had been considerably reduced, and she caused no interference with the movements of the Russians. Our Ally's control of the waters of the Black Sea made itself increasingly felt upon the economic condition in Turkey, and viewed broadly the course of events was an abundant demonstration of the value of sea command.

The chief naval events were undoubtedly those connected with the support of the Army of the Caucasus. From about the beginning of February the Russian ships began a close search of the Asiatic coast, and at frequent intervals bombardments of the Turkish positions were carried out. The communications oversea having been made doubly secure, troops were transported to Atina and landed there on March 4, under cover of a heavy fire from the ships. This place is some sixty miles east of Trebizond, towards which the Turkish Army was falling back. Simultaneously, a flotilla of torpedo boats raided the shipping at Trebizond. During the next few days the cooperation of the Fleet proved invaluable. As the Petrograd Correspondent of *The Times* wrote on March 7, "the able coordination of the naval and military operations, in which the Fleet turned the Turkish flank, conferred on the Russians a big advantage, resulting in the enemy's discomfiture." The ultimate sequel was the capture of the important seaport of Trebizond, on April 18, in announcing which the official report stated that "the successful cooperation of the Fleet permitted us to effect the most daring landing operations, and to give continual artillery support to the troops which were operating in the coastal region."

As in other theatres of naval war, mines and submarines were actively employed by the enemy, but to little or no purpose. The chief victims of the submarines were two hospital ships, the Portugal being sunk on March 30, and the Vperiod, which had replaced her, on July 9. From the former 115 persons were lost, including fourteen ladies of the Red Cross, and about fifty surgeons or doctors. As the Russian official statement showed, the circumstances of the attack absolutely precluded all possibility of any mistake having been made by the submarine. The Portugal was proceeding to the port of Ofou to embark wounded, and was lying stopped in the vicinity of Cape Fathia to enable one of the small craft that accompanied her to effect some trifling

repairs, when two torpedoes were discharged at her, one of which took effect. The Vperiod was likewise on her way from Batum, unescourted, to take wounded on board. She had all the usual distinctive marks, in spite of which she was sunk. A few casualties from mines were also caused, chiefly to merchant shipping.

The Russian torpedo craft—both surface vessels and submarines—in addition to assisting in the sweeping away of Turkish maritime trade, made several attacks on the enemy as occasion demanded. It was evidently due to their alertness and efficiency that the wanton attacks of the Turkish cruisers on undefended coast towns—such as the shelling of the Crimean health resort of Eupatoria, thirty miles north of Sebastopol, on May 7—were not more frequent.

As in the Baltic, there was a change in the chief command of the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea during the year. Early in August it was announced that Vice-Admiral A. V. Kolchak had been appointed Commander-in-Chief in succession to Admiral A. E. Eberhard, who was placed on the retired list, for reasons of ill-health, and appointed a member of the Council of the Empire. Admiral Kolchak was stated to be the youngest admiral in the Russian Navy. He was born in 1874, entered the naval service in 1891, and on April 10, 1916, was promoted to Rear-Admiral and confirmed in a high independent command in the Baltic. He particularly distinguished himself at the defence of Port Arthur

It remains to deal with the operations in the outer oceans in which the Royal Navy was concerned. These were all connected with military undertakings, either for the conquest of German colonies or for maintaining British interests and defending our territory against the Turks. The last of the German commerce raiders had been cleared off the seas in 1915, and with the exception of the cruise of the Möwe, already described, each attempt to revive this species of attack failed. The last of the regular warships employed in destroying commerce to be accounted for was the Dresden, which was caught and sunk off the island of Mas-a-Tierra, in the Juan Fernandez group, on March 14, 1915. After the Falklands battle on December 8, 1914, the Dresden was pursued by the Bristol, but had got a good start of her. The Dresden apparently went to Sandy Point, in the Magellan Straits, and there violated Chilean neutrality by coaling for a second time in Chile within three months, and by remaining longer than 24 hours. For the next three months the vessel hid herself in the labyrinth of inlets and channels of Southern Chile. The Santiago (Chile) correspondent of *The Times*, in a message dated March 21, said that:

During this time she was being sought by the Kent, Glasgow, Bristol, and Carnarvon, and the armed transports Orama and Otranto. Though from time to time it was reported that our ships knew where she was, yet they were never able to catch her outside Chilean waters, and she was able to take advantage of the uninhabited nature of the country in which she was hiding to evade any attempts made by Chile to notify her that she must go out or be interned. On one occasion when our ships had marked her down the Chilean Government sent a

THE CONQUEST OF CAMEROON.
Nigeria troops landing from transport.

man-of-war to notify her, but by the time the man-of-war arrived she had been able to move elsewhere.

At the beginning of March, simultaneously with activity on the part of several interned German steamers on the coast, the Dresden came out of hiding, and on the 9th she sank the merchant ship Conway Castle with her cargo of grain near Juan Fernandez. The cruiser reached the latter place—so well known for its association with "Robinson Crusoe"—short of coal, and was stated to have called for supplies from the steamers interned at Valparaiso, two of which, the Alda and Sierra Cordoba, left soon afterwards. On March 14, however, the British cruisers Glasgow and Kent, with the auxiliary cruiser Orama, commanded respectively by Captains John Luce (Senior Officer), John D. Allen, and John R. Segrave, sighted the Dresden in Cumberland Bay, in the island of Mas-a-Tierra, and immediately opened fire upon her. Within five minutes the Dresden hauled down her colours and displayed the white flag, sending a boat to inform the captain of the Glasgow that he was violating Chilean neutrality. Captain Luce was reported to have said that it was a matter for diplomacy to arrange, and the Dresden must surrender, which she did. After she had been burning for some little time, her magazine exploded and she sank—the Germans claiming to have destroyed her themselves to avoid capture. The German crew were interned on an island called Quiriquina, in Talcahuano Bay. On March 26 the Chilean Minister in London protested to the British Government against the infringement of Chilean territorial rights by the British squadron, and on the 30th Sir Edward Grey, in view of the delay that would have been involved in clearing up the facts, and of the terms of the Chilean Note, which was friendly in tone, offered a full apology for the incident. The correspondence was issued for publication on April 15, 1915. The German Minister at Santiago de Chile sent to the Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs a note replying to the facts set forth in the British Note to Chile in regard to the Dresden, but he was informed that, in view of the fact that the German Government had not yet (June 19, 1915) answered the Chilean Note protesting against the previous activity of the Dresden off the Chilean coast, no opinion could be expressed on the later question.

The expedition of the Anglo-Indian force



ON LAKE NYASSA.
The s.s. "Queen Victoria" on the way to Abercorn.

THE CAPITAL, GERMAN EAST AFRICA.
Dar-Es-Salaam and Harbour.

which in the autumn of 1914 was dispatched to Mesopotamia—to secure, as Mr. Asquith said, the neutrality of the Arabs, to safeguard our interests in the Persian Gulf, to protect the oilfields, and generally to maintain the authority of our flag in the East—is a story in itself. The Navy's part in it was of an important and diverse character, and shed lustre on the traditions of the Service. In particular, the heroic sacrifice of Lieutenant-Commander Edgar C. Cookson, V.C., D.S.O., in his attempt to cut through the Turkish river obstructions; and the gallantry of the men in the relief ship Julnar, which endeavoured to get through to Kut-el-Amara under the command of Lieutenant H. O. B. Firman, stand out as glorious deeds in an unfortunate enterprise. The Senior Naval Officer of the flotilla on the Tigris was Captain Wilfrid Nunn, to whom Vice-Admiral Sir Richard Peirse, Commander-in-Chief in the East Indies, said in his dispatch of January 10, 1916, that much credit was due for having effected the retreat from Ctesiphon in the face of a much superior force with so little loss.

The abandonment of the Comet and Firefly [said the Admiral] was unavoidable, and was accomplished in a highly seamanlike manner under heavy fire. Sir Richard Peirse was succeeded during the year by Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn E. Wemyss, to whom, as well as to Captain Nunn and Commander C. R. Wason, General Sir Percy Lake, in his dispatch dated August 12, 1916, said he was indebted for much useful advice and cordial cooperation. These and other officers of the Royal Navy had "afforded us the able assistance which we have become accustomed to receive from them."

The successful campaign against Cameroon, which terminated with the capitulation of the German garrison at Mora on February 18, 1916, was also contributed to by the French and British Navies. Captain Cyril T. M. Fuller was the Senior Naval Officer throughout the campaign, and in the *London Gazette* of July 28, 1916, he was awarded the D.S.O. in recognition of the ability and success with which he organized the naval operations. He had already been awarded the C.M.G. on January 1, 1915. A blockade of the coast of Cameroon was enforced by the Franco-British squadron from midnight on April 23–24, 1915, to midnight on February 29–March 1, 1916. Help of another character was also rendered by naval guns on

shore. One heavy naval weapon was transported 700 miles to the siege of Garua—a splendid feat of skill and endurance. This gun was in charge of Lieutenant Louis H. Keppel Hamilton, R.N., who had previously commanded the river flotilla which drove the Germans out of Dehane at the end of December, 1914. His detachment with the heavy gun transported it 160 miles up the lower reaches of the Niger river, thence 480 miles up the Benue river, and 60 miles by land, and contributed in large measure to the success of the operations which culminated in the surrender of Garua on June 10, 1915. Lieutenant Hamilton was awarded the D.S.O. on September 24, 1915.

After the fall of Cameroon there remained only one other German colony still unconquered, German East Africa. In the successful operations against this territory the Royal Navy had, if anything, an even larger share than against Cameroon. A blockade of the coast was established as from midnight on February 28-March 1, 1915. On August 19, 1915, two whalers under the command of Commander the Hon. R. O. B. Bridgeman, penetrated into Tanga harbour and endeavoured, though subjected to a heavy and accurate fire, to carry out their orders and board the s.s. Markgraf. In awarding the D.S.O. to Commander Bridgeman the Admiralty said that the manner in which this attempt was made "was worthy of the best traditions of the Royal Navy." On April 11, 1916, two whalers under Commander H. D. Bridges proceeded into Sudi harbour, and remained under fire in a very hot corner, spotting the fall of shot from the cruiser Hyacinth to enable her to destroy a storeship which was in the harbour. In order to reach the requisite position, the whalers were obliged to run up a narrow harbour, where they were confronted with a heavy fire from 4-in. guns at close range. Commander Bridges received the D.S.O. (on July 14, 1916, the same time as Commander Bridgeman) for his services on this occasion. In the advance of General Smuts the Navy cooperated with well-arranged movements, the ports on the coast being captured from the sea as the army advanced. Tanga was occupied on the morning of July 7, 1916, and Sadani on August 1. On August 31 it was reported that "in the coastal area columns are moving on Dar-es-Salaam in cooperation with several ships of the Royal Navy, which have been engaged with the German coast defences about Konduchi (north of Dar-es-Salaam) and in the vicinity of the capital itself." The outcome of this was the report, telegraphed from Zanzibar on September 4 by Rear-Admiral E. F. B. Charlton, Commander-in-Chief on the Cape Station, that "Dar-es-Salaam surrendered at 9 a.m. Our naval forces, in cooperation with our troops from Bagamojo and Sadani, are now engaged in occupying the town, the former seat of Government and capital of the German Protectorate." Later details showed that at daylight on September 3 a close attack was begun by the naval forces, in whalers, in conjunction with a heavy bombardment of the enemy's positions north of the town and the advance of the troops from the direction of Bagamojo. Landings were effected at Konduchi and Msassani Bays (to the north). The enemy troops then evacuated the town, which was occupied by combined naval and military forces. The obstructions placed in the channel of the harbour were then removed. On September 7 naval and marine forces, with military landing parties, occupied the ports of Kilwa Kivinje (about 140 miles south of Dar-es-Salaam) and Kilwa Kissiwani (twelve miles farther south), which were surrendered under the threat of a naval bombardment.

Our Portuguese Allies rendered effective help in the conquest of German East Africa. An official telegram from Lourenco Marques announced that a naval force from their cruiser Adamastor landed on May 21, 1916, with two 1½-in. guns and two machine guns at a point on the Rovuma River. They attacked the German positions on the left bank of the river, the enemy fortifications and the native huts being burnt. The Germans retired without fighting.

Closely connected with the East Africa operations was the gunboat fighting on Lake Tanganyika. The enemy was reported to have four armed steamers on this lake, and to destroy them a naval expedition was organized and equipped with a fleet of specially-constructed armed boats sent out from England. Until the arrival of this flotilla the Germans practically dominated Lake Tanganyika. They could transport at will war material of various kinds from the railway terminus at Ujiji to various points along the Congo-Rhodesia-Nyasaland frontiers. The presence of the British gunboats altered this state of things completely. On December 26, 1915, the

German armed steamer Kingani was attacked by two British motor-boats, and forced to surrender after an action lasting ten minutes, the prize being brought into port in a sinking condition. All the German officers, including the captain, who had formerly belonged to the Königsberg, were killed. The captured boat was renamed the Fife, and in company with the Mimi, one of the British motor-boats, she fought and sank the Hedwig von Wissmann, on Wednesday, February 9, 1916. This German vessel was manned by a crew of fourteen, including nine from the Königsberg, and twelve survivors were afterwards picked up. It was reported that the Belgian gunboat Alexandre Delcommune assisted the British. A third enemy vessel to be accounted for was the Graf von Gotzen, which the Belgian Ministry of the Colonies announced on August 2, 1916, had been surprised on the morning of July 28, while disembarking troops, by the Belgian gunboat Netta, commanded by Lieutenant Lenaerts. The von Gotzen was destroyed after fifteen minutes' fighting, without any loss to the Belgians: She was the largest vessel of the German lake flotilla, and her destruction marked the end of the enemy fleet on Lake Tanganyika.

Dispatches from Sir G. Smith, the Governor of the Nyasaland Protectorate, covering military operations there from August, 1914, to October, 1915, were published on August 3, 1916, in a supplement to the *London Gazette*, and showed that in this remote region also the British Navy had been represented in the fighting. In March, 1915, a naval detachment under Lieutenant-Commander G. H. Dennistoun, R.N., with naval guns, reached the Protectorate, and as reports were received that the Germans were repairing the German steamer Hermann von Wissmann—which had been disabled while on the stocks at Sphinxhaven, Lake Nyasa, at the beginning of the war—a joint naval and military force, under Captain Collins, went to Sphinxhaven, on May 30, 1915. The enemy's position was captured, and the steamer completely disabled by dynamite charges. Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. P. Hawthorn, commanding the troops in Nyasaland, requested that the services of Lieutenant-Commander Dennistoun might be brought to the notice of the Lords of the Admiralty. "In addition,"

ON THE RIVER TIGRIS, PERSIAN GULF.

The Turkish gunboat "Marmariss" after the Turks had run her aground and deserted her.

TORPEDO BOATS IN THE NORTH SEA.

said the Colonel, "to the admirable manner in which he carried out the expedition to Sphinxhaven on May 30, 1915, his cordial cooperation at all times has been invaluable in overcoming difficulties."

In the course of a message on the second anniversary of Britain's entry into the war, Mr. Balfour, in a review of naval work, said that the German Press bade the German public to take comfort from an attentive study of the map. "See," they said, "how much enemy territory both in the East and in the West the armies of the Father-land occupy; see—and take heart." The amount of comfort, however, which the study of maps is capable of conveying depends partly on the maps you choose, remarked Mr. Balfour:

> Even the map of Europe shows an ever-shrinking battle-line. But why look only at Europe? Germany for twenty years has advertised itself as a great colonial Power; and it was to conquer and maintain its position as a great colonial Power that German fleets were built. Let us, then, choose a map which contains her oversea Empire. At the beginning of August, 1914, Germany possessed colonies in the China Seas, in the Malay Archipelago, in the Pacific Ocean, in West Africa, in South-West Africa, in East Africa. All have gone except the last; and the last whilst I write seems slipping from her grasp. The Navy has not conquered them; in the actual fighting by which they have been or are being acquired the Navy has taken a very important yet not the leading part. But without the British Navy to contain the German Fleet, the operations which bid fair to strip Germany of every one of her oversea possessions could not have been successful—could not even have been attempted.

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CHAPTER CLIV.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME (II.).

JULY 10, 1916—THE ATTACK ON MAMETZ WOOD—ITS CAPTURE BY WELSH TROOPS—TRÔNES WOOD—THE FRENCH SOUTH OF THE SOMME—GERMAN PRISONERS—BRITISH MASTERY OF THE AIR—STRATEGIC POSITION ON JULY 13—GENERAL JACOB AND GENERAL BIRDWOOD—THE GREAT BATTLE OF JULY 14—FRANCE'S DAY—THE TWO BAZENTINS—SOUTH AFRICANS AT DELVILLE WOOD—CAPTURE OF OVILLERS - LA BOISSELLE—FRANCO-BRITISH COOPERATION—BATTLE OF JULY 20—THE ATTACK ON POZIÈRES—WORK OF THE FIRST ANZAC CORPS—"THE WINDMILL"—CAPTURE OF POZIÈRES—RESULTS FROM JULY 1 TO JULY 26.

CHAPTER CLI. took the narrative of the Battle of the Somme up to the preparatory measures for the attack on Mametz Wood. It was on July 10 that the expulsion of the Germans from this stronghold began. The garrison obtained some help from their artillery farther back from the Quadrangle and from a machine-gun emplacement near Acid Drop Copse, but otherwise had to depend on their own exertions.

The German gunners in the background were deceived into believing that the eastern edge was most in danger, and consequently the barrage of German shells was sent down between it and Marlboro' Wood. But our real attack was delivered from the south and also against the Quadrangle position. So long as the redoubt at the east end of the Quadrangle Support Trench was not won, an advance up the northern part of Mametz Wood would be very difficult, if not impossible.* It was, therefore, necessary to take it, and all day long desperate fighting for its possession went on. By nightfall it was in the possession of Welsh troops.

Our artillery prepared the way by a devastating fire directed on the wood, and kept carefully ahead of the advancing infantry, which could be seen moving forward in scattered parties towards the southern edge. The German machine-guns at that point were destroyed or buried, and our artillery lifted their range on to the northern edge of the enemy's second line and positions beyond it. Gradually the garrison, or rather what remained of it, withdrew to the upper part of the wood, followed by our ardent and cheering infantry and by the Pioneers, who wired and entrenched the positions immediately after they were taken. At sunset the British line ran along an open drive and the railway which ran through the wood. During the night the enemy vainly counter-attacked. How the contest was regarded by the Germans may be fairly imagined from the entry under July 10 in Colonel Bedall's diary already referred to:

> July 10.—There was very heavy fighting in the Mametz Wood in which No. 1 section of the machine-gun company of the 16th Regiment suffered the exceptionally great loss, by a direct hit, of 15 men and one platoon commander killed and 12 men wounded.
>
> Towards evening a furious struggle began in Mametz Wood. This lasted the entire night until the morning. The 3rd Battalion of the 16th Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the Lehr Regiment were heavily engaged.
>
> To-day a draft of 300 men arrived from the recruit battalion. Each battalion received 100 men to make up for losses.
>
> Bazentin-le-Grand was repeatedly shelled to-day, but during the night less so than usual.

At break of day (July 11) the four Welsh battalions in Mametz Wood pushed onwards to east, north-east, north and south-west. Under

* See small map, Vol. IX., p. 493.

[Official photograph.

AUSTRALIAN TROOPS BRINGING UP A HEAVY GUN.

the hottest fire from *minenwerfer*, machine-guns and rifles our men got within 50 yards of the edge. Yet the narrow strip could not be passed except at the price of too great losses. Orders were given for a retreat to the drive and railway trenches, and our artillerymen were requested to concentrate their fire on the position, which had stopped our advance into the open. For half an hour the northern and north-eastern edge and eastern edge of the wood seemed to be convulsed with struggling men. That anything could live in this inferno seemed impossible. Nevertheless, at the north-east and north-west angles, machine-gunners remained entrenched, and when the British once more went forward through the fallen timber they were met with a hail of bullets. Not until 4 p.m. was the north-east corner, with its *minenwerfer* and machine-guns captured. Later in the day the north-west corner was secured, and by nightfall nearly every German in Mametz Wood was killed or a prisoner. We were within less than 300 yards of the German second line position. The bulk of the prisoners taken came from the 3rd Reserve Division of the Prussian Guard and the 16th Bavarian and 122nd Wurtemburg Regiments. The Wurtemburgers had been brought from the Russian front. They had arrived four days before and complained of the bad weather and of the poor food now supplied to them.

"What sort of a time have you had in Contalmaison?" inquired a war correspondent of a German soldier who, in (for him) happier times, had been a cabinet-maker in the Tottenham Court Road. "Hell, perfect hell," was his answer. "The artillery fire was terrific. I never thought you English could do it."

The last sentence revealed the dominant feeling of the nation-in-arms which had been taught for two generations to regard peaceful projects with contempt and peace as merely an interlude in a perpetual warfare for existence. That British men, mere cricketers and football players, should, in under two years, have been made into warriors more than a match for the pick of the German Army; that the manufacturers and chemists of Great Britain should in the same period have mastered the gunner's craft and surpassed the skill of Krupp was quite incredible. The Germans had fought bravely and even stubbornly, but they felt themselves beaten at their own game.

The centre of the German first line had been broken. To the north and south of Contalmaison and the Mametz Wood the battle continued to rage. In the neighbourhood of

Ovillers, a shapeless mass of ruins, its chalk foundations tunnelled and honeycombed with deep dug-outs, the Prussian Guards still held out.

The road from Ovillers to Contalmaison had been secured by, among others a battalion of a South Country Regiment, which had been relieved on the 9th. During the two preceding days it had been fighting in a quagmire of yellowish-white mud, so tenacious that the very boots of the men stuck in it and had often to be wrenched off. The German soldiers, if not the officers, who appear to have remained in the background of the battle, had proved tough opponents. "These fellows," observed an officer, "fight like blue glory. I can't think how some of our people at home have got it into their heads that we are up against old men and immature lads. All the men we have fought have been fellows of fine physique. There have been exceptions, of course, but the old Boche is still a sticker and stands a lot of beating before he will hand in his checks." As *The Times* Military Correspondent had remarked, it was a tribute to the quality of our troops that some of the finest fighting material in the enemy's armies had been detailed to stem the British advance. Against a less tenacious foe they would probably have succeeded. But our men were made of sterner stuff. One of them, for example, carrying bombs, had crawled up to a machine-gun emplacement and blown up gun and crew. The captain of another regiment had continued to lead his company after being hit in the heel, thigh and arm. Finally he fell pierced through the chest. Of deeds like these there were many.

Two and a half miles to the east of the Mametz Wood, away to the right of Montauban,



[*Official photographs.*

BEHIND THE LINES.

Trench-mortar ammunition. Smaller picture: Taking the ammunition up to the trenches.



[Official photograph.

GUNS IN ACTION AGAINST CONTALMAISON.

more stiff fighting had taken place. The Trônes Wood, through which lay the direct route to the important fortified area of Longueval, in the German second line, had been elaborately prepared for defence. At an enormous expense of labour, a labyrinth of interlacing trenches and redoubts had been constructed. Our troops had entered this nest of machine-guns, and fierce had been the struggles there. Time after time they had had to meet and repel determined charges. On the evening of the 10th it almost seemed as if they would be expelled from their dearly-won trenches and driven down the slopes towards Hardecourt. But fortunately the bulldog courage of the British, never better displayed than in such a crisis, did not desert them. They hung on through the night to the skirts of the wood, and on the 11th once more took the offensive. At 8.30 p.m. the British General Headquarter Staff reported that we had gained the whole of the wood with the exception of the northern end.

Up to this date we had captured 26 field guns, one naval gun, one heavy howitzer, an anti-aircraft gun, and over 7,500 prisoners. That the "Archibald" was not an insignificant item in the booty was apparent from the fact that, worsted, as a rule, in aerial duels, the Germans were more and more inclined to pin their faith on such artillery.

While General Haig was driving his wedge through the German first line between the Ancre and Hardecourt, General Foch had not been idle south of the Somme.

Péronne lies in a slight depression. To its west is the plateau of La Maisonnette, facing, on the opposite side of the Somme, the dominating hill of Mt. St. Quentin north of the town. During the night of the 9–10th our Allies, in the Barleux region, captured the trenches between that village and La Maisonnette, together with 950 prisoners, some of whom had been taken on the previous day. On the 10th, in the outskirts of Biaches, a redoubt with 103 men and 10 officers in it fell into the hands of the French. More important than this, after a desperate struggle Hill 97 and the Maisonnette Farm on its summit were at last carried, together with most of a copse to the north of the farm. The disingenuous German account of this action is worth quoting. "South of the Somme," it ran, "a strong attack made by French black troops against the La Maisonnette Height was

[Official photograph.

BRITISH BIG GUNS GOING UP TO THE FRONT.

met by overpowering fire. A few coloured troops who penetrated into our lines fell at the point of the German bayonets or were taken prisoners." The German General Staff forgot to add that the "overpowering fire" and "German bayonets" had not saved the hill and farm from capture. The next day the Germans were entirely dislodged from the copse, and some communication trenches between Estrées and Belloy, in which parties of the enemy still lurked, were occupied. Foch had secured nearly the whole of the loop of the Somme, and was within a few yards of the suburbs of Péronne.

On the 12th Sir Douglas Haig was able to announce that, despite the desperate efforts of the enemy, the whole of the Mametz Wood was in possession of the British, and that two German attacks against Contalmaison had broken down under our fire. The moment approached when the German second line would be breached. We had smashed our way to various depths of from 2,000 to 4,000 yards, reduced five strongly fortified villages, a large number of extraordinarily strong redoubts, and numerous heavily wired and entrenched woods. Altogether the Allies had taken over 20,000 prisoners, a hundred guns, besides many machine-guns and bomb-throwers.

The special correspondent of *The Times* wrote of these events as follows:

"The prisoners are constantly passing through both the French lines and ours in batches, being kept for a while in paddocks enclosed with barbed wire, for the necessary examination, and then, as rapidly as possible, to the rear. Every time that one visits one of these depôts one finds it full of a new lot. And they vary extraordinarily. Many are fine, robust-looking men in the prime of life. As many others are weedy and poor, some old, some very young. And it is by no means the 'best' regiments which are now composed of the best material. I have seen none who looked under-nourished, though many had plainly endured great privations immediately before their capture.

"As for the guns, one meets them on the high roads and being dragged back from the battlefields, and they are being parked for exhibition purposes about Corps and Division and Brigade Headquarters. At a certain Headquarters there is quite a museum being

accumulated on the lawn, which includes already a variety of designs of German trench mortars and the like and a row of *minenwerfer* made almost entirely of wood bound with wire, with the hollowed wooden blocks to take the recoil and the ingenious sundial-like stand of light iron bars to which they are braced forward to prevent them kicking over on discharge. The whole thing is so light that two men can easily carry it about: and they make, at practically no cost, very useful weapons.

"A gentleman who has just returned from a visit to the French Army tells me that German prisoners there said (what we had in effect heard here before) that they all thought that what they had to do was merely to overrun the new British Army—which they would do as soon as they tried conclusions with it—to have the war won. I was with the French Army myself 10 days ago and I know how utterly unlike a beaten army it looks. I never saw an army gayer or more evidently fit and confident. The German prisoners seem to be utterly astounded and disgusted by what they see there; and their spirits are not raised by what they hear of what has been going on with the new British Army. The whole thing, including the fact that the French could hit as hard as they have hit and that our new armies were made of the stuff that



(Official photograph.

GETTING READY FOR ACTION.
A howitzer and its shell.



FROM THE BATTLEFIELD.
Wounded coming back from the Somme.

they have shown themselves to be made of, has evidently been a complete surprise to them.

"By this time I have had the opportunity of familiarizing myself with the events of the earlier days' fighting on the front of practically every brigade in the whole of our line. A few days ago I was very careful to report that at one point the Germans had shown humanity in allowing us to recover our wounded and in taking those of our wounded within their reach back into their trenches. I am sorry to say that this was most exceptional. The contrary (which I have also reported) was the rule. In general, they have bayoneted our wounded and have played machine-guns over the fields where the dead and wounded lay together to make sure that none would fight again. The evidence comes authoritatively from too many quarters to admit of doubt."

Another instance of German brutality was reported by a French paper, the *Journal:*

Six of the soldiers left behind were taken prisoners. The Germans kept them in an advanced trench without giving them bite or sup. Several times a day they were hoisted on to the parapet and thus made the living target for ball and shell, and as their blood flowed their captors would approach them and taunt them with gibes about the meals they had not had.

Of the six unhappy men three died on the fifth day. Of the others who survived and were rescued by their comrades one has since succumbed.

Prisoners and wounded were brought over to England shortly after the great advance. A writer in *The Times* gave a dramatic account of a meeting of two trains near Southampton Docks, the one filled with wounded returning from France, the other with reinforcements going out to make good the losses :

A long Red Cross train, just filled from end to end from one of the hospital ships—casualties from the present offensive in France—was pulling slowly out

[Official photograph.

SCENE NEAR LA BOISSELLE: SHELLS BURSTING IN THE BACKGROUND.

for its run to London. Almost every window served to frame an outward-gazing soldier, officer or man, in ragged, bloodstained, muddy khaki. These were the sitting-up cases, nearly all with heads bandaged or arms in slings.

Just near the dock gates the hospital train met another equally long train coming in, and packed from end to end with fresh troops bound out for France from some English depôt camp. Each of its windows framed not one, but two or three men in khaki, red, lusty faces, well sun-browned, looking out over the close-cropped heads of their mates ; full of eager curiosity and expectation and fresh clean robustness.

For 50 yards or so, and at a foot pace, the two contrasting trains of King George's soldiers glided side by side in an uncanny silence.

The writer watched them from an office window overhead, and could plainly see in the faces of the untried troops their eager interest, their profound respect for their comrades who had been tried. A strange, dumb kind of promise shone out from many of the eyes in those fresh faces. The assured pride, the easy fearlessness of the man who has proved himself in the very teeth of death ; this was marked in the faces of the wounded. But no man spoke a word. Silent and inarticulate, the man to be tried gazed into the faces of the men tried as they were carried past.

Suddenly then, in a rather quavering voice, most singularly vibrant with emotion, a very young lance-corporal, whose right arm was in a white sling, and whose head was swathed in bandages, cried out, in all the sunny silence :

"Are we downhearted ? "

And then the tension snapped. It seemed that hundreds of these brave fellows—coming home and going out—heaved long sighs. All had wanted to give expression to the powerful emotions inspired by the chance juxtaposition of those two trains ; and none had known how. Here was a way. The music of the roar which rose now from the cabined hundreds of both trains was something to penetrate the vitals of a Briton ; to touch with magic of some kind the least impressionable mind in all this realm. Those wonderful rising and falling waves of sound I shall never forget. It was only when the two trains were divided by a gap of fully 200 yards that the music of it died away, slowly in the soft summer air.

Incidents like this showed the spirit of the New Army.

The progress of the Allies to July 12 had been considerable and continuous. It had also, in contrast with earlier operations, been carried out with losses which, upon the whole, may be described as comparatively small. For this there were three reasons. In the first place the cooperation between the artillery and infantry already described had become more and more perfect as the fighting went on. Secondly, the aircraft had become the close allies of both the foot soldiers and the guns. Thirdly, the operations of the Allies were carefully and skilfully planned, and fully adapted to meet the situation. The intimate relationship between the artillery and infantry was not only shown in the way the artillery prepared for the advance of the infantry, but even more in the absolute unison of effort between the gunners and the infantry during the attack. The positions of the German guns were known by means of the aircraft observations and they were carefully battered, reducing many of them to silence and always diminishing the value of their fire. While this was the task of part of the Allied artillery, the rest overwhelmed the trenches with a fire of great severity so that they could hardly be manned. The guns also put a barrier of fire behind the position attacked, to prevent reinforcements coming up to the threatened points, to keep down counter attacks and protect the flanks of the attacking units. Step by step, as the infantry advanced, the artillery changed its target to suit the situation.

The Flying Corps had, as the war progressed, taken a constantly increasing share in the operations. In the first place the boldness of their flights had enormously impressed the German airmen. The latter could no longer roam over the British lines, while ours constantly went over the German, bombing important points, destroying stores and supplies, railway stations and railway trains, even coming down to low altitudes and using their machine-guns in support of our infantry attacks. The proof of the audacity of our flyers was clearly shown by the increasing numbers of casualties among them. Yet these losses had been justified and more than justified by the gains. They had blinded the enemy's observers and increased the range of their own observations. How their activities were regarded by the enemy may be surmised from the statement of a German prisoner describing the bombardment of St. Quentin on July 10 :

At the end of June the 22nd Reserve Division, to which my regiment was attached, was sent to rest in the neighbourhood of St. Quentin. An order came to us on July 10 to proceed to the Somme front. About three o'clock in the afternoon the first battalion of the 71st Reserve Regiment and the 11th Reserve Battalion of Jaegers were in St. Quentin Station ready to entrain. We had placed our arms and equipment in the carriages.

At this moment some British aeroplanes appeared and dropped bombs. One fell on a building full of ammunition and caused a violent explosion. There were 200 ammunition wagons in the station and 60 exploded. The remainder were only saved with difficulty.

The train which was to have carried the troops, together with all the equipment and baggage, was destroyed, in addition to a large quantity of war material stored on the platforms. The men, seized with panic, fled in all directions. A hundred men of the 71st Regiment and 80 men of the 11th Jaegers were killed or wounded. It was not before several hours that it was possible to reassemble the battalion of the 71st Regiment, which was sent to rest, and the next day it

entrained at another station in order to be entirely re-equipped. Afterwards the battalion was sent to Péronne, where it was placed in reserve before going into action.

The enemy's aviators had been thoroughly dominated, defeated continuously in combat and they began to appreciate the Hudibrastic saying:

> He who fights and runs away
> May live to fight another day,
> But he who is in battle slain
> Will never live to fight again.

The German airman's opinion of our airmen is well shown by the following incident related by a member of our Flying Corps:

"Did I tell you the Huns dropped a note yesterday, 'Please give your bloody Flying Corps a rest'? We give them no peace now, and we do offensive patrols up and down their lines."

Crude in form, but graphic.

The Germans had devoted much time to improving their second line of defence, which was threatened by the impending attack. One of their divisional orders of the early part of July which was found by our troops ran: "The conversion of villages into strong points is of the greatest importance. Such villages are Pozières, Contalmaison, Bazentin-le-Petit, Bazentin-le-Grand and Longueval." Contalmaison was lost, but the other villages mentioned in the order were still held.

The working parties of soldiers had been strengthened by forced labour and French and Belgian men, and women too, had been compelled to work at defences from which their countrymen were to be shot down.

The first advance, although considerable in extent and still more considerable in the moral effect it had produced on the German soldiers, had had little or no influence on the average German citizen not in immediate contact with the fighting line. This was due to the always garbled and often mendacious accounts given in the German newspapers. Thus the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* of July 13 published the following remarks:

> Notwithstanding that the battle was very severe—for the enemy attacked in very great superiority and the individual Englishman is a brave and resolute man—our relatively weak infantry has performed superhuman deeds and inflicted losses on the enemy which he will remember. . . . As is natural in a brave army, British losses in officers are also very great, but some educated ones who are able to form an idea of the war said "that cannot hinder us from making ever-renewed attempts to vanquish the Germans," for the hopes of their whole country are bound up with this thought.
>
> Serious as every German became in spirit when we learnt that the armed millions of the Entente were rushing on us in storm attack on all fronts, that the

[*Official photograph.*

BRITISH ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS ON THE WESTERN FRONT.



ON A BOMBING EXPEDITION.

A French aeroplane photographed from another aeroplane while in full flight above the clouds.

Russians sought to overwhelm the weak places on our East front with their masses, that the Austrian had retired in Italy, and that the Anglo-French flood swelled up against us in the West, the course of events has hitherto shown that in this greatest, most mighty moment of the great war our enemies' plans have been brought to naught by the stedfastness, joyful self-sacrifice, and conscious strength of our nation in arms. They fell on us simultaneously in order that we should not throw our troops like shuttles on threatened points —now East, now West. Things have gone all right without that. Imperishable is the heroism of these great days.

Lieutenant Alfred Dambitsch, who was wounded on the Somme, gave a description in the *Vossische Zeitung* of the Allies' tactics in their present offensive. He described the various weapons introduced during the war, such as liquid fire throwers, gas attacks, and submarines, and altogether gave a good idea from the German point of view of the British and French operations:

In this respect the present French and British offensive is the last word. The aim of any offensive in modern warfare is the destruction of the enemy. This is the object of the present offensive, the idea being to enclose us in a tactical ring by simultaneous bombardment with long-range guns from the front and the rear. Accordingly the greedy beast began eating at the back lines of the German front. First of all our third and second trenches were incessantly bombarded, mostly by heavy artillery, of which the enemy had concentrated unprecedented masses in the sector of attack. It was dug-outs which had to be battered down, so that at the moment of assault all the defenders, except a few survivors, and all the machine-guns might be buried. Our second and third trenches were bombarded in order to prevent our bringing up reserves. For the same reason all the communication trenches leading from the rear to the front position were kept under incessant fire. On the Somme every one of our columns had a good communication trench which led from the headquarters of the battalion to the front trench.

But the attack against our front from the rear extended still further. All the main and side roads and all the cross-roads were kept under fire so that approaching troops, munitions, supplies, and provisions had to pass through several lines of fire. Bombarding villages and places behind the front where the various reserves are supposed to be quartered is an old trick of the British and French, but this time the principle was carried out more consistently and recklessly than ever. All places up to a distance of 10 miles behind the front were brought under incessant heavy artillery bombardment, which often started actual fires, thanks to the incendiary shells used by the enemy.

The battering down of our advanced trenches was almost exclusively left to the heavy artillery and trench mortars, especially the latter. The French have made great improvements in this weapon lately. For the destruction of our trenches they exclusively employed those of the heaviest calibre, and they now throw their mines with greater accuracy and over longer ranges than formerly. Opposite my company not fewer than six mortars were placed. They were worked uninterruptedly, throwing hundreds of aerial torpedoes on our position from the first to the third trenches. They tore up our wire obstacles from the ground, poles and all, and threw them all over the place, crushing

[Elliott & Fry.

LIEUT.-GENERAL C. W. JACOB, C.B.
In command of the Second Army Corps.

the dug-outs if they fell on them, and damaging the trenches. In a very short time great portions of our trenches had been flattened out, partly burying their occupants. This fire lasted for seven days, and finally there came a gas attack, also of an improved kind.

Although the offensive was made by great masses of infantry and had been prepared with all the latest improvements of the science of war, the attempt to break our line completely failed. Our front is no longer in any danger. Though the attacks still continue we are prepared to meet them. Even to-day, when war is so largely a matter of mechanical contrivances, the old truth still holds good that in the long run it is always the men who are the deciding factor.

The deepest impression left on me was not a feeling of horror and terror in face of these gigantic forces of destruction, but an unceasing admiration for my own men. Young recruits who had just come into the field from home, fresh twenty-year old boys, behaved in this catastrophe ploughing and thundering as if they had spent all their life in such surroundings, and it is partly thanks to them that the older married men also stood the test so well.

July 13 had been uneventful, mainly given up to the preparations for the advance projected for next day. But there was considerable artillery activity on both sides and some infantry fighting by which we made appreciable advances at various points, in addition to which we captured some German howitzers with an appreciable supply of ammunition. South of Ypres and also of the La Bassée Canal raids on our trenches attempted by the enemy were easily driven back.

The strategic position on this date was as follows. The left wing of the Allies from Gommecourt southwards to the Ancre had made little progress. The centre, between the Ancre and the Somme, had carried the enemy's front-line and parts of his second-line position. South of the Somme the right wing of the Allied line formed by the French who were on the left bank of the river had pushed into the loop of the Somme and was almost at the gates of Péronne, thus menacing the communications of the Germans behind their line of trenches.

The Army Corps engaged at the beginning of the Battle of the Somme were stated in Chapter CLI., pages 489–90. Subsequently there were brought into front line the Second Army Corps (Lieut.-Gen. C. W. Jacob, C.B.), which ultimately took Thiépval, and, as will be seen later, the First Anzac Corps (Lieut.-Gen. Sir William R. Birdwood, K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G.).

The difficulties in the path of Haig and Foch will be the better appreciated when it is remembered that, under somewhat analogous circumstances, the Kaiser and Falkenhayn had failed

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR WILLIAM R. BIRDWOOD, K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G.
In command of the First Anzac Corps.

AREA OF THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME, JULY TO OCTOBER, 1916.

[Official photograph.

ANZACS ON THE WESTERN FRONT.
Within the Australian lines.

to pierce the Allied line in the First Battle of Flanders, although it had not been supported with any but the slightest trench work. More recently the Germans had failed before the elaborate defences of the French at Verdun. Yet the British and French, undismayed by the formidable character of the works they had to attack, proposed to pierce them, relying on the capacity of their troops and the greatly increased artillery at their disposal. By their efforts during the first twelve days of July considerable progress had been made, and they were now ready to continue the pressure forward to gain more ground towards the Thiépval-Longueval side.

The next step forward, therefore, was towards Contalmaison, the two Bazentins, Longueval, Delville Wood and Waterlot Farm.

The night of the 13th was very warm and calm. Clouds obscured the sky, but through them the moon and occasional stars were at times visible. Suddenly an arc of flame appeared on the horizon from Contalmaison Villa to Waterlot Farm. An answering ring of fire round our trenches was the immediate reply of the Germans, and the deafening combat of the two artilleries began.

The region of Ovillers—la Boisselle also was so dosed with shells as to give it the appearance of a volcano in eruption, while, far off on the right, a fainter curve of flame showed that the French artillerymen were busy.

About 3 a.m. on the 14th the moon set, and a faint light from the east crept over the battlefield. Half an hour later the illumination from the explosion of our shells somewhat died down. Our fire was being lifted and only the German artillery continued firing. The moment had come for the British movement, and the men leaped out of their trenches and moved steadily forward to assault the German position.

At 4 a.m. aeroplanes mounted into the air, and kite balloons ascended through the low hanging clouds.

Ten minutes later a red glow at the edge of Delville Wood, from which flames shot up, indicated that ammunition stores and "dumps" in Longueval had been set on fire. Dense clouds of smoke, rent in places by the blast of bursting shells, rolled over the ground.

As the Trônes Wood extended south of the British right it had, of course, to be taken. So long as it remained in German hand Longueval, if captured, could be attacked by

THE PIPERS AT LONGUEVAL.

From the Bernafay Wood and the trenches north and east of Montauban a body of Highlanders, preceded by pipers playing "The Campbells are Coming," crossed 1,200 yards of "No Man's Land."

the enemy from below, and it would also be difficult to reduce Waterlot Farm and Guillemont.

Out of the Bernafay Wood and from south and east of it the English infantry, which included men of Sussex, dashed forward. Machine-gun fire forced them to crawl forward on their hands and knees to approach the enemy line. In groups of two or three they slowly got to the edge of the tangled heap of felled trees which now constituted Trônes Wood and set about turning out its defenders. While thus engaged some of our men heard shouts in English from ahead of them. They came from a handful of West Kents who, with some Lewis guns, had been maintaining themselves on the eastern edge of the wood, which they had entered two days before. Separated from our lines by a barrage of shells, they and their captain had dug themselves in, captured 35 prisoners and put out of action some 150 Germans. Aided by this heroic band, our troops step by step drove the Germans from the whole wood, and by 9 p.m. Sir Douglas Haig was able to report that the Trônes Wood was at last entirely in our possession.

From the Bernafay Wood and the trenches north and east of Montauban a body of Highlanders, preceded by pipers playing "The Campbells are Coming," crossed the 1,200 yards of "No Man's Land." Under heavy shell and machine-gun fire, and amidst the smoke created by German smoke-bombs, they charged for the blazing wood-encircled ruins of the village. They were following, as it were, at the heels of a line of bursting shells discharged by the British gunners on the German first-line trenches in front of Longueval. What the shells had not accomplished, the bombs and bayonets of the Scots now achieved.

Forcing their way into the dug-outs, they accounted for most of the defenders who had escaped shrapnel and high explosive. The few who escaped ran off panic-stricken.

Our guns were now dealing with the second of the enemy's trenches; then once more they lifted and the scene was repeated. One-third of this trench ran through Longueval itself, and the fighting which ensued was partly in the village. From a dug-out sprang a German officer, an axe in his hand. "I surrender," he cried in English to a kilted sergeant, at whom, however, he treacherously aimed a blow. The aim missed the head of the sergeant, who promptly bayoneted him. From one building six mitrailleuses continued firing until it was entered and the Germans bombed. Down in the cellars of the house the Germans fought with the desperate courage of trapped animals.

Where the village joins on Delville Wood a redoubt with two field-guns and several machine-guns had been built. There the fighting was especially severe. Reinforcements were hurried through the enemy's barrage of shells, and, after their arrival, the Highlanders entrenched themselves on a line running eastward through the top of the village, across the south-west corner of Delville Wood, then south by the western edge of Waterlot Farm to Trônes Wood, where they connected up with the English infantry. The redoubt, with its field-guns, had not been captured, but a counter-attack of the enemy had been repulsed.

Upon the Highlanders descended a very deluge of projectiles. An officer and his orderly were hit by the shrapnel. A few moments later four gas shells burst hard by the wounded men. The officer may be left to tell what followed:

I tried to move, but the shrap. had got me in the right thigh rather badly, and, apart from that, I felt all the sap trickling out of me as I breathed in the gas. It was like struggling against chloroform, and the last thing I remember was feeling that sleep and stillness were best. I should have slept all right, and been dead in a very few minutes. You'd never guess where I next found myself. I was wedged in the forked branches of a little tree, on the highest ground near, and on the ground below me was my orderly, unconscious, and bleeding a good deal from the flesh wounds in his arms and shoulders that he'd got from the same shrap. that hit the rest of us.

That little chap had carried me 300 yards, over the roughest sort of going, with any number of bullets flying round, and himself running blood from half a dozen flesh wounds. He'd been taught, you see, to make for high ground when gas was about, so before he fainted he'd planted me in that little tree. How he managed it I can't think, because I must be nearly twice his weight, and he's small all round—except in the matter of his heart. I guess that's something over standard in size and quality.

Yes, he's all right now, thank goodness. His wounds were none of them serious—splinters, you know, and he might have been doctored on the other side; but I specially asked if he might come across with me, and he's here now, on this ship. I want to go and see his people with him when I can get about again; and I mean to see his old employer, too, and let him know what sort of a man he's got in J——. He gave up a job in which he was earning £3 10s. a week, and joined up before the end of August, 1914. His grasp of the three R's is pretty weak. He tells me he never used to read even the papers, except to get a bit of news about coursing. He's got a wife and three kids at home, and when he joined he had to give up whippets that were more to him than his stable is to any owner of a string of racehorses.

We went out to France in May, 1915, and J—— has been once home on leave. All the rest of the time he's been in and out of trenches with me, and under fire most of the time. He's never known where his next meal's coming from, and an orderly of mine has a pretty thin time in the matter of sleep, I can tell

you; for I'm up and down the trenches all night, and over the parapet a good deal, looking after wiring jobs and that sort of thing. That chap's carried his life in his hand all the time, and never known as much comfort in the last 14 months as the average working man in England gets every day of his life. He was due for leave before this Push, and indeed he was recalled from the railway station when leave was stopped. But nobody's ever heard him utter a word of complaint; two in the morning or two in the afternoon I've found him always the same smart, cheery, willing soldier, all the time, and always with eyes in the back of his head.

I wish you could tell the people here at home about men like J——. I tell you this New Army of ours is full of them. He hardly knew what I was talking about when I tried to thank him for what he had done for me and praised him a bit for his general behaviour. Honestly, you could see he wondered what I was getting at; half suspected I was chipping him. He was just doing his job. Of course, he does his job. That's the way he looks at it; that's the way all my lads look at it. Makes you think a bit, doesn't it, when you remember they none of them knew anything about soldiering a couple of years ago; and, mark you, nobody told J—— he was to enlist or ought to enlist.

I often used to wonder what our chaps thought out there, when they got hold of a newspaper, in billets, and read about conscientious objectors—and objectors who haven't any conscience. Queer position, isn't it, when you come to think of it? Mind, I'm not talking about the few genuine cranks, or whatever you call them. I'm talking about chaps who never believed in anything much, except the main chance, and having a good time.

And what about the exemptions? Why in the name of common justice should exemption be given to eligible men who have stayed in the background for 20 months, while men, often less eligible, have been facing death to protect them all that time? These exemptions and able-bodied chaps going round after soft jobs in the rear—the toleration of them is an insult to men like my orderly; and the voluntarily enlisted New Armies are made up of his sort.

Towards nightfall the Highlanders stormed the redoubt, but the field-guns had been withdrawn by the Germans. Trônes Wood, Longueval and the southern outskirts of Delville Wood were won.

The two enemy trenches (converging outwards in the centre) between Longueval and Bazentin-le-Grand had, except in the middle, been stripped of their barbed-wire entanglements. A shallow road in front afforded some protection to the assailant. Our troops rapidly carried the eastern and western ends of the trenches. In the centre the uncut wire and six machine-guns held up the advance. The German garrison was now attacked by a Scottish regiment from the direction of Longueval. Our men dropped into the trenches and bombed the machine-guns; and soon the whole of the trenches from Longueval to Bazentin-le-Grand were occupied by the British.

Bazentin-le-Grand had in the last twenty minutes of the bombardment received no less than 2,000 shells. It had been pulverized, and the few Germans left offered little resistance to

Official Photograph.

A HIGHLAND REGIMENT ON ITS WAY TO THE TRENCHES.

[*Official Photographs.*

IN A FRONT-LINE TRENCH.

A Lewis gun in action.

Circle picture: Machine-gunners, wearing gas-helmets, firing against a German trench.

the Irish attacking it. In a large cellar under one farm a considerable number of German wounded were taken. Some heavy howitzers also were secured.

From Bazentin-le-Grand westwards a trench zigzagged round the exterior of Bazentin-le-Grand Wood to Bazentin-le-Petit. Two belts of wire entanglements were in front of the trees. A second trench, 150 yards back, with a wire-entanglement before it, ran through the middle of the Wood and in front of Bazentin-le-Petit. But the British bombardment had obliterated trenches and entanglements. At 4 a.m. our troops on the right entered the Wood and began to clear it of machine-gunners and snipers, some of whom were ensconced in the tops of trees. To their left, a little after 4 a.m., Irish and other troops forced their way into Bazentin-le-Petit, now reduced to a mass of battered ruins.

A captain who was engaged in the capture of this village gave the following picturesque account of the fighting there:

I lost touch with my fellows, after I got peppered in the thigh, in the beginning of the village fighting. But my orderly stayed with me, and we did a bit of amateur first aid. We dressed a bomber and two other fellows, not of my battalion, in quite professional style. The bomber still had seven bombs, and the others had rifles and bayonets, and I had my revolver and trench dagger, so as there was still a good bit of kick in us we started on the prowl. The bomber was a sportsman. There was one place where we could see a Boche machine-gun section at work in the cellar of what had been a cottage. There was nothing left but cellar then. The rest was level with the ground. There must have been twelve or fourteen Boches round that gun, bobbing up and down, you understand, as they wanted cover. We crawled on and on till we were no more than twenty paces on their left flank, while they were blazing away like one o'clock, quarter right, at our chaps. Our bomber was rather badly wounded in his left shoulder, but he bowled well with his right, I can tell you. He lobbed two beauties right on the Boche typewriter. They seemed to put the gun out of action all right, but for some reason I never shall understand they only killed one man of the bunch and wounded a couple of others. And just then four or

five more Boches came scuttling into that cellar from somewhere in rear, so there they were as thick as bees. Would they surrender? I thought I'd try them. "Come on, lad; we've got 'em!" I shouted; and, to the Boches, "Hands up!" Those Boches dropped their rifles as though their hands burned. Up went their hands, all except one chap, a sergeant, and he let fly at me. But I ducked. It was the funniest thing. The sergeant was a soldier, all right. He was cursing his men for all he was worth, and as he cursed the habit of discipline told, and the Boches picked up their rifles and stood on guard. Then the moment I showed up again down goes every rifle, up go all the hands, and the sergeant lets fly once more. They were like marionettes on wires, those Boches; up and down according as I showed my head. Only one real man in the lot, you see. But it seemed rough luck for him to have to be killed, because he was a man, so I gave the tip to my cripples; and we made a dash for that cellar, and while the rest of the bunch was bailed up by my orderly and the wounded bomber I fairly jumped on the sergeant. I didn't want him to notice my right leg was pretty helpless, so I embraced him round the neck with one arm and shoved his chin up with the other hand, while one of my cripples got his rifle; and so we got the bunch. They're not hard to handle now, once you can get them away from their N.C.O.'s. As for their officers, they seem to be busy taking care of number one and keeping well to the rear. I liked that sergeant, and he made a regular doctor's job of my leg for me, bandaged it most beautifully, and got two of his men to take it in turns carrying me on their backs on the way down to our dressing station.

By 5.30 a.m. the whole village was in our hands, and though a few ruins in the north of it were recovered temporarily by the enemy, by 9 a.m. the British had dug themselves in on a line which went through the cemetery east of the village to the cross-roads above Bazentin-le-Grand. During the afternoon they pushed up the open slope under shell and machine-gun fire and broke into High Wood, half of which they secured. This achievement was accompanied by another gallant deed unexampled in the western theatre of war since October, 1914.

A regiment of the Dragoon Guards and one of Deccan Horse had been ordered to follow up behind the assaulting infantry ready to take advantage of a sudden collapse of the German forces. In the late afternoon detachments of these regiments proceeded amidst the wild cheering of our infantry to the bottom of High Wood, and with sabre and lance charged the German infantry in some cornfields. The story of this extraordinary event, in which our horsemen were aided by machine-gun fire from our aircraft, may well be told by an officer of the Deccan Horse engaged in it:

At 6.30 we started our famous ride into the enemy country, every now and then coming under heavy shell fire—shrapnel and high explosive. No one can believe, without seeing, what a state the ground is in; there is not room for a table-cloth on any part of the ground there without some part of it touching a shell

[Official Photograph.

THE "FLYING PIG" ON THE SOMME.
Loading a Trench Mortar.

[Official Photograph.

INDIAN CAVALRY AFTER THEIR CHARGE.

hole, so you can imagine the regiment galloping over it at full gallop, barbed wire—well cut by shell fire—old trenches, dead bodies, and every sort of *débris* lying in every direction. Words fail me to describe it. That was for about three miles; then full tilt down a steep bank like the Haggard field, but steeper, into a very famous valley, where the shrapnel got worse, as we were spotted by one of their sausage balloons. This was soon driven down by the fire of our batteries, which just smothered it with shrapnel.

Here we went through our infantry, who cheered us madly as we galloped by, all wishing us luck. On we went, past the remains of guns and everything—tons of ammunition and abandoned material and dead Huns everywhere; and we passed here an enormous gun they had left behind, so really I suppose it was we who took it. We were under cover here for half a mile, but suddenly, coming out of the valley, we had to turn sharp to the right up another little valley, and here we came under terrific, but rather inaccurate, machine-gun fire from two directions. I cannot tell you anything about casualties, but it was here my chestnut mare was killed. We went about a mile up this valley, and then got some cover under a bank—by "we" all this time I mean the regiment and our British regiment. Here we stopped for ten minutes, and then we got orders for our squadron to go on as advance guard in a certain direction.

It was now about 7.30 in the evening, and there were 24 aeroplanes hovering over us, and one monoplane came down to about 200 feet, and fired his machine-guns on the Huns just over us—going round and round—the finest sight I have ever seen. Well, we moved out under a heavy fire, and got on about half a mile. During this advance we rounded up eight prisoners, while between us and the British regiment, I suppose, we stuck with sword and lance about 40 of them—a glorious sight. Our men were splendid and didn't want to take any prisoners, but these eight had chucked away their arms, so we couldn't very well do them in. They were simply terrified, and one clung on to my leg and kept calling 'Pity! Pity!" his eyes starting out of his head. Poor devil, I pitied him, and we sent him back to the regiment.

We dismounted in a little hollow then and went on foot through a damn good crop of wheat full of shell holes and dead Huns. Of course, we were creeping on our tummies all the way, as the fire was very hot. At last, after going a quarter of a mile, we got to the flat top of the hill, driving them before us. Here we had to stop, as the ground was being swept by rifle and machine-gun fire, and they were now shelling us heavily. We got our Hotchkiss guns into action, and set to work. By crawling slowly forward we got a field of fire, and could see the Huns plainly and a battery about half a mile ahead. We plugged a few here, and then it happened to get dark, and we had to retire about 300 yards to a better position and dig in for the night. This we did all right, the Huns making a feeble charge as we did it. I was alone at the time with a message, so I let fly six rounds at them with my revolver, and they all lay down! However, it was not a healthy spot, and I had to crawl back, and rejoined the squadron. We got our horses, and came back and rejoined the regiment. One shell landed in the middle of us as we mounted! These tin hats are damn good! especially for shrapnel.

Well, we got back, and dug in like blazes. They made two weak attacks during the night, and shelled us all the time, and the star shells they sent up all night were like a firework display—a weird sight. One Boche crawled up to one of our listening posts in the dark, and we shot him, brought him in, but he died soon after. We hung on there till 4 o'clock, put up wire in front of us, and our battery helped us well. Infantry relieved us then; they had just got up. You see, our job was to push on as far as we could and hold the line to give "the feet" time to get up. So we did our job all right.

We then rode back—"but not the six hundred.' We were treated to tear shells on the way back—awful sore on the eyes, and my good chestnut horse has both eyes bunged up to-day. Saw more wonderful sights coming back. We got water in the valley we started from, and then rode on back to this field, where we came first from our old camp. Terrible work to-day with the horses, and going through their kits. The divisional general came round last night and congratulated us.

Official Photograph.

WITH THE BRITISH ON THE SOMME.

Bringing in the wounded across No Man's Land.



WITH THE FRENCH ON THE SOMME.

The crater of a mine-explosion.

[Official Photograph.

RED CROSS MEN AT WORK.
Carrying in wounded near Thièpval.

and to-day we got congratulations from the Army Commander. Of course, we are all very bucked and proud. We slept sound last night, I can tell you, on the bare ground under the sky. Thank God, it is fine!

Meanwhile Bazentin-le-Petit Wood had been gained by the British. Through it ran the light railway line from Mametz Wood and three trenches. It was defended by numerous machine-guns and dug-outs, in one of which, 40 ft. below the ground, was the Colonel of the German 91st Regiment, who had sworn to "stay in the wood to hold it to the last." Between the wood and the British a trench ran from 50 to 75 yards in front of the trees, protected by two wire entanglements. Our artillery had made short work of trench and wire and our troops, suffering from machine-guns in the vicinity of Contalmaison Villa, were speedily scrambling into the wood. Soon after 7 a.m. they were at the top of it. Three hundred prisoners, including the Colonel aforesaid, had been captured. He had realized his intention, but not in the way he hoped. From the wood the troops on the right entered the top of Bazentin-le-Petit, where 200 more prisoners were secured. Away on the left fierce struggles went on round Contalmaison Villa. At nightfall our men were north of it, and the sun set on a great victory for British arms. We had broken back the German second line of defence over a length of four miles and captured several strongly fortified localities.

As a young wounded officer who took part in the fighting of the 14th said:

We all knew it was France's Day, and I can't help thinking our chaps borrowed something from our French Allies on Friday, as a sort of tribute to the French nation. They showed a great deal of the sort of sparkling *élan*, the rushing dash and gallantry, which we have come to associate with the French troops; and they backed it all the time with their own inimitable doggedness and steadily pushful indifference to enemy fire.

A young second lieutenant, who had his right forearm badly smashed by a bomb in the attack on Bazentin-le-Petit, most gallantly led his platoon in the storming of the German front trench there. A German bomb landed at his feet, a few yards in front of the Boche parapet, when his platoon sergeant and three of his men were close at his elbows. Without an instant's hesitation this young officer stooped, picked up the bomb, and flung it back at the Boche trench. It exploded when halfway between himself and the German trench, and a large fragment of the spring and casing returned, boomerang fashion, into the thrower's arm. But his action saved several lives. These details were extracted from the platoon sergeant, who had a bullet wound over the left knee. The officer himself was much too full of the exploits of his men to say much of his own part in the affair.

We're pretty keen on our French pals, he said, in our battalion. We were down at ——, you know, alongside the French, before; and my fellows can parley-voo like one o'clock. Well, they all knew about "France's Day," you know; and "La Belle France," and "Vive Français," were our cries on Friday. Must've puzzled the Boche quite a bit, you know. No doubt Master Boche did give a pretty hot reception to the first two platoons and mine. There weren't many men of mine reacned their line unwounded. But the splendid thing was that, excepting a few—who'll never move again (the boy's voice dropped sadly here)—excepting a few the fellows who'd been hit came on with the others. Some of them got there, yelling, with as many as three separate bullet wounds; and half of 'em at least jumped into that Boche trench without a weapon in their hands.

Then was the sight. I was out of it, so far as fighting went; but I saw it all; and never saw anything finer in my life. Never was such a splendid scrum! They took no more notice of Boche bayonets than if they'd been the spray of the sea—you know, when you're running in at low tide, and it's a bit parky, just at first; and you're all shouting like the devil, on kind of short breaths, because it's cold.

Well, as I say, they just jumped straight on to those Boches, and I tell you the Boches fought well. And—here's a point that struck me—the Germans fought well, without leadership. Devil a sign of an officer did I see. And I was in that line for a good many hours. No, I reckon their officers keep out of it all they can. Queer, isn't it? I don't know what our men would make of it if we did that sort of thing.

To see those chaps of mine tackling the Boche with their bare hands was worth living for—or dying for. It was meat and drink to me. They just tore their men down; and wrenched their own rifles from them. One big section commander of mine was just like a terrier with rats; except that he didn't wait for killing. He was too busy. He went for his men like a blooming lamplighter; smashed 'em down; grabbed 'em by the slack of the breeches and the neck, and chucked 'em back over the parapet, to roll down into the remains of their own wire. "Fall in there! Fall in!" he kept yelling, and goodness alone knows what he meant by it. But he put them out of business all right, and I sort of rounded 'em up from the little shell-hole where I lay; and in a way they did fall in, in a cluster, lying on the ground. They were docile enough; mostly stunned; and I'd my revolver in my left hand. And then my lads cleaned out the dug-outs, mostly using German bombs. We left nothing alive in that trench; and I don't believe the Kaiser's got a platoon in all his Prussian Guard who could have lived in the face of those chaps of mine, with their bare hands, on Friday. It was a great do, was "France's Day," at Bazentin!

The 14th July was the Fête Day of the Republic, the hundred and twenty-seventh anniversary of the Fall of the Bastille, the typical bulwark of the Ancien Régime, as life-crushing a Government as that of Modern Prussia. This anniversary had ever been celebrated with considerable fervour since the institution of the Third Republic, and in Paris there had always been a great military spectacle. While the British and French Allied armies had been celebrating it by fresh victories on the field of battle, it was marked by a spectacular incident which distinguished it from all other past occasions. For the first time in history soldiers of other nations fresh from the battle-field took part in the ceremony, and their presence was rightly interpreted by the French people as a visible sign emphasizing the pledge of the Allied Powers to fight together until complete victory should have been gained over Teutonic tyranny; to teach the German people for all time that treaties are sacred, not scraps of paper to be torn up at will; that military brutality would be stamped out, and that the attempt to gain the hegemony of Europe would be replied to by crushing to the ground the statesmen and people who insolently dared to seek it.

[*Official photograph.*

BRITISH TROOPS AT WORK BEHIND A SMOKE ATTACK.

(Official photograph.

THE FRENCH NATIONAL FÊTE DAY, JULY 14, 1916.

The British contingent passing through the Place de la Concorde in Paris, headed by the band of the Scots Guards.

It was indeed a solemn occasion, which spoke in direct and unmistakable terms to the whole world. The troops were marshalled in alphabetical order in accordance with diplomatic usage, the Belgian guests leading, next the British (Grande Bretagne), followed by the Russian, and then the soldiers of France. A Belgian band came first, followed by their infantry, then the machine-guns with their ammunition carts and cyclists. Next came the Belgian standard, received with deep emotion by the crowd, closely followed by a troop of Belgian lancers, all alike received with sympathy. As the last of these filed past the sound of the pipes broke on the ear. It was the band of the Scots Guards with their stalwart pipers at the head. Behind them came the representatives of the British Empire from England, Scotland, India and the realms of Britain beyond the seas. Great was the welcome they received from the cheering crowd, from the enthusiastic girls who showered flowers on them or pressed them into their hands. Next came the Russians moving in sections of 16, the fine men making a great impression as they went by singing their marching songs. Last of all marched the home troops, the beloved representatives of the nation in arms, with their bands playing airs which all the people knew, the noble "Chant du départ," which particularly appeals to Republican France with its old memories, and the no less celebrated "Mourir pour la Patrie." They had a warm reception, which spoke straight from the hearts of the multitude and showed the love which France bears towards her soldiers. Towards the end of the French procession came representatives of the French colonial troops from Africa and Asia, and last of all the Fusiliers Marins, those gallant troops who had fought so bravely and lost so heavily at Ypres and Dixmude. Their bravery recalled the regiment to which Napoleon gave the proud title of "One against ten," and of them France might also say as the Emperor did of the 32nd: "I had no anxiety; I knew the 32nd were there." The reception given to the "75's" was also great, for the people felt how much they owed to the magnificent field guns which had played so great a part in the battles. Nor must it be forgotten that if the material was good, no less perfect was the scientific training which had enabled the French artillerymen to get such great results from their weapons. They had set an example in the handling of guns which had been followed by all Europe.

One of the most interesting scenes in Paris was the bestowal by the President of honours which had been earned on the battlefield by fallen heroes, and were handed to their bereaved relations, to each of whom a certificate was given.

The 14th of July was also kept as a day of ceremony in England and in the Dominions beyond the seas. Queen Alexandra, who was the Patroness of the Croix Rouge Française, Comité de Londres, had started a movement to raise funds for the benefit of French wounded. In a little paper called *France*, which appeared specially for the day only, the following message from Her Majesty was printed:

> To that glorious nation of France which has endeared itself to all Britons I send a heartfelt message of friendship and sympathy.
>
> This anniversary of the National Day of France is to be marked by a collection of offerings for her gallant wounded, the funds being administered by the Croix Rouge Française Comité de Londres, of which I am Patroness. I warmly commend this noble enterprise of mercy to the people of the whole Empire. May their generosity forge yet another link between the sister nations.

All over Great Britain collections and demonstrations were held; the Mayors of Provincial Boroughs enthusiastically responded to the call of the Lord Mayor of London, the Treasurer of the Fund, and a widespread system of collection brought in large sums to the treasury.

In London the results exceeded all anticipations; flags, favours mounted on swords as pins, souvenirs from the trenches, little articles manufactured by the French soldiers from pieces of German shells and relics of every description, were offered and were eagerly bought. Many were the stories of ladies who received in return for a small flag a folded slip of paper in which notes, and in some cases cheques, were enclosed. Between seven and eight million emblems were distributed from the chief depôt at Knightsbridge by voluntary assistants, many of whom used their own motor-cars. Altogether a large sum was collected, to which our Colonies contributed in no mean measure, the total exceeding £100,000.

The British Army, through Sir Douglas Haig, forwarded the following message to the French President:

> The British Army, fighting by the side of the brave soldiers of France in the bitter struggle now proceeding, expresses on the occasion of this great anniversary its admiration for the results achieved by the French Army and its unshakable confidence in the speedy realization of our common hopes.



[*Official Photograph.*

CAPTURED GERMAN GUNS.

M. Poincaré replied :—

I thank you, my dear General, for the good wishes which you have expressed towards France, and beg you to convey to the brave British Army my lively admiration of the fine successes which it has just achieved and which only this morning have been so brilliantly extended. They have produced a deep impression on the hearts of all Frenchmen. Those of your magnificent troops who have to-day paraded in the streets of Paris, in company with those of our Allies, received throughout their march a striking proof of the public sentiment. I am glad to have this opportunity of sending you—to you personally and to your troops—my warm congratulations.

The Tsar sent President Poincaré a congratulatory telegram repeating his full confidence and good wishes for the victory of France and her glorious Army. The President replied thanking him for having authorized the magnificent Russian troops to take part in the National Fête. He added that France, like Russia, had an active and resolute confidence in the final success of the Allies.

Saturday the 15th was spent in consolidating and extending the British lines. Between Fricourt and Mametz the Germans were forced back to their third line of defence. Over 2,000 prisoners were taken in twenty-four hours. Our troops pushed forward to the outskirts of Pozières on the left and cleared the last of the Germans out of the Bazentin-le-Petit Wood, penetrated farther into the High Wood and captured the whole of the Waterlot Farm. In the Delville Wood troops from South Africa greatly distinguished themselves. What they performed there between the 15th and 18th was told by the soldier-father, himself on the Headquarters Staff, of a South African soldier killed in the fighting :

The dead lying in Delville Wood, were still unburied when I was there (because burial was impossible under the fire going on). Men lie in layers. The South African heroes lie underneath.

I wonder whether history will do them justice. Will it tell how, ordered to take and hold the wood at all costs, they took it—and then began one of the most heroic defences known in the history of war? For three days (July 15–18) they were subjected to continuous bombardment by guns of all calibres. They held on with very little food or water. Over and over again they were attacked by overwhelming enemy forces. The gallant fellows fell fast under the terrific bombardment and attacks, but not a man wavered.

Finding them immovable, the Germans, at last, on the 18th, concentrated a terrible bombardment for seven hours on what was left of these splendid men, and then about 5 or 6 p.m. launched an attack by three regiments, on the survivors. The front trench was attacked in front and on each flank. My son's trench was attacked from back and front.

Our gallant, splendid men, reduced to a mere skeleton of what they were, beat back the Brandenburgers. It was during this awful time that my dear boy fell. They died, our noble South Africans, but they held the wood! Thank God, they held the wood! and thank God they kept up the traditions of our race! And my splendid boy helped. He took no inconsiderable part either.

I want our South Africans to get the credit they deserve. If you have any friends who can spread the news of what they did, let it be told. I resign my dear son, who was very, very dear to me, into the safe keeping of my Maker, who gave him to me. It is very hard to part with him, but I glory in his glorious end, my

splendid, chivalrous boy; and if his example inspires others he will not have died in vain.

Use this letter as you like in order to let the world know what the South Africans did. I want these heroes to have some (they can never have all) of the honour due to their glorious memories. What a theme for some painter's brush or some poet's inspiration!

Enraged at their defeat by the British on the 14th, the German Higher Command endeavoured to counterbalance it by a victory over the French south of the Somme on July 15. Under cover of a heavy mist large reinforcements were brought to the left bank of the river, and La Maisonnette Farm and the village of Biaches were violently assaulted. Both were carried, but the French quickly organized counter-attacks, and the Germans were deprived of their hard-won gains.

On the next day (July 16) there was a heavy bombardment on both sides all along the line. Our troops from the east, on a front of 1,200 yards, made their way to within 500 yards of the village of Pozières, while the Royal Fusiliers—recruited chiefly from the Stock Exchange, Lloyd's, the Baltic and Corn Exchange—drew nearer to Pozières from the south to south-west. Five more heavy howitzers and four 11 mm. (4·3 ins.) guns fell into our hands together with a large amount of war material. During the night our troops were engaged in consolidating our positions, covered by a detachment in High Wood, which was afterwards drawn back into the new trench line.

On July 17 the long defence of Ovillers-La Boisselle came to an end. Like Carency in the Battle of Artois (May, 1915), the village had been gradually isolated, and the Prussian Guards of the 3rd Reserve Division found themselves in sore straits. The barrages of shells prevented both food and ammunition from being brought up in any quantities to the defenders. Water was scarce, and the spirit of the hungry and thirsty garrison, now greatly reduced in numbers, was much broken. Sir Douglas Haig decided to use one of his northern divisions to complete the conquest.

At dawn a tremendous bombardment opened, when the guns lifted their rain of shells from the shattered heaps of masonry which now represented all that remained of the once flourishing village of Ovillers-La Boisselle, and the British infantry from their side advanced to the attack. The first line started out of the Ovillers Wood. From the vaulted cellars and from behind wrecked houses the machine-guns and infantry of the Prussian Guards turned a terrific fire on the assaulting troops. Men fell and were left behind, but ever onward moved the British infantry until their goal was reached. Once the Germans' front line was gained the Grenadiers set to work to bomb the dug-outs and destroy their occupants or force them to surrender. As progress was made the sudden cessation of all fire from the various

[Official Photograph.

CARTING AWAY A CAPTURED GERMAN GUN.

[Official Photograph.

SEARCHING PRISONERS.

To make quite certain that nothing dangerous is being concealed.

points showed they had been won. The fight was a hard and prolonged one. One machine-gun, snugly placed in a ruined cottage, managed to maintain its fire after the rest had been conquered. A gallant officer, whose arm had been shattered by a bullet, led a party of his men against and killed the gun's crew. He was then led off to an ambulance, whistling "Tipperary." At about 10 a.m. all resistance was over, and the worn-out remnant of the Prussian Guards surrendered. In one of the cellars 25 Germans, who had exhausted even their emergency rations and had not tasted food for two days, were captured. Of the German garrison in Ovillers-La Boisselle only 126 survivors remained. The entry to the village by the Bapaume road was defended by two strong field works. Round them alone were strewn some 800 corpses. Some of the captured had lost their reason, and many were dying of enteric. "You English fight like devils," remarked one German, "and we gladly surrender to such men as you are." A party of prisoners were placed under a subaltern's guard. Among them were two officers, one of whom is said to have unpinned the Iron Cross from his breast and offered it to the subaltern.

"Take it for having done what we considered to be impossible," said the German; "I give it to you." The subaltern shook his head, and explained that it was not a custom of ours to deprive prisoners of what they had won by their own valour.

The following captured documents are of interest as showing the very heavy casualties which the enemy had suffered in the recent fighting:

From a company of the 3rd Battalion 16th Bavarian Infantry Regiment to battalion commander:

Severe enemy artillery fire of all calibres up to 28 cm. on company sector. Company strength, one officer, 12 men. Beg urgently speedy relief for the company. What remains of the company is so exhausted that, in case of an attack by the enemy, the few totally exhausted men cannot be counted on.

From another company of the same regiment:

Very heavy intense enemy fire on company sector. The company has completely lost its fighting value. The men left are so exhausted that they can no longer be employed in fighting. If heavy artillery fire continues the company will soon be entirely exterminated. Relief for the company is urgently requested.

From 2nd Battalion to 3rd Battalion 16th Bavarian Infantry Regiment:

The battalion has just received orders from Lieut.-Col. Kumml that it is placed under orders of the 3rd Battalion 16th Bavarian Regiment as sector reserve. Battalion consists at present time of three officers, two non-commissioned officers, and 19 men.

In the local actions which took place on this day we captured some more prisoners, and the total of unwounded German prisoners taken by the British since July 1 was 189 officers and 10,779 other ranks.

The German losses in artillery proved to be even greater than at first reported.

[Official Photograph

WOUNDED GERMANS.

Being assisted by British troops.

[Official Photographs.

GERMAN PRISONERS.

Lined up on the road after they were taken from the German trenches. Smaller picture: Conveying a wounded German on a stretcher.

The captured armament collected by our troops now included 5 eight-inch howitzers, 3 six-inch howitzers, 4 six-inch guns, 5 other heavy guns, 37 field guns, 30 trench howitzers, 66 machine-guns, and many thousands of rounds of gun ammunition of all descriptions.

This was exclusive of many guns not then brought in and of the numbers destroyed by our artillery bombardment and abandoned by the enemy.

Before passing on to the subsequent fighting, let the reader see Ovillers-La Boisselle through the eyes of a *Times* correspondent who visited the scene of carnage three weeks later:

As far as La Boisselle itself you can take your motor-car along the main Albert-Bapaume road, though you will have the road to yourself when you do it. La Boisselle on the right of the road is nothing more than a flat layer of pounded grey stones and mortar on the bare face of the earth. Of anything like a village or individual buildings there is, of course, no semblance. On the left of the road the ground dips steeply down for 50 yards or so, then slowly rises to what is called Ovillers-La Boisselle, because that was where a village of that name stood until a few weeks ago. To-day, if La Boisselle is almost obliterated, Ovillers-La Boisselle is non-existent.

Standing on the edge of the white road in the glaring sunshine, with the roar of our own guns behind one and the other guns ahead, one feels onself the only landmark in a waste. The whole earth's surface, before and around, is torn with shell-holes and seamed with lines of trenches, all white, because the soil here is chalk. Such land as there is between, unscarred, is almost bare of vegetation, with only here and there a thin coat of sickly grass or a dusty tuft of cornflower, mallow, or white camomile. Opposite, crowning the gentle slope before you, a few ragged stumps, fragments of tree trunks some 10 ft. high, with bits of splintered lower branches sticking from them, stand gaunt against the sky and mark where Ovillers used to be.

Heading for Ovillers, we—for an officer was with me—left the road and went down across the torn and blasted earth to the white line of what was once the German front line trench. It is a trench no more. It was not much of a trench by the time our guns had done with it at the beginning of this battle. After that, it was pounded day and night through all the desperate fighting which went on for the possession of Ovillers. Since then the enemy has devoted a certain number of shells a day to knocking the poor remnants of it about a little more. It is a futile occupation, because no one, except an inquisitive visitor like myself, would dream of walking along it. The parapet is mostly strewn all over the ground. In places it is mixed with, and fills up, the trench, so that you go on the level of the ground. Then a few yards may be decently intact, so that, half-choked with rubbish as it is, it gives you shelter, perhaps, waist high. It, and the ground around, are littered with equipment. Cartridges, used or unused, and unexploded bombs and bits of shells, or whole shells, "duds," are everywhere beneath your feet. In the

[Official photograph.

LONDON SCOTTISH MARCHING TO THE TRENCHES.

hot sun the chalk is intensely white and the heat beats back on you from the baked earth, and the air is thick with the dreadful smell which belongs to battlefields and with the buzzing of flies. It is truly a vile place.

At last you come to a parting of the way, where an old German sign still sticks up from the fire step of the trench, one hand of it pointing "Nach Pozieérs." You turn where it tells you and go on—in the trench or beside it, it does not matter—till you pass the ragged bits of tree trunks, and you are in Ovillers. You would not know it but for the tree fragments, and, when you look, you see that there is a quantity of broken brick and stone mixed up with the kneaded earth, and also you come to a hole in the ground which, being square and lined with brick, is obviously not a shell-hole, but must be a cellar which once had a house above it.

By this time I have seen a good deal of ruin, but I have talked to experts who have seen more than I, and they agree that Ovillers is more utterly destroyed than any other village in the battle area.

No village could be more destroyed, because there is nothing left but the cellar which I have mentioned and two or three others like it, mere holes in the ground and minus quantities, so far as they are buildings at all. Of superstructure to the earth there is none. One point there is which those who go there speak of as a place to take your bearings from—a sort of Greenwich in this sea of desolation—and it is called "The Church." Undoubtedly a church once was there, because the maps say so, and there is still one fragment of a wall which may have been part of a church, and by it two graves. Why these survive it is impossible to say. If it was not for them no spot in Ovillers above ground would be different from any other.

Underground it is different. You have already heard how it was estimated that the dug-outs here could hold, and did hold, 2,000 Germans. It is doubtless true. One fears from the smell that they hold many yet. We went down into several, though the entrances to most are battered in by shells, and groped about by the light of matches among the litter and the darkness. There is one great dug-out—I mentioned it from hearsay at the time—where eighty dead Germans were found, the place, it is supposed, having been used, in the last days of desperate fighting, as a kind of vault into which the dead were hurriedly thrown with the intention some time of wrecking the place or sealing it up, or otherwise making it into a tomb.

Another large dug-out there is which the Germans used as a dressing station. It is admirably constructed, and has, besides the main entrance from the trench, another opening for exit which gave upon a road where ran a tramway line by which the wounded could be taken from the very door of the dressing station back behind the lines.

On through Ovillers we went by the winding trenches, not knowing when we left the village behind any more than when we entered it. And here one does not climb out of the trench to look. One cannot put a periscope up without its being shot to bits. Close at hand the rifles spat continuously and machine-guns stuttered and growled, and we had trench mortars at work, which heaved projectiles into the air so slowly that you saw them sail majestically to where the enemy was hiding in his trenches, there to explode prodigiously. For short ranges they are as serious as any shell of their size from a great gun.

To our right, close by, we were assured, was Pozières, though I confess I saw nothing of it, and to our left, a little farther off, was Thiépval, which also, though I have seen it from other places, I did not see from here. And ahead was Mouquet Farm. And all around was heat, and noise, and an almost intolerable atmosphere.

During the night of the 17th and 18th further substantial progress was made on a 1,000 yards front of Ovillers-La Boisselle, six

[Official photograph.

A PATROL UNDER FIRE.
Crawling up towards the German trenches.

machine-guns and several prisoners being captured.

While the Prussian Guard prisoners were being removed from Ovillers-La Boisselle, our troops away to the east approached Pozières. They stormed a double line of trenches from Bazentin-le-Petit to the south-east of the village, a distance of 1,500 yards. The trenches when captured were found to be actually filled up with dead and wounded. From the upper part of High Wood, lying over the crest of the heights, and therefore directly under the fire of the German guns, our patrols were, however, withdrawn and our line straightened out between Pozières and Longueval, which could now be attacked from two sides.

South of the Somme, on Monday the 17th, it was the turn of the Germans to take the offensive. From midnight to the late afternoon battalion after battalion charged up the La Maisonnette Hill. Met by the *rafales* of the "75" guns and by withering machine-gun fire, the waves of Germans receded. In the morning some of the enemy penetrated into the east end of Biaches, from which, however, they were soon expelled by French bombers.

When the sun was setting, and during the night, the Germans renewed their attacks between Biaches and La Maisonnette Farm. They were unsuccessful at La Maisonnette, but some parties wound their way along the canal into houses at the eastern end of Biaches. They were driven out the next day.

Near Biaches there had been a savage struggle for the fortified work in front of the village called Biaches Fort. A battery of machine-guns, hidden cunningly in a marsh, prevented a frontal attack. Fire had not sufficed to drive out the defenders of the work, though it had been severely damaged, and sterner measures were needed. An infantry officer volunteered to capture it by surprise, along a communication trench which, he had found, led into the fort. With a small party consisting of himself, a sub-lieutenant, three non-commissioned officers, three dismounted cyclists and a bugler, he crept up the trench into the interior of the redoubt. The Germans when he arrived were underground. Hearing steps, some of them cautiously emerged from their cellars and dug-outs. They found the French in their midst. Before they could recover from their astonishment, the French captain, firing with his pistol at the leader, who fell in a heap, shouted "En avant!" His men darted forward and the Germans above and below ground surrendered. Prisoners to the number of 114 and three machine-guns were taken. In a few minutes the gallant Frenchmen had secured a fort which for twenty-four hours had kept our Allies at this point in check.

The next morning (July 18) General Fayolle, before the Germans had recovered from the repulse of their six battalions on the slopes of La Maisonnette Hill, launched a fresh offensive north and south of the Somme. The French line now extended from Biaches and the La Maisonnette plateau through Barleux to Estrées. In the course of the forenoon five miles of German trenches from Barleux to Soyécourt were secured. North of the Somme, on a frontage of four miles from the point where the French joined up with the British south of the captured Trônes Wood, our Allies overran the German fortified area and reached the Combles-Cléry narrow-gauge railway.

Thick mist and incessant rain had interfered with the French, as they did with the British operations on the 18th. At 5.30 p.m. the enemy, preceded by clouds of poisonous gas and pioneers carrying *Flammenwerfer*, attacked the British positions in the vicinity of Longueval and Delville Wood, where they formed a salient. The attack was heralded by a heavy fire of shells of all kinds, and was delivered by a whole division. One column of the Germans made for the copse, two other columns for the sides of the salient. The north side and Longueval were lost by us and so was a part of the wood. The garrison of the Waterlot Farm, midway between Longueval and Guillemont, however, resisted the German pressure, and our artillery promptly played upon the Germans in Longueval and Delville Wood. Reinforcements were hurried up, and preparations made for the necessary counter-attacks. According to the German report, the Magdeburg 26th Infantry and the Altenburg Regiments had particularly distinguished themselves in these engagements, and we had lost 8 officers and 280 privates taken prisoners. The fighting went on through the night and into the next day. At 9.30 p.m. of the 19th Sir Douglas Haig reported that most of the ground lost in Longueval and Delville Wood had been recovered, and that a large body of Germans massed for another—the fourth—attack on Waterlot Farm had been dispersed by our fire.

South of the Somme that day the French seized some trenches south of Estrées and took about 60 prisoners.

The Battle of the Somme, it must always be remembered, was but part of the British operations against the Germans in France and Belgium. To remind the reader that the long line of trenches and redoubts from the east of Albert to the north of Ypres was constantly agitated by bombardments and local attack let us, at the risk of digression, relate an incident which happened south of Armentières on the 19th. At this point an Australian division, exposed to a shell fire heavier than any they had ever experienced in the Gallipoli Peninsula, followed up a heavy bombardment of the German position, which, however, had not succeeded in destroying or burying all the defenders' machine guns, by a determined attack, aided by a British division on their left. They carried the front line trenches, but were held up by those in the rear. Farther south—in the centre—the whole fortified area was stormed, and the Australians emerged into more or less open country. On the right their comrades had to cross a wide space between the front and rear lines of the system. The Germans here held a very strongly fortified salient. At places the Australians scrambled into the enemy's works, but the Germans by diverting streams of water into the captured spots made the position difficult to hold. After enduring a tremendous bombardment for 11 hours the order was given to retire. The British Engineers had constructed communication trenches along which this movement could be carried out. 200 prisoners and some machine-guns were captured, but our losses had been severe.

"I hope," had written a German soldier of the 190th Regiment, captured at Contalmaison, "this awful business will soon stop." A prayer which we may be sure was cordially re-echoed by many of his fellow-countrymen.

During the night of the 19th-20th our bombing parties made a substantial advance east of the Leipzig Redoubt, which was one of the main obstacles barring approach from the south to the Thiépval plateau. Away to the right beyond Pozières, in the vicinity of the Bois de Foureaux or High Wood, round Longueval, Waterlot Farm, Delville Wood, Guillemont, and thence to the banks of the Somme, a continuous fringe of exploding shells showed that the German artillery was bombarding the British and French positions, to which our gunners were not slow in replying.

The noise was deafening. The sky was lit up by the bursting shells. Sir Douglas Haig had replaced the Western and Eastern Divisions and the Highlanders by South-countrymen and Lowlanders, and the enemy artillery,



[Official Photograph.

CARRYING WOUNDED ON TO A HOSPITAL BARGE.

anticipating an attack, was raining down showers of projectiles on the spots where it was imagined our troops were assembled for the attack. The "Jack Johnsons," which had been but sparingly used by the Germans since the Battle of Ypres, were again in evidence. "They came over," said a Devonshire lad afterwards, relating his experiences, "as thick and fast as hand-grenades." Craters often 40 ft. across and half as deep were formed by the explosion of their shells.

West of this scene an occasional shell was flung into the captured Trônes and Bernafay Woods and against Montauban. The French "75's," the chatter of the machine-guns and a dropping rifle fire added to the sounds of preparation and showed that all arms were participating in it.

Meanwhile, in their dug-outs, staff officers, telephone in hand, waited for the news of what was happening to the north of the Bazentin-Longueval position, where our men were again topping the crest and descending into the High Wood, moving up the rising slope of ground between that and Delville Wood, while through the broken branches and over the fallen trunks a South African contingent was making its way northwards and eastwards. The northern houses in Longueval, the High Wood, the intervening space and Delville Wood, with the village of Guillemont, just east of the Trônes Wood, had to be carried before our hold on the plateau would be secure.

The rain, which had impeded operations for so many days, had now ceased, but had left a dark and heavy atmosphere, through which our soldiers fought. Many of the Germans, the bonds of discipline being loosened in the night of fighting, scuttled back or surrendered, but enough remained to put up a strenuous fight.

At 5.30 a.m. General Fayolle, anxious to assist the British on his left and suspecting rightly that the German reserves were stationed north of Guillemont, launched from Hardecourt and its environs an attack on Hardecourt Hill towards Maurepas, and the narrow gauge Combles-Clèry line. The Germans, alarmed at the new and unexpected attack which threatened their flank, brought southward several regiments from the British front, too late, however, to prevent the French from capturing by 9 a.m. several trenches between Hardecourt Hill and the Somme and from crossing the railway at various points. Prisoners to the number of about 400 were taken by our Allies, whose

[*Official photograph.*

MEN OF THE LONDON RIFLE BRIGADE.
In a reserve trench, waiting to advance to the front line.

[Official photograph.

A MINE CRATER ON THE SOMME.

attack had appreciably lightened the difficult task of the British.

The sun had by now dispersed the mist which had covered the field, when it first rose, and illuminated the whole battlefield. Over it there were still the intermittent clouds produced by shell explosions from the powerful artilleries of both sides firing with their utmost energy, while overhead were seen circling the aeroplanes, round which the numerous white puffs showed that they were the target for anti-aircraft guns. Our troops which had been continuously engaged in this part of the field were now withdrawn and replaced by others. Well and ardently had they fought, the men from the west and east of England and from Caledonia, and they were now to be given a rest, their places at the front being taken by fresher men.

As the day wore on Guillemont received special attention from our artillerymen, and so heavy was the fire that the place seemed actually to shrink away under it.

The destruction wrought by the Allies that day was not confined to the battlefield. Over the German lines, aeroplanes, flying singly, or in squadrons, attacked the railways, aerodromes, hutments and other objectives, dropping on them tons of explosives. About 6.15 p.m. four of our aeroplanes encountered four Fokkers and two biplanes, and the fight went on for over half an hour. One Fokker was destroyed, a second badly damaged; the rest of the German machines fled. None of ours had been injured. Between 8 and 9 p.m. four more of our machines met eleven of the enemy's, which included L.V.G.'s,* Rolands and Fokkers. The leader of our patrol made for an L.V.G., which hastily retired from the scene, and then drove down a Fokker. Attacked by a Roland, he was equally successful, forcing it also to descend. Meanwhile a second machine put out of action another Roland. Two Fokkers, when about to attack, nearly collided and had to draw off. The third of the British pilots, at a lower altitude, also disposed of a Roland, which fell in a "spinning nose-dive," but his own engine being hit by a shot from a Fokker, he descended in a steep spiral. The fourth pilot dived to his rescue, engaged the pursuer at a height of 1,000 feet, and the Fokker was observed to fall to the ground in flames. Eventually all the hostile aeroplanes were dispersed. A French pilot the same day brought down a German machine east of Péronne. These successes more than counterbalanced the loss of the four British machines which since the 16th had failed to return to their aerodromes.

* The L.V.G. was a two-seater biplane.

[Official photograph.

FRENCH CAVALRY PATROLLING.

At 10.55 p.m. Sir Douglas Haig was able to report that north of the Bazentin-Longueval line we had advanced 1,000 yards; our front now ran from the bottom of the High Wood to Longueval, through the middle of Delville Wood, then turned south by Waterlot Farm to a point between Trônes Wood and Guillemont. Heavy fighting still continued in the northern outskirts of Longueval and in Delville Wood.

General Fayolle this day had also won a considerable success north of the Somme. To the south of the river the French on the 20th had not been idle. Our Allies had advanced in the preceding fighting almost up to the gates of Péronne; they were at the bottom of the loop of the Somme. To enlarge this pocket southwards towards Chaulnes and the railway Chaulnes-Péronne was the next step to be taken. From the western outskirts of Barleux to Estrées their line ran back almost at a right-angle. Consequently the troops south of the Somme below Péronne were in a dangerous salient. To drive its southern face southward and thus enlarge the salient was Foch's object.

The French Colonial troops were employed for the purpose, and in the morning of the 20th a terrific bombardment of the German positions south of Estrées opened. Their positions extended from Estrées through the park of Deniécourt, the château of which had been converted into a formidable underground fortress, to Soyécourt, defended by formidable trenches, to the Bois de l'Etoile and Hill 90, situated north-west of Vermand-Ovillers, near which was a redoubt on the road to Lihons. If the French could capture Vermand-Ovillers they would be within easy distance of the Chaulnes junction, where the Amiens-Péronne and Roye-Péronne railways met. As the Roye region was the pivot of the German right wing in this part of the theatre of operations, the importance of the Chaulnes junction is obvious.

When the bombardment ceased the coloured troops of the French advanced. The Soyécourt labyrinth, the Bois de l'Etoile and the redoubt on the Lihons road near Vermand-Ovillers Farm were carried. By nightfall Soyécourt was surrounded on three sides. Thirty officers and 2,870 privates, 3 guns, and 30 machine-guns had been captured. A German counter-attack near Soyécourt delivered in the late afternoon by a battalion was severely repulsed by the French artillery and machine-guns.

Such was the battle of the Somme, of July 20.

[Official photograph.

BRINGING UP THE 75's IN THE GREAT ADVANCE.

To deceive the German people and their friends outside Germany, the German Great General Staff issued the following fabrication:

On both sides of the Somme the enemy yesterday as was expected, prepared to deliver a strong attack, but it failed.

After the strongest preparation on a front of about 25 miles, attacks were made south of Pozières and to the west of Vermandovillers.

More than 17 divisions, comprising more than 200,000 men, participated in these attacks.

The meagre result for the enemy is that the first line of a German Division along a front of about 1¾ miles south of Hardecourt was pressed back from the advanced trenches into the next line of trenches lying 800 yards to the rear, and the enemy divisions penetrated into a salient in the little wood of Vermandovillers.

On the whole of the remainder of this front the enemy's wild onslaughts were broken to pieces against the death-defying loyalty of our troops, with extraordinary losses for the enemy. So far 17 officers and 1,200 men have been captured.

That, so far as numbers were concerned, the battle was on the large scale customary to these operations may be admitted. Otherwise the German fiction bore no relation to actual fact. The Allies were not successful at every point, but they made considerable gains and suffered no reverses of any moment.

During the night of the 20th-21st the enemy, after an intense bombardment with gas shells, entered High Wood, and recovered the northern part of it. The next day (July 21) the battle continued spasmodically from the Leipzig Redoubt to the Delville Road. A German bombing attack against the northern edge of our position in the Redoubt failed. Taking advantage of the fine weather, our aeroplanes bombed important points behind the German lines, and in the evening there was a good deal of aerial fighting east of them. An official account of our aerial activity that day may here be quoted:

Much successful cooperation with artillery was carried out; 92 targets were engaged with aeroplane observation and 25 with kite balloon. Several direct hits on gun emplacements were obtained, the ammunition in one continuing to explode for over half an hour.

One of our machines, engaged on photographic duty, was attacked by a Roland, which came level and then dived and attacked under the tail of our aeroplane. Our aeroplane side-slipped till level with the Roland, and then fired three drums into it at 40 yards. The Roland fell to the earth near Leuze Wood.

One of our aeroplanes, whilst on artillery patrol at 4,000 ft., saw eight hostile aircraft at a height of 9,000 ft. It climbed to this height and was joined by five of our fighting machines. At this juncture the enemy were joined by five L.V.G.'s and two Fokkers. All our machines attacked the somewhat scattered enemy formation. A section of three of our machines dived on to one party, from which one Fokker plunged to earth from a height of 7,000 ft., and two other machines were forced to land. Another machine was seen to fall out of control into a village, and yet another fell headlong to earth in a field. The fighting lasted over half-an-hour, when the remaining enemy machines flew off in twos and threes.

The total of hostile machines brought down on this day was six, and at least three more were driven down damaged.

South of the Amiens-Chaulnes railway, in the Maucourt region, the Germans tried to rush the French lines, but were repulsed with the bayonet.

Saturday, July 22, was a comparatively uneventful day. The Germans bombarded our lines with gas and lachrymatory shells, while we prepared for a fresh advance in which the Australians were destined to distinguish themselves. At Berlin the Higher Command affected to be supremely confident. "In the Somme sector," ran the *communiqué* issued that day, "after their defeat of the previous days . . . our enemies had to abandon their great united attacks." However, all Germans did not agree with their leaders. For example, a German officer, interviewed by the *Vossische Zeitung* of this date, is reported to have said:

The English fought very bravely, notwithstanding enormous losses. I don't know how great their reserves are, but upon this will depend the length of the offensive. Our positions were badly knocked about, but the dug-outs and shelters held out very well, which is lucky for us. Besides this, the higher command knew what to expect about the attacks, and had taken the necessary measures to resist them. Finally, rainy weather came at the right moment to help us.

Herr Max Osborn, writing for the same journal, observed:

We are shaken by a burning pain as new streams of German blood are flowing, and we recognize our powerlessness over what cannot be changed. After two years of war the angel of destruction is passing through the ranks of German arms with a fury and mercilessness as if the death dance of battles had only just begun. Germans are critical, clear-headed, and strong enough to look the truth in the face. Whilst the enemies suffer fearful losses, we do not blind our eyes to the new mourning which has come to us, nor over the seriousness of the fate of this decisive battle which is raging on all the fronts. We should be unworthy of the stupendous task we have to fulfil, and of the scarcely comprehensible sacrifices which our heroes make, if we were not able to understand the whole fury and burden of these weeks. We feel as two years ago the raging storm of the united power of the enemy.

It is now a question of not less than everything for the life or death of our nation. We stand differently now from what we did in August, 1914. Unexampled deeds of fame lie between, but still the concluding point has to be reached, and everything is in the balance of death or life.

Everything between the Somme and the Ancre was, indeed, "in the balance of death or life."

On the evening of Saturday, July 22, the British artillery increased its fire on the German lines from Pozières to Guillemont. Here the Australians were about to play an important part in the Battle of the Somme. The force engaged was the 1st Anzac Corps (Lieut.-Gen. Sir William R. Birdwood, K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G.).

"A large sector of the horizon," said Mr. C. E. W. Bean, the official Press Correspondent with the Australian Imperial Forces, "was lit

[Official photograph.

LOADING A BIG GUN.

up not by single flashes, but by a continuous bank of quivering light." The sweet heliotrope scent of German tear-shells pervaded the air in the vicinity of Pozières. Shells containing poisonous gas whistled towards and over the British lines. Projectiles which burst high up and came down like flaming torches descended among the crouching Australians and Territorials. A torrent of our artillery fire was turned on Pozières, the fortified Windmill behind it, the lines of trenches before the village and the barbed-wire entanglements.

Suddenly, about midnight, the British guns lifted and the Australians rose to their feet. At once rockets rose into the air, and bursting lit up the 500 yards or so of crater-pitted ground between them and the first German trench. The Australians, in the glare of the rockets, under a rain of shrapnel, moved steadily and rapidly forward. On their left Territorials—mostly Londoners—made for the west end of the village. The first German trench had been recently dug; it was shallow, and the enemy there offered little resistance. Digging themselves in, the Australians halted, while our guns played on the second trench, a deep and well-built one beyond the tramway running about the outskirts of the village. There the Germans put up a better fight, but were all bayoneted or taken prisoners.

Having improved the second trench, the Australians, crossing to others, made their way through clumps of woods and orchards into the village itself. Two redoubts were captured on the way. Meanwhile the Territorials had on the left got above Pozières and were attacking it from the north-west. From daybreak onward the work of clearing out the Germans from the ruins of the village went on. At 11.30 a.m. the Germans, strongly reinforced, counter-attacked. They had been doped with ether and charged like a troop of madmen. In a horrible hand-to-hand conflict weapons of every kind were employed and some of the Germans used spiked clubs which had been specially made for this warfare. Backwards and forwards swayed the infuriated combatants. But by 4 p.m. our troops gained the mastery and by nightfall three-quarters of Pozières was won.

Less successful was the attempt to storm Guillemont at the southern end of the sector. Several barbed-wire entanglements covering the position had not been destroyed. Raked by machine-gun fire and charged by the German reserves, the British who had effected a lodgment in the village from the north were obliged to withdraw.

Between Pozières and Guillemont there had also been fierce encounters. At one moment our men had expelled the Germans entirely from Longueval, but by the afternoon they had regained a footing in the northern houses of the village. On the French front there had been an artillery duel, and south of Soyécourt a German attack had been repulsed.

On the 24th the battle for the ridges north of the Somme continued, but nothing decisive occurred. The Australians and the British made some progress in and around Pozières, where six German officers and 145 men were captured and the French south of the Somme carried at night some strongly fortified houses and a stretch of trench between Estrées and Vermand-Ovillers.

The next day (July 25) the situation changed. For a week no rain had fallen and the ground had dried, which was favourable to the Allies, still the atmospheric conditions had been bad for our artillery observers, whether in the forward observing positions or high above the ground in aircraft. For it was hazy and the smoke of battle lay heavy on the earth.

As a consequence, battery after battery of the heavy German guns which had been hastily dispatched to the Somme front were safely placed by their detachments in various suitable positions behind Flers, the next village which would have to be stormed on the road through Longueval to Bapaume. During the 26th the increased volume of shell fire from the German side plainly showed the British that more guns had been brought into action against them. At the same time the strong reinforcements of infantry which had also reached the German lines commenced a series of formidable counter-attacks. One of these in the afternoon was directed from the north-east against Pozières, most of which village was in the hands of the Australians or Territorials. The cemetery on the north-west side had been taken by our men, but to the north-east the complication of trenches in front of the summit known as the Windmill on the ridge behind Pozières still held out. To rescue their comrades still lurking in or near the village the Germans swept down on both sides of the Pozières-Bapaume road from the direction of the Windmill. It was a brave but fruitless attempt. Such charges, already preposterous at the First Battle of Ypres, had, in face of the gigantic accumulation

of guns and shells, now become suicidal. Caught by a deluge of shrapnel, the Germans hesitated, halted, and then ran back, leaving behind them the ground littered with the dead and dying. Almost simultaneously with this charge, another in the region of Guillemont met with the same fate. At other points parties of our infantry progressed. To the south of Estrées the French reduced some strongly fortified houses and farther west expelled the enemy from trenches north of Vermand-Ovillers. The salients created by the Allies north and south of the Somme were being gradually flattened out.

Night fell but brought no rest to the combatants. There was no moon and the only light on the battlefield was that caused by explosions of the shells or the occasional lights and rockets thrown up. About 3 a.m. on the 26th the Germans, undeterred by their losses of the previous day, commenced a counter-attack on our position between Longueval and Pozières. A flight of rockets shot up and great patches of ground became visible, betraying the enemy's advance. At once the trench mortars on our side began to fire, and the sound of machine-guns and of rifle-firing was heard, while our batteries behind poured a devastating fire on the assaulting troops.

The attack was beaten back and a second also failed. When dawn broke, "No Man's Land" was heaped with ghastly results of the British fire.

It was on July 26 that Pozières was finally captured and the second phase of the Battle of the Somme ended. The Territorials and Australians had penetrated the main German line just below the Cemetery, where numerous prisoners were taken. Thence the British worked eastward along the trench to the Pozières-Bapaume road and advanced against the positions guarding the high ground, north-east of the village. Most of the prisoners captured belonged to the 22nd Regiment, brought down from the Ypres region, and to the 157th Regiment.

Every building, every copse, wood, declivity in the ground had been utilized by the German engineers for defensive purposes, and vast underground dwellings had been constructed to house the garrisons in safety. Ample supplies of arms and ammunition were at hand for their troops and careful arrangements had been made to bring a powerful fire on the works themselves in case they should fall into the hands of the British; in short, the whole resources of military art had been exhausted to render this position impregnable. But, battered to pieces so far as the above-ground constructions were concerned, the nerve-shattered garrison had been unable to resist the determined assaults of the British and Australians. The process of clearing out the dug-outs was, as an officer remarked, something like drawing a badger. But it was done, and Pozières remained in the hands of our gallant troops.

Since July 1 some 24 square miles had been seized by the British. They had advanced eastward on an average 7,000 yards on a front averaging between 9,000 and 10,000 yards.

[Official photograph.

A VIEW OF POZIÈRES AFTER THE BRITISH ATTACK.

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CHAPTER CLV.

THE CAMPAIGN IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA (I).

AREA OF OPERATIONS—SKETCH OF EVENTS 1914–16—THE COUNTRY DESCRIBED—HISTORY OF THE GERMAN COLONY—DR. SCHNEE'S GOVERNORSHIP—ANTI-MOSLEM POLICY—THE GERMAN FORCES—BRITISH EAST AFRICA AT OUTBREAK OF WAR—NATIVE LOYALTY—TROOPS FROM INDIA—LETTOW-VORBECK'S PLANS—THE FIRST FIGHTING—THE TANGA DISASTER—WORK OF THE ROYAL NAVY—BOMBARDMENT OF DAR-ES-SALAAM—THE KÖNIGSBERG—BRITISH REORGANIZATION AND COMMANDS—BUKOBA—THE WESTERN FRONTIER—NYASALAND—NORTHERN RHODESIA—REVIEW OF OPERATIONS IN 1915—GENERAL SMUTS TAKES COMMAND.

AT once the largest and the most important of German over-sea possessions, German East Africa was also in a more favourable position both for offensive and defensive operations than the other German colonies. The commander of the forces, Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck, proved to be an able soldier, and for the first 18 months of the war he kept practically intact the territory committed to his charge. Throughout the greater part of that period he maintained an offensive on all his land frontiers. This he was able to do as the combined result of the unpreparedness of his opponents and of geographical factors.

The region known as German East Africa lies between Portuguese East Africa on the south and British East Africa on the north. Westward it extends to the great lakes of Central Africa, and includes parts of all those lakes—Nyasa, Tanganyika, Kivu and Victoria Nyanza. It is bordered north-west by the Uganda Protectorate, west by Belgian Congo, and south-west by Northern Rhodesia and the Nyasaland Protectorate. Its land frontiers are over 2,200 miles in length. In relation to its neighbours it occupies a central position with shorter and better lines of communication. Of this circumstance von Lettow-Vorbeck took full advantage.

On the Indian Ocean the German protectorate had a seaboard of about 450 miles, with several good harbours. But from the naval standpoint the value of the two chief ports, Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga, was diminished owing to the proximity of the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, which are a British protectorate. In the event of hostilities these islands form convenient bases for operations against the mainland—a circumstance of considerable importance, but yet a poor consolation in the Great War, for the price paid for Zanzibar by the Anglo-German agreement of July, 1890, was the cession of Heligoland!

The value of Zanzibar as far as East Africa was concerned was demonstrated at the outset of the campaign, two cruisers sailing across and bombarding Dar-es-Salaam (August 8, 1914). The initiative at sea rested with the British, but it was momentarily challenged. The cruiser Königsberg was in the Indian Ocean when war was declared, and on September 20 it destroyed the Pegasus in Zanzibar roadstead. Meantime, on August 15, German forces had invaded British East Africa in the Kilimanjaro region and had seized Taveta. A combined

land and sea attack on Mombasa was then planned. The land force got within 25 miles of that port, but the Königsberg instead of being able to help was chased by British warships and eventually came to an inglorious end in the shallow waters of the Rufiji river. In December, 1914, Dar-es-Salaam was again bombarded, and in February, 1915, a blockade of the coast of German East Africa was instituted.

From Taveta, and from other places on the frontier, the Germans made raids on the Uganda Railway,* but they failed in their endeavours to capture Nairobi, the capital of British East Africa, and to seize the governor. Early in November, 1914, troops from India attacked Tanga from the sea. The attack failed, the British casualties being 795. A

COLONEL VON LETTOW-VORBECK.

simultaneous attack on the German positions north of Kilimanjaro also failed. In January, 1915, Indian troops garrisoned Jassin, a small post within the German frontier, but in the same month they were compelled to surrender to the Germans. There followed many weary months of frontier fighting. In April, 1915, Brigadier-General Stewart was superseded in the command of the troops in British East Africa by Major-General Tighe, who also had charge of the operations on the western Uganda frontier, where there was considerable fighting. In June, 1915, a combined land and lake attack on Bukoba, the chief German port on the west side of Victoria Nyanza, was completely successful. The only armed German boat on the lake had been previously disabled. The strength of the British in East Africa was



DR. SCHNEE,
Governor of German East Africa.

largely increased early in 1916 by the arrival of an Expeditionary Force from South Africa, and in February of that year General Smuts took over the command. General Tighe had already initiated an offensive movement against the enemy, and in March, 1916, General Smuts swept the Germans out of the Kilimanjaro area.

On the Congo frontier the war began with the bombardment — August 22, 1914 — of Lukuga, a Belgian port on Tanganyika, of which lake the Germans held command until the close of 1915. The operations against the Belgians, especially in the region of Lake Kivu, were on a comparatively large scale, but the Belgian commander, General Tombeur, kept his opponents in check while engaged in raising a force strong enough to begin a serious offensive. The Belgian colonial army—Congo natives—struck its first big blow in April, 1916. Next, however, to their efforts against British East Africa, the German offensive in the early months of the war was directed mainly against Northern Rhodesia and Nyasa-

* So called because it leads to Uganda. The official title is the Mombasa-Victoria Nyanza Railway, and it is wholly in British East Africa.

GENERAL MAP OF GERMAN EAST AFRICA.

land. On Lake Nyasa itself they were powerless, the British having disabled the only German steamer on the lake on August 13, 1914. Outstanding events in the campaign were the defeat on September 9, 1914, of a determined attempt to seize Karonga, a British port on Lake Nyasa, and the successful defence by an Anglo-Belgian force of the post of Saisi, just within the Rhodesian frontier (June-August, 1915). In September-November, 1915, reinforcements from South Africa reached Nyasaland, but it was not until May, 1916, that an invasion of German territory from that protectorate was undertaken. Meantime, in March, 1916, Portugal had joined in the war and her troops had occupied one or two places on the southern frontier of the German protectorate.

German East Africa had an area of over 380,000 square miles—that is, it was nearly twice as large as Germany. At its greatest length—S.E. and N.W.—it extended for a distance of 1,000 miles. Although in the tropics, this territory contains several areas which, owing to their elevation, are suitable for settlement by Europeans. These areas probably do not exceed altogether 50,000 square miles, and in the rest of the country the climate is unhealthy for white races. Little mineral wealth had been discovered, but in sylvan, agricultural and pastoral resources the country is immensely rich, and it is the natural avenue of trade for a considerable part of Central Africa. Moreover, judged by African standards—the continent is very sparsely populated—its native inhabitants, who number about 8,000,000, are fairly



ON THE BORDERS OF RHODESIA.
Rhodesian troops on the march.

numerous. Many Arabs and Indians dwell in the coast lands. The physical features of the country are on a grand scale, the principal drawback being the lack of navigable rivers. Of non-navigable rivers there are many, some of imposing length. The major part of the country is a tableland, 3,000 to 4,000 feet in average elevation and with an undulating surface. Parts of the tableland are barren, but for the most part it is covered with forests or elephant grass. Big game is plentiful in many regions. The lion, leopard, buffalo, giraffe, antelopes of many kinds, the "rhino." and the "hippo." are all there, and snakes, many venomous, abound. Crocodiles infest the rivers and the tse-tse fly—and other pests—many districts. The soil is nearly everywhere rich and abundantly repays cultivation. The eastern escarpment of the tableland is much broken, forming ranges of

mountains which run parallel to the sea. The coastal plain, sometimes sandy, but mostly mangrove swamps and dense jungle, is from 30 to over 100 miles wide. Owing to their fertility the majority of the European plantations were in the coastal plain and in the mountains facing it. There were two principal areas of settlement, in the hills around Mrogoro, west of Dar-es-Salaam, and, farther north, in Usambara, where the highlands come nearest the sea and reach to within a few miles of the frontier of British East Africa. Besides the tangle of mountains forming the sea-ward wall of the tableland, several isolated summits mark its eastern edge. Of these Mount Meru (14,950 feet) and the majestic, glacier-clad, volcanic cone of Kilimanjaro (19,321 feet, the highest mountain in Africa) were within the German frontier. The southern slopes of Kilimanjaro and Meru are among the best watered, most cultivated, and most healthy regions of East Africa. They are conveniently adjacent to the Usambara highlands, and have in Tanga an excellent port.

Much of the interior is unattractive from the scenic point of view, but few regions of Africa rival in grandeur and beauty the western fringe of the protectorate. Here the tableland is cleft by a huge chasm, known as the Great Rift Valley, and in the chasm, of immense depth, lie lakes Nyasa, Tanganyika and Kivu. The walls of the chasm tower sheer above the lakes. In the south-west Nyasa—350 miles in length—lies 6,000 ft. below the unbroken line of the Livingstone mountains; due west is Tanganyika, a rock-bound ribbon of water 30 to 45 miles wide and over 400 miles long. North of Tanganyika, framed in mighty mountains, lies Kivu, a pigmy among its giant neighbours, for its length is only 55 miles, but the most picturesque of African lakes. And north of Kivu is a land of wonder and mystery dominated by the lofty cones of a series of very active volcanoes, the Mfumbiro Mountains. Eastward of Mfumbiro, and comparatively shallow, for it lies on the tableland, not in the Rift Valley, is the vast expanse of the Victoria Nyanza, with an area nearly as great as Scotland. About a fourth of the waters of Nyasa, half of Kivu, and rather more than half of Victoria Nyanza, together with part of the Mfumbiro Mountains, were in the German protectorate. The waters of Tanganyika, outside the three miles limit, were international,



DAR-ES-SALAAM.

as free to the British, who own its southern shores, and the Belgians, to whom belong its eastern coast, as to the Germans. Immediately east of Kivu is the mountainous and thickly-populated district of Ruanda, a feudal State still governed by its own Sultan in 1914, though German sovereignty was acknowledged. Ruanda is famed for its countless herds of cattle and its healthy climate. It also contains the most remote of the head-streams of the

BRITISH WATER-SUPPLY COLUMN.

Nile. These gather into one and, as the Kagera, flow into the Victoria Nyanza just within the bounds of the Uganda Protectorate.

It was one of the ironies of the partition of Africa that this central region of the eastern half of the continent fell to Germany, for in its exploration and early development they had had scarcely any part. The first Europeans to hold sway over the seaports were the Portuguese—some vestiges of their rule still remain. In the nineteenth century the Arab Sultans of Zanzibar had succeeded to the sovereignty over the coast of the neighbouring mainland. It was one of these Sultans, Seyyid Majid, who first recognized the advantages that the perfectly sheltered harbour of Dar-es-Salaam (Arabic for the Haven of Peace) offered in contrast with the open roadstead of Zanzibar. To the Zanzibar Arabs was due also the first authentic knowledge of the interior. In quest of slaves and ivory these Arabs penetrated inland to Tanganyika, and even across that lake into the heart of what became Belgian Congo. Leaders in this movement were the family of which Tippoo Tib was the best-known member. Starting from Bagamoyo, opposite Zanzibar, the Arabs formed a caravan route to Tanganyika. They founded on the open tableland the town of Tabora as a half-way house between the sea and the lakes. Ujiji, midway on the eastern shores of Tanganyika, where occurs one of the rare breaks in the line of precipitous cliffs forming the eastern wall of the Great Rift Valley, was their lake port, and there they ruled as sovereigns and lords. Rumours of the existence of vast seas in the heart of Africa presently reached Europe. It was the age of great explorers in Africa, and Burton and Speke made an adventurous journey from Bagamoyo to Tanganyika. First of white men at Ujiji, in February, 1858, they gazed upon the waters of that lake—the longest fresh-water lake in the world. Next to explore Tanganyika was David Livingstone, and it was at Ujiji that he was "found" by H. M. Stanley in 1871. Speke, besides his share in the discovery of Tanganyika, was the first white man to see the waters of that *nyanza* which he named after Queen Victoria; and to Speke and Grant and to H. M. Stanley was due the opening up of the route from Bagamoyo to Victoria Nyanza. Speke likewise was the first European to see Mfumbiro. Kivu alone owed its discovery to a German, Count Götzen.

Hard on the heels of the explorers came the missionaries—British missionaries—and these carried on desperately hard work with unceasing devotion. Much of their effort was directed to combating the Arab slave traders, and

believing that one of the surest methods of accomplishing their object was to develop legitimate trade, they launched the first steamers placed on the waters of Tanganyika and Nyasa. After the missionary came the trader—British and British-Indian—and after the trader the political agent. As early as 1877 Seyyid Bargash, then Sultan of Zanzibar, had offered to British merchants extensive rights in his mainland dominions. Seyyid Bargash, like his predecessors, was in close relations with the Government of India, and British influence was predominant in Zanzibar, where Sir John Kirk was in the critical period of partition the British Agent. In 1877 the British merchants proved more timid—a remarkable exception to the general rule—than the British Government in assuming responsibility, and Seyyid Bargash's offer was not accepted. In 1883–84 the rivalry of Germany began. The notorious Karl Peters, whose subsequent exploits earned for him among the natives the title of "The Man with the Blood-stained Hand," with two companions, landed clandestinely on the mainland near Zanzibar in November, 1884, and concluded treaties with chieftains in the Kilimanjaro and other regions, upon which a little later the German Imperial Government founded claims of sovereignty. For action of this kind some of the British interested in the development of East Africa had been prepared, and a short while before Karl Peters reached Zanzibar Mr. (afterwards Sir) H. H. Johnston had made treaties with the chiefs of Taveta and other native potentates in the Kilimanjaro region.

It is not necessary to set forth the diplomatic struggle which followed; the result was that through the complaisant action

DISPATCH-RIDER CROSSING AN IMPROVISED BRIDGE.

MEN OF THE KING'S AFRICAN RIFLES.

of the British Foreign Office, which then welcomed German cooperation in the work of civilization in Africa—Germany secured the rich region which had been opened up by British enterprise, while to the British fell an unknown land, believed to be worthless, save as affording a route to Uganda and the Upper Nile. It had one good harbour—Mombasa—and that in 1885 seemed to be the beginning and end of its advantages. It fell to Lord Salisbury in 1890 to sign the agreement which settled the boundaries of the German protectorate. The Germans in characteristic fashion had intrigued to secure Zanzibar Island, both because of its commanding strategic position and its value as chief entrepôt for the trade of Central Africa. In the end they acknowledged a British protectorate over Zanzibar—but they got Heligoland in recompense. Further, Karl Peters had conducted a filibustering expedition into Uganda with the object of obtaining for Germany a footing in the Upper Nile basin. Lord Salisbury insisted that the whole basin of the Nile should be left in the British sphere, and carried his point. But again the price paid was somewhat heavy—it was the sacrifice of the scheme, associated chiefly with the name of Cecil Rhodes, for an "all-British" route from the Cape to Cairo. Sir Harry Johnston, Mr. A. J. Swann and others had in the region between Tanganyika and Uganda made treaties with native potentates which would have achieved the desired object, but Germany objected to have the British as neighbours in the west as well as in the north and south, and by the 1890 agreement the limits of the German protectorate were made conterminous with the eastern frontier of the Congo Free State (now the Belgian Congo).* Apart from this main issue two other noteworthy incidents occurred in fixing the frontier. They concerned rival claims to mountains, Kilimanjaro and Mfumbiro. The outcome of the negotiations may be told in the words of a correspondent of *The Times*:

> To Kilimanjaro the British had the best title, and the straight line which it was proposed should form the Anglo-German boundary would have carried the frontier across the mountain and left the highest peaks on the British side. Lord Salisbury, however, was told—the story was current at the time, though it does not appear in the diplomatic documents—that the Kaiser (then Prince William of Prussia) greatly desired that Kilimanjaro, first sighted by a German,† should become German territory. Lord Salisbury was complaisant, and the frontier was deflected to meet the wishes of the Prussian Prince—though the Taveta district fell to Great Britain. The story is characteristic, and it has been an undoubted point of satisfaction to William II. that the German flag should float over the highest point of Africa. The particular peak which rises a few feet above its neighbours is called the Kaiser Wilhelm Spitze.

Among other things, the Kaiser had expressed great interest in "the flora and fauna" of Kilimanjaro, and this was remembered when the diplomatists came to fix the western frontier, where Mfumbiro was situated. The straight line then favoured for international boundaries would have placed Mfumbiro (as was supposed) within the German sphere.

> The chance glimpse which Speke obtained in 1861 of the magnificent volcanic region led, however, to the saving of a portion of that territory for Britain. Kilimanjaro had been gracefully given to Germany, and Lord Salisbury claimed Mfumbiro in return. "Tell the Emperor," Alexander Bruce, one of the founders of the British East Africa Company, and a son-in-law of David Livingstone, is reported to have said, "that there is a Scotsman in Edinburgh interested in the flora and fauna of the mountain." The Germans, more than half believing that Mfumbiro had only a mythical existence, agreed to Lord Salisbury's demand. Later on Speke's Mfumbiro was found to be full 20 miles west of its supposed position, and was claimed by Belgium to be in Congo territory. [Eventually, after years of negotiations, the Mfumbiro region was divided between Britain, Germany and Belgium.]

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* When in 1894 the Rosebery Administration tried to get through the Cape to Cairo connexion by obtaining the lease of a strip of Congo territory, Germany at once intervened and the proposed lease was abandoned.

† Johannes Rebmann (in 1848). Rebmann was a Wurtemburger, a missionary in the service of the Church Missionary Society.

For a number of years the Germans did little towards the development of their protectorate. The administration had to meet Arab revolts on the coast and to subjugate many native tribes in the interior. Their methods were in general very harsh; the efforts of one or two enlightened governors, such as Major Hermann von Wissmann and Count Götzen, could not change the whole spirit of the administration. For years, too, the public services were starved by the refusal of the Reichstag to vote the supplies required. The Usambara Highlands were developed by private enterprise, part of the capital employed being British. It was not until the appointment, in 1907, of a business man, Herr Dernburg, to the German Colonial office that the protectorate was given ample means of development. The Uganda Railway, which reached Victoria Nyanza in 1901, had proved highly successful and was drawing to Mombasa much of the trade of German East Africa. The lesson was not lost on Herr Dernburg. The railway from Tanga to the Usambara Highlands was continued to Neu Moshi, on the slopes of Kilimanjaro, and 18 miles west of the British frontier. More important was the completion of what is called variously the Central Railway and the Tanganyika-bahn. This trunk line, from Dar-es-Salaam to Lake Tanganyika, was begun in 1905, but in 1907 had not got beyond Mrogoro. After Herr Dernburg's visit to East Africa in that year construction went forward rapidly, and in February, 1914, the rails reached the lake—a distance of 780 miles. Owing to an alteration in the level of Tanganyika Ujiji was not chosen as the lake terminus, a land-locked natural harbour, Kigoma, being available four miles farther north. With the building of the railways the number of plantations increased. In 1913 the value of exports from the protectorate was £1,777,000, an indication of the volume of trade which would follow the provision of cheap transport.

In 1912 Dr. Albert Schnee, who had held posts in London and the South Seas and who had married a New Zealand lady, was appointed governor, and he was in office when war broke out. Towards the coast Arabs and the British Indians (who were among the chief traders) he followed a conciliatory policy; he also took some steps to secure reasonable treatment of the negroes by the planters. In view of the *rôle* of Protector of Islam adopted by the Kaiser it is noteworthy to find that Dr. Schnee, months before the war broke out, was engaged in an anti-Mahommedan crusade. A circular signed by him was sent, in October, 1913, to all District Commissioners on the subject. A copy of this precious document was discovered by the British in the archives at Moshi in March, 1916. It read as follows:

All military stations.

You are requested to send within three months from date of receipt a report stating what can be done by means of Government servants and Government teachers to counteract effectively the spread of Islamic propaganda.

INDIAN MOUNTAIN GUN IN ACTION.

TRAINING SCOUTS FOR THE BRITISH FORCES.

Do you consider it possible to make a regulation prohibiting Islam altogether? Possibly a rule might be enforced by which teachers would not be allowed to perform circumcisions or act as preachers in the mosques, etc. The same prohibition might also be applied to other Government servants.

The encouragement of pig-breeding among natives is recommended by experts as an effective means ot stopping the spread of Islam. Please consider this point also.

"Expert opinion" recommended pig-breeding as a preventative to the spread of Islam—a fine example of the profundity of German thought. But when the war began Dr. Schnee changed his tune. By his authority a proclamation inciting the Moslems to a Holy War was distributed broadcast. The Germans did more. They entered into direct negotiations with Moslem notables, subjects of the Allies, and endeavoured to seduce them from their allegiance. A choice specimen of the way in which they went to work to effect this object is afforded by a letter addressed by Count Falkenstein, the officer commanding the forces on the Nyasa frontier, to a Mahomedan who exercised great influence over the large Moslem population living on either side of the Anglo-Portuguese border near Lake Nyasa. The following is a translation of the principal passages of Count Falkenstein's letter:

The Mahomedans together with the Germans and the Austrians are fighting with English, French, Italians Serbians, and Japanese. The enemy everywhere are defeated. . . . In Morocco the French are completely cleared out. . . . In Afghanistan and Baluchistan the English have run away.

Now the children of Padisha have entered into power. . . . French and Russians are practically fallen and the English not quite yet, but many of their soldiers are killed outright, very many of their battleships are sunk. Of their steamers more than 500 have sunk.

Here in East Africa soldiers [? our] have reached close to the English railway at different places. The English railway, its roadway, our askaris [native soldiers] have destroyed. . . . The Belgian askari have everywhere been defeated, many have died, many taken prisoners. Furthermore, here in Nyasaland there are many German askari. Many Mahomedans and we ourselves will make a great "business."

And now all Mahomedans are knowing when they die. Furthermore, they are dying for God. He has seen their flag of holy war with His own eyes. And you do not fail to bring news to me immediately and the names of those Angoni [a tribe of Zulu origin living in British Nyasaland], we are wanting their "marks" and their chieftain.

Ask them quietly. Dispose clever men well for the hiding of our secret and you will be happy in the Government together with your people.—FALKENSTEIN, Captain.

The new attitude of the administration towards Islam had its effect on the Moslems living in German East Africa, and among the stoutest of Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck's troops were Arab volunteers.

Nominally the combined strength of the military and police forces in German East Africa when war began was some 260 Germans and 2,500 natives. The *North German Gazette* of March 25, 1915, claimed that in East Africa, as in South-West Africa and Cameroon, "the military organization consisted at all times solely of police troops designed exclusively to assure security against native revolts, but not against an exterior enemy." Although

this assertion was not true, the forces in German East Africa at the beginning of August, 1914, were not sufficient to enable Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck to take the offensive immediately. But he speedily raised a comparatively large army. All German residents of military age in the protectorate, some 3,000, were called to the colours, as well as the native soldiers who had passed into the reserve. It also happened that in August, 1914, there were at Dar-es-Salaam a number of non-resident Germans. It had been arranged to open at that port on August 15 an exhibition in celebration of the completion of the Tanganyikabahn. Many visitors, including several army officers, had arrived. They had no chance of returning, and together with the crews of the steamers in harbour were available to reinforce the ranks of von Lettow-Vorbeck's army. Most of the German missionaries in the country also joined the ranks; as already stated, numbers of Arabs volunteered, and large numbers of natives were impressed. By October, 1914, the German force was three

GERMAN EAST AFRICAN NATIVE TROOPS.

times as large as its nominal strength in the previous August, and at its maximum Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck had under his command 4,000 Europeans and 30,000 natives. At the beginning of 1916, that is after allowing for the serious casualties the enemy had already suffered (not fewer than 4,000), General Smuts estimated the German force at 16,000 men, of whom 2,000 were white, with 60 guns and 80 machine guns. This was either an underestimate or did not include the Germans operating in the Tanganyika and Nyasaland regions. The German troops were organized in companies varying from 150 to 200 strong, with 10 per cent. of whites and an average of two machine guns per company. They were plentifully supplied with ammunition. All the principal Government stations were fortified, and were connected with one another and with the railways by well-made roads, mostly suitable for motor traffic.* Tabora, at which town many of the main roads meet, was especially well defended, as was also Kigoma, the harbour of Ujiji. The "military organization to assure security against native revolts" had certainly been thorough, and Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck was able to contemplate the immediate military situation with much greater equanimity than could the British and Belgian commanders opposed to him. He was, it may be added, a man of experience in tropical Africa, for before taking up his command at Dar-es-Salaam, in 1914, he had been commander of the troops in Cameroon.

Though the local situation in East Africa was favourable to Germany it speedily became apparent in Berlin that the naval supremacy of Britain left them without means of succouring their colonies. Thus it came about that on August 23, 1914, the Berlin Foreign Office made proposals that such of the African possessions of the belligerents as were within the conventional basin of the Congo should be neutralized. This German manœuvre has been dealt with in the account of the Cameroon campaign, and need not again be discussed. How far the German Government's action was disinterested may be judged from the fact that German troops, while Berlin was still in wireless communication with Dr. Schnee, had invaded British East Africa and Nyasaland, and had bombarded (entirely without provocation) a Belgian port on Lake Tanganyika before the German Foreign Office first made its proposals for neutralization. Those proposals were rejected.

When news that war was declared reached the British protectorates in East and Central Africa there was an immediate rally of the white settlers to the colours. The native communities proved equally eager to serve the British cause, and the propaganda of the Germans among them met with no response. There was a small rising in Nyasaland in January, 1915, but it was the work not of the Germans, but of a native Seventh Day Adventist, who proclaimed that the millennium would come when Nyasaland had a black king. The rebels, receiving no support, were easily crushed. They in no sense represented the native Christians. The Mahomedans gave ample proof of their loyalty. Of all the declarations made by Moslem rulers none was more significant than that of the Sultan of Zanzibar, for the Zanzibar Arabs had had practical experience both of German and British methods of rule. In a letter to his representative at Mombasa the Sultan wrote:

> Let no consideration or promises from Germans prevail upon you to change your allegiance from the mighty Empire of England. Remember that England has ever been a true friend and protector of our interests and religion, and I commend to you and all Arabs that your attitude now be of unswerving loyalty to Great Britain.
>
> Let me warn you against believing lies coming from Germans. Remember how the Germans behaved during the reigns of Seyyid Majid and Seyyid Bargash respectively. The amount of outrages and violation of the local Government's rights and forced intervention in our religious concerns committed by them at that time, even entering the mosques with their shoes on, not even regarding the sacred rights of the mosques. . . . The German Government is harsh and cruel, and they have ever shown themselves scornful and despising Mahomedans. Do not believe their words, for they lie to gain your confidence, and then they will crush and ill-treat you and our religionists.

The Arabs responded to the Sultan's appeal, and not in lip service only, nor in munificent donations to war funds. Arab volunteers rendered valuable help in the critical first months of the war. Pagan tribes were likewise eager to help. The warlike Masai were among the first to offer their services and many Masai acted as scouts to the British East African force. Fears of unrest among the natives, which for some weeks haunted the minds of the British settlers in East Africa, proved groundless.

On receipt of the news of the declaration of war, which to the British in East Africa came,

* Apart from these main roads there were a few secondary roads, but in the greater part of the country the only means of communication were bush tracks.

in the words of a resident, "almost like a bolt from the blue," the Governor, Sir Henry Belfield, proclaimed martial law in British East Africa and Zanzibar. The situation was precarious; no preparations had been made to guard against invasion from the German frontier. The East Africa Protectorate Force, which was under the command of Lieut.-Col. L. E. S. Ward, D.S.O., consisted of the 3rd Battalion King's African Rifles and part of the 1st Battalion of the same regiment. It numbered about 1,200. Many of the rank and file were Yaos, a virile tribe living in Nyasaland, but among them were numbers of other tribes —Sudanese, Gallas and Abyssinians. Highly trained, daring to a fault, enduring, no finer body for campaigning in Africa could be found. They were led by officers seconded from British regiments. Besides this very efficient but very small body there was a semi-military police force in British East Africa about 2,000 strong. Few of these could be spared from their normal duties, and in August, 1914, not even the majority of the K.A. Rifles were available for service against the Germans. They were in Jubaland, maintaining order among unruly Somali on the borders of Italian Somaliland.* They had to be brought from distant stations, embarked at Kismayu, and thence taken by boat to Mombasa; and it was not until September that they reached the front. Meantime volunteers were called for from among the European population of British East Africa. The appeal was made to willing men. Within a fortnight over 1,000 settlers were under arms, and one troop had already taken the field. Two regiments were formed from the ranks of the settlers—the East African Mounted Rifles and the East African Regiment (infantry). The Boer Volunteers were enrolled in a separate company under Capt. Wessels. Lieut. A. J. B. Wavell (Special Reserve, The Welsh Regt.), a man with an intimate knowledge of Islam, one of the few Europeans who

SOMALI SCOUTS AT A CAPTURED GERMAN OBSERVATION POST.
Native huts on either side.

* The Somali living in the more settled part of the Protectorate were absolutely loyal. Many volunteered for service and under white leadership the Somali Scouts did good work.

had visited Mecca, obtained permission to recruit among the coast Arabs, and "Wavell's Arabs" soon earned distinction.

The East African volunteers were exceedingly keen, hard, sturdy men. Many had seen service in South Africa, nearly all were expert shots and accustomed to the bush. The majority brought their own horses and equipment. Among the volunteers was Lord Delamere, the first settler in British East Africa, whose experience was utilized in the Intelligence Department. Another of the earliest to volunteer was Mr. Charles Grey, brother of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

While the resources locally available might suffice for the moment large reinforcements

LIEUT. A. J. B. WAVELL.

were needed, and orders were issued for troops from India to go to East Africa. The first regiment to arrive was the 29th Punjabis. With it came Brigadier-General J. M. Stewart, who took over the command of the troops from Colonel Ward. At that time two enemy cruisers were in the adjacent waters, the Emden and the Königsberg. But the transport of troops went on unhindered. The British ships in the Indian Ocean did more, however, than convoy transports. They took an active part in the fighting, and in fact struck the first blow in the campaign.

On August 8, 1914, two ancient cruisers, the Astræa and the Pegasus, appeared off Dar-es-Salaam. The Astræa (4,360 tons) ranked as a second-class cruiser and carried two 6-inch and eight 4·7 guns. But she was 23 years old and could steam no more than 18 knots. The Pegasus (3,000 tons) was slightly younger, scarcely 20 years old, her principal armament being eight 4-inch guns. At Dar-es-Salaam there were no heavy guns and the German navy was represented only by the 10-year-old surveying ship Möwe, of 650 tons, which carried nothing more than three 1-pounders. This vessel and the floating dock the British ships sank by gunfire. Landing parties destroyed the (newly erected) wireless station and dismantled the ships in harbour. It was not a big affair, but as Dar-es-Salaam was not only the chief port of entry in the German protectorate, but the seat of government, Dr. Schnee received a valuable lesson as to what supremacy at sea meant. However, the Germans were heartened a few weeks later by the arrival of the Königsberg, a cruiser of 3,400 tons, launched at Kiel in December, 1905, which carried ten 4·1 inch guns and had a speed of 24 knots. On September 20 the Königsberg surprised the Pegasus as that vessel was lying at anchor in Zanzibar roadstead cleaning her guns and repairing her machinery. The Königsberg with her long-range guns completely disabled the Pegasus, which was unable to reply, and lost 25 killed and 80 wounded out of her crew of 234. The German cruiser also sank the two small guard-ships Cupid and Khalifa. This success led the Germans to plan a combined land and sea attack on Mombasa. Up to that time there had been no very serious fighting on land.

The frontier between the German and British East Africa protectorates ran mainly through desert regions. Only at Kilimanjaro was there any considerable area under cultivation close to the boundary. Here on the German side was the post of Moshi, and on the British side, 25 miles distant, the post of Taveta. Moshi (or, strictly Neu Moshi, a mile or two south-west of the government post) was the terminus of the railway from Tanga, and thus the Germans had an easy means of sending troops thither. Taveta, however, is 75 miles from Voi, the nearest station on the Uganda Railway, and most of the intervening country is a waterless desert. On August 15 a German force, about 100 strong, crossed the frontier and occupied Taveta, its "garrison," consisting of a District Commissioner, his Goanese clerk and 25 natives, retiring. Although it did not appear at first

MASAI WARRIORS AS BRITISH SCOUTS.

to affect the general situation the occupation of Taveta was of importance. It guarded the easiest if not the only route open from British East Africa for an invasion in force of the German protectorate. Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck also took steps to guard Kilimanjaro from the north, where the branch line from the Uganda Railway serving the Magadi soda lake reaches to within 30 miles of the German frontier, its terminus being about 90 miles north-north-west of Kilimanjaro. Somewhat nearer Kilimanjaro than Magadi, and a mile or two on the German side of the frontier, is an isolated mountain called Longido. There the Germans established a strong military post.

Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck now began to develop his plans for an offensive on all his frontiers. As regarded British East Africa a leading object was the destruction of the Uganda Railway. From its starting point at Mombasa on the Indian Ocean as far as Nairobi (the capital of the protectorate), a distance of 327 miles, this railway is nowhere more than 80 miles from the German frontier. From Taveta, Longido, and other points raiding parties were sent out to damage the line. At the same time an advance was made along the coast from Jassin. Crossing the Umba river the Germans seized Vanga, which was "garrisoned" by one British officer and seven native soldiers. Up to the middle of September they had not advanced far beyond Vanga, but on the same day—September 20—that the Königsberg destroyed the Pegasus at Zanzibar the Germans began to march on Mombasa, which is only 50 miles from Vanga. Their strength was estimated at from 1,000 to 1,500, and they had several machine guns. Information received by the British led them to believe that September 29 had been fixed by the Germans as the day for the fall of Mombasa. The Königsberg was to bombard the port and occupy the island on which it is situated, while the land force was to destroy the railway bridge which connects Mombasa with the mainland. As a precautionary measure the women and children, the rolling stock and specie were sent up country from Mombasa by the Uganda Railway.

On land the British had selected a locality called Majareni at which to meet the enemy. It is south of Gazi, a small port 25 miles from Mombasa. Here Lieut. Wavell was in command of his Arab company—130 strong— and a few scouts. A blockhouse had been built, and the camp, which stood in a clearing in



THE GERMAN CRUISER "KÖNIGSBERG."

a mangrove swamp, was entrenched. The general character of the country along the coast is not exaggerated in the following account written by one of Wavell's cyclist scouts :

> Now the road is one of the vilest paths possible to imagine. In one place, some seven miles in length, the sand is from 8 in. to 9 in. thick, in others the road has been dug out at the side and thrown up in the middle, to a varying height of 8 ft. to 10 ft., and only 13 in. wide. In other sections it winds through 8 ft. or 9 ft. high elephant grass, a narrow, winding little footpath, which one finds only through the damage done to the grass-blades and stalks through negroes passing through, then over swamps galore, wading through small, slimy streams, reeking with malaria, through long stretches of mud which clogs one's boots and bicycle, and finally over huge extents (five or six miles) of mangrove swamps and wonderful African jungle, great ferns, cactus, creepers, and impenetrable scrub.*

On Sept. 23 the Germans attacked Wavell's camp. After a very stiff fight lasting from daylight till 5 o'clock the enemy was beaten off. Lieutenant Wavell was severely wounded in the left arm. Four days later Wavell's Arabs were reinforced by a detachment of the 1st Batt. K.A. Rifles which had arrived from Jubaland, and on October 2 by Jind Infantry. The Germans continued their attacks, but these were all repulsed. Meantime the Königsberg, chased by British warships, had fled, and in October her captain, to escape capture, ran her aground in the shallow waters of the Rufiji river, to the south of Dar-es-Salaam. All anxieties as to Mombasa were ended on October 8 when the Germans were routed at Gazi. On that day, to quote the Colonial Office report, "a force of the enemy, estimated at 500 native troops and 30 Europeans, with six maxim guns, attacked our position at Gazi at several points. A sharp fight ensued, but upon our troops delivering a counter-attack—made in face of heavy fire at close range—the enemy were beaten back and forced to retire to the frontier. The Germans lost four Europeans killed and four wounded and captured, besides several native casualties, and they were compelled to leave a considerable amount of arms and ammunition behind them." Captain (temp. Major) G. M. P. Hawthorn, who was in command of the British, and the three other officers of the K.A. Rifles were wounded early in the engagement. "Col.-Sergt. Sumani, K.A. Rifles," wrote a correspondent, "quietly took charge and led his men as if nothing had happened. He gave the order to charge, and the enemy broke and fled."

As the Germans had failed to take the field in any strength before the beginning of September, 1914, they had lost the advantage they would have gained had they attacked in the first fortnight of the war. All through September reinforcements from India arrived at Mombasa, and the slender British posts were strengthened. There was, however, one sharp engagement in August. It was on the 26th, between a detachment of 80 men of the East African Mountain Rifles guarding a frontier post and a German column of 100 natives and 30 whites, with two maxims. The fight took place in thick bush, the Germans being driven off. In the same month a small enemy party, consisting of white officers and natives, made their way across the desert from Taveta with the intention of blowing up the railway at

* Yet in this region were a number of European plantations—mostly sisal.

Maungu, a little south of Voi. The party, which had suffered much from thirst, was broken up by a British patrol before it could do any damage, and all its dynamite and outfit was seized. Two white officers were captured. Shortly afterwards the Germans began to send stronger parties into British territory. A favourite route, as affording water, was from Kilimanjaro down the valley of the Tsavo river. These parties had a double object—the blowing up of the railway bridge spanning the Tsavo, and a raid on Nairobi. Interesting particulars concerning the project for the seizure of Nairobi became known through papers found on the body of a German officer killed in one of the fights in the Tsavo valley. These papers contained instructions that he should proceed to the Uganda Railway, destroy the bridge over the Tsavo river—thus isolating Mombasa and the British forces in the south—and then go on by rail to Nairobi, occupy that town and capture the governor and officials.*

There were three stiff fights in the Tsavo region in September. On the 6th, 250 men of the 29th Punjabis and K.A. Rifles defeated a stronger enemy force advantageously placed. The Punjabis charged several times with the bayonet, clearing the enemy off three successive ridges and capturing a number of prisoners. The British casualties were Lieutenant G. C. O. Oldfield and an Indian Subadar killed, and about 35 rank and file killed or wounded. As soon as the fight was ended the wounded were collected. The bringing in of the wounded at the first possible moment is an urgent matter in tropical Africa, for the helpless are exposed to a danger absent from the battlefields of Europe—that of being devoured by wild beasts.

The bodies could not be buried that night (wrote an officer who took part in the fight) as they had enough to do to bring in all the wounded. Even some of these were missed in the bush, with the result that they spent a most horrible night surrounded by lions, leopards and hyænas. As it was, many of the dead bodies were almost entirely eaten. All available hands were called upon to bury the dead at daybreak next day, and I was amongst the party who set out. It was the most gruesome job I have yet undertaken. We buried Lieutenant Oldfield where he fell. His body was pierced with 18 bullets from a German maxim gun. [Mr. Oldfield was the first British European to be killed in the campaign in East Africa.]

At dawn on September 19 a German force attacked a post held by the K.A. Rifles in the Tsavo valley. After two hours' rifle fire they were beaten back and retired in scattered parties, leaving 13 dead on the field. In this engagement Lieut. A. C. H. Foster (Hampshire

* A naval officer serving in British East Africa wrote stating that as an inducement to their native troops to take Nairobi the Germans offered them the white women in the town.

A BRITISH MOUNTAIN BATTERY IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA.

Regt. and 4th Batt. K.A. Rifles), who was in command of the post, was killed. A week later the enemy again attacked in the Tsavo district —this time at Mzima post, which was held by K.A. Rifles under Capt. A. C. Saunders. The assailants were several hundred strong, the squadron threw the enemy into confusion, but they rallied, and when they got their maxims to work the British retired on their base camp. The German column was so shaken that it retreated to Longido. The casualties in "C" squadron were eight killed and four



RECEIVING WOUNDED FROM THE "PEGASUS" ON BOARD A HOSPITAL SHIP.

Europeans alone numbering 50, and they had with them six maxims. The attack shared the fate of the previous attacks, the enemy being driven off.

Besides these actions in the Tsavo region there was a gallant fight near Longido, in which 30 men of "C" squadron of the East African Mounted Rifles distinguished themselves. It happened on September 25. The Mounted Rifles were under the command of Capt. Paul Chapman, and were watching a water hole by which it was expected an enemy column might pass on its way to attack the Magadi branch of the Uganda Railway. In the dense bush the Germans, 150 to 200 askari, with 30 or more Europeans and two maxims, passed the squadron without either force seeing the other. Scouts informing Capt. Chapman of the presence of the enemy, he advanced in open order through the bush, and surprised the Germans as most of their officers were breakfasting. Opening fire at close range, the wounded. A correspondent of the *Times of India* at Nairobi, whither the wounded were taken, wrote that "C" squadron on retiring were met by "D" squadron, and when it was found that 10 men were missing, our troops hurried back to the scene of the encounter. On arrival they found that eight of our men were killed, and an examination of their bodies showed that some of them after being wounded had been killed by bayonet thrusts and revolver shots.

This was the first occasion in the campaign on which the Germans in East Africa were charged with breaches of the laws of war. In the following months many instances occurred in which they showed a flagrant disregard of the rules of civilized warfare.

After the failure of the attempts to seize Mombasa and Nairobi the German offensive on the British East African frontier came to a standstill for a time. At this period, mid-October, 1914, it had indeed been decided by the British authorities—on whom the responsibility rested for the decision was not

made known—to make an effort to conquer Kilimanjaro and the Usambara Highlands out of hand. The plan adopted was simultaneously to attack the Germans in the Kilimanjaro region and to capture Tanga, the port of Usambara. Tanga was to be seized by an expeditionary force from India which was to be landed under the protection of warships. Tanga, said an official *communiqué*, "was reported to be weakly held." The execution of the plan was timed for the beginning of November. General Stewart reorganized his command so as to have a force ready to strike the blow at Kilimanjaro as soon as the over-sea expedition arrived at Tanga.

The Tanga Expeditionary Force, as it may conveniently be called, sailed direct from India to Tanga. It was commanded by Major-General A. E. Aitken, and left Bombay in the latter part of October. It was made up of British, Indian, and Imperial Service Troops, its total strength being about 6,000. The information that Tanga was not held in strength was accurate, and had the attack been made unexpectedly the place might well have been captured. But the Germans were warned in time. A German officer taken prisoner in the fighting said that they got an intimation of an intended attack by the appearance of British warships off the port taking soundings. The officer in command at Tanga thereupon asked for reinforcements, and a considerable number of troops—including at least 1,000 Europeans—arrived from Moshi by rail. They were well provided with maxims and pom-poms. Early in the morning of November 2 General Aitken's transports arrived off the harbour. "As it was an open town and reported to be undefended, it was apparently deemed right to give notice of the intention to occupy the place and to summon it to surrender before commencing a bombardment. The summons to surrender, made by H.M.S. Fox, was refused." * On the evening of the same day (November 2) one and a half battalions were landed in Tanga Bay, within two miles of the port. This small force advancing through dense jungle, became heavily engaged just outside the town, and as the enemy were in much superior strength it was compelled to fall back and await reinforcements. The main attack was made on November 4. It failed. Three weeks later (November 23) the Secretary of State for India issued an account of the fighting which, after noting the events of November 2, continued:

MACHINE GUN COVERING AN INFANTRY ADVANCE.

At 11 a.m. on the 4th the attack was renewed. When within 800 yards of the position the troops engaged came under very heavy fire. On the left flank, in spite of heavy casualties the 101st Grenadiers actually entered the town and crossed bayonets with the enemy. The N. Lancashire Regt. [2nd Batt.] and Kashmir Rifles on the right pushed on in support under very heavy fire and

* *Pioneer Mail*, December 18, 1914.

also reached the town, but found themselves opposed by tiers of fire from the houses, and were eventually compelled to fall back to cover 500 yards from the enemy's position.

The losses were so heavy and the position so strong that it was considered useless to renew the attack and the force re-embarked and returned to its base to prepare for future operations.* The total casualties in this unsuccessful operation were 795, including 141 British officers and men. The wounded are mostly doing well, and many are convalescent.

Accounts of the engagement from officers who took part in it show that the fighting was of a desperate character. All around Tanga the ground is covered with dense jungle in which are many closely cultivated plantations, and the advance—Tanga town was a mile and three-quarters from the landing place—had to be made against an invisible enemy on well prepared and concealed positions. And in bush fighting the Germans showed that they possessed both skill and resource. Some of the devices employed to delay the British advance were thus described by a correspondent of *The Times*:

Ropes were hidden under sand and brushwood and stretched across paths and, when trodden on by our troops, brought down flags hoisted in the trees. By this means the ranges were accurately marked. The fall of the flags was the signal for a heavy fire from sharpshooters, and sometimes from machine guns, which had been hoisted into trees farther to the rear.

Another device, which would almost seem to have been suggested by Kipling's tale of how an invading pack of "Red Dogs" was destroyed by the "little people," was resorted to by the enemy with some success. Hives of wild bees, partially stupefied by smoke, were placed under lids in the bush on each side of narrow tracks, along which our troops must advance, some hour, before the attack began. Wires or cords, concealed in the same manner as those attached to the range-finding flags, lifted the lids when touched by the advancing troops, and swarms of infuriated bees, recovered from their temporary stupor, were let loose on the attackers. The failure of the attack at certain points is said to have been due as much to this onslaught of the "little people" as to the German rifles and machine guns, many men being so horribly stung in the face or hands as to be temporarily blinded or rendered incapable of holding their weapons. Over 100 stings were extracted from one of the men of the Loyal North Lancashires.*

Owing to the density of the jungle it had been decided to attack without the aid of the guns, which, however, fired at such targets as could be seen from the deck of a transport moored in the outer harbour. It was not until 3.30 p.m.

* The statement that Gen. Aitken's force "returned to its base" was misleading. His force had come direct from India. The facts were more accurately stated in a War office *communiqué* issued on April 24, 1915, in which, for the first time officially, it was stated that Gen. Aitken was in command and that the force had come from India. This April *communiqué*, after recounting the failure of the attack on Tanga, added "The force from India, therefore, re-embarked and proceeded to Mombasa, and thus became a part of the British forces engaged in the defence of the British East African Protectorate."

* Death from bees' stings is not an uncommon occurrence in East Africa. A *safari* always gives a wide berth to a hive of wild bees.

TANGA, AND ITS MAIN STREET.

that the fight became general. Most of the British casualties were caused by machine-gun fire. An officer who took part in the fight wrote home: "Gott strafe the German maxims; they are the only thing we really dislike." The 101st Grenadiers, one of the five infantry regiments of the Indian Army engaged, the 2nd Batt. N. Lancashire Regt., and the Kashmir Rifles, after they had fought their way into Tanga, did not receive the support which might have enabled them to hold the town. The dense character of the bush had, it was stated, led to a too extended disposal of the troops. Other causes would seem to have contributed to the want of success, for Sir Henry Belfield, in congratulating the N. Lancashire Regiment on their "consummate bravery and exemplary discipline," added, "You set an example of steadiness and pluck to some other units of the force which would appear to have been much in need of it."

At nightfall the action was discontinued, the British withdrawing to a camp near the shore. One of the regiments engaged had lost 30 per cent. of its total force. The next day (November 5) the troops re-embarked, unmolested by the enemy, whose losses had been heavy. Their casualties among Europeans alone were estimated at 400.

"The brilliant victory at Tanga," said the Kaiser, in a message to Dr. Solf, who held the thankless office of Colonial Secretary, "has pleased me greatly. I heartily congratulate you upon this glorious deed of our colonial troops. . . . The Fatherland is proud of its sons."

As the attack on Tanga had failed, so also did General Stewart's attempt to capture Longido, the position defending the approach to Kilimanjaro from the north. Longido was important not only because of its natural strength but as containing the only permanent water in a large area. From their base camp in the Magadi region the British had to march 15 miles across country without any water. The force was some 1,500 strong, made up of 300 of the E.A. Mounted Rifles, 800 of the 29th Punjabis, and 400 Imperial Service troops, with the 27th Indian Mountain Battery. After a night march the German lines were assaulted at daybreak on November 4. The enemy, fully equal in number to their assailants, offered a stubborn resistance. The Volunteers exhibited conspicuous gallantry, and the Punjabis took successively three of the enemy's outposts. A German counter-attack was repulsed and considerable ground gained. The fight continued till 7.30 p.m., when, owing to

[*Elliott & Fry.*

BRIG.-GENERAL J. M. STEWART, C.B.

the lack of water, the British, not having captured the enemy's main position, retired in good order to their base. The story of the attempt was neatly summed up by the officer who wrote, "We marched all night, attacked at dawn, fought all day, and then, having failed to turn the Germans out, came back here, as we had no water." The British casualties were 52, 10 of the E.A. Mounted Rifles being killed. The enemy casualties were reported as 38 Europeans and 84 natives. Although they had beaten off the attack the Germans a few days later evacuated Longido, which on November 17 was occupied by General Stewart's troops. It was held, however, simply as an outpost in German territory against enemy raids in the direction of Nairobi, and some months later the British garrison was withdrawn. In conjunction with the attack on Longido an advance had been made against the Germans in the Taveta region; it also was unsuccessful.

Thus ended the first British offensive against German East Africa, and no attempt was made to renew it until ample forces had been assembled. But in the coast region of British East Africa vigorous operations against the enemy

were resumed in December. After their defeat at Gazi on October 8 the Germans had retired south, but still remained in British territory. The Vanga Field Force, as it was called, was now brought up to a strength of 1,800, being composed of King's African Rifles and Indian troops, with light field artillery. By Christmas the Vanga Field Force had driven the enemy out of British East Africa, and with the help of the Navy occupied the valley of the Umba river. On January 2, 1915, the British captured the German town of Jassin, near the coast and two miles south of the frontier. Three companies of Indian Infantry, in all about 300 men, under Colonel Ragbir Singh, garrisoned Jassin. On January 12 the Germans made a surprise attack on the post. Repulsed, they collected a larger force—2,000 troops with six field and many machine-guns—and renewed the attack on January 18. The Indians met the assailants with the utmost resolution, while from the British camp on the Umba river, 19 miles away, a body of K.A. Rifles were sent to their relief. The African troops failed to get through, but the Indians held out all day and all the night. On the morning of the 19th their ammunition being used up and Colonel Ragbir Singh killed, the little garrison was forced to surrender. But one party, consisting of 40 Kashmir Rifles, which had been stationed at the Jassin sisal factory, though without ammunition, cut its way through the



MAP ILLUSTRATING EARLY OPERATIONS IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA.

enemy lines and reached the camp on the Umba, losing 19 men on the way. The total casualties on the British side were one officer killed, one wounded and four missing, 19 rank and file wounded and 242 missing. The Germans admitted losing 7 officers and 11 men killed, 12 officers and two staff surgeons wounded, 22 men wounded and two missing.

river by the Navy was part of the continuous service rendered by the squadron under Vice-Admiral King-Hall to their comrades ashore. In the first half of December, 1914, Dar-es-Salaam was again bombarded. On this occasion the old cruiser Fox (4,320 tons) was supported by the Goliath, a battleship of 12,950 tons, completed in 1900, and some auxiliary

THREADING THE JUNGLE.

Three of their machine-guns were smashed by the Indian mountain artillery with direct hits at 300 yards range. A little incident, recorded in the Nairobi paper, the *East African Standard*, may be quoted as illustrative of the spirit of the native soldiers:

A man in the K.A. Rifles attached to a machine-gun—he was a Christian and called himself Charles Matthews*—was engaged in the attempted relief of the post. When the attack failed he succeeded in bringing the gun away with him. Arrived at the main camp he reported himself, stated that he had brought away the gun, and apologised profusely for having left the tripod behind.

As a result of the recapture of Jassin by the Germans the Vanga Field Force withdrew from the Umba river towards Mombasa, and the Germans again occupied Vanga.

The aid given the land force in the Umba

small craft. The primary object of the visit was the destruction of German steamers which had taken refuge in the harbour. A lively account of what happened, written by an officer of one of the ships, appeared in the *Morning Post*. This narrative shows that the Germans were guilty of deliberate abuse both of the white flag and the Red Cross flag:

On arrival (writes this officer) we sent in to parley with the Governor, who came out. We told him what our intention was, and that if any resistance were offered the town would be bombarded. He said that he would communicate with the commanding officer of their troops, and asked us if we did bombard to spare the hospital and a mission station, to which our people agreed. White flags being hoisted on shore, our boats started, our Commander being in charge. He sent parties on board the ships to disable their engines, blew up a crane on shore, etc., this being done some distance up.

Meantime a boat from the cruiser was fired on from trenches immediately under a flagstaff flying the white flag. One man was killed and some men wounded, also

* Probably a relative of the man of the same name who was one of Livingstone's followers and afterwards held a small post in Government service.

an officer very dangerously. Our ships opened fire at once, a shell or two from us set fire to the Government House, which made a fine blaze; other fires broke out in the town, and, of course, we shelled the points from which they fired.

Our boats up harbour had a lively time. They had to run the gauntlet of nearly point-blank range of machine-guns, maxims, and rifle fire. Our Commander's cleverness in seizing two lighters and taking them one on each side of his pinnace, undoubtedly saved her. As it was she was well peppered. Altogether we (that is our lot) had two officers and eight men hit, some of them several times.

Of the party sent to disable the ships, which they did, three officers and some men are missing—prisoners, we hope—one being one of our surgeons. The party brought back some 30 or 40 prisoners, one a fat German engineer, slightly wounded in the back by his own side.

The Germans are foul fighters. We could see them retiring with their guns to the hospital, and they fired from the mission station as well as from beneath the white flag to entrap the boats coming out. They acknowledged 411 casualties.

After this bombardment Dr. Schnee found the climate of Dar-es-Salaam unhealthy, and he removed the seat of government to Mrogoro, a pleasant hill-town built in the European bungalow style, and 140 miles inland on the Central Railway. Early in January, 1915, cruisers convoyed troops from Mombasa to Mafia, an island of considerable

A POINT OF VANTAGE OCCUPIED BY BRITISH NATIVES.



GOVERNMENT BUILDING, DAR-ES-SALAAM.

size opposite the estuary of the Rufiji. Mafia was occupied with slight loss, the German garrison surrendering unconditionally on January 12. During that and the following month the Astræa, Hyacinth, and other ships bombarded several German ports, and on February 28 a blockade of the whole coast of the German protectorate was declared, the main object being to prevent the smuggling in of arms and ammunition. The Germans adopted many strategems to get munitions to Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck. In some instances supplies did get in, as was indirectly admitted when in October, 1915, a *communiqué* issued at Nairobi stated that the enemy were "believed to have completed the re-arming of their native troops with modern smokeless rifles."

One of Vice-Admiral King-Hall's most difficult tasks concerned the Königsberg. She had, it will be remembered, run herself aground in October, 1914, in the Rufiji river, and the stream was too shallow for the ships available to follow and engage her, whilst constant watch had to be kept lest she might get afloat and escape. With the warships on guard the captain exchanged pleasantries by wireless telegraphy. Assured that he would have "a hearty British welcome" if he came out, he replied that he was "always at home to visitors." Small vessels reconnoitred up the Rufiji; one of them, the Adjutant, a steamer captured from the Germans, ran aground in February, 1915, an officer and 23 men being taken prisoners, and its guns removed by the Germans. The Königsberg had mounted some of her guns ashore at the mouth of the river, and she concealed herself in a mass of greenery. Eventually the Admiralty sent out two monitors, the Severn and Mersey, which, owing to their shallow draught, were able to ascend the river. With the help of aeroplanes

to spot the position of the German boat and to direct their shots, the monitors succeeded in setting the Königsberg on fire (July 11, 1915). The Germans, however, saved their ten 4·1 in. guns, and these and the officers and crew of the ship joined the German land forces. The naval guns Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck distributed in various parts of the protectorate —they were the heaviest ordnance he possessed. Part of the crew were sent aboard the steamers on Lake Tanganyika.

In the region of Victoria Nyanza,* and on that lake hostilities began in September, 1914. An inland sea, the nyanza has a breadth of

AN OX-TEAM HAULING A FIELD GUN IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA.

240 miles, a length of 250, and its deeply indented coast line exceeds 2,000 miles. It is noted for its sudden and severe storms, and soon after the war broke out the British steamer Sybil was wrecked on the German shores of the lake by one of these storms. The railway from Mombasa reaches the nyanza at Kisumu in Kavironda Gulf, an eastern arm of the lake, and the Uganda Railway Marine had several steamers on the lake. The Germans had one armed steamer, the Mwanza, but the British boats (the Clement Hill, Winifred and Kavirondo) were unarmed. Troops and machine guns were put aboard them and they went on their business. The Winifred embarked at Kisumu two squadrons of the E.A. Mounted Rifles and sailed south for Karungu, a British port near the German border. On entering Karungu Bay on September 15 it found the place in the hands of the Germans and the Mwanza in port. The Mwanza opened fire from 17-pounders and maxims and the Winifred was obliged to retreat. There had been some stiff fighting on shore.

Starting from Shirati, a few miles within their own frontier, a German column estimated at 400, including 50 Europeans, occupied Karungu, on September 9, and the next day took the post of Kisii. The few officials at those places could offer no opposition. Two Customs House men escaped from Karungu in a canoe. They were picked up on the 10th by the Clement Hill, which was racing across the whole width of the nyanza with 240 of the K.A. Rifles on board, bound for Kisumu. A few hours later the Clement Hill rescued two District Commissioners who had escaped from Kisii. On reaching Kisumu the steamer took aboard 30 police, a field hospital and porters, and at.

* It is incorrect to speak of *Lake* Victoria Nyanza. *Nyanza* is a native (Bantu) word for a lake or large sheet of water. Cf. the Arabic *bahr*.

5 a.m on September 11 had landed the force at Kendu Bay, no enemy being present to interfere. The column, less than 300 strong all told, with six white officers, marched to Kisii, 28 miles away, which was reached by 10 a.m. on September 12. They attacked the Germans at 11 a.m., and fought till 7.15, when, short of ammunition, they retired to Kendu. A study of this time-table shows the wonderful powers of endurance of the King's African Rifles and their readiness to undertake any task required of them by their white officers. In three days



[Lafayette

VICE-ADMIRAL KING-HALL.

the men had travelled 300 miles by steamer and had marched 28 miles and on the fourth day were in action for over eight hours.

As in many similar engagements the fight at Kisii ended in both sides retiring. In scattered fighting in thick bush it was frequently difficult to know which side had won. The British, as stated, withdrew to Kendu; the Germans fell back to Karungu, leaving on the field 10 dead and six wounded Europeans. These and 28 bodies of askari were found the next day when the British returned to Kisii. Four maxims and several thousand rounds of ammunition had also been abandoned by the Germans. On the British side Captain E. G. M. Thornycroft was killed, Temp. Lieutenant Charles Grey—brother of Viscount Grey—severely, and Lieutenant E. L. Musson slightly, wounded. The casualties in the native ranks were six killed and 14 wounded. On the 17th the Winifred, reinforced by the Kavirondo, returned to Karungu to find that the German troops, and the Mwanza, had fled.

It was not until January, 1915, that the enemy displayed any further activity in the Karungu district. When news of movements of troops from the German ports was received by the British they took the initiative and captured Shirati on January 9, with trifling loss. This port was not retained and in March German troops again entered British territory. In an action fought on the 12th of that month between Shirati and Karungu 300 of the enemy under Captain Haxthausen, with machine guns, were driven back in disorder well beyond the frontier by a body of K.A. Rifles and E.A. Mounted Rifles, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hickson. In the meantime the boats of the Uganda Railway Marine had been properly armed and given naval ratings and on March 6 the Winifred drove ashore and disabled the Mwanza. British supremacy on the lake was established, though the Germans still possessed some armed dhows. Their command of the lake enabled the Uganda Marine to send a party to the wrecked Sybil, which was refloated and safely docked.

After the recapture of Jassin by the Germans in January, 1915, there was little change in the situation along the southern frontier of British East Africa for nearly a year. Apart from raids on the Uganda Railway, the Germans devoted most of their energies to strengthening their position around Taveta. They fortified a hill called Salaita (El Oldorobo)* and pushed their outposts to Mbuyuni, 17 miles from Taveta, on the road to Voi. Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck was preparing obstacles for the next British offensive. He had presently to deal with a new commander of the British forces, which were at this period further reinforced. On April 29, 1915, it was announced that Brigadier-General M. I. Tighe, C.B., D.S.O., Indian Army, had been appointed Major-General to command the troops in East

* The first recorded attack on the German position at Salaita was on March 26, 1915, when the British had 21 casualties, besides losing two machine guns through the flight of native porters. In July a British reconnaissance in considerable strength gained valuable information concerning the defences of Salaita.

Africa. Brigadier-General Stewart remained in East Africa, and served under General Tighe. The new troops sent to Mombasa included the 2nd Rhodesia Regt. (a volunteer body raised in Southern Rhodesia) and the Legion of Frontiersmen (25th Bn. Royal Fusiliers), among whom served, with the rank of Captain, the veteran hunter-naturalist, Mr. F. C. Selous. His intimate knowledge of equatorial Africa enabled Mr. Selous to give invaluable help, and his work as scout was the admiration of the whole force.

General Tighe's main task was to prepare for the coming offensive. But the situation on the German-Uganda border called for immediate attention. The kingdom of Buganda,* the most important part of the Uganda Protectorate, lies mainly on the north side of Victoria Nyanza, and only a fragment of it was the scene of hostilities. The Baganda, about half of whom, like their *Kabaka* (king), were Christian, offered to raise a levy for service outside Uganda. They were asked instead to help in the defence of the southern frontier of the Uganda Protectorate, lying west of Victoria Nyanza. This they did, releasing some of the regular troops in the country. Moreover, under the inspiration of Sir Apolo Kagwa, K.C.M.G., the Prime Minister, the Baganda seized a strategic line a little south of the British frontier—that of the Kagera river. On November 20, 1914, the British positions on the Kagera were attacked. The Baganda held their ground at all points save one, where they abandoned Kyaka Fort, situated on the south bank of the river. From that time onward the Germans exercised continuous pressure on the Uganda border, the natives suffering a great deal from their raids—generally for cattle. General Tighe decided to relieve the situation by destroying the enemy's base. This was the port of Bukoba, on the west shore of Victoria Nyanza, about 25 miles south of the British frontier. Here the Germans had a fort and a wireless installation, and had accumulated warlike stores of all kinds. General Tighe arranged for a simultaneous advance on two sides—one column starting from the Kagera river, while the main body would come across the lake. Brigadier-General Stewart was given command of the lake expedition. It was made up of detachments of the Legion of Frontiersmen (under Colonel Driscoll, after whom the Frontiersmen were known as "Driscoll's Tigers") the Loyal North Lancashires, 29th Punjabis, 3rd K.A. Rifles, Machine Gun Co., and complements of artillery and engineers.

* Buganda is the correct name of the country popularly known as Uganda. Officially and conveniently Uganda is the name of the whole protectorate, which includes a great deal more than the kingdom of Buganda. The natives of Buganda call themselves Baganda (sing., Muganda) and their language Luganda.

THE UGANDA RAILWAY STEAMERS "CLEMENT HILL" AND "WINIFRED"
a. Kisumu, Victoria Nyanza.

From headquarters at Nairobi it journeyed by rail to Kisumu (237 miles), and on June 20 embarked on steamers of the Uganda Railway Marine. The lake passage was one of 240 miles, and to time his arrival off Bukoba at the precise moment when the Kagera column could cooperate was a task of no small difficulty for General Stewart. The Uganda column had only 30 miles to cover. But it was a march through enemy territory, and surprise had to be guarded against. Moreover, the country was a mass of swamps covered with dense vegetation. Nevertheless no hitch occurred, and on June 22 the Germans at Bukoba were surprised. They offered determined resistance, the British troops bearing special testimony to the bravery of the Arabs in the enemy ranks. During the action the German commandant received reinforcements, which brought his strength up to 400 rifles, but for once in those early engagements the enemy was heavily outnumbered. In the end the Germans were decisively defeated. The following description of the engagement was issued from headquarters at Nairobi:

The bulk of our forces, including our mountain guns, were landed about three miles north of Bukoba at dawn, a hostile picket being surprised and driven off.

At daybreak the fight was opened by the enemy making an attack on our right centre, closely supported by machine-gun fire, which gave us considerable trouble in the dense banana plantations, till our guns finally located it and silenced it. All was ready for a final advance when a drenching rainstorm, obscuring all view and depriving us of artillery support, held us up till 9.15 a.m.

About 11 a.m. the enemy attempted to withdraw their gun, but a direct hit from one of our mountain guns forced them to abandon the attempt, and the gun lay at our mercy on the road south of Bukoba, whence we recovered it and brought it aboard our convoy. By an oversight it was not securely lashed and in the rough weather on the lake slipped overboard into several fathoms of water.

By 12.30 p.m. our right had made good progress and the enemy commenced to retire, and the Fusiliers, advancing in quick time over the open, carried all before them, the K.A.R. remaining on the heights to guard our right and rear. The Lancashires entered the town from the west. The enemy, by now thoroughly demoralized, broke and fled in a disorganized rabble, and were not seen again. The enemy's verified casualties were 16 killed and 29 wounded, but they are in all probability considerably higher. Our losses were much less than the enemy's. The British casualties, 10 men killed, 2 officers and 25 men wounded.

We destroyed or captured one field gun, two machine guns, 32,000 rounds small arms ammunition, 144 rounds gun ammunition, 40 cases petroleum, 15 cases lubricating oil, one motor launch, three small boats, several standards, including a Mahommedan flag, and a quantity of explosives.

As it was not our intention to hold Bukoba, re

BUKOBA: THE GERMAN FLAG HAULED DOWN AT THE COMMANDANT'S HOUSE.
On the right is Col. Driscoll; next is Lieut. Dartnell, who pulled down the flag: and the other officer is Capt. Lock.

embarkation commenced at 6 p.m. on June 23, and, except for our covering pickets, was complete by 2 a.m. on the 24th, a bright moon and the entire absence of the enemy facilitating matters.

Owing to the enemy selecting his gun positions at mission stations some damage may have been done to these buildings, but it is believed that no shell touched a mission building.

The Moslem standard captured was found not on the field of battle, but in the house of

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR MICHAEL J. TIGHE, K.C.M.G.

the German commandant, and it was of European manufacture. Many valuable documents were also seized by General Stewart, who before leaving Bukoba destroyed the fort and the wireless apparatus. For their "signal success" General Stewart and his troops received the congratulations of Lord Kitchener. Some time afterwards the Germans re-occupied Bukoba, but for a considerable period they refrained from further action on the Uganda border.

On the western frontier, where for over 500 miles the Belgian Congo joins German East Africa, there were three spheres of activity: (1) Lake Tanganyika, (2) the plain at the northern end of that lake, and (3) the narrow stretch of lowland by the northern shore of Lake Kivu. Tanganyika was chiefly useful to the Germans as a means of communication. They could hardly undertake an invasion of the Belgian Congo by landing forces on the Belgian shores of the lake, as great cliffs rise almost unbroken from (or within a mile or two of) the water's edge. The chief break is in the centre of the lake where the Lukuga, through a narrow valley, carries the overflow of Tanganyika to the River Congo. At the mouth of the Lukuga valley the Belgians had a port also called in 1914 Lukuga, but since known as Albertville. It had been selected as the terminus of a railway which, starting from the navigable waters of the Upper Congo, should give a continuous steamer and rail route from the Atlantic to Tanganyika. The railway was under construction when the war began, and was completed in March, 1915. Whether on account of its prospective importance or because it was the enemy port nearest Ujiji, Lukuga was the first spot in Belgian Congo attacked by the Germans. On August 22, 1914, the steamer Hedwig von Wissmann bombarded Lukuga, killing two negroes and wounding two others. At frequent intervals during the next 16 months the Hedwig von Wissmann and its sister ship the Kingani steamed up and down the western shores of Tanganyika, bombarding the various Belgian stations, and occasionally landing raiding parties. They did not always succeed in their efforts. Thus in February, 1915, the Hedwig von Wissmann, while convoying troops to the south end of the lake, was fired at from the Belgian shore, was struck three times and so damaged that it took several weeks to repair. But about the middle of 1915 the Germans launched at Kigoma the Götzen, a twin-screw steamer 220 ft. in length, the largest boat placed upon the lake. The British had then no boats on Tanganyika, and the Belgian gunboat A. Delcommune had been disabled at the beginning of hostilities. In the closing days of 1915 the situation was altered by the arrival of two British armed motor-launches, which had been brought overland across Central Africa by bluejackets. As set forth in Chapter CLIII., the British boats, with Belgian help, speedily captured the Kingani and sank the Hedwig von Wissmann. German supremacy on Tanganyika was at an end. The Götzen, however, by keeping mainly in harbour at Kigoma, escaped destruction until August, 1916.

Possession of the plain north of Tanganyika (once a part of the lake) was stoutly contested. Frontier posts were built on either side of the Rusizi, which, traversing the plain, enters

TROPHIES FROM BUKOBA.
German flags used as decorations for the railway coaches.

the lake. The most notable engagement was fought on September 29, 1915. Beaten in previous attacks on the Belgian post of Luvungi, the Germans on that occasion brought against it a large force provided with field artillery and machine-guns. The action was of a most obstinate character and lasted fourteen hours. It appeared to be indecisive, but under cover of night the Germans retreated, leaving behind 68 dead, two of whom were German officers, besides a large quantity of munitions and stores. After this the Belgians established themselves firmly on the German side of the frontier.

In the Kivu sector no question of naval power was involved, for there were no armed vessels on Kivu, immediately north of which rise the Mfumbiro mountains. "There is a very narrow stretch of lowland along the north side of the lake, and here passes a road which on the German side gives access to the rich region of Ruanda. The Belgian frontier post, Ngoma, and the German frontier post, Kissenji, are built on this road, being only two miles apart. Both posts are dominated by mountains over 8,000 ft. high." * Kissenji had been made by the Germans their chief base in the district between Tanganyika and Victoria Nyanza. A mile or two from the government post they had a strong fort, just completed when the war broke out. At the end of August, 1914, the garrison of Kissenji captured Ngoma. From that date until the month of May following there was a bitter struggle on the narrow strip of land by the lake side. (Fighting in the mountains was out of the question; the great cones are volcanic, generally in a state of semi-eruption, and between them extends a vast and scarcely traversable lava field.) The Belgians towards the end of 1914 recaptured Ngoma and took the post of Kissenji, but not the fort. Early in 1915 the Germans, reinforced, drove back the Belgians, but in a later engagement were themselves once more compelled to seek the shelter of their fort. The commander of the Belgian troops at Ngoma determined to reduce the fort. This officer was Lieutenant Puck-Chaudoir, a man already with a record. An ex-soldier and African traveller, he had served in the opening weeks of the war in the civil guard of Liége, and afterwards in the Belgian cavalry, where he earned both the Cross of the Order of Leopold and the Legion of Honour. His knowledge of Africa had led to his being sent to the Congo. In May, 1915, he made a surprise attack on Kissenji fort, took it by storm, and completely destroyed its works. The Belgians continued to harass the enemy in this region, keeping open the door through which their advance in force was made in 1916.

Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, whose frontiers between lakes Nyasa and Tangan-

* *Geographical Journal*, April, 1916.

yika adjoined German East Africa, were exposed to a common danger in August, 1914. Neither country was prepared for war and defence measures had to be improvised. Nyasaland was fortunate in possessing in Sir George Smith a governor of marked ability, a man in whom the whole community had confidence. He acted with energy and promptitude, and one source of danger to the protectorate was disposed of at the outset. The protectorate owned a "fleet" and used it. Its "battleship" was the twin-screw steel gunboat Guendolen of 350 tons, which mounted four 6-pounders and four machine guns, had a length of 136 feet and could steam 11·6 knots. The boat was named in compliment to Lord Salisbury, who had made Nyasaland a British protectorate, after his daughter Lady Guendolen Cecil. It was sent out to Africa in sections and was launched in December, 1898. The rest of the Nyasa "fleet" consisted of the Pioneer and Adventure, 35-ton gunboats built in 1892. On August 8—four days after war was declared—the Guendolen (Commander E. L. Rhoades) started to search for the Hermann von Wissmann, a boat of about her own size and armament, and the only German steamer on the lake. Sphinxhaven, where, correctly as it proved, it was reported that the Hermann von Wissmann was undergoing repairs, was reconnoitred. Sphinxhaven is a snug little natural port, and very unobtrusive; it was not marked on the German maps, though they labelled a neighbouring islet New Heligoland. On August 13 Commander Rhoades found the German boat on the stocks at Sphinxhaven, and captured the crew. He could not refloat the Hermann von Wissmann, so he removed her armament and the important part of her engines and sailed away.*

With no fear of interference from the enemy the troops in Nyasaland were brought by boat from Fort Johnston, at the southern end of the lake, and by August 22 the field force had concentrated at Karonga at the north-west end of the lake, and 18 miles from the German frontier. An enemy patrol had crossed the Songwe (the river which formed the frontier north of Nyasa) two days before, and the Germans quickly established themselves within British territory. Capt. C. W. Barton,

* When reports came to hand that the Germans were repairing their boat another visit was paid to Sphinxhaven (May, 1915) by the British. On that occasion the Hermann von Wissmann was completely disabled.

AT BUKOBA: TROOPS AT REST AFTER THE FIGHT.



THE NAVAL EXPEDITION TO LAKE TANGANYIKA: A BELGIAN BOAT BREAKS FROM HER MOORINGS.

D.S.O., Northamptonshire Regt., was in command of the British force. It was of very small dimensions — part of the 1st Batt. King's African Rifles, some reservists of the same gallant corps, and European volunteers. There was no question of compulsion in the Protectorate. The Nyasaland Volunteer Reserve represented practically the whole of the British of military age in the country. As the total white population in the Protectorate, men, women and children, barely exceeded 800, the numerical help that the planters could give was not great. A first contingent of 56 men reached Karonga at the beginning of September. Nyasaland is reckoned a small territory, though it is five times the size of Wales, but it runs to length, and three-fourths of the Europeans live in the Shiré Highlands, a region south of the lake, so that the Volunteers had a journey of nearly 400 miles before they reached headquarters.

Strengthened by the presence of the Volunteers, Capt. Barton resolved to attack Kapora, an outpost of the enemy some twelve miles north-west of Karonga. Leaving a garrison of 10 Europeans and 50 natives at Karonga under Lieut. P. D. Bishop, Capt. Barton began his advance on September 8. Early (7 a.m.) the next morning an enemy company was met. A double company of the K.A.R. crossed a river (the Lufira) to attack, but the enemy retired. Shortly afterwards (8 a.m.) the sound of gunfire from the direction of Karonga created alarm, for the small force at that place (where there were three white women —two nurses and the doctor's wife) could not be expected to hold out long. A singular situation had arisen. Both sides had taken the offensive simultaneously, and while Capt. Barton was marching north, a German force under Baron von Longenaer was marching south, close to the lake shore, to attack Karonga. The German main column—400 strong, with two light field pieces and three maxims—had passed east of Capt. Barton's column during the night without being detected. The rest of the tangled story is best told in the words of the official despatch. The narrative is taken up at the point where Capt. Barton became aware that Karonga was in danger.

A double company with 1 maxim, under Capt. A. H. Griffiths, 1st K.A.R., was ordered to march with the utmost speed to relieve Karonga. The remainder of the force with the transport, as soon as the double company from the north bank of the Lufira had rejoined, followed towards Karonga.

The enemy had attacked Karonga at about 7 a.m., and a continuous fire was kept up from 400 yards range against the post by about 350 rifles and three maxims; a few shells were also fired by two field guns (1·4-inch).

Capt. Griffiths arrived on the scene at about 11 a.m., completely surprising the enemy, whom he put to flight, capturing two maxim guns.

In the meantime, our main body, hampered by transport, was slowly returning towards Karonga; at about 11 a.m. it met half a company of the enemy, which was quickly routed. At about 1 p.m., when crossing the Kasoa stream, the force came into contact with the enemy, who had reformed during the retirement from Karonga. After a sharp action of two hours' duration the enemy was completely defeated and retired in disorder towards the German border, losing two field guns, a quantity of small arms, ammunition and stores.

THE NAVAL EXPEDITION TO LAKE TANGANYIKA.
German prisoners from the sunken "Hedwig von Wissmann."

The enemy having been completely scattered, our force was again concentrated at Karonga.

In this brilliant affair, which saved Nyasaland from invasion, the casualties were heavy. The British losses were, among Europeans, 3 officers killed and 3 wounded, 3 Volunteers killed or died of wounds, 4 others wounded and one missing. In the native ranks 8 men were killed and 42 wounded. The enemy left on the field 58 dead, of whom 7 were Germans, and 72 wounded or unwounded were made prisoners, of whom 3 were German officers—130 altogether. About 40 other wounded, including the Commandant, the enemy took away. Baron Longenaer was reported to have died during the retreat. Among the British wounded was Capt. Barton, and the command of the Field Force was taken over by Capt. H. W. Stevens. As the Germans could without difficulty reinforce their troops on the Nyasa frontier and as there was no immediate hope of reinforcements on the British side, Capt. Stevens did not pursue the routed enemy; he decided to put Karonga in a state of defence. The Germans did not renew their attack and with the advent of the rainy season at the end of November the region of the Songwe Valley became impracticable for operations. What the rainy season means in a "wet" area of tropical Africa may be judged by the fall in the Songwe district—nearly 150 inches between the end of November and the early part of May. Happily, Karonga was not in the "wet" area—in the same period its rainfall was only 30 inches—and this difference greatly favoured the British troops in the matter of health as compared with those of the enemy.

In December, 1914, Lieut.-Col. G. M. P. Hawthorn arrived in Nyasaland and took over the command on the 29th of that month. He

came from British East Africa, where it will be remembered he had been wounded in the early fighting near Gazi. On January 23, 1915, a revolt of natives occurred in the Shiré Highlands. It was quickly suppressed, the leader being killed in action on February 3. A double company of K.A. Rifles, under Capt. H. G. Collins—which marched 86 miles in 47 hours—was sent from Karonga to restore order, but the rebel force had meantime been defeated by 40 British Volunteers and 100 K.A.R. recruits, under Capt. L. E. Triscott.

The revolt (wrote a correspondent) was engineered by one John Chelembwe, a negro, who, after being trained as a teacher by the American Baptist Mission, was sent to the United States and there took a University course. On his return he built a church and preached "Ethiopianism" (roughly, Africa for the negro). His followers, who numbered about 500, were chiefly Anguru, recent immigrants from Portuguese territory. In the evening of January 23 they attacked Magomere, the property of the A. L. Bruce Estates, Magomere having been bought by Mr. Livingstone Bruce, grandson of David Livingstone. In the houses attacked were Mr. and Mrs. Livingstone, Mr. and Mrs. Robertson, Mr. Fergusson, Mrs. MacDonald, and five children. Mr. Livingstone was killed by a blow from an axe and decapitated in the presence of his wife. Mr. Fergusson and Mr. Robertson were also killed, and the women and children carried off. Helped by her native servant, Mrs. MacDonald, however escaped in her nightdress and barefooted, and ran through the jungle to another planter's house and gave the alarm. The rebels took Mr. Livingstone's head to John Chelembwe's church—which was strongly built and intended to be used as a citadel—and Chelembwe preached a sermon with the head stuck on the pulpit. Forty-eight hours afterwards the women and children carried off had been rescued. Later Chelembwe's church was blown up. About 20 rebels were hanged and 400 imprisoned.

Owing to the prompt suppression of the revolt the military situation was not affected. In June, 1915, the Germans strengthened their forces on the Nyasa border, and from that time onward there were many skirmishes but no serious fighting. The enemy's energies were at that period bent chiefly against the Rhodesian sector of the frontier. In September, 1915, the danger to which Nyasaland had been exposed owing to the paucity of its defence force was removed by the arrival at Karonga of the Imperial Service Contingent (1,000 strong) raised in the Union of South Africa. These troops reached Nyasaland *via* Durban and the Zambesi, a toilsome route (1,600 miles) involving ocean, river and railway transit, as well as a march of 130 miles on foot, before reaching

THE NAVAL EXPEDITION TO LAKE TANGANYIKA.

Some of the officers and men in the bush, with their motor transport.

SOUTH AFRICANS BRINGING A GUN INTO ACTION.

Lake Nyasa. Yet it was the quickest means of conveyance. Within a week of their arrival at the front the South Africans were in action.

When the war began Northern Rhodesia was in almost as defenceless a condition as Nyasaland. The native police, commanded first by Major Stennett and later by Col. Hodson, were the only trained force in the territory, and their numbers were few. A volunteer corps, the Northern Rhodesian Rifles, was formed by the settlers, but, as the total white population of Northern Rhodesia, a region six times the size of England, was barely 3,000, this corps was also necessarily small.* Its commander was Major Boyd Cunninghame, a noted big-game hunter, administrator, and transport expert. This last qualification was invaluable, as the nearest railway was 400 miles away. Three or four hundred British lived near the border of German East Africa, in the high land between Nyasa and Tanganyika. Fairly good roads connect those lakes. The German road ran from Bismarckburg, on the south-east shores of Tanganyika, and kept close to the frontier till it reached the northern shore of Nyasa. The British road—called after its projector and first builder, the Stevenson Road—starts from Karonga, on Nyasa, and passes through Fort Hill, Fife and Abercorn, and ends at Kituta, the Rhodesian port on Tanganyika. At all these places were police posts, and at them lived a few whites, while others dwelt on neighbouring farms and cattle runs. In view of their defenceless position, the settlers and missionaries were ordered, at a day's notice, to remove their wives, families and cattle 200 miles from the frontier, and the available police and volunteers manned the British posts against attack. Almost from the first the Rhodesians had the help of the Belgian (native) troops on the Congo side of their frontier. In all, to guard a frontier 150 miles long, the Rhodesian-Belgian forces may have totalled 3,000. General Edwards, commanding the Rhodesian forces, had control of the operations. The principal Belgian officers were Major Olsen and Major de Konnick.

Early in September, 1914, the Hedwig von Wissmann and the Kingani sailed from Bismarckburg and after bombarding Kituta landed parties, which defeated the small garrison (commanded by a Belgian officer) and looted

* Northern Rhodesia bordered on the north-west the strip of German South-West Africa which stretched east to the Zambesi and was known as the Caprivi Finger. As Northern Rhodesia undertook (and kept its undertaking) to occupy this strip of German territory, its force available for the East Africa frontier was thus weakened

RHODESIAN POLICE CROSSING A RIVER BY A NATIVE BRIDGE.

the place. Next day a British column arrived, but the Germans had gone, taking with them £30,000 worth of goods. On September 5 Abercorn, which is 10 miles from Kituta, was attacked. It was held by Mr. Bisset, the postmaster, and 40 police. Mr. Bisset worked a machine-gun with excellent effect; during the fight reinforcements, 130 strong, arrived, and the Germans were beaten off. The severe defeat suffered by the enemy at Karonga on September 9 checked their activity on the Rhodesian frontier also, and during the ensuing rainy season only minor operations could be undertaken, the chief event being the repulse of another attack on Abercorn (March, 1915). This gave the British and Belgians the opportunity of bringing up reinforcements. What the difficulties of transport were may be seen by following the fortunes of one column—a column which later on greatly distinguished itself. On December 5, 1914, Major J. J. O'Sullevan, in command of the 2nd Mobile Column of the Northern Rhodesian Police, then stationed in the Caprivi Finger, was ordered to the Tanganyika front. The first stage of the journey was to the town of Livingstone, on the Zambesi, just above the Victoria Falls. This was a 90-mile stage. Major O'Sullevan himself covered it in exactly 24 hours, 60 miles in a dug-out on the Zambesi and 30 miles on foot—all in blinding rain. But the column, which had difficulties with its wagon transport, took 11 days on the journey. From Livingstone the column went by train to Sakania in Belgian Congo—a distance of 508 miles. Thence to Abercorn was a 430 miles' walk, done without a single officer or man falling out. (En route one of the officers shot an elephant.)

This march, said Major O'Sullevan, was accomplished in heavy rains; swamps had to be corduroyed, and several bridges had to be erected daily to get the mules over the swollen rivers. The 430 miles was done in 29 days, averaging about 21 miles per day.

It was a fine record, and the column fought even better than it marched. It was sent by Col. Hodson to Saisi, a farm near a hill of the same name, through which, a few hundred yards from the German frontier, the Stevenson Road passed. Here, 30 miles from Abercorn, Major O'Sullevan, whose command included Belgian troops, built a fort, cutting down the long grass (10–12 ft. high), trees and other cover. Early in June, 1915, the Saisi force raided and burnt an enemy camp, capturing a large convoy of supplies (including "some excellent wine")

and a number of native levies. Saisi, in short, became an annoyance to the Germans, who determined to capture it. Their first attempt was made on June 26 with a force of some 70 Europeans and 400 natives, with three maxims. Just after daybreak the enemy tried to surround the position, and the fight lasted all day. Completely foiled, the enemy retreated to Lake Tanganyika, leaving their dead (including 10 Europeans) on the ground. While burying them the British noticed newly dug "graves" on the German side. They were opened and found to contain ammunition buried by the enemy in convenient spots for future use. South-east of Saisi the Germans made repeated attacks in the direction of Fife. They received a check in May, when Lieut. Bremner, with 50

[*Elliott and Fry.*

MAJOR J. J. O'SULLEVAN, D.S.O.

Northern Rhodesian Rifles and 25 police, captured a stockade in a brilliant little action. The stockade consisted of a double row of logs, 10 ft. high, surrounded by a trench staked at the bottom and sides by sharpened pegs a couple of feet long. Lieut. Irvine was mortally wounded in leading the attack on the stockade gate. Few of the enemy escaped, and the 32 survivors were made prisoners. In the following month Major Boyd Cunninghame had a very brisk engagement with the enemy, who almost rushed the camp at Fife.

In July, 1915, the Germans made a determined attempt to occupy north-eastern Rhodesia. Their main attack was again directed against Saisi. But the British intelligence staff was well informed, and for three weeks before the Germans attacked the native troops and 300 carriers had been busy strengthening their defences. At 7 a.m. on July 24 the enemy

[*By courtesy of the African Society.*

EMPLACEMENT OF GERMAN GUN FROM THE KÖNIGSBERG.

surrounded Saisi. Their force, strong in Europeans, was estimated at 2,000 and they had 12-pounder guns and ten machine guns. Against them were 20 British and Belgian officers and men and 450 Belgian and British native soldiers, a 7-pounder, a 4-pounder, and two maxims. The enemy had trenched close up to the water supplies, and the only means the besieged had of getting water was by stealing down to the rivers at night and bringing water back in bottles. On some nights they failed in their quest; "so we remained thirsty till the next night." In such conditions, against odds of four to one, the defenders beat off the Germans.

Firing continued day and night for four days, said Major O'Sullevan, and all our mules and oxen, besides the sheep and goats, upon which we depended for food, were killed by shrapnel. On the fifth day the German officer in command sent in a *parlementaire* with a note asking me to surrender. He stated that he had captured a large convoy of supplies, and had also beaten back our relief forces, that he knew we had no water, and so on. I replied that under no conditions whatever would we surrender. . . . That night they attacked in force by the light of a fairly bright moon, and came on bravely, but they could not get actually to our trenches. The

[*By courtesy of the African Society.*

INTERIOR OF THE GUN EMPLACEMENT

INDIANS REPAIRING THE UGANDA RAILWAY.

attacking force were about 1,500, a large majority being Europeans, but though we heard them encouraging the Arabs and native troops to charge they could not get them to do so. The attack lasted an hour and a half. Various ruses were adopted. They blew the Belgian "Cease Fire," and ours also. Firing ceased for a few minutes on our side, but was resumed, and we afterwards ceased bugle calls. . . .

Fighting went on until August 3, when the enemy had eaten up all his supplies and all ours. He then retired to Lake Tanganyika, embarked for Ujiji and also marched off by road to Bismarckburg and Neu Langenburg. We were too done up to go after them, and were relieved by a battalion of Belgian troops after a few days.*

For the gallant defence of Saisi Major O'Sullevan received the D.S.O. The casualties in his command in the period June-August were about 80; the Germans who attacked him suffered much more severely. They lost 60 dead in Europeans alone. Early in September Count Falkenstein again concentrated a force near Saisi, but it was dispersed by the Belgians. There was no other considerable engagement on the Rhodesian frontier in 1915. Before the year ended the British forces had been increased and the Belgian soldiers were released for service on their own front. The troops in Nyasaland and Rhodesia then came under one command, that of Brig.-Gen. E. Northey, A.D.C. While keeping the enemy employed Gen. Northey elaborated plans for an invasion of German territory at the beginning of the dry season of 1916.

* *Journal of the African Society*, April, 1916.

On the British East Africa side a condition resembling stalemate was created in the closing months of 1915. Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck still maintained an offensive, but at every point he was met and checked. The German commander was well aware that Gen. Tighe was engaged on the task of organization, concentration and preparation for offensive measures, and he endeavoured to disarrange the British plans by renewed attacks on the lines of communication. Gen. Tighe's foresight and energy were conspicuous, notably in overcoming the difficulties presented by the waterless desert between Voi, on the Uganda Railway, and Taveta. With Taveta still in German hands Gen. Tighe pressed forward the building of a railway towards it and took it to Maktau, within a few miles of the enemy outposts. A water pipe was laid down from the Bura Hills (near Voi) which provided the force at Maktau with 40,000 gallons daily, about half the supply needed, and the balance was made good by railway and storage tanks. This work was carried out by Lieut.-Col. C. B. Collins, R.E., and his staff.

The persistent efforts of the enemy to blow up the Voi-Maktau and Uganda railways were uniformly futile. They maintained an advanced garrison of 500 to 600 rifles whose duty it was to send out parties with dynamite bombs to blow up the railways. Favoured by the dense bush small parties succeeded now and again

in reaching the Uganda railway undetected, and between April and November, 1915, trivial damage was done to the line on some 10 or 12 occasions. Thrice trains were derailed, but in each instance there were no casualties. Once at least the raiders were hoist with their own petard. A bomb exploded prematurely, fragments of the bodies of a German officer and two native soldiers being found near the line.

Apart from efforts directed against the railways the Germans continued to maintain themselves in force on the Umba River; they still held Vanga and patrolled the coast region thence to the neighbourhood of Gazi. As General Smuts said, General Tighe "had to be constantly on the watch for the next move of his active and enterprising foe"; his troops were in touch with the enemy at many points along the 600 miles of land frontier he had to guard. The result was many small actions and no big engagement. In places where the condition of the roads permitted their use the British employed motor cars for reconnoitring purposes. On one such occasion when a general officer was in the car, the covering party of 15 Baluchis suddenly encountered a German patrol 100 strong. "We must attack to let the Sahib get away," cried the Subadar (Ghulam Hardar) and the 15 Baluchis charged the enemy. The Subadar, mortally wounded, died the next day. In the middle of September, when a German patrol was ambushed near Maktau, the patrol, 60 strong, ran into a trap set for them by a party of E.A. Mounted Rifles and Baluchis. Charged with the bayonet the enemy fled, leaving 32 dead on the ground, one a European. Lieut. Wildman, of the Baluchis, who led the charge, was killed, the total British

[Elliott & Fry.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL E. NORTHEY.

casualties being 4 killed and 11 wounded. With affairs like this 1915 ended and 1916 began. In a skirmish on January 6 in the New Year, Wavell, of "Wavell's Arabs," was killed. He had recovered from his wound received at Gazi in September, 1914, and had been promoted to the rank of Major. His death was a loss to Oriental learning and to geography, as well as to the Army.

As soon as General Botha had completed the conquest of South-West Africa—July, 1915—suggestions were made that the Union should send troops to East Africa. Recruits for East Africa were enrolled at Cape Town in September, and in November the Union Government



GERMAN TROOPS AT DAR-ES-SALAAM.

THE NAVAL SUCCESS ON LAKE TANGANYIKA.
Native stretcher bearers waiting for German wounded.

undertook to raise a brigade. The response to Gen. Smuts's appeal for volunteers was so satisfactory, and so many of the men who came forward were trained soldiers, that the 2nd S.A. Infantry Brigade was formed before the year was out, and early in February it reached Mombasa. A month later the 3rd S.A. Brigade had disembarked. Gen. Tighe had already formed the infantry of his original command into two divisions, the 1st E.A. Division, under Gen. Stewart, and the 2nd E.A. Division, under Brig.-Gen. Malleson. Gen. Stewart's Division was posted on the Longido side of Kilimanjaro; Gen. Malleson's at Maktau.

The long period of preparation had come to an end, and all was ready for an immediate attack on the Kilimanjaro position. In view of the magnitude of the forthcoming operations, and the part South African troops were to play in it, the command was offered to Gen. Smuts. Owing to the political situation at the Cape he felt himself obliged to decline the offer. Gen. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was then appointed to the command, but while in South Africa on his way to Mombasa ill-health compelled Sir Horace to resign the post. Again appealed to, Gen. Smuts accepted the post, assuming command on February 12. He received, for the first time, a commission in the British Army, being given the rank of Lieut.-General. Gen. Smuts reached Mombasa on February 19, and on March 5 began his forward movement. Henceforth the theatre of war was transferred to German territory.

NAIROBI: THE MAIN STREET.

LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC

CHAPTER CLVI.

THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE OF 1916: LAST PHASE.

EXTENT OF THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE JUNE-AUGUST, 1916—THE AUSTRO-GERMAN COMMANDS—COMPLETION OF THE GERMAN CONTROL—NEW DISTRIBUTION ANALYSED—LIMITED POSSIBILITIES OF THE OFFENSIVE—COUNT BOTHMER'S RETREAT—BZHEZHANY—RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE ON THE ZLOTA LIPA—FIGHTING IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER DESCRIBED—THE INTERVENTION OF RUMANIA.

THREE stages can be distinguished in the great Russian offensive of the summer of 1916. It began on June 4, with the piercing of the Austrian lines in the district of Lutsk and in the Bukovina. The following month saw these tactical achievements developed into strategical victories. Two Austro-Hungarian armies, one in Volhynia and the other south of the Dniester, were involved in irretrievable disaster, and the parts of the front held by them caved in. This was the first phase of the offensive and an account of it was given in Chapter CXXXVII. The second phase, which formed the subject of Chapter CXLIII., was mainly concerned with the fate of the other three Austrian armies holding the line between the Pripet Marshes and Rumania, and of their fronts, as yet practically intact. Was an approximately straight line to be regained by the flattening out of the Russian salients or by a completion of the Russian advance? By the middle of August, on the troops of Count Bothmer evacuating the last remaining sectors of the original front, this question was definitely solved in favour of our Allies.

The main problem of the third and concluding phase of the summer offensive, which is the subject of this chapter, was whether it was possible to make any further advance at this time in the Podolian centre—*i.e.*, between the Lvoff-Krasne-Tarnopol railway in the north and the Dniester in the south. The answer proved on the whole negative. Although considerable tactical successes were gained towards the end of August and in September, no strategic advance was achieved, whilst meantime the centre of the fighting on the Eastern front gradually shifted to the Rumanian theatre.

The moving battle on the Russian front in 1916 is thus practically enclosed in the two first phases of the offensive. The map given on page 163 illustrates the results as shown in gains of territory and in the capture of men and material. The figures there shown cover exclusively the ten weeks of advance from June 4 to August 12 and are given separately for each of the four armies which had begun the offensive south of the Marshes; the Army of General Lesh, which did not come into action within that theatre until the beginning of July and then carried out the advance from the Lower Styr to the Stokhod, is included in that of General Kaledin within whose area it operated. The victories of General Brusiloff's Armies, best illustrated by the capture of 7,757 officers and 350,845 men, of 405 guns and 1,326 machine-guns, left little of the Austro-Hungarian armies which had held the front in the first days of June. Still less was left of their



THE TSAR AT THE FRONT: BLESSING THE TROOPS.

leaders—the Germans saw to that. Once more the entire management of the Eastern Front passed into their hands, but whilst in the winter of 1914–15 and during the following summer campaign they had supplied merely a "stiffening" to the Austrian armies, disorganised by the defeats of the first Galician campaign, they had now to provide very large reinforcements to fill the gaps in the depleted ranks of their ally.

Some of the changes in the superior Austro-German commands were mentioned at the end of Chapter CXLIII. On August 2 the entire Eastern Front had been put under Field-Marshal von Hindenburg. A few days later, as the result of urgent entreaties from Vienna and Techin—the Headquarters of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff—a nominal command was conceded to the Austrian Heir-Apparent in the southern area, between the Lvoff-Tarnopol railway and the Rumanian frontier. The intervention of Rumania in the War caused a new change to be made in the delimitation of the two areas. The remaining part of the line in the Galician plains was transferred to the northern command, whilst the entire range of the Carpathians, from the foothills on the Bystritsa, south of Stanislavoff, to the Iron Gates of Orsova on the Danube, was comprised under the southern command. In other words, the Eastern Front now fell into two clearly marked divisions widely different in topographical structure, the one extending over more than 600 miles from the Gulf of Riga, across the plains of Lithuania, White Russia, the Poliesie, Volhynia, Galician Podolia and the valley of the Dniester; the other, about 400 miles long, in the Transylvanian arc of the Carpathian Mountains. For simplicity's sake they may be distinguished as the Russian and the Rumanian front. This, of course, is not meant to imply a clear-cut national distinction on the side of our Allies. The northern sector of the Carpathian arc is inhabited by Little Russians, and Russian armies soon reinforced the Rumanians, even on the whole extent of the Transylvanian frontier. Yet the division between the two areas was based on the most primitive facts of strategy and topography and it made itself felt on the side of our Allies as much as on that of the enemy. About September the Army of General Lechitsky, which had conquered Czernovitz, Kolomea and Stanislavoff, passed definitely into the Car-

MAP SHOWING EXTENT OF THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE, JUNE 4-AUGUST 12, 1916, AND NUMBER OF PRISONERS CAPTURED.

pathian area and gradually extended its lines to the Moldavian front, whilst the Army of General Shcherbacheff, which operated in Podolia, took over the Dniester region.

Thus at the conclusion of the shufflings of 1916 on the enemy side the entire Galician front had been joined under one command with the German lines north of the Marshes. Yet it is clear that on a front of more than 600 miles the person of the chief commander in the field is of minor importance. The main, common business of armies extended over such a vast line could be settled in Berlin as well as, if not better than, somewhere near the front. The supreme commander in the field became a mere figure-head. When in the last days of August, the twins in command, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, succeeded Falkenhayn at the head of the German General Staff, Prince Leopold of Bavaria, nominally at least, took up Hindenburg's inheritance. In the southern area the more showy part remained reserved to the Austrian dynasty. When, towards the end of November, 1916. the Heir-Apparent succeeded to the throne of his grand-uncle, Francis Joseph, Archduke Joseph was appointed his successor in the Transylvanian theatre of war. That appointment was meant as a compliment to Magyar national feeling; Archduke Joseph was a descendant from what might be described as the Hungarian branch of the Hapsburgs, and had commanded for almost two years the Seventh Austro-Hungarian Army Corps, which consists mainly of Hungarian regiments. Thus even the honorific functions received a German-Magyar tinge; still more so the realities of command.

To understand the transformation it is necessary to realise the changes which had taken place in the organisation of the enemy armies on the eastern front since, say, March, 1915. The eastern front was then divided between the German and the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Commands. Directly under these commands came the different armies, usually consisting of about four army corps. It was of course impossible to preserve perfect regularity. Here and there, as necessity arose, a new formation called the Army Group made its appearance An "army-group" meant an incomplete army—*i.e.*, say, one and a half to three army corps under a joint command. Below the army corps came divisions endowed as yet with little independence. This organisation changed gradually by a natural evolution which it would take too long to trace step by step. Few of the changes seem to have been thought out beforehand, and it usually took some time before any of them received official acknowledgment. A glance at the north-eastern front in September, 1916, discloses the following arrangement: As previously stated, the office of Commander-in-Chief in the field—itself a product of the developments of 1915—has by the end of 1916 become purely nominal. The first real authority in the field is the commander of each group of armies (not to be confused with the army groups). There are two of them between the Pripet Marshes and the Carpathians; they may be roughly described as the Volhynian and the Galician group. Their existence is now hardly receiving the same acknowledgment which this new formation had in the late summer of 1915, when official *communiqués*

GENERAL LUDENDORFF,
Hindenburg's Chief of Staff.

openly spoke of the groups of Hindenburg and Mackensen. This reticence is observed in deference to Hapsburg vanity. The leaders in these two areas are the Prussian von Linsingen and the Bavarian Count Bothmer; their power is real but not avowed. Late in September the Austrian General von Boehm-Ermolli receives the command of the Galician Group. Then for the first time it is mentioned in official reports. Next come the armies. But below them stand no longer army corps; these are now a quite exceptional formation. The *division* is now the unit in the field, and between the Army command and the division stands a new formation—the group of divisions. Thus the new arrangement is as follows: Group of armies, armies, groups of divisions and divisions. The two new organisations, the groups of armies and the groups of divisions within the armies, have deprived the intermediary formation of armies of most of their previous importance. And one is hardly astonished to find that in September, 1916, the commanders of armies are still Austro-Hungarian generals sandwiched in between Germans at the top and German commanders of the groups of divisions, ranking below them.

In September, 1916, the front between the Marshes and the Rumanian border was still divided between six armies—von Fath in the Poliesie, von Tersztyansky in Volhynia, von Boehm-Ermolli in north-eastern Galicia, Count Bothmer in the Podolian centre, Kövess von Kövesshaza between the Dniester and the Carpathians, and Karl Baron Kirchbach auf

GENERAL BRUSILOFF,
Chief Commander of the Southern Group of Russian Armies.

GENERAL KÖVESS VON KÖVESSHAZA,
Commander of an Austrian Army.

Lauterbach * in the Carpathian Mountains. But these armies, though always cited in the Vienna *communiqués*, very seldom appear in the German reports. There one hears, *e.g.*, of General von Clausius (a German) commanding on the Lower Stokhod German and Austrian troops within the group of General von Bernhardi (General von Fath—a Magyar—their nominal commander, is passed over in silence). Or again, when in October, 1916, internal troubles broke out in the Polish Legions which had attained the honour of fighting under the notorious Bernhardi, General von Fath's person never appeared. It was with Linsingen that the decision rested. And when they were leaving the Stokhod front an even more characteristic incident occurred, illustrating the mutual relations of the German and the Austrian officers. General von Kneussl, of the Eleventh Bavarian Division, published a farewell order to the Legions which had evidently been under his command, though they themselves formed considerably more than a division—in fact, had recently been given the standing of a Corps—and were commanded by a regular Austrian general, von Puchalski. In Volhynia it was von der Marwitz, von Litzmann and Schmidt von Knobelsdorff, all of them Germans, who really conducted the battles of Shelvoff and Korytnitsa, not Tersztyansky. Or, again, during the September fighting round Zboroff, little was said by the Germans about the Austrian Army commander, von Boehm-Ermolli. It was the Prussian General von Eben, at the head of German and Austrian troops, who was the real man on the spot, and General von Melchior on the Graberka and von Wilhelmi on the Zlota Gora. In Podolia, where the name of the army had always been German, and

GENERAL FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI,
the notorious Prussian writer, Chief of a group of divisions.

where German and Turkish troops were now brought up to save the very critical situation, the Austrians had not been able to preserve even as much as an appearance of independence. In the Carpathians the position was slightly different. The nature of the ground did not admit of large groups; each mountain or valley formed a unit in itself, and here and there veteran Austrian corps and divisions, or even large detachments like, *e.g.*, that of Colonel Papp in the Yacobeny-Mesticanesti region, still retained some individuality of their own.

Little can be said about the national distribution of the troops just because it was so varied. Germans were to be found everywhere. There were, *e.g.*, Bavarian and Silesian regiments on the Stokhod, troops from Posen, Brandenburg, East Prussia, Baden, and Alsace-Lorraine in Volhynia, Prussian crack regiments in Podolia, Hessians in the Dniester valley, and again Prussians and Bavarians in the Carpathians. A most interesting accession, which deserves notice, was no doubt the Turkish Army Corps, which appeared in Galicia

* He succeeded Pflanzer-Baltin in September, 1916; he was an Austrian and ought not to be confused with the German General von Kirchbach, whose name is known from the fighting on the Western front.

in the month of August. One of its divisions, which took up its positions south of Bzhezhany, was commanded by Mehmed Shefrik Bey, and had fought at Yanina during the Balkan Wars, and at Ari Burnu in Gallipoli. It consisted mainly of regiments recruited in Asia Minor, round Smyrna and Brussa, with a small sprinkling of Druses and Arabs, and was now

GENERAL VON EBEN AND PRINCE LEOPOLD OF BAVARIA.

used by the Germans in the defence of the most exposed sector on the Galician front. Finally, among the remaining Austro-Hungarian troops one could mark a new and significant regroupment by nationality. The Magyars, though by no means all, were shifted to Transylvania, leaving in the northern area mainly Austrian Germans and Poles. Ever since the Russians had again started hammering at the north-eastern gates of Transylvania voices had been raised in Hungary about the "iniquity" of using Magyar troops elsewhere whilst their own homes were exposed to invasion. When in the first days of September, the Rumanians were crossing the Carpathian range, a cry rang out in Hungary for their return. "On oreign soil, under foreign command," said Count Michael Karolyi in the Hungarian Parliament on September 5, "the Hungarians fight for the frontiers which are left undefended at home. . . . We do not ask, we demand, that the Hungarian Honveds be brought home at once from foreign countries! We demand that the frontiers of Transylvania be protected by Magyar soldiers! We demand that Hungarian soil be defended by Hungarian soldiers!" About the same time a proclamation was secretly circulated among Magyar soldiers at the front calling upon them to demand their return to Hungary. Here and there these circulars proved effective and mutinies broke out. These were quelled with a firm hand—*e.g.*, in a Magyar regiment near Brody no less than 30 men were shot. Yet the feelings of the most enthusiastic and best fighters in the Austro-Hungarian Army and Magyar opinion in Hungary could not be disregarded, and gradually the Magyar regiments were withdrawn to the south. "For more than two years," said the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf, answering the Magyar arguments, "we have defended Hungary on Galician and Russian soil. What our brave troops have done there has been done also directly for Hungary. . . . I can understand it, that the soldiers, especially the Szekels [of Transylvania] desire to take their revenge for the invasion of their own land. In so far as it was possible to take account of that wish, it has been done. It is, however, impossible beyond a certain point. . . ." With the Magyar the last really efficient element was disappearing from the Austrian ranks in Volhynia and in the Galician plain, and by the force of circumstances both the burden and the command of the defence passed more than ever into German hands.

It goes without saying that the Austrian officers, especially those of higher rank, and most of all those hanging about General Headquarters at Techin, bitterly resented the increasing dominion of Germans, their undisguised contempt for their allies and the famous Prussian manner. But in what light did the rank and file of the Austrian Army consider the change in its leadership? A picture of the mixed feelings with which it was received can be gathered from a large and most valuable collection of letters from Austrian soldiers made at the front by one of the special war-corre-

spondents of the *Russkoye Slovo*, M. Oblonskiy, and published in the issue of September 17. The new German chiefs showed both foresight and brutality, neither of which the Austrian soldiers had experienced in an equal degree from their own officers. Especially when once the defeats and the retreat had disorganized

warm food once daily," etc. Orders and counter orders: "It very often happens: we are entrained for some destination, but within an hour the opposite thing is done . . ."; "Our officers have completely lost their heads. No one knows anything. . . ." Or, again, in another letter: "None of us can

COL. HOFFMANN.
Chief of Staff to Prince Leopold of Bavaria.

GENERAL BARON KARL VON KIRCHBACH.
who succeeded General von Pflanzer-Baltin.

GENERAL BARDOLFF.
Chief of Staff to General von Boehm-Ermolli.

LIEUT.-GENERAL VON CONTA.
Commanding troops in the Carpathians.

the Austrian staffs, there was no trace left of foresight or order. Most letters of those dates complain about it. Bad commissariat: "we stop at one place and our kitchens at another . . ."; "we are far from getting

LIEUT.-GENERAL SCHMIDT VON KNOBELSDORF.
Transferred from Western to Eastern Front.

understand what has happened to our generals and officers. Sometimes they absolutely don't know what they are doing." And then blunders occur, most galling to the depressed and weary soldier. "You would not believe," wrote one soldier in a letter which never reached its destination, "what enormous distances they make us march nowadays; twenty-five to thirty miles is nothing. . . . Yet this is war and we should bear it. The worst, however, is that very often they send us about for nothing, once in that direction and then back again. . . . And some time ago we marched the entire, weary day along a railway line. 'Why do we march? Why don't they entrain us?' asked some of the soldiers. The officers and railway officials answered that there were no cars. And in the meantime several trains passed us with empty cars. . . ."

All that changed with the coming of the Germans. "When the commanders are Germans we do not suffer hunger!" "The Germans," writes another soldier, "are quite a different affair. They never lose their heads and work like a machine. It does not happen with them, as with us, that several detachments go for the night into one tiny village, nor is one under their command sent about for nothing. They calculate everything with mathematical accuracy." ". . . They look better after us than our own officers. . . ."

But not for reasons of sentiment. "Are we in their eyes human beings? No, we are beasts to be sent to slaughter, if they need it. . . . When it is necessary to attack, we go in front. When enough of us are killed, the Germans advance under cover of our dead. Oh, if you could only know how I hate those dear allies of ours for their cold cruelty!" "I wish," is the conclusion of another letter, "that the Germans could be made to experience what we are going through!"

Yet it was this German combination of perfect order and callous brutality which stayed the Austrian *débâcle* in the summer of 1916.

On June 13, 1916, whilst people, impressed by the splendid initial victories of the Russians, were talking of the capture of Kovel and Lvoff as of imminent events, *The Times* published a warning against such excessive optimism. It was pointed out that an advance from Rovno against these two centres would have had to proceed along divergent lines. The Russians had therefore to make it their first concern to secure the flanks of the Lutsk salient. When they had reached the Stokhod in the north and Brody in the south, their position within the apex of the triangle Kovel-Rovno-Lvoff was safe, yet the difficulties of an advance against the centre of its base round Vladimir-Volhynsk or against its two corners at Lvoff and Kovel remained very considerable. The most feasible strategic movement against Lvoff seemed now to be an advance from the south-east, especially after Count Bothmer had been forced to abandon the powerfully fortified line of the Strypa. It is a very considerable advantage both for speed and safety in an offensive movement to have one flank protected by a natural cover so as to be able to pursue a defeated force without having to wait for developments in the adjoining sectors. The Dniester offered such a cover to an advance directed against Lvoff from the south-east. Moreover, that movement did not lead the attacking forces against any lateral railway, which would give the enemy a chance of quick manœuvring, but was aimed along three converging railway lines. It seems to have been the Russian plan to pivot on Brody and to advance against Lvoff along the railways leading towards it from Zboroff past Zlochoff and Krasne, from Podhaytse, past Bzhezhany

RUSSIANS WITH PORTABLE KITCHENS CROSSING A RIVER.

HALITCH.

and Pshemyslany, and from Halitch past Khodoroff. Our Allies made a splendid beginning towards the carrying out of that scheme. They got within a distance of about a mile of the two important centres of Halitch and Bzhezhany, they reached, and even crossed, the River Narayovka. But then, by bringing up enormous reinforcements both in men and guns, the Germans were able to prevent any further advance, and even to retain their hold on those two towns. Another offensive was started by our Allies in September in Volhynia, in the district of Shelvoff and Korytnitsa. This movement, carried out in very difficult conditions, could only have had strategic results if the attack from the south-east in the region of Bzhezhany had succeeded in piercing the enemy lines. Then the advance from Volhynia might have developed in a concentric movement against Lvoff. As things turned out, the forces gathered in Volhynia could do no more than help by frequent attacks to relieve the German pressure on Rumania. Gradually, as Rumania was becoming the main theatre of war in the East, all fighting on the north-eastern front died down.

The Russian offensive of 1916 reached its conclusion in the first half of October, and only minor engagements of a local character continued to break the lull in Volhynia and the Galician plains. Also in the Carpathians the Russian offensive ceased about the middle of October, when a joint concentric movement against Transylvania had become impossible and Rumania had to be helped in her struggle against the invasion by superior Austro-German forces.

About the middle of August, 1916, the army of Count Bothmer had evacuated its positions on the River Strypa and on the hills round Kozloff, Tsebroff and Vorobiyovka, and was retiring on to the next defensive position—namely, that of the Zlota Lipa. For about 15 miles to the east its retreat led across an open high plateau. The average level of that tableland exceeds 1,000 feet, and only in very few parts insignificant streams cut its even surface. North of a line drawn from Dobrovody to Bobulintse not a single forest intervenes between the Strypa and the River Koropiets. West of the Koropiets and still more beyond the Zlota Lipa the landscape changes considerably. Ranges of hills, broken by numerous streams and covered with dense forests, extend for tens and scores of miles, from the neighbourhood of Bzhezhany and Podhaytse, past Halitch and Rohatyn, to about Bobrka and Mikolayoff—*i.e.*, within short distance of Lvoff. This region of hills and forests was now to become the scene of fighting.

On August 13 the troops of General Shcherbacheff in their pursuit of the retreating enemy reached the village of Tsenioff, north-east of Bzhezhany, and approached the Zlota Lipa near Zavaloff. In the extreme south, close to the Dniester, where their movements were supported by the previous quicker advance of General Lechitsky's Army south of that river, they broke on the same day across the Zlota Lipa, near Toustubaby, and captured the village of Mariampol, at the junction of the Zgnily Potok with the Dniester.

REPAIRING A BRIDGE BLOWN UP BY THE AUSTRIANS.

Two or three days later a short lull supervened on the entire front. The defeated army had received considerable reinforcements and a new balance was established.

The front of Count Bothmer's Army now extended for about 50 miles from south-east of Pluhoff to Halitch. Its centre lay round Bzezhany, which since the autumn of 1915 had been the headquarters of General Count Bothmer, but now lay only a few miles behind the front. It was soon to find itself actually in the firing line. The Zlota Gora, the key of the enemy positions in the Pluhoff-Zboroff district and also the hills south-west of the Zlochoff-Tarnopol road were held by the group of divisions under the German General von Eben, forming the extreme right wing of the Second Austro-Hungarian Army. North of the village of Koniukhy and of Hill 404, at the eastern edge of vast oak-forests which in that region border on the Podolian steppes, began the line of the "German Army of the South." At Koniukhy, on a small stream bearing the same name, its front reached the system of the Zlota Lipa: it followed from here the stream Koniukhy to the River Tseniovka, and the Tseniovka to its confluence with the Zlota Lipa. Next to the confluence of these two rivers lies the important railway station of Potutory, the junction of the Lvoff-Podhaytse line and the railway running from Tarnopol to Halitch and Khodoroff. The Tseniovka, which runs between high wooded hills rising about 300 feet above the level of the valley, is lined with marshes, difficult to cross especially during a wet season such as was the summer of 1916. The most convenient passages across it are covered by the villages of Byshki and Kuropatniki in the north, the village of Shybalin on the Tarnopol-Kozova-Bzhezhany high road, and that of Potutory on the high road leading from Podhaytse by Bzhezhany to Lvoff. On the western bank of the Tseniovka, between it and the Zlota

Lipa, a range of high hills formed a defensive wall in front of Bzhezhany, the most important strategic centre between the Dniester and the Lvoff-Krasne-Tarnopol railway. The average height of these hills amounts to about 1,300 ft. Some of them are covered by forests ; in most cases, however, the summits of the hills are naked, decaying rock, and below them open steep slopes covered with grass. The Lysonia height, near the junction of the Tseniovka and the Zlota Lipa, dominating both valleys and the crossings of Shybalin and Potutory, was the key to the positions in front of Bzhezhany.

Bzhezhany itself is an interesting old town. It has for many centuries held an important place, both as a centre of commerce and as a link in the chain of Podolian fortresses, which defended Red Russia against the Tartar invasions. In the sixteenth century it was one of the main settlements of the Polish Armenians, once the chief merchants in the borderland of Poland, Little Russia, and Moldavia. Only very few of them are now

MAP OF THE DISTRICT FROM ZLOCHOFF TO THE DNIESTER.

GENERAL VON GEROK.
German Commander on the Narayovka.

left in the town ; having grown rich, these families acquired landed property and changed into Polish country gentry. The Armenian Street and the old Armenian Church are the only surviving monuments in Bzhezhany of that once considerable settlement. The southern suburb of Bzhezhany is inhabited by the descendants of another exotic race, the Tartars. These men, who arrived as invaders, and remained as captives, have lost both their language and their religion, and only their Mongol features distinguish them from the surrounding Little Russian peasantry. By a curious coincidence the Russian forces which were now attacking the town of Bzhezhany included many Armenian and Tartar regiments from the Caucasus.

Next to the old Armenian road which approaches Bzhezhany from the direction of Shybalin, not far from where the River Zlota Lipa emerges from the small Bzhezhany lake, stands the old castle, once an important fortress and the seat of one of the richest aristocratic families of Poland—the Sieniawskis. The last of that family was a faithful adherent of the League which in the first quarter of the eighteenth century opposed Charles XII. of Sweden, the Turks, and the rebel Cossacks of Mazepa, and Bzhezhany became the scene of an important battle in that war. Through the only daughter of the last Sieniawski, the god-child of Peter the

CAVALRY V. ARTILLERY: A SOTNIA OF COSSACKS CAPTURING AN AUSTRIAN BATTERY.

Great, Tsar of Russia, August II., King of Poland and Saxony, and Rakocsy, Grand Duke of Transylvania, the estates of Bzhezhany passed into the hands of the family of the Czartoryskis, who now for the first time rose to historic importance. But the magnificent old castle was abandoned for a more habitable country house, and a century later, under Austrian rule, like so many of the finest old Galician castles, was changed partly into military barracks and partly into a brewery. Only the old family chapel of the Sieniawskis remained intact. On the western side the town of Bzhezhany is dominated by the Benedictine Monastery founded by one of the Sieniawskis towards the close of the seventeenth century.

For about 15 miles south of Potutory the broad, flat, marshy valley of the Zlota Lipa formed the dividing line between the Germanic and the Russian armies. This was comparatively the least interesting and least eventful sector of the front on which the forces of General Shcherbacheff faced those of Count Bothmer. Huge forests cover the ranges of heights on both sides of the river, and not a single important line of communication crosses it within that area. Zavaloff is the first point of considerable strategic importance which one reaches moving down the Zlota Lipa. Its position is analogous to that of Burkanoff on the Strypa, and of Halitch, Jezupol and Nizhnioff on the Dniester. It lies at the point at which the marshes lining the upper valley of the Zlota Lipa cease and that river enters a deep, winding cañon. In the intervening district, at Zavaloff, where the river-bed on the Zlota Lipa is narrow, but not yet deep, the most important highroad approaching Halitch from the east crosses the river.

Zavaloff had formed in the last stage of Count Bothmer's retreat, in the first half of August, the southern bastion of the line of the Zlota Lipa and the pivot of his extreme right wing. Near Zavaloff the retreating army had retained on the eastern bank of the river several important heights, which covered the approaches to the crossing. Farther south, not even the line of the Zlota Lipa remained in their possession. Small cañons in which the river itself does not form a serious obstacle (as does, *e.g.*, the Dniester) are no cover to a retreating army. Their winding course renders the front disproportionately long ; the different loops, the various levels and the numerous terraces on its sides make it easy for the attacking army to force a crossing somewhere. The range of hills extending west-south-west of Zavaloff past Horozhanka and Deleyoff and Lany to the Dniester proved a much stronger and much more convenient defensive line for the Austro-German armies. These hills, attaining an average height of 1,200 feet, are covered by dense forests and protect against the south the Zavaloff-Halitch highroad. Between Mariampol and Jezupol, Count Bothmer's new front touched the Dniester.

GENERAL PETER HOFMAN,
Austrian Commander at Bzhezhany.

About the beginning of June, 1916, the so-called " German Army of the South " of Count Bothmer included only one German division (the 48th Reserve Division) and six Austrian divisions. Then in July the 105th German Division was brought up from the Balkans, and the 119th German Division from the Riga front. The 95th and 199th German Divisions came to Podolia in August, and were followed by the 19th and 20th Turkish Divisions. Still further reinforcements were brought up about the middle of September, when the 123rd German Division arrived from the Aisne and the 208th from the Somme. Moreover, fragments were added of the First Reserve Division and of the Third Prussian Guard Division, which had originally belonged to Count Both-

COSSACKS COLLECTING PRISONERS.

mer's army, but had been sent to Verdun in March, 1916. On the other hand, of the original six Austrian divisions two were withdrawn, one of them, Hungarian by nationality, proceeding to the Rumanian front. Three other Austrian divisions of Count Bothmer's army had been completely destroyed in the fighting. In their place two and a half fresh Austrian divisions were brought up, so that about the middle of September, 1916, the German Army of the South consisted of seven complete German divisions and fragments of two other German divisions, three and a half Austrian and two Turkish divisions. It is true that the German divisions were now smaller than they had been earlier in 1916, each division consisting of three instead of four regiments. Even so, however, Count Bothmer's army was now considerably stronger than it had been in June, though its front was only slightly longer.

August 29 marks the renewal of the Russian offensive on the Zlota Lipa. The first blow was directed against the centre of General von Gerok's group of divisions in the salient near Zavaloff. The important artillery positions on Hill 413 were captured and the enemy was compelled to retire beyond the Zlota Lipa. On the following day (August 30) the fighting was extended towards the south-west; soon the battle had spread over the entire front from Zavaloff and Nosoff on the Zlota Lipa to Mariampol on the Dniester On September 3 the struggle reached its culminating point. In the morning of that day our Allies, operating on both sides of the Dniester, captured the town of Jezupol and its surroundings, including the wooded heights which dominate that town and the crossing of the Dniester, on the Stanislavoff-Halitch railway line. Meantime, farther north, the advance had begun against the Dryshchoff-Nosoff front. It led across steep hills and through thick forests, and was necessarily slow. Especially obstinate was the resistance of the enemy in the forests between Horozhanka and Dryshchoff, these positions being held entirely by picked German troops. Three successive Russian attacks were repulsed. However, later in the afternoon our Allies, by an advance through the forests north of Byshoff, succeeded in turning the right German flank. The enemy now tried to withdraw, but the Russian *barrage* prevented all retreat. At 6 p.m. the Russians forced their way into the forest, and most bitter hand-to-hand fighting developed. The enemy did not surrender, nor were the Russians in a mood to spare him. By the end of the day the four square miles of forest were strewn with German corpses. With the piercing of the Nosoff-Deleyoff front all further resistance on that advanced line was rendered impossible. In the ensuing German *déroute* the Russian cavalry played a brilliant part. More than 4,000 Austrian, German and Turkish prisoners were captured. On the following day (September 4) the advance from the south-east was reinforced by a concentric movement from the east, across the Zlota Lipa. The difficult river-

crossing between the village of Voloshchyzna on the eastern and Bozhykoff on the western bank was captured, and the Turks who held that sector were completely routed. On the same day the Russian advance was pressed across the wooded heights west of the Zlota Lipa within a few miles of the Halitch-Podvysokie railway. Meantime, at the southern end of the line, the Russians had completely cleared of the enemy the eastern corner between the Dniester and the Gnila Lipa, had captured the railway between Vodniki, Siemikovitse and the railway station of Halitch (on the northern bank of the Dniester—the town itself lies south of the river), and were crossing the Gnila Lipa. On the night of September 4–5 the military stores of Bolshovtse were set on fire.

The new front of the enemy now ran from the Dniester north of Halitch along the Narayovka to Lipnitsa Dolna. This part of the line was held mainly by German troops, Brandenburgers and Pomeranians. From Lipnitsa Dolna the front extended to the east across the wooded hills south of Miechyshchoff to about Saranchuki on the Zlota Lipa. This most exposed sector, which in the following weeks was subjected to frequent Russian attacks, was assigned to the Turkish troops. They had to cover the southern flank of the district of Bzhezhany which now formed a pronounced salient. The district of Bzhezhany itself was held largely by Austro-Hungarian troops, comprised in one of the few surviving Army Corps, namely that of General Hofman. It consisted of Poles, Germans and Magyars, and also of Czechs and Rumanes: these last two nationalities remained, of course, under "police supervision," the Germans from Bohemia and Magyars from Transylvania being only too glad to play the part of spies and hangmen of their "fellow-countrymen."

The districts of Halitch, Bzhezhany and Pluhoff were now the chief objectives of the Russian attacks. They were the three bastions of the enemy centre in East Galicia, on a line which had already been laid bare of its foreworks and offered the last defensible connected positions in front of Lvoff. Of these three bastions the most important was Bzhezhany. Whilst round Halitch and Pluhoff the Germans might yet have maintained an unbroken front, even if the wings had been bent back still farther, a piercing of the line of the Zlota Lipa round Bzhezhany would have resulted for them in an immediate loss not only of the district of Pluhoff, but also of Zlochoff and Krasne. Then a concentric movement by General Sakharoff's Army from the direction of Brody would have become possible, and the road would have been opened for a direct blow from the east against Lvoff.

The battle in the region of Bzhezhany began on September 1, round the village of Shybalin

A FIELD WAR COUNCIL.

on the Kozova-Bzhezhany road, and extended on the following day to the south, beyond Potutory down to the hill called Dzikie Lany (near this hill was the junction of the Austrian and the Turkish lines). The Lysonia range, in the corner between the Zlota Lipa and the Tseniovka, which dominates that district, was one of the main objectives of the Russian artillery. "The Russian batteries are skilfully placed and masked," wrote the military correspondent of the Hungarian *Pester Lloyd* from the enemy headquarters near Bzhezhany, "and even our flying men find it difficult to discover them. Very often the Russian batteries succeed in directing the most destructive form of fire against our positions, namely cross-fire, and sometimes they even outflank us. . . Since the beginning of the autumn fighting much heavy artillery—of 15 and 18 cm. calibre—is employed by the Russians. In the last few days (beginning of October) a huge Russian gun, presumably a 28 cm. howitzer, throws its enormous shells into our trenches. . . . The quality of the Russian soldiers is still always very good. It is true, different ages, varying from 19 to 40, are represented among them, and their training is less thorough than it used to be, but in general they are excellent soldiers. Their equipment, clothes and boots are perfect." So was also the leadership, and if the results of the battle were not such as the previous months had produced, the reason for it was that the enemy, in view of the extreme importance of these positions, had spared no pains in strengthening them in every possible way.

In the afternoon of September 2 the Russian artillery began to bombard the range of heights in the corner between the Zlota Lipa and the Tseniovka. The nature of these hills favoured its work; the decaying rock and the brittle chalk was breaking and crumbling under the heavy artillery fire. "After some time of hurricane fire—I can hardly realize whether it lasted a second, a minute, an hour or a day—our trenches were obliterated," wrote a Polish officer serving with the Austrian army in a letter to his parents. "We remained without cover. Whistling and screeching, shell followed on shell, and shrapnel on shrapnel. . . The earth was opening below us and the trees were falling on top of us. We now made for the first time the acquaintance of the new Japanese explosive, shimosa. . . . Its force surpasses anything we had seen previously. Small shells filled with it can be shot off from light guns. The effect is gruesome: there remains only one mass of mangled human flesh. . . ." On the next morning (September 3) at 5 a.m. the Russian infantry, which had been gathered under cover of the forest above Zolnovka, opened its attack

RUSSIAN PEASANTS RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES.

across the Tseniovka valley and against the heights on its western bank. Most of the enemy batteries on the Lysonia had been silenced, and soon our Allies came to grips with the infantry. "Only now I believe," writes again the Austrian-Polish officer, "that there can be such a thing as a heap of corpses . . . . that corpses can form high, defensive walls. The battle-scene simply defies all description. Those distorted, inhuman, terrible faces, black with smoke and dust, with shining white maddened eyes, and wide, gaping mouths, from which flows one continuous howling cry! Oh, that howling! It has nothing human in it, it must be the cry of madmen or damned souls. But I also howled in the same way, I continued to howl after I had been wounded, I howled all the time until the parched lips and the sore throat got fixed in the cry. Why did we howl? I don't know. But everybody did it, the soldiers advancing along with me, and the Russians flashing into our eyes with their blood-covered bayonets. . . . . At first I felt fear, anger, horror, fury—then I grew indifferent. One loses all sensibility."

The battle continued all day and through the following night. The Russians carried the hills south-east of Bzhezhany, including the Lysonia. But meantime the enemy was gathering powerful reinforcements. Bavarian reserves were brought up to restore the perilous situation. They began the counter-attack against the tired Russian troops under cover of the morning mist, at 4 a.m. on September 4. The Lysonia Height was lost, but the extreme end of the triangle, Hill 348 near the confluence of the rivers, and the crossing of the Tseniovka remained in the hands of our Allies. "In the region of Bzhezhany our troops forced the passage across the Tseniovka . . . and carried the hostile position, taking prisoners 80 officers and 2,641 men, and capturing 6 machine-guns" was the short and terse announcement of the Russian official *communiqué* of September 4. It is only from eye-witnesses and war-correspondents (among whom especially those of the *Russkoye Slovo* were distinguished for the fullness and accuracy of their reports) that detailed knowledge of the battle can be gathered.

AUSTRIAN PRISONERS ENJOYING THEIR MIDDAY MEAL.

The battle round Bzhezhany continued with varying success throughout September; positions were taken, lost and retaken. It was extremely creditable to our Allies that in all this fighting they spared the town and its historic monu-

ments, though the enemy was using its heights and towers for purposes of military observation. A further important advance was achieved by the Russians in the last days of September and the first days of October, when they extended their ground on the hills and captured the village of Potutory below the confluence of the rivers. Yet Bzhezhany remained in the hands of the enemy.

Between September 5-7 the first battle was fought for the Halitch positions. Our Allies consolidated their hold on the western bank of the Gnila Lipa, and the enemy evacuated the northern bank of the Dniester opposite Halitch, blowing up the forts and the bridge. From Halitch itself the stores were removed, and practically the entire civilian population left the town, except the Karaites. This most lonely fragment of a tribe, stranded here by some unknown historic tragedy, refused to leave the only street which it inhabits in the entire Hapsburg Monarchy.*

After the line of the Narayovka and of the Dniester had been reached on September 7, a lull ensued in this region, which lasted until September 15. When the battle recommenced, the severest fighting took place on the Nara-

* The Karaites are a Jewish sect, which rejects the Talmudic tradition. Their chief home is in the Crimea. They were settled there together with the Tartars and speak a Tartar language. They are mostly peasants, do not mix with the other Jews and do not understand Yiddish. Outside the Crimea they have settlements only in Halitch and in one or two Lithuanian towns. They alone of all Jews enjoy in Russia full civil rights.



RUSSIAN WOUNDED BEHIND THE LINE.

yovka, at the southern end of the village of Svistelniki, below Lipnitsa Dolna. Here our Allies had gained a foothold on the western bank of the river; the salient held by them was about three miles long and two miles deep. They had captured the forest of Svistelniki, Hills 345 and 310, the fortified positions of Piakova, and the village of Skomorokhy Nove. The Russian forces holding that salient included the 41st Russian and the 3rd Finnish divisions. Opposing them were picked Prussian troops—part of the Third Guards Division, Fusiliers of the Guard, and Pomeranian Grenadiers—under General von Gerok and Major-General von Gallwitz. In the battle which now developed it is almost impossible to say which side took the initiative. Attacks and counter-attacks followed on one another, the Russians trying to enlarge their foothold on the right bank of the Narayovka, the Germans endeavouring to push them back across the river. In this fighting, which with varying intensity lasted for about three weeks, neither side secured any marked gains, though each at one time or another scored considerable successes. "In the region of the River Narayovka," read the Russian official *communiqué* of September 17, "fighting continues. The enemy has already suffered great losses in killed and wounded, and has left in our hands 3,174 prisoners, 34 of them officers, all Germans. We also captured 20 machine guns and two trench guns." "German troops under the command of General von Gerok counter-attacked on both sides of the Narayovka," ran the Berlin answer two days later. "The greater portion of the ground lost the day before yesterday is again in our hands. Besides heavy losses in killed and wounded, the enemy lost also 3,500 prisoners and 16 machine-guns." Towards the beginning of October the two armies were still facing one another on approximately the same lines which had been reached a month earlier, neither of them able to overcome the resistance of its opponent.

Another battle, equally desperate and equally indecisive, was fought during the month of September and during the first half of October in Southern Volhynia, especially east of Sviniukhy, on the Shelvoff-Korytnitsa-Pustomyty front. Here the 4th Siberian and the 40th Russian Army Corps, including the "Iron Division," the Russian Guard under General

MAP ILLUSTRATING THE OPERATIONS IN THE CARPATHIANS.

Gurko and a division of Orenburg Cossacks, were fighting North-German troops under Generals von der Marwitz and von Litzmann, and Magyars and Viennese regiments under General von Szurmay. The scene of the most important operations extended over hardly more than six miles, and included the villages of Shelvoff, Bubnoff and Korytnitsa, stretched across the marshy valley of the Lug and two forests, one known as the "Devil's Wood," the other, on account of its peculiar shape, as the "Three Fingers Wood." The first important engagement took place on August 31—September 1, and resulted in some gains of ground for our Allies. With interruptions the fighting continued throughout the following six weeks, culminating in a pitched battle about September 20, when the Russians captured about three miles of German trenches. As, however, the strategic advance from the Zlota Lipa had not developed sufficiently, the attempt in Volhynia lost in strategic importance, and a lull again supervened on that front.

THE TSAR REVIEWING INFANTRY AT THE FRONT.

Towards the end of June the Russian troops under General Lechitsky had once more reached in the Bukovina the foothills of the Carpathians. In July they extended their Carpathian front from the Cheremosh to the Yablonitsa Pass, and advanced deeper into the mountains. It was, however, only after the entry of Rumania into the war, and in view of the Rumanian invasion of Transylvania, that this front acquired considerable importance. General Lechitsky now directed his main forces against the Hungarian frontier; it was here that the three Russian army corps commanded by Generals Zhychevski, Count Baranoff-Krusenstern and Count Keller were fighting. On August 15 our Allies captured important positions in the Yablonitsa (sometimes called also the Tartar Pass), and on August 29 the village of Rafailova, south-west of Nadvorna, and the Pantyr Pass. On a front of 90 miles—between Mount Pantyr and Dorna Vatra—they stood close to the Hungarian frontier and to the main Carpathian crest. The battle for the chief mountain groups, which average in height 6,000-7,000 feet, had already begun. Each of them formed almost a separate theatre of war, the absence of tactical cohesion being perhaps the most characteristic feature of the operations on this front of high mountains and pathless forests. In the first days of September fighting took place almost in every sector of the Carpathian front; round Mount Ploska, near the Pantyr Pass; round Mounts Kukul and Khoverla, south of the Yablonitsa; round Mounts Stepanski, Kreta, Ludova, Bal a Ludova and Pnieva between the two Cheremosh rivers; round Mounts Vipchina, Kapul and Cimbroslava, in the village of Luchina, and on the Tommatic range in the Kirlibaba sector; and lastly, round the road from Yacobeny to Dorna Vatra on the Rumanian frontier. It is impossible to enter into the detail of this fighting, where in the many separate battles successes and reverses closely followed on one another. Of the more important captures by our Allies may be mentioned that of Mount Ploska in the first days of September, of Mounts Kapul and Pnieva on September 11, Mount Smotrets on the 19th, Mount Koman on the 27th. Each of these successes brought with it a considerable haul of prisoners.

The operations on this front were, however, necessarily only supplementary to those in Transylvania, and when the Rumanian invasion had failed, a lull followed on the line between Mount Pantyr and Dorna Vatra.

CHAPTER CLVII.

GERMAN AIR RAIDS: MAY TO NOVEMBER, 1916.

IMPROVEMENT OF AIR DEFENCES—AEROPLANE AGAINST AIRSHIP—LIGHTING REGULATIONS—THE DARKNESS OF LONDON—GERMAN FICTIONS—ZEPPELIN AND SCHÜTTE-LANZ—RAIDS IN JULY AND AUGUST, 1916—VISIT TO SCOTLAND—RAID OF SEPTEMBER 2—A SCHÜTTE-LANZ BROUGHT DOWN AT CUFFLEY—LIEUTENANT ROBINSON, V.C.—CAPTAIN SCHRAMM'S FUNERAL—ZEPPELIN DESTROYED IN ESSEX ON SEPTEMBER 22—LOSS OF LIFE IN LONDON—ZEPPELIN DESTROYED AT POTTER'S BAR ON OCTOBER 1—TWO ZEPPELINS DESTROYED IN THE NORTH SEA—A SEAPLANE OVER LONDON.

THE air war over the United Kingdom followed in its earlier stages certain clearly marked lines. At the beginning there was general scepticism among British authorities as to the possibility of a serious aerial menace. It was considered doubtful if Zeppelins could cross the North Sea, save at great risk of wreck from storm, and every confidence was felt that if they did so our aeroplanes, travelling faster and climbing higher, could easily deal with them. This belief found expression in Mr. Churchill's oft-quoted phrase about "a swarm of hornets" which would tackle and destroy the invaders. During the first year of the war nothing adequate was done in the way of aerial defence. The anti-aircraft guns were far too few in number and of too small a calibre to produce satisfactory results. There was no proper system of communicating warnings. Our protective methods lacked both adequacy and co-ordination.

The reliance upon aeroplanes as the principal weapon for defence was based upon the assumption that the Zeppelins would attack in daytime. When the Zeppelins attacked at night, the difficulties, for pilots inexperienced in night flying, of meeting them with aeroplanes became evident. Numbers of gallant young airmen attempted to attack in the dark. Some received more or less serious injuries. The inadequacy of our defensive methods was finally and conclusively shown on the night of September 8, 1915, when several Zeppelins hovered over London, dropping bombs almost at leisure and ignoring our feeble gunfire from below.

From that night the authorities regarded the matter more seriously. There was still a tendency to deprecate any outside attention being drawn to the reality of the menace. A number of public men, utterly mistaking the nature of the danger, scolded those who urged greater preparations, charging them with cowardice and selfishness. The nation was assured that it ought to be glad to share in some small degree the dangers of the soldiers in the trenches. The great raid of January 31, 1916, when Zeppelins travelled over the Midlands and reached the West of England, revealed the fallacy of such arguments. It proved beyond question how necessary an adequate aerial defence of England was, not merely for the protection of individual private citizens, but for the safe operation of our great industrial and military works.

During the months that followed steady progress was made. It was recognized that the aeroplane, once the dangers from night flying

were diminished, was the ideal anti-airship weapon. It was much faster than a Zeppelin; it could climb higher; it presented a very small object for attack, as against the enormous vulnerable surface of the airship. It could seek out the enemy wherever he was or could pursue and overtake him. It cost comparatively little and could be quickly constructed. By the summer of 1916 the training of pilots in night flying and the recognition of the most suitable machines and weapons for attacking Zeppelins had greatly improved the prospects of the country's anti-aircraft defence.

A considerable degree of co-ordination had been attained. A much more abundant supply of anti-aircraft guns had been manufactured. The plan of throwing the country into darkness, so as to give the enemy overhead a minimum of guidance for direction, was made by degrees more and more strict. By the early winter of 1916 great cities like London presented a remarkable spectacle after 5 o'clock in the evening. Every house and shop had its windows carefully shaded with dark curtains, and the street lamps had been reduced in number and obscured so as to give no more than a glimmer of light. The illuminated advertisements had long since disappeared and the headlights of vehicles were reduced in power. The darkness was such that it was often impossible for the wayfarer to distinguish the kerbstones of the streets. This had certain drawbacks. It caused a great increase in the number of street accidents, and it tended to give every place an aspect of gloom after dark. But it deprived the enemy of one of his chief means of finding his way. Zeppelins were now driven to attempt to discover their whereabouts by looking for rivers. "The English can darken London as much as they want," boasted Commander Mathy, one of the most redoubtable of the Zeppelin commanders; "they can never remove or cover up the Thames, from which we can always get our bearings and pick up any point in London we desire." But this method of picking up bearings was of very doubtful success. Time after time the German official accounts showed that the Zeppelin commanders had almost ludicrously misjudged their whereabouts. Houses, factories, railways, electric trams, furnaces were all brought under regulations tending to increase the general darkness.



[From "The Aeroplane," by permission.

STEM AND STERN VIEWS OF A ZEPPELIN
Showing construction.

Even in the worst days there was never any general feeling of panic concerning the Zeppelins. The damage inflicted was comparatively so small that the public imagination was more impressed with the Zeppelin as a great spectacular display than as a death-dealing instrument. The merest rumour of the approach of Zeppelins brought people crowding into the streets to catch a sight of



From "The Aeroplane," by permission.

COMPARATIVE DIAGRAMS OF THE FRAMEWORK OF A ZEPPELIN (OF ALUMINIUM) AND THAT OF A SCHÜTTE-LANZ (OF WOOD).

them. The very children clamoured to be allowed to sit up at nights "to see the Zeps." Little girls playing in slum streets had their own game of "Zeps," invented no one knew how, in which the Zeppelin crews made figures for mockery similar to the Guy Fawkes of an earlier generation. In one leading orphanage for young girls, around which bombs had fallen on several occasions, the children would promise their dolls, as a crowning reward, that "if they were very good they might sit up and see the Zeppelins come." The attitude of children and adults alike was one of curiosity rather than fear.

The German authorities never, of course, believed the fantastic tales of the destruction of whole districts in London and elsewhere that were carefully circulated throughout the world by their official agencies. These fables served possibly to hearten the civil population and to cheer soldiers fighting on the Western front. They knew that the original hopes that the Zeppelins would terrorize English people or produce widespread destruction had failed. They had succeeded in diverting a certain number of British guns and men from the Western front to the defence of England. Apart from that the material damage they had done was so small compared with the effort involved that it must have been a profound disappointment to all responsible for it.

The Germans employed two types of airships in their attacks, the Zeppelin and the Schütte-Lanz.

The improved Zeppelin was about 680 feet long and had a maximum diameter of 72 feet. Its framework was composed of girders of a very light and strong aluminium alloy, the same material being largely used in the construction of the gondolas. Inside its envelope were 18 or 19 gas ballonets, holding two million feet of hydrogen gas. It had six engines, each of 240 h.p. It carried an armament of several machine guns, and possibly one or two small light guns firing shells. It carried also sixty bombs.

The captain directed and controlled the ship from a cabin in the foremost gondola. He released the bombs by means of electrical devices. Levers and wheels enabled him to control the speed and alter the direction of flight. In an adjoining cabin in the same gondola sat the wireless operator. Behind him, still in the same gondola, were an engine and two mounted machine guns, the engine operating a propeller.

This gondola was connected by a "cat-walk" inside the keel with two central gondolas containing engines and machine guns, and



[F. N. Birkett, Photo.

A PROPELLER OF A ZEPPELIN.

these in turn were connected with a large rear gondola which also contained engines and guns There were in addition gun emplacements right on top of the envelope. Two thousand gallons of petrol were carried as fuel, and the total crew numbered twenty-two, including captain, wireless operator, machine-gun men, and mechanics for each engine. The Zeppelins could travel at a speed of 55–60 miles an hour.

The improved type of Schütte-Lanz airship was about 500 feet long, and carried three gondolas, containing engines, in addition to a little navigating cabin forward. It differed from

the Zeppelin chiefly in the fact that its frame was made, not of aluminium, but of wood with wire wound around it.

From May 20, 1916, when a seaplane dropped some bombs on the east coast of Kent, until early in July there was a pause. On the night of July 9-10 a seaplane visited the Isle of Thanet, but was immediately pursued by naval aircraft, and made off without dropping any bombs. A second seaplane visited South-East Kent, dropping seven bombs, but inflicting no damage beyond breaking a number of windows. There were no casualties in either raid. A German



CAT-WALK OF A ZEPPELIN.

communiqué stated that the coastal works and port establishments of Harwich and Dover had been visited. The raid on Harwich was entirely imaginary.

The Germans took advantage of the ideal summer weather at the end of July and the beginning of August to carry out a series of four raids on the Eastern and South-Eastern Counties and on the Thames Valley. Large numbers of incendiary bombs were scattered among ripening fields of corn, and farmers believed that a serious attempt was being made to fire our crops. The bombs failed to do any widespread damage to the crops, despite the favourable summer conditions.

The first of the raids was on the night of July 28-29, over Norfolk, Lincolnshire, and Yorkshire. A heavy fog hung over the coast



[*By permission, from "Flight."*

THE PORT SIDE GONDOLA OF L 33.

at the time, making observation difficult both for attackers in the air and defenders on the ground. The Zeppelin pilots lost their way. They believed, according to the official German statements, that they reached the mouth of the Humber, destroying a lighthouse there, and that from there they went inland to Lincoln and Norwich, and then on to Grimsby and Immingham. Actually, many of their bombs fell into the sea, and a large proportion of the others on agricultural land. In Lincolnshire the casualties were reported as one calf, one rabbit, and five thrushes killed. A haystack was set on fire, two bombs fell on the side of a railway, and eight bombs, evidently aimed at a village, fell into fields and roads, doing no harm.

When the airships approached certain important points, they were met by heavy fire from anti-aircraft guns, and sheered off. From the British point of view the defence was not satisfactory.

On July 31 the Zeppelins came again. This time they spread over a wider field, including the Thames Estuary, Kent, Lincoln, Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridge, Essex and Huntingdon. The enemy pilots claimed that they reached London, a claim promptly denied. The airships sailed very high and were aided in approaching the coast by a thin mist, which gave them some concealment. They reached England at ten, before it was quite dark. They were warmly received. Our ships fired on them at sea, they were picked up time after time by searchlights as they passed over the land, and whenever they came within range of the British defences they were heavily bombarded. They showed special activity in scattering incendiary

bombs among growing crops. Apparently little damage was done by either side. There were no casualties among the British population. One Zeppelin was believed to be hit, but got away.

One very curious incident was reported by the Secretary of the Admiralty. A British aeroplane was reported to have pursued and attacked a Zeppelin 30 miles off the East Coast "The pilot had fired over two trays of ammunition into the Zeppelin when he was temporarily incapacitated by a portion of his machine gun flying off and stunning him. The Zeppelin was nowhere to be seen when the pilot regained consciousness, and he was therefore forced to return to the station."

On August 3 a fleet of Zeppelins hovered over the North Sea, attacking trawlers, and soon after ten at night crossed over the land, visiting Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex. On this occasion the Zeppelins did not attempt to go far inland. They dropped bombs over a large area of the coast and were engaged at different points by anti-aircraft guns. Nine horses were killed and three injured. The futility of this raid could only be explained by the assumption that the airships lost their way. They wandered about with apparent vagueness. Flying at a great height they succeeded in keeping out of the range of anti-aircraft guns, but were unable to bomb any important centre, nearly all their missiles falling on vacant land. Once more the Germans claimed that London, Harwich and important

TYPICAL EXAMPLES OF THE WORK OF THE ZEPPELINS.

In the house represented in the lower illustration a woman, a girl and a boy were killed, and several persons were injured near by.



BOMB-DROPPING APPARATUS

industrial establishments and railway works in Norfolk had been attacked. It was firmly believed by many observers that one of the Zeppelins had been struck, and seriously damaged. It showed every sign of being crippled as it made off eastwards, and a search was undertaken seawards to discover if it had fallen there. As the Zeppelins returned home they crossed over Dutch territory and were fired upon by Dutch batteries.

On August 9 the fourth attack was made; it was by far the most serious. A number of hostile airships visited, singly or in pairs, a wide area in the South-East of Scotland and the North-East and East Coasts of England. This time the enemy showed more boldness, directly attacking various towns, and evidently aiming at the indiscriminate destruction of property. The German armies were being severely pressed on the Somme, and it was apparently desired to be able to report great damage to England in order to divert the attention of the German people from the Western front.

In Scotland the raiders were hampered by thick weather, and their bombs, reported to be of an unusually powerful kind, fell harmlessly on fields and roads. In several towns on the North-East Coast the anti-aircraft guns drove the enemy off. A Zeppelin came over from westwards, hovered at a height beyond the reach of the guns, and dropped a number of bombs over a residential district, doing considerable damage to private property and causing some loss of life. Three people died of shock, seven were killed, and a number injured.

The German official report confirmed the opinion that unusually powerful bombs were employed. Apparently the invaders were unaware that they had reached Scotland, as they laid no claim to it. "Powerful explosions were observed at the iron works and benzol factories in Middlesbrough, and large fires were seen in the harbour establishments of Hull and Hartlepool. The good effects of the explosions were also observed in yards on the Tyne, and fires were caused in the industrial establishments of Whitby. Strong effects were seen at the railway establishments of King's Lynn," said the German report. This statement was dismissed by the British authorities as being "the usual perversion of truth."

From the British point of view the way in which the series of raids was met could not be considered wholly satisfactory. It is true that, with the exception of one town, the enemy had been driven off without inflicting any material damage, and our anti-aircraft guns had demonstrated their ability to compel the enemy to fly at great height and to avoid many important centres. But it was equally true that numbers of airships had come over British soil, had remained in many cases for hours, and had returned in safety. There was a growing feeling that our defence would not be effective until the invading airships were attacked by other aircraft, in the air.

Two hostile seaplanes visited Dover on August 12. They made at great speed for the town, flying seven or eight thousand feet high, dropped their bombs, turned and



OF A GERMAN AIRSHIP.

fled. Anti-aircraft guns immediately opened fire on them and aeroplanes rose in pursuit, but the attackers, having the advantage of altitude, got clear away. The attack only lasted a few minutes. One officer and several men were slightly injured, and some windows were broken.

The enemy, keeping to their usual plan of waiting for moonless nights for airship attacks, did not visit England again until August 24, when six Zeppelins raided the East and South Coasts, and one succeeded in reaching the outskirts of London. Attacks were made on two seaside towns, one on the East and the other on the South-East Coast. In both cases the enemy were driven off by gunfire, one of the Zeppelins being obliged to empty all its bombs in the sea before it made away.

In the district outside London that was attacked there were a number of narrow escapes. One bomb fell in the roadway in a street of shops which was of average width. It exploded with great force, making a big cavity in the street, and smashing windows for a considerable distance round. A block of granite edging of the footpath was carried up by the force of the explosion into a first-floor bedroom. A carter with a van and two horses had pulled up at a coffee stall in the street, and was talking to the stall-keeper when the bomb burst quite close to him. The two horses were killed, and the two men were knocked over but only slightly injured. These were the only casualties at that spot. Another bomb dropped in a yard behind a group of almshouses, where about 80 old men and women lived. Every window in the almshouses was broken, but no one was hurt. Another bomb blew down part of the iron railings of a railway station, but did no further damage.

The number killed in this district was seven. A bomb fell on the roof of two small new houses, and destroyed them. In one of the houses a worker, his wife, and a daughter aged 22 months were killed, and another child was slightly injured. They were evidently trying to get downstairs when the bomb landed and the falling *débris* killed them. In a house in a different locality another man was killed, with his wife and a daughter aged 11. The house was wrecked, with the exception of a staircase, on which the body of the man was found, half-dressed. The body of the wife was practically in two, while both arms and one leg had been torn off the child. A young woman occupying apartments in the house was killed in bed. The bomb had blown the floor away, causing the bed to fall on to the next floor, when the walls had collapsed on it. Another victim who was fatally injured on the head and chest was a switchboard attendant at an electric works.

In one South-East Coast village the upper floors of two adjoining houses were completely wrecked. In one of these a father, mother and child were killed, and in another several people were seriously injured. A woman of 70 was killed while in her room. The first returns gave the total killed as eight, and the injured

as 21; but later information showed that the total of the wounded and killed was larger than at first thought. The authorities complained that people would gather in the street to see the airships, and declared that several cases of injury would have been avoided but for this.

A captain in the Royal Flying Corps set out from an aerodrome on the South-East Coast in pursuit of one of the airships. He reached it and maintained a running fight with it until the coast of the Continent was reached, pumping



A ZEPPELIN ON FIRE NEAR LONDON.
Seen from a distance, one of the burning airships appeared as a rosy-red glowing mass, revealing its shape distinctly.

nearly two drums of ammunition from his machine gun into it. Faced as he was by the powerful armament of the Zeppelin, his venture was one of great daring, but he escaped unscathed, and was given an enthusiastic reception by his fellow airmen on his return.

The night of Saturday, September 2, witnessed the most formidable airship attack made upon England, and witnessed also the initiation of new methods of defence which immediately proved their effectiveness. Thirteen airships crossed over the North Sea into the Eastern Counties, making for the Midlands and London. New lighting regulations had come into force shortly before, greatly reducing the visible illumination throughout the area of air attack. It was soon seen that these were effective, compelling the airships to grope about trying to find their way. Most of the raiders wandered over East Anglia, dropping bombs indiscriminately. Three succeeded in reaching the outskirts of London. Two were driven off. The third was brought to the ground in flames by an attacking airman—Lieutenant William Leefe Robinson, of the Worcester Regiment and Royal Flying Corps. It was the first German airship destroyed on British soil.

The fight took place within view of hundreds of thousands of people, and even the dullest could not fail to realize that here was a spectacle of profound significance. London, like the whole of the rest of the country affected, was lying in almost complete darkness. Faint flickering lamps in the streets and shaded lights through the curtained windows of the houses were alone visible. The news that an air attack was impending had spread over the town. The hospitals were ready for possible emergencies; at every fire station the engines waited, prepared to respond to any call; at every police station surgeons and nurses had come on duty, and ambulance men, with stretchers, were waiting. Every special constable had been called up. Lawyers and merchants, veteran civil servants and elderly shopkeepers, men most of them engaged fully during the day in their ordinary tasks, they were voluntarily giving their hours for leisure and sleep to the nation. In many homes the young children had been taken to the lower floors, and put to sleep on extemporised beds there, so as to minimise their risk should a bomb strike the house. Some people gathered on the roofs of houses; multitudes flocked into the streets; every vantage spot was crowded with spectators anxious to miss nothing of what was happening.

The searchlights were exploring the dark, star-lit, partly clouded sky. There were dozens of them, beams showing from every part of London and the outer suburbs and sweeping the sky section by section. Now half a dozen lights would play on one spot; now they would move their rays rapidly across the entire heavens. On this night the full strength of the lights was on, and such brilliant illumination had never been witnessed by London before.



[Photo by H. Scott Orr.

THE BURNING AIRSHIP.
Near Cuffley, Sept. 3, 1916.

Spectators could not but realize the amazing beauty of the scene.

Soon there came the sound of distant guns and bursting bombs. Then shells could be seen bursting in the air. The lights were now concentrating northwards, and a thrill passed through the crowds as the shape of an airship became visible. It was moving southwards and westwards. It paused, dodging apparently to escape the lights and the bursting shells, changing its altitude and turning. Some signals of no significance to the watching crowds were momentarily seen. The airship disappeared from view, behind a smoke screen which it had created. The searchlights were suddenly cut off and the gunfire ceased. What had happened? What was about to happen? men asked one another. Then came a little mass of flame, which instantly kindled into a great blazing body, an illumination such as London had never witnessed before. Twenty miles away men could see to read their newspapers. Not that anyone wanted to read. There were no eyes save for this one thing.

Strangers caught one another by the arm in their tense excitement. The airship had caught fire! It was blazing from stem to stern! The great mass of flames came hurtling earthwards. The crowds started to cheer, hard cheers, stern cheers. The messenger of death had come over them, and had himself met death on his way.

At first it was thought that a shell had struck the airship. Soon the truth became known all over London that it had been brought down by a young British flying man, who had engaged the monster in a duel in the air. Several airmen had gone up to meet the invader. One of these, Lieut. Robinson, caught sight of her, after long searching. He was then about 8,000 feet high; the airship was 2,000 to 3,000 feet higher. He made straight for the German. The searchlights were cut off, and the gunfire ceased. The airman, in searching the heavens, was naturally in even greater danger from our own shell fire, until it ceased, than he was from possible attack from the enemy.

The gunners on the airship saw him and opened fire. They were too late. He delivered his attack on the great monster. The hydrogen gas in the ballonets caught alight and then all was over.



[Photo by H. Scott Orr.

FINAL FALL OF THE CUFFLEY AIRSHIP.

One of the most detailed accounts of the fight in the air was given at the time by an officer of the Royal Flying Corps who was among the airmen engaged:

Two other aeroplanes, he said, were at that time endeavouring to engage the airship, which was making



THE LIGHTS OF LONDON.

From a Drawing by Joseph Pennell

frantic efforts to get away, at the same time firing with machine guns. The Zeppelin was travelling at top speed, first diving and then ascending, and apparently Lieutenant W. L. Robinson anticipated the manœuvre. The commander of the airship threw out tremendous black clouds of smoke which completely hid him from our view, and in which he managed to rise. A few seconds later we saw the airship a couple of thousand feet above us, and at the same altitude was Lieutenant Robinson, although perhaps half a mile away. Immediately Robinson headed his machine for the raider, and, flying at a terrific speed, it appeared that he was going to charge the monster. As the Zeppelin took fire a second airship was seen approaching, and this now occupied our attention. The commander of that craft, however, seeing the fate of the first Zeppelin, turned tail and scurried off as fast as his engines would enable him. I am told that German aeroplanes accompanied the Zeppelins, but of this all I can say is I saw none on Sunday morning, although other officers claim to have done so.

The great mass of wreckage fell still blazing on a field at Cuffley, a little village near Enfield, to the north of London. The bodies of the crew of sixteen, burned almost out of recognition, lay all round, and even those who felt most bitterly about the brutality of raids upon unarmed civilian populations could not refrain from pity at the sight. At first the airship was supposed to be a Zeppelin. It was called so in the first official dispatch, which somewhat naïvely remarked: "The large amount of wood employed in the framework of the Zeppelin is startling, and would seem to point to a shortage of aluminium in Germany." Experts, however, quickly recognized it as a Schütte-Lanz.

The news that the airship had been brought down by an airman was not allowed to be published until the following Tuesday, when it was formally announced that the King had been graciously pleased to bestow the Victoria Cross on Lieutenant Robinson for most conspicuous bravery. "He attacked an enemy airship under circumstances of great difficulty and danger," the official *communiqué* declared, "and sent it crashing to the ground as a flaming wreck. He had been in the air for more than two hours, and had previously attacked another airship, during his flight."

Lieutenant Robinson was a national hero, even before the formal announcement was made public. He was only twenty-one years old and was a grandson of a Chief Naval Constructor at Portsmouth Dockyard. Born in India, and educated at St. Bee's School, Cumberland, he entered Sandhurst in August, 1914. In the following December he was gazetted to the Worcester Regiment and joined the Royal Flying Corps as an observer in March, 1915. Wounded on May 9 that year by a shrapnel bullet in the left arm he returned home and soon afterwards qualified as a flying officer. His successful fight brought him not alone great honour, but large monetary prizes. Various rewards had been offered for the first airman bringing down a Zeppelin in the British Islands. Among these were £2,000 from Mr. Joseph Cowen, £1,000 from Lord Michelham, and £500 from Mr. William Bow, the shipbuilder of Paisley. It was strongly felt in Army circles, however, that the offer of outside monetary rewards for British officers was undesirable, and a regulation was passed shortly afterwards prohibiting it in future.

The name of the German commander was subsequently given in the German casualty lists as Captain Wilhelm Schramm. When it was announced that the airship crew were to be given a military funeral, some protests were raised, on the ground that no honours ought to be paid to the remains of those who had come here to attempt the slaughter of unarmed women and children. This protest caused resentment among members of the British flying services, who declared that the Germans were brave men who, in attempting to bomb London, had only obeyed orders, who had run great risks, and who had earned their right to the last token of soldiers' respect.

The funeral was carried out under the direction of the Royal Flying Corps, and a contingent of our flying men attended. Six officers of the Flying Corps with bared heads carried the body of the commander from the motor lorry to the graveside, and each other coffin was carried by men of the corps. There were also present six more officers and about fifty men; among them were several who had earned decorations for conspicuous bravery in the air war. Two graves had been dug, one for the commander, and a large grave for the fifteen men. On the coffin of the officer was a simple inscription, his name not then being known:

AN UNKNOWN
GERMAN OFFICER
KILLED
WHILE COMMANDING
ZEPPELIN L.21,
3RD SEPTEMBER, 1916.

At the conclusion of the funeral service two buglers sounded the "Last Post," while the soldiers stood to attention.

One other airship was badly injured during

the raid, although it managed to get away. A part of a Zeppelin was picked up in East Anglia, which proved on examination to be an observation car, made of aluminium, and elaborately fitted for an observer to be lowered a considerable distance below the Zeppelin, to watch the country underneath, and to telephone what he saw to the commander above. The casualties reported for the raid of September 3 were surprisingly few considering the number of ships engaged, one man and one woman being officially recorded as killed, and 11 men and women and two children injured.

A seaplane visited Dover on September 22, dropping three bombs and inflicting no damage.

[*Heath.*

FLIGHT COMMANDER W. L. ROBINSON, V.C.

Two nights later another big airship raid was attempted. Twelve Zeppelins crossed over the East and South-East Coasts. This time their main destination was London. They were received as they approached the shore with what they themselves described as "extraordinarily heavy fire with incendiary shells." Some of the airships made for Lincolnshire and the Eastern Counties. Two made for London from the south-east and one from the east.

One Zeppelin fell in flames in Essex, every man in it being killed. Another, so damaged by the British shell fire that it could not get away, came to earth by the Essex coast. The commander and crew blew it up, and then marched along seeking someone to whom they could surrender themselves. A special constable hearing the noise outside went along the road to learn what was the matter. He met a group of twenty men. One, the commander, asked him how far it was to a certain town, and on learning that it was six miles turned, after some talk with his men, to the special constable. Another of the party volunteered an explanation. "Zeppelin," he said. "We crew—prisoners of war." The men showed some anxiety to be placed in the hands of the military, possibly fearing violence from mobs. Some more special constables and police came up and the crew were taken away.

Daylight revealed a wonderful sight. The framework of the Zeppelin, a tangled mass of wreckage after the explosion, glistened like the scales of some prehistoric monster. Its size amazed all who saw it, and visitors exhausted themselves in adjectives to convey their impression. One man described it as like "a Crystal Palace in ruins." Close on 700 feet long, over three score and ten feet in diameter, even though crushed in, it still gave an overwhelming impression of greatness. The explosion had not succeeded in totally destroying the ship, and enough was left to enable the British authorities to learn full details of the newest type of German airship.

The end of the airship set in flames in the sky was well described by a Special Constable, writing in *The Times*:

> I watched one of the Zeppelins under fire for some minutes; in the searchlight beams she looked like an incandescent bar of white-hot steel. Then she staggered and swung to and fro in the air for just a perceptible moment of time. That, no doubt, was the instant when the damage was done, and the huge craft became unmanageable. Then, without drifting at all from her approximate place in the sky, without any other preliminary, she fell like a stone—first horizontally—*i.e.*, in her sailing trim—then in a position which rapidly became almost perpendicular, she went down, a mass of flame.

The nation did not learn the name of the airman to whom special credit was due for the destruction of the first of the Essex Zeppelins until early in October, when it was announced that the King had been pleased to bestow the Companionship of the Distinguished Service Order upon Second Lieutenant F. Sowrey and Second Lieutenant Alfred de Bath Brandon, both attached to the Royal Flying Corps. The decoration was given in recognition of their gallant and distinguished service in connexion with the successful attack upon enemy airships.

Mr. Sowrey, who was 23 years old, was a son of a Deputy Chief Inspector of Taxes at Somerset House. He was studying for the Indian Civil Service when the war broke out, and was then granted a commission in the Royal Fusiliers. He was wounded at Loos, and afterwards at Ypres. Joining the Royal Flying Corps in January, 1916, he took his pilot's certificate in June, and had been night flying since. He was with his friend Lieutenant Robinson when the latter brought down the airship at Cuffley. Mr. Sowrey had been flying some time on the night of the raid in Essex when he picked up the Zeppelin. He at once climbed and attacked it. The Zeppelin replied vigorously, and an amazing fight in the air followed, each manœuvring for position. Mr. Sowrey out-manœuvred his giant opponent, attacked him, and caused the gas to ignite.

Mr. Brandon, decorated at the same time, was a New Zealander, 32 years old, and was a barrister in practice in New Zealand until the war broke out, when he returned home. He joined the Flying Corps and distinguished himself, not by the destruction of any particular

REMOVING A MACHINE GUN AND A BROKEN PROPELLER FROM THE WRECKAGE OF THE CUFFLEY AIRSHIP.

Zeppelin, but by marked gallantry and devotion to duty. He had taken conspicuous part in several of the biggest air fights in England, and had shared in the destruction of the Essex Zeppelin. The tale of his doings was familiar to most military airmen, and his decoration was universally regarded as thoroughly well deserved.

One of the raiders on the night of September 23 reached outer London from the south, dropping bombs at irregular intervals. Its activities strikingly revealed the essential futility of this form of attack against the population of a great city. In one way the Germans were able to claim a certain amount of success. Some of the bombs fell on houses—small, two-storied suburban homes—and destroyed them. A certain number of the inmates of these houses and of people in the streets were killed or mutilated. One bomb fell in a front garden and killed or wounded people. The pecuniary total of the damage did not, it is true, amount to a fraction of the cost of the two Zeppelins destroyed. In another outlying East London district another Zeppelin dropped bombs in a poor quarter and killed or wounded some more folk, but the outrages affected London as a whole no more than a pin prick would affect a healthy man. Most Londoners knew nothing of what had happened until they read about it next morning in the newspapers. The main current of life in the metropolis was not so much affected as it would be by a stoppage of traffic at Ludgate Circus for half an hour. It became clear that to affect London as a whole, not one or two but a hundred raiders, allowed to work their will freely, would be necessary.

The individual sufferings of the few families concerned aroused natural pity. But in London, where a man often does not know

THE OBSERVATION CAR FOUND IN EAST ANGLIA.
Interior and Exterior.

the name of his next-door neighbour and would not recognize him by sight, there was no sense of common suffering such as accompanies a tragedy in a smaller district. A retired shopkeeper and his wife lived in a villa facing the main road. Aroused by the noise they came to the front door to find out what was the matter. A bomb dropped in the garden in front of the house, and killed both of them. A man was found standing dazed outside his house. He declared that a bomb bursting in the roadway had blown him

out of the front window. He helped to carry his daughter, a girl clerk, out of the house, and then the two were taken to hospital. Both died, the father from injury to the abdomen, and the daughter from shock and injury to the spine. A tobacconist's manager left his wife standing by the front door of the shop and went upstairs to see after the children. As he bent over their bed, the ceiling fell down on them. A bomb exploding near by had wrecked the house and started a fire. The father was unable to make a way downstairs, and so carried the children out of the front window and along some ledges to another shop. When he came back to where his wife had been he found her horribly mutilated—dead. The bomb had exploded right in front of her.

A woman, the wife of a variety performer, was caring for the four-year-old child of a friend, on the way home from South Africa. *Débris* from an explosion fell on them and crushed and suffocated both. A printer's reader, hearing the noise of the bombs, went to seek his two daughters. They found him lying in the roadway. "I don't feel very much hurt," he declared bravely. "You can take plenty of time." An hour later he was dead. An insurance clerk was decapitated and could only be identified by his clothing.

The age and callings of the victims can best be judged by the cases in the first day's inquests. The age of each is given in brackets :

French polisher (58).	Married woman.
Window cleaner (57).	K.R.R.C. private's wife.
G.P.O. sorter (55).	Barmaid (19).
Two men (31 and 45).	Carpenter's widow (63).
Insurance clerk (23).	Baker's widow (71).
Stevedore (43).	Sluiceman's wife.
Carman (20).	R.F.A. gunner's wife (20).
Carman (53).	Their daughter (13 months).
Casual ward attendant (41).	Engineer's son (4).

FUNERAL OF CAPTAIN SCHRAMM, COMMANDER OF THE CUFFLEY AIRSHIP.

There were tales in plenty of quiet heroism. A doctor went to one woman, injured about the head and face. "Don't bother about me," she murmured. "Attend to the others who are more seriously injured." A girl of 13 was sitting up waiting for her parents to come home. A bomb burst near by, blowing the whole side of the house in. The child, recovering her senses, remembered her baby brother upstairs. The stairs were broken and some of the steps knocked out. She climbed up them, picked the baby out of bed, and carried it into the dark street. Here for the moment her heart shook,

ROLLING UP WIRE FROM THE CUFFLEY AIRSHIP.

and kneeling down on the roadway she prayed for help. Then she took off her dress and wrapped it round her charge.

A special constable coming along told her to take shelter. "I knew I must take my baby brother to a hospital," she afterwards said, and she took him along. There it was found that she herself was wounded. The little maid sometime afterwards received the Carnegie Medal for bravery.

The official returns gave the casualties due to this raid as 140—30 killed and 110 injured. Of these, 28 were killed and 99 injured in the metropolitan area. Fourteen bombs were dropped on a Midland town, killing four persons and injuring seven. On the North-East Coast, Zeppelins attacked by land, while submarines attacked fishing boats by sea. The submarines were far more successful than the airships, for they sunk 12 Grimsby trawlers.

On the following Monday night there came another attack, now by seven Zeppelins. This time some industrial centres in the North were aimed at, and a number of small houses, the homes of working people, were destroyed. The airships approached various important centres but were driven off them by heavy gunfire. In one place a Zeppelin reached a congested working class quarter and dropped bombs on it. A chapel was wrecked, 40 small houses damaged, and a number of men, women and children killed. Thirty-six bodies were recovered from the ruins in two days. The flimsy houses afforded no protection, and under the force of the heavy explosives most of the victims were buried in the ruins. In one house alone, father, mother and five children were all killed. In another town in the North Midlands 12 bombs were dropped and 11 persons killed. The known losses from this raid were returned on the following day as 36 killed and 27 injured, but it was feared that there were still more to be accounted for under the ruins of some of the houses. It was reported from various quarters that not a factory or place of any military importance had been touched. On the same evening an airship visited the Southern Coast but was discovered by searchlights and quickly retreated before heavy gunfire. The Germans claimed on this occasion "to have bombarded lavishly, with explosive and incendiary bombs, with visibly good result, the British naval port of Portsmouth, the reinforced places at the mouth of the Thames, and industrial and railway installations of military importance in Central England, including York, Leeds, Lincoln and Derby."

The third of these attacks, in some ways

the most formidable series yet launched against England, was on the night of October 1, when 10 Zeppelins crossed the East Coast and made another attempt on London. The scene was in many ways a repetition of that a month before. The anti-aircraft guns around London were actively engaged. One Zeppelin was seen approaching shortly before midnight, and was bombarded. The searchlights caught it, lost it, and caught it again. The gunfire was clearly very effective. Suddenly it ceased and the searchlights were cut off. A sudden glow came in the sky, first a crescent of fire which grew with almost incredible rapidity to a round ball, and then to a great, long sheet of flame. To some gazing at it, it was as though the sword of the Angel of Wrath was stretched over London. Then the line of flame fell, faster and faster. As it descended it broke in two, and the main gondola separating from the hull fell still more rapidly by itself. As it reached earth with enormous momentum, at Potter's Bar, the crowds assembled at a thousand points started singing "God Save the King." The spectacular fall could be clearly seen from Tunbridge Wells on one side to the end of the Home Counties on the other. Millions witnessed it, and men realized that the worst menace of the Zeppelin was now over. They might come again, doing even greater harm. But at least we had weapons and men to fight them.

The credit on this occasion was mainly due to Second Lieutenant Tempest, of the Royal Flying Corps, one of four soldier brothers, 26 years old, and a son of the Chairman of the Pontefract (West Riding) Magistrates. Mr. Tempest was shortly afterwards decorated with the Distinguished Service Order.

As the burning airship fell to the ground, several of the crew flung themselves or were thrown from it. Their bodies were scattered over the ground, a sloping meadow, and presented a hideous sight. It was found on examination that the commander of the airship had been no less a man than Mathy, the best known of all the Zeppelin captains. In an interview given to an American journalist some little time before, Mathy declared that he had taken part in every raid on England. When asked about danger from aeroplane attacks, he ridiculed the notion of danger from solitary planes.

PART OF THE WRECKAGE OF A ZEPPELIN.

WRECKAGE OF THE BURNT ZEPPELIN BROUGHT DOWN IN ESSEX, SEPTEMBER 24, 1916.

"I am not afraid of them," he said then, "I think I could make it interesting for them, unless there was a regular swarm." It was to an aeroplane that he owed his end.

"Our revenge must be brutal!" the *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten* declared, when lamenting the loss of a Zeppelin. "It is not known how the disaster occurred, but one thing seems to be certain—that the English anti-aircraft service has become better and therefore more dangerous for our men." Critics in America began to talk of the Zeppelin as an exploded instrument of war. The British authorities, however, by no means adopted the view that the danger was over. With a long line of coast to defend, it was recognized that Zeppelins might on any favourable occasion make a way through undefended gaps, unless the greatest care and watchfulness were exercised. Therefore, defensive air preparations of every kind were still further pushed on.

There came a pause, lasting over some weeks. Then on the night of November 27 a number of airships approached the North-East Coast of England. On this occasion, London was carefully avoided. The North-East Coast was prepared for them. The German official statement admitted, "The defence was extraordinarily powerful." The night was unusually still. As one Zeppelin drew near, it was

2nd LIEUT. W. J. TEMPEST, D.S.O.

2nd LIEUT. F. SOWREY, D.S.O.

FLIGHT COMMANDER A. de B. BRANDON, M.C., D.S.O.

WRECKAGE OF BURNT ZEPPELIN BROUGHT DOWN AT POTTER'S BAR.

located by the searchlights, which could not be shaken off, however it dodged and twisted. There followed the now familiar spectacle. A ball of brilliant light appeared in the hull of the vessel. It quickly became a mass of flame, lighting up the country for 40 miles around. Then the nose of the airship dropped straight to earth and it began to fall, splitting into two parts before it plunged into the sea. The great armies of spectators sung the National Anthem, as their fellow-countrymen had done earlier around London.

A second airship travelled over the Midland counties dropping bombs. At six in the morning, when the first signs showed themselves across the sky of the coming of dawn, it drew near the Norfolk coast. Aeroplanes were still attempting to attack it, and it was firing on them. The Zeppelin moved slowly like a badly wounded bird making for home. It was clear that it had suffered much in the fight. The crew evidently effected some repairs, for as the airship approached the land defences it rose in the air to a height of 8,000 feet, and suddenly put on high speed. It seemed for the moment as though it must escape. Nine miles out at sea four machines of the Royal Naval



THE NOSE OF L 33.

Air Service attacked it, and an armed trawler opened gunfire. Soon a glowing spot appeared on its side, and spread fore and aft, and the ship, blazing from end to end, also fell into the sea. Three officers of the Royal Naval Air Service were decorated for their work during this raid. The Distinguished Service Order was bestowed upon Flight-Lieutenant Edward L. Pulling; and the Distinguished Service Cross on Flight-Lieutenant Egbert Cadbury,



THE FRAMEWORK OF L 33 IN A FIELD IN ESSEX.

THE WRECK OF L 33.
Showing the great length of the airship.

and Flight Sub-Lieutenant Gerard W. R. Fane.

The Zeppelins had inflicted little damage. Over a hundred bombs were dropped, but the effect was surprisingly small. In one town 15 houses were seriously injured. One woman died from shock, and five men, seven women and four children were injured.

The same morning, while England was rejoicing over the defeat of the Zeppelins, a fresh blow was struck at London. For over a year experts had anticipated that attempts would be made to attack London in daylight by aeroplane. On Tuesday, November 28, a German aeroplane, taking advantage of a slight haze, made for London, flying at a great height. It was unobserved until its bombs began to fall. Six bombs in all were sent down, and nine persons were injured. The raiders quickly turned back. That afternoon, at a quarter past two, the French at Dunkirk brought down the plane as it passed. It carried two naval lieutenants, and with them was a large scale map of London.

What did the incident signify? Was it the beginning of a new era in the air war against London, when the Zeppelin was to be abandoned and aeroplanes take its place, or was it merely the incidental activity of some adventurous German officers?



FLIGHT-COMMANDER BRANDON'S AEROPLANE.
Presented by the Gaekwar of Baroda.

LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

CHAPTER CLVIII.

THE ADVANCE TOWARDS BAGHDAD.

OPERATIONS IN WINTER OF 1914 RECALLED—LORD HARDINGE AT BASRA—MOVEMENTS IN JANUARY, 1915—ACTIONS AT AHWAZ AND SHAIBA—ATTITUDE OF THE ARABS—CONDITIONS OF CAMPAIGNING IN TURKISH ARABIA—SIR JOHN NIXON'S COMMAND—PROSPECTS OF AN ADVANCE—BATTLE OF BARJASIYA—THE KING'S MESSAGE—THE POSITION AT KURNA—PROBLEM FOR GOVERNMENT OF INDIA—THE DECISION TO ADVANCE—GENERAL NIXON'S DISPOSITIONS—GENERAL GORRINGE—GENERAL TOWNSHEND'S OPERATIONS—OCCUPATION OF NASRIEH—THE BATTLE OF KUT—GENERAL TOWNSHEND'S VICTORY—THE DECISION TO ADVANCE ON BAGHDAD—GENERAL TOWNSHEND'S VIEWS—MR. ASQUITH'S SPEECH—THE BRITISH REPULSE—BATTLE OF CTESIPHON—CAUSES OF FAILURE—WITHDRAWAL TO LAJJ—RETREAT TO KUT—KUT BESIEGED—THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY.

AN earlier chapter, entitled "The Invasion of Chaldea," * gave an account of the hostilities between the Turks and the British forces at the head of the Persian Gulf during the winter of 1914.

The chapter began with a description of this great inland sea, and showed how from the earliest ages its lonely waters and arid shores had borne an important part in the history of the Eastern World. The conditions under which the control of the Gulf fell into the hands of Great Britain three centuries ago were fully explained, and it was made clear that ever since that time British influence had been used for the extirpation of piracy and slavery, for the maintenance of order, and for the freedom of trade. The chapter went on to recount the steps taken by other nations with the object of undermining the British position—especially the efforts of the Turks to push forward along the western shores of the Gulf, and the attempts of the Germans during the last 20 years to obtain a footing in this part of the world. It was pointed out that the main object of Germany had been, not to get a share in the Gulf trade in pearls and wheat and dates, rich as that might become, but to establish herself on the Gulf as a political power. Supported by the Turks, and having at her back a German railway through Western Asia, with its terminus at the ancient port of Basra, she would then have gained a position from which she could manœuvre after her way against British supremacy in the East. Finally, it was shown that Great Britain had gained a new interest, and taken upon herself a new responsibility, by the acquisition of a valuable line of oil wells in Persian territory near the Turkish frontier, the oil being destined for the use of the British Navy.

The chapter closed with a brief review of the military operations. This narrative showed that, before Turkey had declared herself, the Government of India had sent a brigade, under Brigadier-General Delamain, to the island of Bahrein, in the Gulf; that immediately after the declaration of hostilities this small force had seized Fao, at the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab, and pushed on some miles farther up the river; that it had then been joined by two

* Vol. III. Chapter LII.

Elliott & Fry.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES V. F. TOWNSHEND, K.C.B., D.S.O.,
Who commanded the British Force beleaguered in Kut-el-Amara.

more brigades; that in the course of the next few weeks the combined force, now a division under the command of Major-General Sir Arthur Barrett, had after one or two sharp fights occupied (November 23, 1914) the port of Basra itself, and (December 9, 1914) the town of Kurna nearly 50 miles farther north, at the confluence of the Euphrates and Tigris; and that by the capture of these points the British troops had established themselves in a position not only to protect the oil wells, but to control completely the lower course of the combined rivers, thereby blocking the German railway scheme.

In February, 1915, the Viceroy of India, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, paid a visit to the headquarters of the force, which was under the control of the Indian Government, and inspected some neighbouring points. He had come, he told the people of Basra, to see local conditions for himself, in order the better to judge what measures were necessary. His conclusions were, of course, not made public; but all then seemed fairly satisfactory. The Turks had offered no very stubborn resistance, and though it was known that some Turkish forces, supported by Arab tribesmen, were still holding the country beyond our outposts, it was generally believed that at this distant extremity of the Turkish Empire the enemy would be unable to develop any great show of strength. The British force was supposed to be fully capable of holding its own and doing the work required of it, for no large scheme of territorial conquest had then been put forward. Moreover, the Arab tribes whose territory surrounded the positions held by our troops, and stretched for many hundred miles inland, were believed to be disaffected, if not hostile, towards the Turks, and some were on friendly terms with the invaders.

Even so, Lord Hardinge, who before the war had been rightly opposed to the despatch of a force to safeguard British interests in Southern Persia, must have left the Gulf with the feeling that the protection of the oil wells and the blocking of the German railway had already involved an expedition which must prove a sensible burden on the military resources of India, already heavily drawn upon for Europe and Africa. But this could no doubt be borne if no further advance was contemplated.

Unfortunately, as all history shows, it is not easy, when part of a foreign Asiatic country is invaded and occupied, to set limits to the forward movement of the invading force. It is generally found, whatever the intention may be, that as soon as the advance ceases reports of hostile gatherings begin to come in. The natural tendency is to regard these gatherings as a danger. It is felt that if they are allowed to make head unchecked the effect upon the surrounding country may become serious, and that, for the peace if not the security of the invading force, they must be broken up. When this has been done in one case there is soon news of another gathering farther on, and so the theatre of operations tends to expand, and with it the size and cost of the force employed. Such small advances are like the growth of a coral reef, and are apt to result in the building up of great dominions. It is largely in this way that the Russian and British empires in Asia have gone forward, a step at a time, until, separated originally by vast tracts of territory, they have at last become practically conterminous.

The probable result of the invasion from the



GENERAL SIR JOHN NIXON, K.C.B., A.D.C.,
General Commanding Indian Expeditionary Force until the beginning of the operations for the relief of Kut.

ONE OF THE DOUBLE-ENTRIED GATEWAYS OF ZOBEIR, NEAR BASRA.

Persian Gulf had been foreseen. An official of Indian experience, speaking in London earlier in 1914, made the following remarks regarding a possible expedition to Southern Persia :

> The occupation of Southern Persia by British troops might involve a very serious development of military strength, and put a considerable strain on our Indian army. Nothing could be worse than sending an insufficient force, as we did before, and a sufficient force will be a large force. Nor can we assume that the occupation would be temporary. All experience points the other way. Considering all the possible eventualities involved, I feel that our Government will do well to be very cautious in committing the country to such a move. The supply of British bayonets is limited.

What applied to a British expedition to Southern Persia applied with greater force to an expedition which was to include in its scope a landing on the coast of Turkish Arabia. Events soon showed that the forecast had been correct.

Already, in the latter part of January, 1915, it had been thought necessary to push out a force from Kurna in order to break up a hostile gathering to the northward, and there had been some fighting. One officer, Major M. H. Anderson, of the 33rd Cavalry, was afterwards brought to notice for having on this occasion "led a successful charge against the enemy with conspicuous gallantry and resolution. He had two horses shot under him." Another, Captain H. E. Scott, of the Indian Medical Service, "displayed great devotion and courage in attending wounded in the open, in face of rifle fire at comparatively close quarters." In the end the enemy were pressed back, but the gathering was not really broken up. It was known that a considerable number of Turks and Arabs remained in this direction, and at a point from which they could threaten alike the British position to the south and the line of oil wells to the eastward across the Persian frontier. This incident had occurred actually before the Viceroy's visit, so that the whole state of affairs must have been well known to the Indian Government.

Little more than a month later it became clear that the enemy meant mischief. A British brigade had been sent up not long before to garrison the town of Ahwaz, in Persian territory, close to the main point of the oil wells. Receiving news of a gathering to the westward, the commander of the garrison sent out a reconnaissance in force to ascertain its numbers and disposition. The enemy was found to be 12,000 strong, including two or three regiments of regular Turkish infantry and a contingent of Arabs ; and though the British force consisted of troops of all arms it found some difficulty in effecting its retirement, the enemy making repeated efforts to cut it off. Five British officers were killed, and the losses of the Indian troops were considerable—nearly 200 in all. The nature of the fight may be gathered from a dispatch afterwards sent in by Sir Arthur Barrett, bringing to notice the services of several officers. Cap-

tain W. M. Hunt, of the 23rd Mountain Battery, had "displayed conspicuous coolness and bravery in repeatedly checking the enemy with his own rifle, although severely wounded, and thus enabling his section of the 23rd Mountain Battery to withdraw at a most critical stage of the fight." Second Lieutenant H. J. Baillie, 2nd Battalion Dorset Regiment, had "displayed conspicuous courage. With a handful of men he gallantly checked the advance of overwhelming numbers of the enemy, and was thus instrumental in saving many of our wounded from falling into their hands." Captain A. R. Thomson, 7th Rajputs, had at a critical moment "displayed great initiative in collecting as many men as he could and holding a position to cover the retirement. He next gallantly led a bayonet charge against a party of the enemy who were blocking the road to camp, and succeeded in clearing them out." Lieutenant R. H. Sheepshanks, 12th Cavalry, had been conspicuous for his gallantry and skilful handling of a small body of cavalry. "Reforming his troop he repeatedly charged the foremost lines of the enemy and inflicted heavy loss on them."

The total losses of the enemy were afterwards estimated at 600 killed and very many wounded. However this may be, it was evidently a sharp action, in which the enemy showed considerable fighting power.

On the day that this encounter was taking place to the extreme east of the line of positions held by the expeditionary force another encounter took place at the opposite end of the line, 100 miles away to the west, beyond Basra. There, on reports of a gathering at Nakhaila, 25 miles or so up the Euphrates, a cavalry reconnaissance was sent out to ascertain conditions. As the British force withdrew it was followed up by a body of 1,500 horsemen. These were skilfully drawn on to a concealed position occupied by infantry and guns. They suffered heavily and fled back to Nakhaila, but not until they had inflicted some loss on our people. Four British and two Indian officers were killed, and the enemy reached Shaiba, a point only five or six miles from Basra itself, for, in Sir Arthur Barrett's despatch before quoted, two officers were brought to notice for good service at this place. These were Lieut.-Col. C. S. Stack, 33rd Cavalry, who was "severely wounded while displaying great personal gallantry and handling his regiment in a most skilful manner," and Captain H. C. West, S Battery, R.H.A., who "at a critical moment of the operations, when the teams of a gun and a wagon were down,

THE AGRER CREEK AT BASRA.

WITHIN THE WALLS OF THE CITY OF ZOBEIR, NEAR BASRA. ON THE TIGRIS.

displayed conspicuous coolness and courage in keeping the enemy at bay with his revolver, whilst he enabled his helpless drivers to escape on foot."

These two small fights at the two ends of the British front have been noticed in some detail because they had a considerable significance. In themselves they were not important. A reconnaissance, as its name implies, is an operation where the main object is to reconnoitre, not to beat the enemy, and the force sent out is intended to return to the point from which it started. But when the enemy receives a reconnoitring force with such active opposition, and follows it up so shrewdly, it becomes evident that he is in strength and in a fighting temper. There is not much prospect under such conditions of a foreign invader being left unmolested in possession of the ground he has occupied. Therefore, even in the month of March, 1915, the Turks and Arabs confronting our expeditionary force had given proof that it was likely to have more work in front of it before it could hope to settle down in peace.

And here it may be desirable to touch upon some of the circumstances in which, if further trouble occurred, the British troops would have to fight.

It has been said that the surrounding country was held by Arab tribes, that they were believed to be disaffected towards the Turks, and that the Turks themselves were thought to be unlikely to develop great strength. But it had now become known that the Turkish regular troops were in some numbers, and that they had, in fact, been joined by large bodies of Arabs. The Arab perhaps was not a very formidable enemy at close quarters. Brave enough in occasional instances, he was, as a rule, a marauder rather than a soldier. But, for all that, in his own country he was not an enemy to be despised. Light and well mounted, and often well armed, he could, on his sandy plains, ride all round our heavily-weighted cavalry, and he could harass a British force by day and night with continual "sniping." A blow at him was a blow spent in the air, for his swarms scattered as soon as they were attacked, and disappeared in the distance, perhaps vanishing into the magic trees and lakes of his desert mirage. And though there was no love lost between him and the Turk, who had usurped his heritage and occupied the capital of his Khalifs; though many of his tribes had even, in long past days, held the faith of the Christian invader; yet, after all, the Arab was now a Mussulman, and in his own eyes the very aristocracy of Islam. Had not the Prophet himself been an Arab of the Arabs? Therefore, when his country was invaded by the Infidel, it was only natural that the Arab should, as a rule, side with the Mussulman Turk. And his swift bands of horsemen formed the most valuable support which the Turkish troops could have. In their hour of defeat the Arab might, and did, turn upon them, robbing and murdering their wounded; but so long as they seemed to be in superior strength he rendered them efficient service, bringing them information and covering their columns. At times he even fought gallantly by their side, helping to fill their trenches and pouring his rifle fire into the advancing line of bayonets.

Moreover, the country did not all consist of arid plains. At certain seasons of the year the Tigris and Euphrates came down from the north in flood, and all about their lower course they spread over the flat land, forming vast marshes, never wholly dry, where the Arab alone was at home. There his villages were miniature islands, rising only a few feet from the waste of shallow waters, or even clusters of light huts borne on floating rafts of reeds. In such a country the half-naked marsh Arabs, with their swarms of narrow canoes drawing a few inches of water, were almost as mobile and elusive as the horsemen of the desert, who scorned them as web-footed savages. And in March, when the British fought their two actions at Ahwaz and Shaiba, the floods were already out. For some months to come they would remain and increase. So long as our troops confined themselves to the positions they then held, on the deep channels of the Shatt-al-Arab and its Persian tributary, the Karun, where the vessels of the Royal Navy and Indian Marine, and the merchant steamers, could support and supply them, and there was dry ground on the banks, they were under comparatively favourable conditions; but directly they attempted to move forward they were sure to find themselves at a disadvantage, with difficulties of transport and supply increased tenfold, and little solid ground to fight on.

Meanwhile the British public, ignorant of all these conditions, and wholly absorbed in the progress of the desperate fighting in Europe, could spare little thought for the brave men, English and Indian, who were serving in this distant field. The War Office, looking upon

the expedition as one of the Indian campaigns which it had been accustomed to treat with scant attention, gave no news of their doings. No wonder that the British portion of them, at all events, felt at times that they were forgotten by their countrymen. They were apparently not even regarded as sharing in the Great War, and an officer wrote with pardonable indignation from Kurna: "You said you were glad I was not going to the 'front.' I think the 'front' we are getting out here is quite enough for most people." And he went on to describe a typical attack upon the Turks in their entrenchments, with guns in position, such as the force had already had to make more than once. "Not a scrap of cover of any kind, absolutely flat and unbroken, no cover for the guns or infantry advancing, no cover for hospital or wounded as we advanced—nothing; simply a wide, flat, sandy plain. . . . The Arabs smite (snipe ?) us every night. . . . Give the troops out here their due, because they are 'empire building' in a country where no white troops have ever been before . . . digging and fighting all day and outpost all night."

He might have said much more; might have given some description of the terrible heat at times, when the thermometer rose to 120 deg. in the hospital tents, and at night the weary men suffered from the unceasing attacks of mosquitos and biting flies, which gave them little rest. In truth campaigning in Turkish Arabia was hard and somewhat thankless work.

In April, 1915, Sir Arthur Barrett handed over the command of the expeditionary force to General Sir John Nixon, and took leave owing to ill-health. This date marked the beginning of a new period in the history of the expedition. Until then, after the landing and the subsequent occupation of Basra, Kurna, and Ahwaz, the British Force had remained, as far as possible, inactive. They had done some fighting; but the two reconnaissances of March had been only reconnaissances, and there had been no advance. From the time when Sir John Nixon took command one advance followed another, until before the end of the year our troops had fought a battle near Baghdad, more than

THE COMMANDER OF THE 18TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Major-General C. T. Fry (x) and the Staff of the 18th Brigade, which captured Kurna and the Turkish garrison, including the Vali of Basra.

500 miles by river from the shores of the Persian Gulf. It remains to tell the story of this memorable campaign.

Sir John Nixon was a cavalry officer of distinction, who had served many years, and had both in India and South Africa made a name for himself as a brave and capable soldier. He had some hereditary connexion with the country in which he was now serving, for his father, also an officer of Indian Cavalry, had been British Resident and Consul-General in Turkish Arabia, with headquarters at Baghdad. The new general, therefore, may be supposed to have entered upon his command with exceptional interest, perhaps with some exceptional knowledge.

It has been said that up to this time no further advance from the tract of country occupied by the British Force appeared to have been under contemplation. Yet it is to be observed that during the winter or early spring the Expeditionary Force seems to have been augmented by some 14,000 men. If there was indeed no intention to push forward, the increase is not altogether easy to explain, unless the Viceroy's visit to the Persian Gulf had convinced him that the original force was too small for the comparatively modest rôle of securely holding the country already occupied. However this may be, there was now a much larger number of troops in the country, and it had been found possible to collect at Shaiba, west of Basra, where the action of March 3 had been fought, a force consisting of two infantry brigades and one brigade of cavalry, with two batteries of field artillery and a mountain battery. One of the infantry brigades was commanded by Brigadier-General Delamain, the other by Major-General C. I. Fry. The cavalry commander was Brigadier-General H. Kennedy. The whole force was under the command of the senior officer, General Fry. It included two battalions of British infantry—the 2nd Dorsets and the 2nd Norfolks.

On April 11, only two days after General Nixon had taken over charge from Sir Arthur Barrett, General Fry reported that hostile cavalry and infantry had occupied points within a few miles of Shaiba; that he considered them to be the advanced guard of the enemy's main forces, and that a serious engagement was probable within a day or two. This forecast proved to be exact, for on the morning of April 12 an enemy force estimated

[Barnett.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES J. MELLISS, V.C., K.C.B.,

Commanded the 30th Infantry Brigade.

at 12,000 Turkish regulars and 10,000 Arabs attacked the British position with much dash and persistence. They were repulsed, but they had worked round the position from north, west, and south; and during the night they continued to molest our force by sniping and desultory attacks. These were not pressed home, though the enemy tried to cut our wire entanglements and showed at times a threatening front.

Meanwhile, late on the evening of April 12, Major-General Sir Charles J. Melliss, V.C., C.B., arrived at Shaiba from Basra, with a small reinforcement of the 24th Punjabis, and, being senior to Major-General Fry, took command of the Shaiba garrison. Such was the state of the country that General Melliss and his detachment had to come in native boats or "bellums," which were punted across eight miles of water.

On April 13 General Melliss cleared the neighbourhood of the camp, after some fighting, in the course of which the British captured 400 of the enemy and inflicted considerable losses. The night passed quietly; but next morning it was found that the Turks had taken up a strong position some three miles in length at Barjasiya, to the south of Shaiba, and had there entrenched themselves. This position General

GENERAL MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE MESOPOTAMIA OPERATIONS.

Melliss proceeded to attack. After a long and somewhat severe day's fighting, during which the British troops were much hampered by mirage, which concealed the enemy's trenches, these were stormed and the Turks broke and fled. The British loss was not small. Lieut.-Colonel H. L. Rosher, commanding the Dorsets, was killed, Lieut.-Colonel E. S. Cleeve, commanding the Artillery, was severely wounded, and the casualties altogether amounted to 700. But the losses of the enemy were much heavier, probably four or five thousand, and there is no doubt that he was thoroughly beaten. During his retreat the Arabs turned upon the fugitive Turks and did them much evil. When the wholly inactive at other points of the British front. Both at Kurna, in the centre of the long line, and at Ahwaz, on the right, they had made some threatening demonstrations. But at these points there was no serious fighting, the enemy confining himself to threats and artillery fire. The first month of General Nixon's command, therefore, closed quietly, and it may be said that, so far, his action had been limited to a vigorous offensive defence against the attacks of the enemy. The real advance had not begun. Possibly it had not been contemplated.

That this was the view taken in England may perhaps be gathered from the King's message to Sir John Nixon, though the closing words

BRITISH TROOPS GOING ON PICKET DUTY.

retreat was over, many miles to the rear, the enemy commander, it is said, assembled his officers and, after denouncing the treachery of the Arabs, shot himself.

While the land fight was going on, a flotilla of armed launches, small steamers, and gun barges, which had been organized for service on the rivers and flooded land about Basra, was able to do good service by pushing up to and beyond Nakhaila in the enemy's rear. Lieut.-Colonel R. P. Molesworth, R.G.A., who commanded the flotilla, received valuable assistance in this operation from Lieutenant A. G. Seymour, R.N., of H.M.S. Espiègle, and other officers and men of the Navy. Supplies were intercepted, native boats captured, and the enemy's retreat severely harassed.

During these successful and creditable operations by land and water the Turks had not been

might bear another meaning. The message ran as follows:

"I wish to express my admiration for the gallant manner in which the naval and military forces cooperating under your command have so successfully overcome the repeated attacks of an enemy superior in numbers. Please convey to all ranks my appreciation of the spirit and endurance they have shown during the past month. At home we all watch with pride and interest the work and progress of your column."

If the officers and men of the expedition were inclined to think that their doings had been overlooked by the War Office and the British public, this warm and timely message must have gone far to remove the feeling.

But real advances were now to begin, and it seems desirable at this point to examine the position in which Sir John Nixon found himself

ABANDONED TRENCHES ALONG THE TIGRIS.

before his troops received the order to go forward.

As the British force under his command, now consisting apparently of two divisions, confronted an enemy based on Baghdad, and the Turkish provinces beyond Baghdad, it was facing north-west. Its own base was the sea, lying to the south-east, from which supplies and reinforcements could reach it by the deep-water channel of the Shatt-al-Arab, running up to and beyond its headquarters at Basra. The left of the force consisted of the garrison holding Shaiba and perhaps Nakhaila. In front of the centre was an advanced detachment at Kurna. On the right was a brigade at Ahwaz in Persia. The position may be compared to an irregular fan, of which the handle was the Shatt-al-Arab, and the points of the open spokes, going from east to west, were Ahwaz on the Karun, Kurna on the Tigris, and Nakhaila on the Euphrates. The enemy had a force at Nasrieh on the Euphrates, facing the British left, but at a distance of 70 or 80 miles. The size of this force was not known, but it was believed to consist mainly of the troops beaten at Shaiba, and to be incapable of much mischief. Facing the British centre at Kurna, and close by, was another Turkish force, consisting of six battalions and ten guns, with a gathering of Arab tribesmen. Facing the brigade at Ahwaz, on the British right, was a third Turkish force—eight battalions and eight guns, with 10,000 Arabs. This was in Persian territory, and not far from Ahwaz. Along almost the whole front, from Nasrieh on the west to beyond the Persian frontier on the east, the spring floods, said to have been the highest known for 30 years, formed, to use General Nixon's words, "an inland sea of water and reeds varying from two to six feet deep," and having a breadth of something like a hundred miles. If the British force was to operate to its front before the floods began to subside about the end of July it would have to operate over this area, making use as far as possible of the comparatively practicable channels of the Euphrates and Tigris. And these channels were by no means a satisfactory highway. They admitted of the advance of vessels of considerable draught for a few miles above their junction; but, beyond that, only country boats or very small steamers were of any use. The banks

of the rivers were here and there lined by belts of dry or comparatively dry land, but these belts were intersected at right angles by numberless irrigation channels, and were not easy for an advancing force. In their upper waters, moreover, the rivers, especially the Tigris, made their way by very tortuous courses through the flat plains and offered many opportunities for effective resistance. How flat the plains were may be judged from the fact that Baghdad, 560 miles by water from the mouth of the Tigris, lay at a height of only 120 feet above the sea. It was easy to understand the formation, in such a country, of the vast marshes, with their swarms of buffalo and wild pig, and "web-footed" Arabs.

Having regard to these facts, the Government of India, which controlled the expedition, must, it would seem, have considered with care the question whether it was necessary or desirable for General Nixon to make any further advance at all The question was not one for the commander on the spot to decide. If, as was generally believed, the objects of the Government of India had in fact been attained, by the securing of the oil wells and the blocking of the German railway, then, *primâ facie*, there was nothing to be gained by undertaking fresh operations which were sure to involve further losses and further expenditure. It would doubtless be annoying for our troops to sit still while the enemy lay confronting them, but this was not sufficient reason in itself for sanctioning a forward move. Except on one condition, that the neglect of these enemy forces was held by the general in command to threaten the security of his troops and of the military position, an advance seemed undesirable. Forward operations without a definite objective can rarely be justified. Of course, if the security of the British force was endangered by leaving the enemy unmolested, the Indian Government could but sanction any action necessary to avert the danger; indeed, it was the duty of the general in command to take such action on his own responsibility. Otherwise the Government of India, warned by many examples in past times, must have asked itself whether the annoyance ought not to be borne, our troops perhaps striking at times a swift blow at any enemy column which came within their reach; but, that done, returning to their position. No doubt if there was a clearly-defined objective—if, for example, it was held by His Majesty's Government that an advance, say, to Baghdad, would sensibly affect the course of the Great War, then the case was different. But, so far as is known, no scheme of that kind had then been proposed,



A RIVER GUN-BOAT AND MOTOR-LAUNCH ON THE TIGRIS.

ARABS SCOUTING ON THE BANKS OF THE TIGRIS.

and though the British force had been augmented, the increase seemed hardly on a scale to suggest that any operation of such magnitude was in view. That being the case, it is not easy to see what could be the aim of the Government of India in ordering or sanctioning an advance. And, whatever the aim, would not any attempt to close with our elusive enemy be merely following a will-of-the-wisp across those wide and treacherous marshes?

However this may be, the decision was to advance, or, in General Nixon's words, "to take active measures against the enemy detachments on the Karun and on the Tigris." The die was cast. Whether the Government of India intended it or not, Great Britain was committed to an invasion of Mesopotamia—committed to a great military operation the scope and end of which no one could foretell.

It is difficult to overrate the importance of the decision which was now to be carried into effect, or the manifold interest of the country which lay before the British invaders. The immense plain between and about the Tigris and Euphrates is teeming still with ruined cities and monuments, aqueducts and irrigation works, the remains of past empires. Its wealth had in recent centuries been destroyed by the Turk, who had misruled it, setting tribe against tribe, and making a desolate waste of what should be one of the most fertile and populous countries of the earth. It was the cradle of civilization and the arts, perhaps the cradle of the human race. In thinking of it, one calls up of necessity innumerable scenes and names of bygone days, some historical, if anything in the East is historical, many dim with the mists of countless ages. Haroun al-Raschid in his golden prime, Xenophon's Ten Thousand setting out upon their march, Roman emperors and their legions, Nebuchadnezzar and his golden image, the Writing on the Wall, the splendid capitals of the Greek and Persian monarchs, far to the north "Nineveh, that great city," angry Jonah and his gourd, Abraham and Lot marching out with their flocks and herds from Ur of the Chaldees, the Tower of Babel, even—if the Arab legend be true—the Garden of Eden in the fork of the two great rivers, and the Cherubim with their flaming swords. Into that wonderful plain, so full of all that can appeal to the imagination of man, a British army of the twentieth century was now to march, with its machine-guns and telegraphs, motor-cars and

aeroplanes. Where Babylon and Nineveh had fought for the mastery of the East, Turk and Arab were now to contend in battle against the soldiery of England and India.

General Nixon decided to deal first with the gathering in Persian territory on the extreme right of his long line. A division was concentrated at Ahwaz, and placed under the command of Major-General Gorringe, who was instructed to drive the enemy back across the frontier into Turkish territory. General Gorringe carried out with skill and success the work entrusted to him. The Turks on his front had already begun to fall back on hearing of the defeat near Shaiba, and as he moved out westward from Ahwaz they retreated across the border, making for Amára on the Tigris, where another Turkish force had been assembled. The operations of the British division extended over a period of seven weeks, and included not only the pushing back of the Turks to Amára, but the punishment and subjugation of certain Arab tribes which had joined them The work was arduous, for the heat was already severe, and the troops had to begin by effecting the passage of the Kharkeh, a river 250 yards broad, with a deep and rapid stream. The attack on the main Arab stronghold was carried out when the temperature in tents stood at 120 deg. "Among other intrepid deeds," General Nixon afterwards wrote, "was the exploit of Subadar-Major Ajab Khan and 20 men of the 26th Punjabis, who swam the river under heavy fire and brought back a boat, in which troops were ferried across." The place was then captured. The general result of the short campaign was to clear the enemy out of the Arab districts of Persia and to enforce the submission of the tribes, thus allowing the pipe line of the oil company to be repaired, and normal conditions to be resumed at the oil-fields. The line had been damaged and set on fire by the tribesmen. General Gorringe's movements also materially assisted the advance of another

MAJOR-GEN. SIR GEORGE F. GORRINGE, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Who directed many operations in the Mesopotamian campaign.

MAJOR-GEN. SIR CHARLES V. F. TOWNSHEND, K.C.B., D S.O.
From a photograph taken at an observation post in Mesopotamia.

GENERAL SIR JOHN NIXON (centre second row) AND THE OFFICERS OF HIS HEADQUARTERS STAFF.

British force, which was made about the same time.

This advance up the Tigris from Kurna was, in fact, the main operation of the summer campaign. It was one of exceptional difficulty, for it had to be carried on across the flooded tract already described. "Owing to the limited amount of the river transport available at that time, the movement and collection of troops was a slow and difficult process, and the flooded country round Kurna presented many problems, which required careful consideration before operations could be commenced.

"Bellums, long narrow boats of the country, were collected and armoured with iron plates, to be used for carrying infantry to the assault of the enemy's positions; troops were trained in punting and boat work; various types of guns were mounted on rafts, barges, tugs, and paddlers; floating hospitals had to be improvised; and many other details of construction and equipment had to be thought out and provided for." *

By the end of May, 1915, all these preparations were complete, and a division numbering, perhaps, 14,000 men, under the command of Major-General Sir Charles V. F. Townshend, C.B., D.S.O, was ready to advance.

General Townshend, like General Nixon, was a cavalry officer, but had chiefly distinguished himself during the memorable siege of Chitral, where he commanded the little garrison. He had made many campaigns, from the Gordon Relief Expedition to the South African War, and had also served as Military Attaché in Paris. He had the reputation of being an ambitious soldier, and one who devoted every available hour to the scientific study of his profession. An officer who had known him for many years wrote of him: "He was always hard working, cheerful, and amusing . . . he has worked as few men have in the army, and *he knows his job* from A to Z." He was popular with the troops, and seemed in all ways well fitted for a difficult command.

The Turkish force was entrenched a few miles to the north of Kurna, on two groups of islands, one group three miles in rear of the other, standing out from the surface of the flood. The position was one of some strength, and, as General Nixon wrote, necessitated "a carefully organized attack in successive phases by combined naval and military operations."

[Swaine.

CAPTAIN WILFRED NUNN, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Commanded H.M.S. Comet.

On the early morning of May 31 the attack began by a heavy bombardment from Kurna and the floating batteries; and then the infantry advanced to the assault in a flotilla of "bellums," supported by the fire of the guns. A brigade under Lieut.-Colonel Clime, 24th Punjabis, made a frontal attack, while the 22nd Punjabis and the Sirmur Sappers and Miners seized a point on the enemy's left, and enfiladed their line. "Norfolk Hill," the first objective of the frontal attack, was carried at the point of the bayonet by the 1st Battalion Oxford and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, "after poling their boats for over a mile through thick reeds, and landing waist deep in water." Behind the assaulting infantry came the naval sloops and armed tugs, preceded by a line of mine sweepers; and their fire, combined with that of the Royal Artillery, ashore and afloat, was more than the enemy could bear. By noon the first group of islands was in British hands. The second group, which formed the main position, was not occupied that day; but on the morning of June 1 an aeroplane reconnaissance discovered that the Turks had evacuated it, and were in full retreat up the Tigris. The naval flotilla, led by H.M.S. Espiègle (Captain Nunn, R.N.), went on in

* General Nixon's dispatch of January 1, 1916.

A CAPTURED TURKISH GUN AT NASRIEH,
Occupied by the British on July 25, 1915.

pursuit, followed by the shipping and troops. Next day the water was found to be too shallow for further pursuit by the larger vessels, but the Naval armed tugs were still able to move, and on June 3 General Townshend in H.M.S. Comet, a vessel of light draught, with three of the tugs, pushed on to the town of Amára, 87 miles above Kurna, and nearly 200 miles from the sea. It was a daring thing to do, for a Turkish force was still in the town, but happily the Turks laid down their arms and 700 men became prisoners. On the following morning the infantry of the British force began to arrive, led by the 2nd Battalion Norfolk Regiment, and the town was securely occupied. They were more than welcomed, for the population of the town were beginning to recover from their surprise, and trouble might have occurred.

In the course of this well-planned and well-executed operation the British force took 17 guns and nearly 1,800 prisoners, also capturing or sinking several steamers, among which was a Turkish gunboat. Owing to the superior power and skilful handling of its artillery, the British loss was small. Not long afterwards the advanced guard of the Turkish force driven westward from the direction of Ahwaz by General Gorringe, was surprised and dispersed by General Townshend, with the loss of some prisoners and two guns. Among the prisoners taken at Amára, over 2,000 in all, were three Germans. These were the remainder of a party of six, the others having been killed by the marsh Arabs. The Germans, it is said, freely cursed the Turks, who as freely cursed them in return.

Having thus disposed for the time of the enemy troops confronting him on the east and north, General Nixon proceeded to complete the advance by striking at the force which held Nasrieh on the west, close to the Biblical Ur of the Chaldees. This operation was entrusted to Major-General Gorringe, who had done so well on the eastern front. It was, like the advance to the northward, an amphibious operation, to use General Nixon's term; and with the help of naval officers and men under the command of Captain Nunn, it was equally successful. General Gorringe's force was concentrated at Kurna during the month of June, and on the 27th he pushed out across the flooded lands to the westward. Before the middle of July the flotilla and troops had overcome all obstacles, and forced their way up the Euphrates to the neighbourhood of Nasrieh. They had some hard fighting, with much trouble from mines Thornycroft launches

AN ANGLO-INDIAN VICTORY AT NASRIEH.
British sailors on a captured native vessel.

carrying "pompoms," deep creeks, and stretches of mud, over which the boats had to be dragged by men. The heat was great, especially in the iron vessels, for the thermometer rarely stood below 115° in the shade, and the glare from the water was almost intolerable.

Some five miles short of Nasrieh General Gorringe found the Turks entrenched in a formidable position, or series of positions, on both sides of the river, with their flanks resting on marshes, and their front covered by deep irrigation channels. They were said to have with them several German officers and gunners. After one unsuccessful attempt at turning the enemy's right flank, the British troops remained for some days facing the position and making preparations for a decisive attack. On July 24 it was delivered, and in spite of a stubborn resistance line after line of entrenchment was carried by storm, a battalion of the West Kents greatly distinguishing itself. But not only the West Kents, for British and Indian soldiers vied with one another in the ardour of their assaults, while the Navy cooperated with close-range fire from small gunboats and other vessels. The Turks lost heavily, 500 dead being left in the trenches. Seventeen guns and 1,000 prisoners were captured. The British loss was under 600. On July 25 Nasrieh was occupied without further fighting.

The importance of this victory was considerable, as Nasrieh was, to use General Nixon's words, "the dominant place on this flank." It was, he said, the base from which a hostile force threatening Basra must start; it was the centre from which influence could be exercised among the powerful Arab tribes on the Euphrates; and it was the headquarters of the civil administration of a large part of the Basra Province. Moreover, it stood at the southern end of the Shatt-el-Hai, a channel joining the Tigris and Euphrates, and open during half the year for traffic between the two rivers. By this channel the force which attacked Shaiba in April had come down. During certain months, when there was a good flow of water from the Tigris, the Shatt-el-Hai was in fact the usual line of communication from north to south. It is said to have been at one time the main channel of the Tigris.*

General Nixon had now pushed forward his line along both Tigris and Euphrates to a distance of 100 miles or so from his former advanced post at Kurna. His foremost troops

* The large coloured map which forms the frontispiece of Volume VIII. should be consulted regarding this and other geographical points.



INDIAN TROOPS CAPTURE AN ARAB STRONGHOLD.

Destroying the treacherous Beni Turuf Arabs' stronghold after two days' bombardment, during which a Subadar-Major and his party swam the Kharaké river, and, seizing the only undamaged enemy's boat, brought it across stream. The Indian troops were then ferried across.

on each of these rivers were nearly 200 miles from the sea. The outermost points of the great fan were now Ahwaz, Amára and Nasrieh. It might have been supposed that the stretch of country below these points was already large enough for two divisions to hold with comfort, and certainly large enough to cover securely the future terminus of the German railway and the line of oil wells.

But this was not General Nixon's view. While he was dealing with the Euphrates flank he heard that strong Turkish forces

THE DORSETS AT THE BATTLE OF KUT-EL-AMARA, SEPTEMBER 28, 1915.
The 1st Battalion, Dorsetshire Regiment, 117th Mahrattas, and 22nd Company Sappers and Miners captured a redoubt and trenches on the enemy's extreme left, inflicted heavy losses and took 135 prisoners.

under the command of Nur-ed-Din, "the Light of the Faith," had concentrated at the town of Kut-el-Amara on the Tigris, about 140 miles by river above Amára, towards which they had pushed out some detachments. It was at once decided that the defeat of Nur-ed-Din and the occupation of Kut-el-Amara were necessary, and the day after Nasrieh was secured General Nixon began transferring troops from General Gorringe's command on the left of the fan to General Townshend's in the centre. The reason given for this further advance was that

THE BATTLE OF KUT.

Kut-el-Amara lay at the northern end of the Shatt-el-Hai, and that it was therefore, like Nasrieh at the southern end, a strategic point. With both places in British hands effective control of the northern part of the Basra district would be secured. It is said that General Nixon wanted nothing more than Kut-el-Amara, but that this much he considered necessary. The Government of India apparently acquiesced in his view, for with the telegraph between them General Nixon would hardly have decided upon so large an operation without sanction. Indeed, he would hardly have undertaken the three advances which led up to it.

It may be pointed out here, incidentally, that the original objects of the expedition—the protection of the oil wells and the blocking of the German railway—were both Imperial rather than Indian objects, though the latter object deeply affected India. In these circumstances it seems that the British Government also might naturally have had something to say to the whole course of the expedition from beginning to end.

On August 1 the further advance began, a detachment from General Townshend's force, with a Naval flotilla, pushing up the river and occupying Ali-el-Gharbi, a point about halfway between Amára and Kut-el-Amara, which place, to avoid confusion, will for the future be written Kut. At this point the whole division was gradually concentrated, until on September 12 it was ready to go on. There had been some difficulty and delay in bringing up the troops sent from Nasrieh. Beyond Amára the banks of the Tigris were dry enough to admit of an advance by land, while the shallowness and winding course of the river were unfavourable to the use of the water route, except for the flotilla and supply vessels. The force accordingly marched up the bank, the flotilla following. The march was trying, for even now the thermometer stood at 110° or more in the shade; but there was practically no opposition, and on September 15 General Townshend reached a point 15 miles from Kut. Here he halted, for news had come that the Turks were occupying an entrenched position eight miles further on, and intended to make a stand. The next ten days were spent in careful reconnaissances, in which the work of the Flying Corps was of the greatest value. When complete knowledge of the enemy's



GENERAL TOWNSHEND AND HIS STAFF.

THE BRITISH HEADQUARTERS, KUT-EL-AMARA.

dispositions had been gained, and some reinforcements had come up from Kurna, the attack was delivered.

The position held by the Turks was exceedingly strong. Their force consisted of 8,000 regular infantry and a large contingent of Arabs, horse and foot, which made their total numbers larger than those of their assailants, some said twice as large. To quote General Nixon's account, the Turks "occupied a line naturally favourable for defence, which during three or four months of preparation had been converted into a formidable position.

"On the right bank the defences extended for five miles southwards along some mounds which commanded an extensive field of fire. The river was blocked by a boom composed of barges and wire cables commanded at close range by guns and fire trenches. On the left bank the entrenchments extended for seven miles, linking up the gaps between the river and three marshes which stretched away to the north. The defences were well designed and concealed, commanding flat and open approaches. They were elaborately constructed with a thoroughness that missed no detail. In front of the trenches were barbed-wire entanglements, military pits, and land mines. Behind were miles of communication trenches connecting the various works and providing covered outlets to the river, where ramps and landing stages had been made to facilitate the transfer of troops to or from ships, while pumping engines and water channels carried water from the river to the trenches.

"Nur-ed-Din s army held this position: one division being on each bank, with some army troops in reserve on the left bank, near a bridge above the main position. A force of Arab horsemen was posted on the Turkish left flank; most of the Turkish regular cavalry were absent during the battle on a raid against our communications."

On September 26 General Townshend advanced to within four miles of the Turks, and there completed his plans. His idea was to deceive them by feints against their right, south of the Tigris, and then to envelop their left with the main body of his troops, and if possible destroy the whole. This idea, a very bold one



INDIAN CAVALRY IN THE DESERT.

INDIAN CAVALRY ADVANCING TOWARDS KUT.

considering the length of the position and the consequent separation of force involved, he proceeded to carry out with striking success.

On the morning of the 27th the British force advanced along both banks of the river, the main part of it by the right or southern bank. On this side a feint attack was made upon the Turkish trenches, but was not pressed home further than was necessary to attract the attention of the Turks and bring about a concentration of their troops upon the southern end of their line. Meanwhile the British force on the left, or northern, bank pushed forward to within 3,000 yards of the enemy, and there entrenched itself. While these movements were being carried out a bridge was thrown across the river by Captain W. S. Oldham, R.E., and carefully "strewn with gorse and mud to deaden the sound." When darkness fell the main body of the British force was brought over by this bridge from the southern to the northern bank, and deployed opposite the enemy's left flank. This operation was tiring to the troops, for the heat was great. It was also a hazardous one, involving, as it did, a march across the front of an enemy well within striking distance, and at night, when delay and confusion might easily arise. But with well-trained and eager troops such manœuvres may no doubt at times be properly risked; and no night attack being made by the enemy while the manœuvre was in course of completion, all went well.

On the morning of September 28 the British force moved forward to the final attack. The troops on the southern bank made only such demonstrations as were sufficient to keep their enemy in front of them; and on the northern bank, close to the river, a brigade under Major-General Fry made a "pinning" attack with the same object; but further north the main body fell upon the enemy's left with fiery energy. This main body consisted of two brigades of infantry under Brigadier-General Delamain and a cavalry brigade. One of the infantry brigades, under the direct command of Delamain, carried out a frontal attack upon some Turkish trenches which lay between two stretches of marsh; the other, under Brigadier-General Hoghton, with the cavalry and some armed motor-cars covering its right, moved wide round the enemy's northern flank, and came down upon him from the rear. The Turks resisted bravely; but the 1st Battalion of the Dorsetshire Regiment,

LIEUT.-COMMANDER E. C. COOKSON, D.S.O., V.C.

Awarded the Victoria Cross for gallantry during the advance to Kut. He was shot dead while attempting to cut a wire cable securing enemy barges which formed an obstruction across the river.

with the 117th Mahrattas, and the 22nd company of the Sappers and Miners, stormed a redoubt and its neighbouring trenches on their extreme left; and then the two brigades joined in a combined onslaught, under which the resistance broke down. After hard fighting and several counter-attacks the enemy's left was completely enveloped and beaten, and by two o'clock the whole northern end of the position was in British hands.

A scorching wind, with dense clouds of dust, had swept the desert during the whole day; and the long fight in this heat, coming after the night march, had exhausted General Delamain's troops, who were suffering severely from thirst, the marsh water being undrinkable. He was therefore obliged to give them a short rest. Then he set them in motion again, and pressed on to complete the victory. His first intention naturally was to sweep down the Turkish trenches from north to south, and to strike in flank and rear the force opposed to General Fry's brigade; but at this juncture strong hostile reserves

appeared to the south-west, in the direction of the Turkish bridge, and General Delamain, at once changing front, attacked the fresh enemy. His weary troops, forgetting their thirst and fatigue at the prospect of a hand-to-hand fight in the open, swept forward with magnificent dash, and though the Turks fought well they were overthrown and routed, the fall of night alone saving them from destruction. The victory was complete. During the night the Turks evacuated all the trenches they still held, and their whole force fell back along the river. They had lost fourteen guns and 4,000 men, of whom over 1,100 were prisoners. The British loss in killed and wounded amounted to 1,233. Though fought some distance below Kut, the battle was given the name of the Battle of Kut.

While the land attack was in progress the naval flotilla had been supporting it by attacking along the river, and late on the evening of the 28th the flotilla made a gallant attempt to force the boom. Under "a terrific fire from both banks at close range," the little Comet, Lieut.-Commander E. C. Cookson, R.N., rammed the boom but failed to break through, and the brave young officer was shot dead while trying to cut a wire cable connecting the barges.

During the summer of 1915 little had been heard in England of the doings of the Mesopotamia force, and toward the end of September some impatience had begun to be shown by the British public at the silence of the authorities. This found expression in a leading article in *The Times* of September 22, which gave an account of the exploits of the troops concerned. The article pointed out that the campaign in Mesopotamia was "the only one in which the Allies can claim continual success from the outset, unmarred by a single failure," and it commented upon the spirit of "red tape" in which the War Office had acted in concealing these successful exploits from the nation. A few days later the news of the fight on September 28 was received, and it became known that the Mesopotamia force had added to its exploits a fresh and striking victory. The public satisfaction was great. If only the British advance had ended at this point satisfaction might never have been turned into sadness and recrimination. But the Fates had other things in store.

Kut was occupied by General Townshend's troops on September 29. It has been described by Sir Mark Sykes, who saw it at this time, as "a dirty, tumbledown, insanitary little town," but with a minaret and decorated portals as perfect in design and line as the best work of ancient days. It lies in a loop of the Tigris, about 340 miles from the sea, by the river route, and contains about 6,000 inhabitants, largely Arabs. There is fertile ground about it, which might be greatly developed, but, except for its position at the northern end of the Shatt-el-Hai, it has no special importance, and it will owe its place in history solely to its connexion with one of the outlying episodes of the Great War.

When General Townshend had made his entry into the town his first care was to re-establish order. Owing to the confidence reposed in the British throughout Asia this was not difficult. The late Turkish Governor had, it is said, been maintaining his prestige during the last week by daily hangings and shootings.

> Enter the victors; within an hour the women were chaffering milk, dates, and sweet limes, the merchants were offering contracts, policemen were patrolling the dirty streets, a governor was established in an office, tired troops were standing in the sun while billets were sought for them, and, most unbelievable of all, the Arab cultivators were dropping in to complain of a certain horseman who had ridden through a crop of beans, and of a supply and transport officer who had parked his belongings in a garden.

The writer, Sir Mark Sykes, added:—"It must not be supposed that our coming evokes enthusiasm, nor our justice gratitude, nor our discipline admiration." That, perhaps, was true, for "East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet." But it was not the whole truth, as the writer himself clearly recognized, for he went on:

> If the British soldier leads, the Sepoy has not been slow to follow; and to see the wounded Indian soldier stiffen himself on his stretcher, and sit up to salute an unknown British officer, gives one a glimpse of that spirit of loyalty, pride, and glory in the profession of arms that no windy intriguer can dispel, and years of patient justice and devotion of forgotten generations of Englishmen have evoked.

That also is true, and it is worth remembering. The white man's burden is not borne in vain. And it is borne not mainly or even largely by Governors and Viceroys and Secretaries of State, good as some of them are, but by obscure soldiers and civilians who give their whole lives to the East and are unknown to their countrymen "at home."

A remarkable consequence of the Turkish defeats, which throws some light upon the methods of the Turks in Mesopotamia and upon

RE-EMBARKATION OF BRITISH TROOPS ON THE TIGRIS.

their relations with the people, may, perhaps, be mentioned here.

Not far from Baghdad are several shrines held sacred by the great Shiah sect of Musulmans, and visited by innumerable pilgrims from Persia, India, and other countries. These shrines, especially Kerbela and Nejef, are also used as places of burial, and many dead are brought yearly to be interred in their holy earth. The Turks are Sunnis, and regard the Shiahs as heretics, but they have always tolerated these shrines, partly because the mass of the Arab tribesmen of the country are Shiahs themselves, and partly, no doubt, on account of the revenue to be derived from the pilgrims, who are subjected to various imposts, regular and irregular.

Shortly after their defeat at Shaiba, perhaps

AN INDIAN MACHINE-GUN SECTION IN ACTION.

exasperated by the treachery of their Arab allies, but doubtless in real difficulties to raise money and supplies for the war, the Turkish authorities began to oppress the inhabitants of the Holy Places, extorting from them money, valuables, and foodstuffs, and impressing men for military service. It may be doubted whether the Turks were not within their rights in calling upon these people to bear a share of the burdens of war; but their methods were apparently as irregular as Turkish methods of government usually are, and serious abuses occurred, homes being raided at night, men seized, and women molested. Finally, at Nejef, the populace, perhaps a somewhat turbulent one, rose in revolt and barricaded the streets. Thereupon the Turks, who had sent a regiment with artillery to hold the place, turned their guns on the rebels and damaged some of the minarets of the shrine. There was then some angry fighting, the result of which was that the rebels got the upper hand and disarmed the Turkish troops. The Government buildings were burnt and the Governor expelled. This revolt was followed by outbreaks at Kerbela and other places, and, in the end, the Turks were everywhere driven out.

How far the Turks were to blame it is not possible to say, but the able and judicious Resident in the Persian Gulf, Sir Percy Cox, who was serving as political officer with the British forces in Mesopotamia, evidently considered that the Turks brought the revolt upon themselves. In any case, the whole incident seemed to show that their authority in the Holy Places was a very precarious one, and that the Shiah population was by no means disposed to serve them with enthusiasm against the British invaders.

It was possibly in connexion with these outbreaks that not long after the occupation of Kut a circular letter was issued by order of General Nixon to the tribal chiefs of the Arabs on the line of the Tigris, in order to reassure them about the objects of the British Government, and, if possible, secure their neutrality in the war. This letter informed the chiefs that Great Britain had been forced into the war unwillingly, by the intrigues of the Germans, who incited the Turks to acts of hostility against her; that the British entertained the most friendly feelings towards the religious authorities of the country, the inhabitants of the Holy Places, and the Arab tribesmen, none of whom would be molested; and that the Arabs should therefore "refuse to be misled into abandoning an attitude of aloofness and neutrality."

This letter has been quoted because it is an excellent example of the "political" work which, with the help of special officers attached to the troops, British commanders in Asiatic wars have to take upon themselves. Such appeals to the inhabitants of invaded countries are not unknown in European warfare, but the conditions in the East, where Governments are often composed of foreigners ruling an alien if not hostile population, naturally lead to attempts on the part of an invading force to detach the people from their rulers. In the opinion of most soldiers such attempts are

rarely successful. Probably the bulk of General Townshend's officers, if they read the letter at all, read it with somewhat contemptuous amusement, feeling sure that the Arab chiefs concerned would receive it, and any cash presents or robes of honour which might accompany it, with grave politeness, and would then proceed to "snipe" the infidel, according to custom, whenever they got the chance. Too often that is the only result of such overtures to uncivilized tribesmen, and the "political" is a person who does not, as a rule, command warm sympathy in a British force. In old days, when he was wholly independent of the British commander, and apt at times to take too much upon himself, he was regarded, with a measure of reason, as a dangerous nuisance; and some soldiers, if their words were to be believed, would without deep regret have seen him hanged. But that bad system has long been abandoned, and now that the "political" is a subordinate like any other, some generals who know how to use him find him of more or less value in collecting information and supplies. There are even times when his efforts bear real fruit in disarming opposition and bringing about good relations with the people of the country. The long-standing friendliness between the British and certain Arab chiefs in Southern Persia afforded an instance of this, and gave some reason to hope that the Arab of Mesopotamia might not be found wholly impervious to diplomatic suasion.

Order and confidence restored in Kut, General Townshend's next care was to think out his plans for the prosecution, if there was to be a prosecution, of his victorious campaign. The first question to be decided was whether any further advance at all was necessary or desirable. It is by no means obvious that this was the case. On the contrary, there seemed to be many reasons why the opportunity should now be taken to put an end to the forward movement. Granted that it had been necessary to go on as far as Kut, a very large concession, there could apparently be no need to go farther. The original objects of the expedition had been amply attained, and after the victory just won there could now be no reasonable doubt that the British forces were able to beat off any attack and hold the territory they had occupied. Why should they try to do more? Unless there was some clear and important object in view it was surely unnecessary and imprudent to undertake fresh operations, calling for renewed labour and losses on the part of our troops, and lengthening the already long line of communications behind them.

The answer is that there was now a clear and important object in view—the capture of Baghdad, which it was hoped would be, both on military and on political grounds, so heavy a blow to the Turks that it would have a sensible effect upon the fortunes of the Great War. Who first put forward this idea was not known, but it had evidently by this time gained a hold on the imagination not only of the soldiers on the spot but of others. It was probably the natural outcome, if, indeed, it was not partly

KUT-EL-AMARA FROM THE RIVER.

A WATER-HOLE DUG IN THE DESERT.

the cause, of the decision taken in April. And, provided that the British forces available were strong enough, there was much to be said for it. Baghdad was an ancient and famous city—the capital of the Khalifs, and therefore in a sense the spiritual centre of the Turkish Empire. Its fall would on that account undoubtedly have a great effect all over the Musulman East, and perhaps throughout the world. Moreover, it was an important strategical point—the military base of Turkish Arabia, and so situated that the occupation of it might even conceivably affect, in spite of great distance, any Turkish projects against Egypt, or operations against the Russians in Asia Minor. To save it the Turks would probably draw troops from these or other fields. A threat to Baghdad would no doubt be a valuable diversion, if nothing more.

But if all this were conceded, the practical question before General Townshend, and all concerned with the Mesopotamian campaign, was the question whether the British forces in that part of the world were, or could hope shortly to become, strong enough to undertake such an operation with reasonable prospect of success. Baghdad was 227 miles from Kut by water. The distance by land was much less, indeed not half as great, but the force at Kut was organized for the water route, and had little land transport. And it was a small force. Its original numbers had never been stated officially; but after its losses in action, and the greater losses due to the wear and tear of a campaign in great heat and unhealthy surroundings, it was now reduced to less than 10,000 effectives. The British battalions had been brought down to half their original strength, and the drafts which were being received from India to fill up the Indian regiments consisted of raw recruits. The garrisons in the rear could hardly be expected to spare any large number of men for the force in the front. The Turks had, it is true, been repeatedly beaten, but they had not fought badly, and it was impossible to form any accurate estimate of the numbers which they and their Arab supporters would be able to gather for a final stand. Moreover, the occupation of a city containing a population of not less than 150,000 inhabitants was in itself a serious matter. Finally, it was quite possible that the Turks, who now seemed to be holding the Dardanelles without great difficulty against the allied attack, might have already sent large reinforcements to Baghdad. Indeed,

General Townshend appears to have received information that they had done so. In such circumstances it was at least possible, if not probable, that he might find himself opposed to greatly superior numbers; while he would have behind him a very long and precarious line of communications through country held by hostile or at least doubtful Arab tribes. To push forward one small division on such an errand seemed rash in the extreme. Even if it got to Baghdad it would be a mere handful, too weak to do much more than hold the town, and liable at any time to be surrounded there, out of reach of support. The whole project was too full of risk to be sound, and so on consideration General Townshend decided.

It is true that before the battle of Kut he had contemplated an advance on Baghdad in case of victory. To use his own words: "I told Sir John Nixon previous to the battle of Kut that not only did I hope to defeat the Turks in their position at Kut, but also, as at Kurna, to rout them completely, and that if I saw the chance, as I did in May at Amára, I should take the risk of pushing on into Baghdad at the heels of the rout." Apparently Sir John Nixon had make no objection to this proposal. But the action at Kut, though a victory, had not resulted in the complete rout of the Turks. They had retired rapidly; but, at all events after the first confusion of defeat, they had retired in fairly good order, covered by a strong rear-guard with infantry and guns; and by October 3 General Townshend knew that they had halted and taken up a fresh entrenched position at Ctesiphon, across the Baghdad road. All chance of riding into Baghdad at the heels of the rout was over, and the question had to be regarded from a fresh point of view. General Townshend, pressing on in pursuit with part of his force, had then reached Azizieh, "30 miles from Ctesiphon" by land, about 100 miles by river, and from there he sent to Sir John Nixon, or his Chief of Staff, a telegram which seemed to show that in existing conditions he considered it dangerous and undesirable for him to march on Baghdad. The

CAPTURED TURKISH RIFLES,

And a portion of a machine-gun being sorted before sending to the base.

telegram was curiously worded, but it was comprehensible enough, and it was so important that it must be given in full. It ran as follows :

October 3, 1915. To Major-General, General Staff, Kut. By aviator's report you will see he had just left for Kut, and that the chance of breaking up the retreating Turkish forces, which have by now taken up a position at Suliman Pak,* no longer exists; that position is astride the Baghdad road and the Tigris, and is estimated to be six miles of entrenchments. It is also probable that Baghdad has sent them reinforcements. See report by aviator, which gives 6 barges, 3 more steamers, 1 mahela, 105 bell tents, etc., also many men and many stores, etc.; another steamer five miles west of Suliman Pak. My opinion, if I may be allowed to express one, is that up to the battle at Kut, our object has been to occupy strategical position of Kut, and to consolidate ourselves in the vilayet.† Ctesiphon is now held by the defeated Turkish Forces. Should it not be considered politically advisable by Government to occupy Baghdad at present on account of doubtful situation at Dardanelles, and possibly of our small forces being driven out of Baghdad by stronger forces from Anatolia, which would compel us to retire down a long line of communications teeming with Arabs, at present more or less hostile, whose hostility would become active on hearing of our retreat, then I consider that on all military grounds we should consolidate our position at Kut. The sudden fall of water, which made our advance in ships most difficult, slow, and toilsome, upset our plans of entering Baghdad on the heels of Turks while they were retreating in disorder. If, on the other hand, it is the desire of Government to occupy Baghdad, then, unless great risk is to be run, it is, in my opinion, absolutely necessary that the advance from Kut by road should be carried out methodically by two divisions or one army corps or by one division supported closely by another complete division, exclusive of the garrisons of the important places of Nasiriyah, Ahwaz and Amára. It is now quite impossible for laden ships to go up.

The gist of this telegram, expressed in a few words, appears to be :

"On all military grounds it is undesirable to advance on Baghdad at present, and we should content ourselves with consolidating our position up to Kut, which has hitherto been our object. If, however, it is the desire of Government, on political grounds, to occupy Baghdad, then, unless great risk is to be run, it is absolutely necessary that the force ordered to do so should consist of two divisions or one army corps, or of one division supported closely by another complete division, exclusive of the garrisons of important places below."

In face of this telegram General Nixon, who was himself at Kut, did not press General Townshend to move forward, but left him at Azizieh; strengthening him as time went on by such reinforcements as were available in the country, which amounted to a brigade of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and a battery of artillery. On October 24 it became known that two more divisions were being sent to Mesopotamia from France, and this held out a prospect that if there was to be an advance on Baghdad it would be possible to make it in the strength considered by General Townshend to be "absolutely necessary." Then, on some date unknown, but at some period in October long before the arrival of the divisions from France, General Nixon seems to have expressed to the Indian Government, or direct to the Home Government, either of his own accord or in answer to inquiry, an opinion in favour of an advance; the Government of India accepted it, and H.M. Government did likewise. Upon this General Nixon gave General Townshend the word to move forward, and he did so. On November 11 his advanced troops, the cavalry and a brigade of infantry, broke up camp at Azizieh, and a few days later the whole of the force was in march for Baghdad.

It was still a small force for such an undertaking, perhaps 12,000 men all told; but General Townshend made no protest as to its inadequacy, regarding his telegram of October 3 as "all that a subordinate commander could do" in this respect; and General Nixon assumed, rightly or wrongly, that he no longer thought himself too weak. Indeed, after some personal communication between General Nixon's Chief of Staff and General Townshend, it seemed to General Nixon "quite clear that the final confirmation of the coming of two divisions from France had satisfied him (Townshend) that the conditions he mentioned at the beginning of the month were fulfilled." How this can have been the case, when the two divisions were still in France or on the high seas, is not easy to understand, for General Townshend's division was certainly not "supported closely by another complete division." That, however, was a matter between the two soldiers only, for General Townshend's telegram of October 3, being the telegram of a subordinate, had not been sent on to the Government of India.

Meanwhile the campaign had been attracting much attention in England, and on November 2 the matter came up in the House of Commons. The Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, then took upon himself the duty of explaining the situation. He announced that Sir John Nixon was within measurable distance of Baghdad. "I do not think," he said, "that in the whole course of the war there has been a series of

* Ctesiphon.
† The province of Basra.

WADING THROUGH THE MARSHES.
Indian troops advancing to the support of a British attack.

operations more carefully contrived, more brilliantly conducted, and with a better prospect of final success." The House cheered, and the inference drawn from this speech by the country was that British troops would soon be in occupation of the famous city. General Townshend's subsequent advance from Azizieh was therefore regarded with cheerfulness, and it was confidently hoped that the blow struck at the Turks in this quarter would be some compensation for the great losses and disappointments of the unhappy venture in the Dardanelles. That hope, doubtless shared by the Government, and presumably the real cause of the advance, was heightened towards the end of November by reports of a victory gained by General Townshend within 20 miles of Baghdad, and it seemed as if the confidence of the Prime Minister was on the point of being fully justified.

Then the blow fell. The first reports of the victory, though leaving some room for doubt, had been generally satisfactory. A few days later it was stated by the India Office that

General Townshend had "withdrawn his force to a position lower down the river," which looked ominous. Finally, on December 6, it was known that the victory had been turned into a repulse, and that the British were in full retreat down the line of the Tigris. A "severe check" had been administered to the expeditionary force, whose record till then had been one of unmarred success, and there was to be no speedy capture of Baghdad. It was a deep disappointment to the nation, already saddened by the gloom which hung over the Dardanelles.

General Townshend had in truth suffered not a defeat in the open field, but still a repulse



THE BATTLE OF CTESIPHON.

which made it clear that his small force had shot its bolt. The story of that repulse and its consequences is honourable to him and his troops, who did all that men could do; but it is none the less a melancholy one, and there was some reason to fear that political reasons might in this instance, as so often before, have been allowed to override military considerations.

Advancing by both banks of the Tigris, with little opposition, while the flotilla of war boats and transport followed closely by the river bed, General Townshend's division was concentrated on November 21 at Lajj, a point nine miles from the Turkish position. Information had reached him that this was held by his old opponent, Nur-ed-Din Bey, with 13,000 regular troops and 38 guns, besides Arabs; and there were reports that large Turkish reinforcements were about to join the enemy. The truth of these reports could not be ascertained, but, in case they should be true, it was evidently desirable that Nur-ed-Din should, if possible, be attacked and beaten before his reinforcements came up. General Townshend therefore decided to attack at once, and, leaving his shipping at Lajj, he marched on the night of the 21st, arriving before daylight in front of the Turkish lines, which had been thoroughly reconnoitred by his airmen.

Ctesiphon was a place of deep historical interest. It had in ancient times been the capital of the Persian kingdom of the Chosroes; and thirteen hundred years before the date on which it first heard the sound of British guns it had been the scene of memorable warfare between Moslems and Infidels. In the year 636 A.D., soon after the death of the Prophet, when the Arab tribes, swarming from their desert sands in all the ardour of a new-born faith, had boldly thrown down the gauntlet to the two great powers of the world, "Rûm" and Persia, the host of Islam, marching from victory to victory, finally drove the Persians back to their capital on the Tigris. At that time Ctesiphon extended to both banks of the river and included Seleucia, the former capital of the Alexandrian kings. There the Arabs were checked, for the walls of Seleucia were too strong for them to storm, and their rude engines of warfare made no impression on the ramparts of sunburnt brick. For months the Persians held their assailants at bay. Then, at last, worn out by famine, the garrison evacuated the town in the night, and crossed the river to Ctesiphon, taking with them all their boats. For some weeks longer the Arabs remained in sight of the city and of the palace of the Chosroes, with its great hall of white marble and stately Arch, already one of the wonders of the world. Their efforts to collect boats proved unsuccessful, and it seemed as if, after all, their army of 60,000 men would have to raise the siege. But, when hope had almost left them, a deserter told them of a ford where, with some swimming perhaps, their horses might get across the river. It seemed a desperate venture, for the stream was swift, and on the rise, but, after some hesitation, they decided to put their fortunes to the hazard, and a body of picked horsemen plunged into the flood. They reached the farther shore, and driving back a few of the enemy who opposed their landing, secured the ford. The Persians, taken by surprise, fled panic-stricken, and the whole city fell into the hands of the conquerors. The spoil was of priceless value—millions in coin, with countless vessels of gold and silver,

and a great store of jewels and wealth of all kinds, including the regalia of the Persian Empire and the sword of the Chosroes. The Arab leader took up his residence in the royal palace, and the Great Hall was turned into a House of prayer for the worship of the God of Islam.

A hundred years later, when the Khalif of the day had chosen Baghdad for the site of his future capital, he resolved to demolish the palace of the Chosroes to provide material for the new city. Much of it he overthrew and carried away, but not all. "The noble Arch, hard as iron," says the historian of the Khalifate, "withstood the pickaxe," defying all his efforts. "And there on the river's left bank still stands the grand monument in majesty, while all around is now a bare and sandy plain."

It was to look down, after twelve centuries more had passed, upon the grim struggle in which British and Turks, backed by their Indian and Arab allies, contended for the mastery of Mesopotamia. From the British lines at Lajj, on the evening of November 21, it had been seen standing out against a blood-red sunset sky; and in the morning the British soldier awoke from his uneasy sleep on the chilly moonlit plain to see it facing the sunrise, with the Turkish host gathered about it. Tradition lives long in the East, and perhaps the Arabs who confronted the invader of their country found encouragement from the great mass that towered above them, a silent witness to the ancient conquests of their race. It may even be possible that some feeling of the kind had its influence in leading the Turks to fix upon this spot for their last stand in defence of Baghdad. More probably their German-trained officers found other reasons for the choice, but sentiment and superstition have a strong hold on the Eastern mind.

Nur-ed-Din and his troops had taken up a position somewhat similar to the one from which they had been driven at Kut. It lay astride the Tigris, and consisted of two lines of carefully prepared entrenchments strengthened by redoubts. The first line was about nine miles in length—six to the north of the river, three to the south. The second line was roughly parallel to the first—five miles behind it on the south bank, two miles behind it on the north bank. In rear of the second line was a bridge connecting the two wings of the army. Close beside the

RUINS OF THE GREAT PALACE OF THE CHOSROES AT CTESIPHON.

river on the north side, and midway between the two lines, stood the Great Arch.

As at Kut, General Townshend attacked the left of the enemy's position, and after a severe fight the front line of trenches was stormed with "a rush and a roar of cheering." The 45th Turkish division, which held them, was practically destroyed. It lost 1,300 prisoners, and the trenches were choked with dead. The attacking force then pressed on, across a flat, bare desert, towards the second line, losing heavily from the artillery and rifle fire of the Turks. Nevertheless, advancing by short rushes they at last reached the line, and, fighting fiercely, carried a portion of the trenches, with eight Turkish guns. But there the success of these brave troops came to an end. Bringing up strong reinforcements of fresh men, the Turks made one counter-attack after another; the tide of battle swayed backwards and forwards; the captured guns changed hands time after time; ammunition ran short, all the mules having been killed by shrapnel, and at last, as night fell, it was seen that our people could do no more. Leaving, sorely against their will, the guns in the hands of the enemy, they were withdrawn to the line of trenches they had first taken, and there they spent the night. It was far from being a night of complete rest, for the Turks, emboldened by their success, seemed disposed to attack in the darkness the line they had lost. But their attacks, if, indeed, they ever meant to attack, came to nothing, and in the morning our weary troops still held not only the first Turkish position but some ground beyond.

During this day, November 23, General Townshend reorganized his force in this position, and collected his numerous wounded, but no attempt was made at a fresh advance. "Owing to heavy losses in killed and wounded it was inadvisable to renew the offensive." The Turks understood, and throughout the following night they made repeated attacks all along the line. They were beaten off with great loss, their advancing masses being dispersed in every case before they got to close quarters, and when day broke our cavalry were well forward. All about the base of the Arch was "the gallop and glint of horsemen who wheeled in the level sun." It was believed that another advance would take place without delay.

But no orders came to move forward. November 24 was, like the 23rd, a day of comparative inaction, spent in removing to Lajj the wounded and prisoners, now amounting to 1,650, and a third night was passed in the same position. During this night the Turks did little to molest the British force, and on the morning of the 25th it was still hoped that they were about to abandon the hard-fought battlefield, which was covered with their dead and wounded. This hope was soon at an end. More Turkish reinforcements came up, and during the afternoon it was seen that large columns were moving down to turn both of the British flanks, while bodies of cavalry began to threaten the rear. Faced by fresh troops greatly outnumbering his own, perhaps in the proportion of three or four to one, and encumbered by thousands of prisoners and wounded, the British commander recognized that another attack could not succeed. To remain where he was would be to incur the danger of being cut off from his base. During the night of the 25th he withdrew to Lajj, where his boats and supplies had remained. The advance on Baghdad was over. The Arch of the Chosroes had proved the high-water mark of invasion.

Lajj, where General Townshend halted during November 26, was not a place at which he could make a permanent stand. "A position so far from bases of supply," General Nixon wrote, "with a vulnerable line of communication along the winding shallow river, was unfavourable for defence. It was necessary to withdraw farther down stream to a more secure locality until conditions might enable a resumption of the offensive." The place selected was Kut, which had already, to some extent, been supplied and prepared. There the retreating force might hope to be joined before many weeks had passed by reinforcements from below. Kut was far in rear—210 miles by the river and 70 or more by road—but the decision seemed sound. On November 27 the retreat began, and for about half the distance was not much molested. But the Turks had no intention of letting their enemy escape unscathed, or escape at all if they could help it. Their mounted troops were pushing down the river round the British flanks, and, as Townshend had foreseen, the Arabs of the neighbouring country were hostile. Many of them had joined what they now believed to be the winning side, and it was evident that the British might soon find their retreat intercepted. Enemy horsemen were reported even below Kut. Impeded as they were by

the necessity of keeping within supporting distance of the naval flotilla and boats, which were constantly grounding in the loops and twists of the river, the retiring troops could not push on as rapidly as they might have done; and this gave the enemy time to overtake them. The position was one to cause grave anxiety.

On November 29 the cavalry under Brigadier-General Roberts drove back some enemy horsemen who were attacking a stranded gunboat. The 14th Hussars and 7th Hariana Lancers made a successful charge, and killed a column which tried to envelop the British right flank enabled General Townshend to break off the fight and retire. But the enemy's attacks were resolute, and he reported that only "the splendid steadiness of the troops and the excellence of his Brigadiers" had allowed him to extricate his force from its difficult position. It had been in serious danger, and though the Turks were shaken off for the time their superiority in the field was now manifest.

On December 3, without further fighting, the British force was "installed at Kut," and the

BRITISH TROOPS GETTING A GUN OVER A "BUND."

or wounded 140 of them. But the Turks were still advancing, and on the following day General Townshend was forced to halt at Umm-el-Tubal because the shipping was in trouble owing to shoal water, the gunboat Shaitan having grounded. Her guns and stores were removed by the Firefly and Shushan under heavy sniping from both banks, but the Shaitan could not be refloated, and had to be abandoned. The delay was considerable, and during the night of the 30th the whole Turkish force came up. At daylight on December 1 they attacked in great strength, and a hard fight ensued. The Turks lost heavily from the British artillery fire, and a successful attack made by the cavalry brigade against retreat was at an end. Though closely pressed, General Townshend had brought in with him the 1,650 prisoners taken at Ctesiphon, and there had never been anything approaching a rout. Nevertheless, the losses of the force during the battle and retreat had been severe—4,567 men—and the naval flotilla had been obliged to abandon not only the Shaitan, but also the Firefly and Comet, which had grounded during the fight of December 1, and been surrounded by the enemy. Their crews were taken off with great difficulty by the Sumana under close and heavy fire. "Throughout these operations," General Nixon wrote, "Captain Nunn, Lieutenant Eddis, who was wounded, and all officers and men of the naval flotilla behaved

MAJOR-GENERAL M. COWPER, C.I.E.,
Head of the Administrative Staff at Basra.

with great coolness and bravery under most trying circumstances."

Once the retreat was over, General Townshend set to work to strengthen his position and prepare to stand a siege until relief should arrive from the south. Reinforcements for Mesopotamia were known to be coming from overseas, and it was hoped that with the force already under General Nixon's command there would soon be troops enough not only to relieve Kut, but even to resume the interrupted advance. Meanwhile the first thing was to get rid of all superfluous men and animals. The numerous sick and wounded, and the Turkish prisoners, were sent down to Basra by water. On December 6 the cavalry, who could be more useful outside, and a convoy of transport animals, marched down the road towards Amára. All unnecessary shipping was also sent away. These measures were carried out just in time, for on the day the cavalry left Kut the enemy closed in upon the northern front of the position, and on the following day the investment of the place was complete.

As before stated, Kut lies in a loop of the Tigris. This loop has the shape of the letter U, with its open end pointing about north-west. The town is at the opposite end, near the spot where the Shatt-el-Hai flows out of the Tigris. The loop is about two miles in length and a mile in breadth. Across the open end had been constructed a line of defences, which were now strengthened. The line terminated at its eastern extremity in a redoubt, close to which was a bridge of boats across the river. Two detached posts were thrown out on the right bank of the river, one to cover the bridge, the other opposite the town.

The siege now began. On December 8 the enemy bombarded heavily from three sides, and Nur-ed-Din called upon General Townshend to surrender. On the 9th the Turks attacked the detachment on the right bank covering the bridge, and it was forced to retire. The bridge was now useless, if not dangerous, as the enemy held the right bank in such force that an attack upon him would have been impracticable, and General Townshend decided that the bridge must be demolished. His orders were successfully carried out, with little loss, by a party under Lieutenant A. B. Mathews, R.E., and Lieutenant R. T. Sweet, of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Gurkha Rifles.

Then followed several days of continuous bombardment, varied by attacks which were beaten off with severe loss to the Turks. In one such attack, on December 12, General Nixon reported that their casualties were estimated at 1,000 killed and wounded. After this the enemy settled down to regular siege operations and confined themselves to sapping and mining. Two or three successful sorties on a small scale were made by the garrison, who were in good heart and in no difficulty about supplies. Nothing perhaps did more to keep up their spirits than the example of their commander.

always cheery and confident and almost boyish in his love of fun. So matters continued until Christmas Eve, when another attack, and this time a formidable one, was made upon our works. The point selected by the enemy was the redoubt previously mentioned, at the north-east corner of the defences. This redoubt was heavily bombarded during the night of December 23, and throughout the morning of the 24th, the parapet was breached, and then, believing their time was come, the Turks swarmed out of their trenches, a hundred yards away, and suddenly rushed to the assault. Their onset was at first successful. They got through the breach, and for a time it looked as if they might maintain their hold. Their success was shortlived, for a strong counter-attack was launched against them, and, after a hand-to-hand fight, in which the Oxford Light Infantry and Norfolk Regiment were conspicuous, they were driven out, leaving 200 dead in the redoubt. This first failure did not discourage them. Under cover of darkness they returned to the assault, fresh troops pouring in to fill the place of those who fell, and at least once they again succeeded in effecting a lodgment. But they were again expelled, the garrison fighting with desperate resolution, and though the struggle lasted throughout the night, sunrise on Christmas morning saw it at an end. It had resulted in a bloody repulse for the assailants, whose dead lay heaped in and around the redoubt. They had been driven not only out of the defences but out of their foremost line of trench, and the garrison were left to pass their Christmas Day in peace.

From then until the close of the year no further attacks of the kind were delivered. A large body of the enemy marched round Kut and took up a position some miles down the river, to block any attempt at relief, while the rest of his troops kept the garrison closely besieged; but, for the time, any chance of the speedy fall of the place seemed to be over.

Thus ended the advance from which so much had been hoped. Since the landing of the expeditionary force, 14 months earlier, the Turks had been repeatedly beaten on their own ground, and a large Turkish province had been conquered. Finally a body of British troops had marched up almost to within sight of Baghdad, more than 500 miles from the sea. Then, after a gallant and partially-successful attempt to storm a strong entrenched position held by greatly superior numbers, the advance of the British force had been checked, and eventually it had been obliged to fall back to a point 200 miles down the river. But it had gone back fighting steadily, and bearing off with it a large number of prisoners wrested from the entrenchments of its enemy. The attempt on Baghdad had failed, but unquestionably the balance of honour and advantage still lay with the invaders. They were still in possession of a great tract of Turkish territory, and they had shown again and again that British troops, and Indian troops led by British officers, were more than a match for an equal number of Turks, even when the Turks were trained and directed by German officers, and held strong positions. British and Indians alike felt that they were the better men, and not discouragement but a spirit of pride and confidence was the result of the year's fighting.

Nevertheless the blow at Baghdad had failed; and the British nation, sore at its disappointment, now demanded to know who was to blame. It was felt, as further information came in, that General Townshend's force

[*Elliott & Fry.*

GENERAL SIR BEAUCHAMP DUFF, G.C.B.,
Commander-in-Chief in India.

had been far too small for the work expected of it. There were, moreover, reports that the provision made for the transport and medical requirements of the force had been deplorably insufficient, and that our troops, especially the sick and wounded, had been exposed to wholly unnecessary sufferings. A vehement feeling of indignation arose, and grew stronger day by day.

Time would doubtless show who was in fact responsible for the reverse sustained by our arms. The first, and perhaps the natural, inclination of the British public in such cases, has always been to throw the blame on the military commander. But military reverses have not always been due to the soldiers in command. Any reader of Fortescue's "History of the British Army" must have had it brought home to him, if he did not know it already, that too often the reputation of British generals and the lives of British troops have been wantonly sacrificed by the incompetence or selfishness of statesmen and politicians. When the case came up for judgment, on full knowledge of the facts, the question for decision was not which general blundered, but what authorities, military or civil, were chiefly to blame. His Majesty's Government and the Government of India were both concerned in the invasion of Mesopotamia and the march on Baghdad. They might have been wholly free from fault in the matter; but they might have been not only in fault but primarily and chiefly in fault. They could not be absolved at the expense of the soldiers on the spot unless it was clearly proved that the soldiers misled them, and that they neither took the initiative in urging the unfortunate advance nor could properly have forbidden it.

It was possible that this could be proved. The military commanders might be shown to have erred from over-boldness, and to have pressed their views upon their Governments in such a way that those Governments could not decline to accept them. This seemed the less unlikely from the fact that the military commanders had been trained in a school where boldness of action was steadily inculcated. For many generations, ever since the foremost of our Sepoy generals, Arthur Wellesley,

> Against the myriads of Assaye
> Clashed with his fiery few and won,

it has been the tradition of the Indian Army that an Asiatic enemy can best be met by bold attack, and that nothing is so dangerous as any show of backwardness. That tradition is based on countless wars. Clive, long before Wellesley's day, Roberts and many others in later times, have helped to found or establish it. If on rare occasions in our Asiatic history over-boldness led to defeat, it led, times without number, to victory against almost hopeless odds. It was the very foundation of our Indian Empire. Therefore it did not seem altogether improbable that the military commanders in this campaign were over bold, and that they pressed their views on their Governments with a confidence which was hard to resist.

But this was not yet proved. General Townshend's telegram of October 3 seemed to throw much doubt upon it, and to suggest that the advance on Baghdad was made on political rather than on military grounds. In the House of Lords, on December 8, Lord Crewe declared that "the early capture of Baghdad would have been a great stroke both from a military and a political point of view." He was then generously defending the man who actually carried out the advance. "It was a complete error," he said, "to suppose that this was a rash military adventure undertaken by General Townshend on his own initiative. The advance on Baghdad had been contemplated some months ago." He went on to say that "a sufficient force had been collected to carry out the operation, the whole proceedings having been thought out by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir John Nixon." But he did not show, or allege, that the initiative was Sir John Nixon's. It seemed not impossible that His Majesty's Government, anxious to have in the capture of Baghdad a set-off against the evacuation of the Dardanelles, themselves suggested or pressed the advance.

As to the alleged breakdown in medical arrangements, and in other respects, there was undoubtedly strong ground for the feeling of the nation that the matter demanded thorough investigation, and the sternest apportionment of blame for any avoidable suffering inflicted upon our brave and patient soldiery, who under the best conditions would have suffered much. On the facts as reported the nation did well to be angry; and it was expected that sooner or later it would pronounce an unsparing judgment. The times are gone for ever when the soldier could be safely neglected and left to die in misery for want of his country's care.

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CHAPTER CLIX.

THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1915-16 IN ARMENIA.

THE EARLY OPERATIONS IN THE CAUCASUS—POSITION IN SUMMER OF 1915—THE GRAND DUKE'S COMMAND—PREPARATIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE—TURKISH STRENGTH—THE BRITISH OPERATIONS IN MESOPOTAMIA—GENERAL YUDENITCH'S GREAT ADVANCE—FALL OF ERZERUM, FEBRUARY 16, 1916—CAPTURE OF MUSH AND BITLIS—FEELING IN TURKEY—FRESH RUSSIAN ADVANCE—NAVAL ASSISTANCE—FALL OF TREBIZOND—GENERAL BARATOFF IN TOUCH WITH GENERAL LAKE—LAST PHASE OF THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN—SOME TURKISH SUCCESSES—FALL OF ERZINJAN—TURKISH STRATEGY—SITUATION IN AUGUST, 1916.

THE opening moves of the campaign in the Caucasus have already been described in an earlier chapter.* The Turkish advance, which was believed to embody in a special degree the aims and the skill of Enver Pasha and his German advisers, began at the end of November, 1914, with a brilliant dash across the Russian Asiatic border over a wide front, and came to an inglorious conclusion at Sarikamish in the first week of the following January. The plan was the plan of Berlin, but the hands were the hands of Constantinople, and the invasion failed utterly in its main objective—the capture of Kars, which had been lost by Turkey in 1878. At Sarikamish, which may be called the Turkish Tannenberg, General Yudenitch, the Russian commander, with an army inferior in numbers and equipment, practically annihilated the main Turkish force and captured Ikdan Pasha with the whole of his staff, together with the German officers attached.

"The Turks have their German friends to thank for this," was the comment attributed to a high Russian officer on hearing the news, and the whole advance movement was an excellent illustration of the danger of attempting to carry out a complicated series of operations without the thorough army training necessary for its success. On the extreme left wing, indeed, in the Chorok valley, a small Turkish force, fighting in the old dogged way, made a considerable advance and kept up a troublesome resistance for many months: so that although the campaign as a whole was over with Sarikamish on January 6, 1915, it was not till April 8 that the Russians were in a position to announce officially that the Turks were "completely ousted from the districts bordering on Batum and Kars." Meanwhile there was much jubilation in Petrograd, and some writers, with the incurable optimism of the amateur expert, began to talk of the speedy appearance of a Russian army "under the walls of Constantinople."

But we may be sure that Count Vorontsoff-Dashkoff and General Yudenitch cherished no such illusions. Russia's best troops were far away on her western front, and the Army of the Caucasus, splendidly as it had acquitted itself, was comparatively small in numbers and mainly composed of second line troops. There ensued, therefore, a long period of waiting and of careful preparation before

* Vol. III., Chap. LI.

AFTER THE DEFEAT AT SARIKAMISH.
Turkish stragglers making for Erzerum.

anything like a general advance could even be thought of. And the Russian force in Persia, which has already been mentioned,* was in a difficult position at Tabriz, while troops from the Caucasus were required to maintain the prestige of the northern empire in that direction. By patience, energy, and skill all these difficulties were in time surmounted and it is our task in this chapter to tell the story of the great advance—one of the most brilliant and successful of the whole war—in the course of which Russia's victorious standards were planted successively in Erzerum—Turkey's "impregnable" citadel in the East—in Trebizond—her leading Black Sea port, the gateway of trade for Eastern Asia Minor and Persia—in Erzinjan—a hundred miles inland—and in Mush, Bitlis, and Van, still reeking with the blood of massacred Armenians.

The whole country is one of extraordinary difficulty for military operations. All Switzerland, with its mountains, could be dropped into the vast complex of mountain land stretching from the plains of Russia far into Asia Minor and Persia without producing any remarkable variation in its rugged outline. Elburz and Ararat would still tower unchallenged over Mont Blanc and the Matterhorn. For centuries—since Ivan took Astrakhan, since Peter took Azov—the eyes and the heart of Russia have been set on this mighty barrier that stretched between the two seas and closed to her the gates of the south. To obtain possession even of the northern ranges, Russia, as General Kuropatkin* pointed out ten years before the Great War, fought two wars with Persia and three with Turkey, only to find at the last that the south was guarded against her "not only by the Turks but by the Germans." "The task of preserving our position on the Mediterranean from the Black Sea," he added prophetically, "has passed to the twentieth century." The Russian War Minister was, no doubt, speaking primarily of the Balkans, but the Baghdad Railway and all that it meant for Asia Minor was also in his thoughts, for he recognized that in Europe Russia had no land frontier with Turkey, whereas in Trans-Caucasia Russia marches for 325 miles with Turkey, and for 465 with Persia. "The frontier fixed in 1878," he said, "gives us an advantageous route by which to advance on Erzerum, the most important point in Asia Minor, and the only fortress of any strength nearer than Scutari."

The Caucasus campaign seventy years earlier, in which England and Russia found themselves on opposite sides, was illuminated

* Vol. III., p. 79.

* *The Russian Army*, by A. N. Kuropatkin, Vol. I., p. 33.

by one incident characteristic of the relations that existed between chivalrous foes in the days before war had been degraded by Prussian brutality. The defence of Kars, then a Turkish outpost, was entrusted to General Fenwick Williams, a Canadian by birth, who held out for over five months against the repeated attacks of Muravieff and the encroachments of cholera, famine, and cold within the walls. As no relief was possible and the garrison was exhausted, Williams was compelled at the

GENERAL YUDENITCH.

He is photographed studying a tactical problem.

end of November, 1855, to ask for terms. Muravieff, all of whose assaults had been hurled back with great loss, and who respected a gallant foe, readily conceded Williams's claim to be permitted to march out with the honours of war. "You have made yourself," he wrote, "a name in history, and posterity will stand amazed at the endurance, the courage, and the discipline which this siege has called forth in the remains of an army."

It took Russia sixty-two years of almost constant warfare with the Caucasian mountaineers of varied nationality—Circassians, Georgians, Lesgians, Tartars, Kurds, Armenians, and so forth—to produce something like peace and order in what is now a Russian province. "It is," says Mr. Douglas Freshfield, "an ethnological museum where the invaders of Europe as they travelled westward to be manufactured into nations left behind samples of themselves in their raw condition." Once across the Caucasus proper, Russia found herself confronted with a pretty solid population of Armenians and Kurds, with the Persians still some way off on the southern shores of the Caspian, and the Turks in a corresponding position on the Black Sea. Reference to the coloured map which forms the frontispiece to Volume VIII. of this History, together with the explanation given on page 77 of Volume III., will make a very complicated situation as clear as is possible. But the state of affairs on either side of the Turco-Persian frontier in this quarter had been one of practical anarchy for several years past.

Round Lake Van, and on to the western side of Lake Urmia across the Persian frontier, Kurds and Armenians are inextricably mingled together. This state of affairs had always provided the Turks with an opportunity and a pretext for a massacre of Armenians as often as their fears prompted them to suspect anything in the nature of disaffection, the Kurds acting as willing instruments whenever called on. The massacres of April-July, 1915—the most systematic, widespread and ruthless of a long series—have already been described at length.* It is only necessary here to remind readers that the Turkish defeats in the Caucasus and on the Suez Canal (February, 1915) and their failure to make good their plans for the conquest of Western Persia impelled them to assert the supremacy of their race and their religion in the Eastern highlands. They did it in wholesale fashion, and they resumed the process at intervals afterwards, a message from Baku in November, 1916, announcing the massacre at Sivas of 5,000 of the 6,000 Armenians left alive at that place.

During the rest of the summer of 1915 nothing of military importance occurred or was reported from the main front in the Caucasus. Russian pressure in Western Persia was still maintained mainly with the view of keeping occupied Halid Bey and the remnants of his army and preventing them from reinforcing the Turkish troops at Baghdad and down the Tigris, where the British force was advancing from the Persian Gulf. At the beginning of May quite a notable little victory over superior numbers was gained by the Russians at Dilman, to the north-west of Lake Urmia. Meanwhile the Turkish army had to some extent reorganized itself after the disaster of January, with the aid of reinforcements from Anatolia and from Syria, but neither side was sufficiently supported from headquarters to be in a position to think of resuming operations. The British force continued its successful advance in Mesopotamia; Egypt and Arabia still detained considerable forces, while the landing on the Gallipoli peninsula, with its direct menace to Constantinople, caused very real anxiety in the Turkish capital. All this time Russia was fighting for her life on her western front from the Baltic to the Carpathians, and, hampered by a desperate shortage of guns and munitions, was being driven back with unbroken front in Poland and the Baltic provinces, as well as in Galicia.

In August, 1915, the Turks, having finished for the time their sanguinary exploits in

MACHINE GUNS CAPTURED AT SARIKAMISH.

* Vol. VIII., Chap. CXXXIII.

THE TSAR INSPECTING HIS ARMY OF THE CAUCASUS.

Armenia and the Van-Urmia district, and the Russians having reoccupied Van (August 17), again showed some activity in the coast region, where the army that had offered such stubborn resistance in the Chorok valley still constituted a menace to the frontier. Even on the Black Sea Turkish vessels began to show themselves, and to throw troops and provisions into Trebizond for the defence of Erzerum. In the third week of this month the Russians struck back vigorously, and on August 27 they were able to announce that the Turkish attempt to take the offensive had again completely broken down and that many of their vessels had been sunk. At Olty also, and at the confluence of the Olta and the Chorok, there was some sharp fighting, the Turks being again driven back. All these movements, however, were only of the nature of an intensive reconnaissance, and had no further military purpose or effect.

It was in the beginning of September that the great news came that was to transform the Trans-Caucasian campaign. On September 5 the Tsar issued the Army Order announcing that he had himself taken over the supreme command of the sea and land forces of the Empire, with General Alexeieff as his Chief of Staff, and on the same day he issued a rescript to the Grand Duke Nicholas appointing him to the command in the Caucasus. The Imperial Rescript was in the following terms:

At the beginning of the war I was unavoidably prevented from following the inclination of my soul to put myself at the head of the Army. That was why I entrusted you with the Commandership-in-Chief of all the land and sea forces. Under the eyes of the whole of Russia, your Imperial Highness has given proof during the war of steadfast bravery which caused a feeling of profound confidence and called forth the sincere good wishes of all who followed your operations through the inevitable vicissitudes of the fortune of war.

My duty to my country, which has been entrusted to me by God, impels me to-day, when the enemy has penetrated into the interior of the Empire, to take the supreme command of the active forces and to share with my Army the fatigues of war and to safeguard with it Russian soil from the attempts of the enemy. The ways of Providence are inscrutable, but my duty and my desire determine me in my resolution for the good of the State.

The invasion of the enemy on the Western front, which necessitates the greatest possible concentration of the civil and military authorities, as well as the unification of the command in the field, has turned our attention from the southern front. At this moment I recognize the necessity of your assistance and counsels on our southern front, and I appoint you Viceroy of the Caucasus and Commander-in-Chief of the valiant Caucasian Army.

I express to your Imperial Highness my profound gratitude and that of the country for your labours during the war.

(Signed) NICHOLAS.

The references to the Grand Duke's bravery as a soldier and to the confidence with which he had inspired the country and the army were as well placed as they were gracious; for he had conducted the inevitable retirement

PRIEST SPRINKLING RUSSIAN TROOPS WITH HOLY WATER.

of his armies from position to position, through weary months, with rare skill and fortitude, and it was no ordinary achievement to have kept up as he did the discipline and the confidence of all, and to hand over an unbroken army at the end. Of even more interest, however, from the point of view of the Armenian command, was the admission that the anxieties of the western campaign had during the summer diverted the attention of the higher authorities from the situation on the southern front—that is to say, in the Caucasus. There had, as we have seen, been no lack of dash and energy in the local command in that quarter, but there was evidently no one at Tiflis, the seat of the provincial army administration, with sufficient influence and vigour to make his demands heard at the War Ministry in Petrograd. The Grand Duke Nicholas, both as an Imperial Prince and as a soldier of forty years' experience, who had held the highest commands, was in a very different position from that of Count Vorontsoff-Dashkoff, and the new impulse soon began to make itself felt throughout the Caucasian command.

As usual when under German instruction, the Turks endeavoured to meet the threatened fresh Russian offensive by forestalling it. No sooner was the Grand Duke's appointment announced than they began to assume the offensive at various points on the front. Fighting had, to some extent, been carried on all the summer in the Lake Van district, and also at Olty, in the Chorok valley, and in the coast districts. In all these directions increased activity was shown, although without much vigour or success. In the six months or more that had elapsed large numbers of reservists and fresh troops had arrived and a considerable army had been assembled along a front which began in the north thirteen to twenty miles west of the Russian frontier, and passed south and west to Lake Van. It was estimated, on good information, that the enemy's forces were distributed approximately as follows: North of the Chorok were placed eighteen battalions—all that were left—of the First, Second, and Fourth Corps; forty-two battalions of the Tenth and Twelfth Corps, and seventy battalions of the Ninth and Eleventh Corps were in the centre; forty battalions of the Thirteenth Corps were on the Euphrates, north of Lake Van, and thirty battalions of the same corps, with Kurdish irregulars, south of the lake.

This force of two hundred battalions, constituting the Third Turkish Army, should, if it had been up to full strength, have possessed a decided superiority over the forces of the Russian Army of the Caucasus, and its offensive at that period would have been a serious matter. But it was obvious that the Turkish army was deficient in everything—men, food, clothing, and munitions. The efficient watch of the Russian cruisers had prevented sub-

stantial reinforcements from arriving by Samsun and Trebizond, whilst the deficiency of railway transport—the nearest railhead, Nisibin, on the Baghdad Railway, being over 200 miles, and Angora, on the Anatolian line, over 400, from Erzerum—complicated matters still further. By the time the Turkish troops reached the front, according to the reports of the correspondents of the Petrograd papers, their uniforms were tattered and their boots worn out. And when winter comes on the cold on the high Erzerum plateau is terrible. Organized transport of food and clothing there was little or none, and the massacres and plundering of the summer had left the country bare of everything. As one correspondent reported: "During last year's campaign the Turks were much better off in every respect. In the prosperous frontier villages, inhabited by the industrious and thrifty Armenians, the Turkish soldiers used to find everything they needed. Now all the villages are destroyed, the Armenian merchants and contractors butchered, and there is no one to supplement the irregular Government supplies of the Turkish Army." Only constant reports of a revolution in Russia, manufactured with untiring industry by German press agents, added the correspondent, served to keep up the spirits of the starving and shivering Turks through that cruel winter.

COUNT VORONTSOFF-DASHKOFF.

Meantime preparations for the coming campaign were energetically pushed forward on the Russian side. The details of the Grand Duke's new Caucasus army were not published,

RUSSIAN AND ARMENIAN OFFICERS RESTING ON THE MARCH.

GENERAL MAP OF TURKEY IN ASIA.

but to the last he was still probably somewhat inferior in numbers to the combined Turkish strength, the best of the Russian first-line troops being still detained on the European front.

On September 28, 1915, the British Army on the Tigris had defeated the Turks at Kut-el-Amara, and was advancing on Baghdad. To facilitate this important move and to relieve Turkish pressure in that direction increased Russian activity was displayed in Persian territory. South of Van the Turks were attacked from the Persian side on December 1, and driven in disorder out of two fortified positions, whilst ten days later another Russian force carried the Sultan Bulak Pass and again opened the road to Hamadan, a body of Turkish and German mercenaries being routed with great loss. The Russians next took the Persian towns of Hamadan and Sultanabad, 80 miles to the south-east, and on the road to Ispahan, intercepting the telegraph wire connecting the German headquarters at Teheran and the Turkish troops in Mesopotamia. By the end of February General Baratoff had reached Kermanshah, 100 miles south-west of Hamadan and in the direction of Baghdad.

The British advance on the Tigris, however, had in the meantime received an unwelcome check at Ctesiphon when almost in sight of Baghdad, and at the end of November it was compelled to fall back on Kut. At the same time Serbia was being overrun by Germans and Bulgarians, and, worst of all, the Anglo-French force had to admit the failure of its attempt on the Dardanelles and evacuate the Gallipoli peninsula. This released a large Turkish Army, composed of the flower of the Ottoman troops, and some of these were certainly sent to strengthen the army in Armenia. But it was mid-winter, and even at the best of times six or seven weeks would be required to get the first of these reinforcements to the front. In these circumstances the Grand Duke decided to strike at once. In the coastal region, on their left wing, the Turks were still unpleasantly close, and at the beginning of the year steps were taken to occupy the lower valley of the Chorok and the Tortum district. This was successfully accomplished, and the way clear for the main advance. The evacuation of Gallipoli took place on January 9, 1916, and on the 16th the march on Erzerum had begun.

Kiamil Pasha, who was in command of the Turkish Army, appears to have been completely taken by surprise by the suddenness and vigour of General Yudenitch's advance, although their experience of just a year before ought to have taught the Turks that the Russians could fight in winter. A careful

AHMED FEVZI PASHA.
The defender of Erzerum.

calculation was made by a military correspondent of the *Novoye Vremya* at this time. According to this, the First, Second and Fifth Turkish armies were in the Constantinople district, Adrianople and Smyrna, and of these some 200,000 were released by the abandonment of the Dardanelles campaign. The Third Army, amounting to from 120,000 to 150,000 men, was in North Armenia under Kiamil. Two army corps were in Mesopotamia. The rest of the Turkish strength was in Syria, Arabia and Suez, the design of an invasion in force of Egypt not having been given up. Kiamil, as we have seen, had distributed his men so as to hold a line stretching from the Black Sea down to the south of Lake Van. The main point of defence, of course, was Erzerum. This great fortress was commanded by Ahmed Fevzi, who had recently succeeded the German, Posselt Pasha, under whom all that German skill could do had been done to render the position impregnable.

Erzerum is one of the highest placed of cities—6,000 feet above the sea—and it is frequently snowbound for six months in the year, yet it lies in a hollow and is surrounded by high mountain peaks. Many writers have exhausted their powers in a description of the sublimity of the situation, but the best account for present purposes, because the plainest and simplest, is that given by the late Mr. Lynch* in his masterly and exhaustive work on Armenia:

> What the basin of Lake Van and the plain of Mush are to the southern districts of Turkish Armenia, are the plains of Pasin and Erzerum to those on the north. They represent depressions of the surface of the table-land, and constitute arteries of communication between the east and the west. . . . An invader coming from the East and desirous of forcing his way westwards will find all his roads converging on either one or other of the two strings of depressions. The block of lofty tableland, seared by the action of ice and water, and covered for the greater part of the year with snow, causes them to be deflected as by an impassable obstacle, though it is by no means impervious to an army during summer. . . . Pasin is one of the principal links of the chain of depressions which connect the extremities of Western Asia and facilitate intercourse between east and west. From the narrows of Khorasan to the fantastic parapet of the Deve Boyun it has a length of no less than 44 miles. . . .

* H. F. B. Lynch, *Armenia: Travels and Studies*, Vol. II., p. 200.

GENERAL BARATOFF.
Russian leader on Persian frontier.



MAP OF THE APPROACHES TO ERZERUM.

The height of the Pass (over Deve Boyun) is not more than 500 or 800 feet above the level of the adjacent plains. But the ridge is defended by a line of modern forts, and if these were captured the invading army would find itself enclosed within a space which can be swept by the fire from heights on the north and heights on the south. These positions, which have all been fortified since the last Russo-Turkish war, rest against the slopes of the parallel walls of the mountain, confining the depression on either side.

And it was this great fortress, unapproachable in winter and believed impregnable in summer, "by far the most important strategical position" in Asia Minor, reorganized and strengthened by Posselt Pasha, with an outer breastwork of forts on the eastern hills and with an armament, it was claimed, of over four hundred modern Krupp guns, not to speak of mountain guns, that was taken by General Yudenitch in the depth of a terrible winter, and within four weeks of the opening of the campaign! Little wonder that Russians spoke of Yudenitch as the one who "invariably gives his Fatherland only victories," and that the soldiers would willingly follow him anywhere, for "neither difficulties of access nor cruel cold and storms, nor the stubborn resistance of the enemy, could stop the impetuosity of our advance."

The great Russian forward move was spread over an unusually wide front, extending from Lake Tortum on the north to a point near Melazgert just north of Lake Van. Before the Turks were well aware that the campaign had begun in earnest Yudenitch had advanced 20 miles, and had struck with irresistible force against their main central position at Koprukeui, where the main road from Kars to Erzerum crosses the Aras river. The result was a striking victory, which soon developed into utter rout for the Turks, who fled, leaving behind them guns, munitions, and supplies of all sorts. This was on January 19, and on the 20th the victors were already at Hassan Kale, 10 miles farther on the road to Erzerum, and only 30 miles distant from the "impregnable bastion" of Asia Minor. "The enemy have sustained heavy losses," wrote a Russian correspondent, "and have left in our hands all their stores and artillery. . . . The disorderly retreat of the Turks shows that they have not simply retired to the shelter of the Erzerum defences, but fled before our irresistible pressure. Evidently the German officers could not cure the Turks of inclination to panic. Brave and manly fighters as they are in battle, once they lose faith in their resistance abject panic possesses them."

ON THE WAY TO ERZERUM: THE MARCH THROUGH THE SNOW.

Meanwhile Yudenitch's left wing was pressing the Turks back on Mush, and his right was driving the force opposed to him into precipitate retirement in the north. At Hassan Kale,

GENERAL SHEVALSKY.
Commanded the Russian right wing at Erzerum.

well situated for defence, the Turks made no stand, but continued their flight for the shelter of the ridge of Deve Boyun. On the 26th Yudenitch was before Erzerum with a force equipped only with mountain and field guns; in a country swept by constant snow-storms and with a temperature of 24 deg. below zero. "The Northern Column," wrote the Special Correspondent of the *Russkoye Slovo*, "had to drag their guns themselves while driving the enemy with the bayonet from a series of fortified heights situated above the clouds." In this quarter the Turks (Tenth Corps) fought with desperate valour. They were pressed from Tortum to the Chorok valley by the Russian right under General Shevalsky. Shevalsky then pushed on over the mountains, made his way into the valley of the Kara Su, or Western Euphrates, at Kara Gobek, and so threatened Erzerum from the north. Similarly the left wing, working through a roadless country, completed the movement by forcing the ridges of Palandoken, whose summits attain the height of 10,000 feet and command the fortress from the south. Such daring movements might have been regarded as insane under ordinary circumstances, but Yudenitch drew his own conclusions from the confusion in the Turkish Army, and with the true instinct of a commander decided that it was a time to "let everything go in." He sent back to his base for howitzers and heavy guns, moved his headquarters right up into

POSSELT PASHA (the third from left) AND THE GERMAN OFFICIALS WHO ABANDONED ERZERUM.

THE ATTACK ON ERZERUM: RUSSIANS DRAGGING UP GUNS THROUGH THE SNOW.

the fighting line, and was to be seen everywhere directing movements personally. The north-western mountain range, corresponding to Palandoken in the south, was Kargabazar. This, too, was in Russian hands before the week was out.

On the night of January 26 (continued the special correspondent of the *Russkoye Slovo*) the bold ascent of Kargabazar began, and the Russian troops succeeded in reaching the summit in face of a blinding snowstorm and intense cold. By a kind of miracle (the whole storm of Erzerum was a miracle) they even dragged up not mountain guns, but field guns! Camels transported shells for the guns, together with cartridges and food. On these "inaccessible" heights also arrived the flying Red Cross detachments and the tea-rooms of the Municipal Unions.

On February 10-14 Shevalsky's flanking force was able to join hands with the force

from Kargabazar at Fort Tafta in the valley of the Kara Su due north of Erzerum, and as Palandoken was surmounted on the 15th, the lines north, east, and south were complete. On the 15th nine of the inner ring of forts had been stormed, and on the 16th Erzerum itself was captured, the Turks in their retirement going west or south as they could find an opening to escape from the Russian guns. The city was nearly intact, and as the conquerors gazed on the triple ravine, the high walls and the three rings of forts bristling with guns, they may well have believed that such an achievement in such a time was little less than miraculous.

and routed, but there was still the possibility of further resistance to the north and to the south, for the much-needed reinforcements were coming up from Constantinople as speedily as the conditions of roads and weather permitted. No time was lost by General Yudenitch, an almost simultaneous stroke being delivered in the direction of Lake Van, where, on February 19, Mush and Akhlet were captured. Mush was one of the centres of the Armenian massacre of the year before, and its delivery from the Turk was thus doubly welcome. The place is, next to Bitlis, the most important in the Van district, the two being commonly spoken of as guarding the gates of Mesopotamia. The

RUSSIANS AWAITING THE ORDER TO ADVANCE.

Yudenitch's crowning victory at Erzerum was so sudden and so overwhelming that the Grand Duke Nicholas, whose labours at headquarters had been invaluable, was not in time to come up for the final triumph. He received the great news at Tiflis, where he was enthusiastically acclaimed by the people in the palace square. It was more than compensation for all the disheartening retreats of the previous year, and he hastened to send the following message to the Emperor:

> God has granted the brave troops of the army of the Caucasus such great help that Erzerum has been taken after five days of unprecedented assault. I am inexpressibly happy to announce this victory to your Imperial Majesty.

It was a veritable *débâcle* of the Third Turkish Army, whose centre was driven in

clearing of the right flank followed, and with the aid of gunboats from the Black Sea Fleet the Turks were pressed back along the coast to the left bank of the Buyuk Dere river. Another portion of this northern force marched up the Chorok valley and occupied Ispir, forming a connecting link across the mountains with the coastal force which was to make itself heard of shortly.

Thus protected, the central army continued its pursuit in most difficult weather, the men being often breast deep in snow. "Our troops," said one enthusiastic correspondent, "are pursuing, not the defeated army of Kiamil Pasha, but the wretched remnants of what was a great army some four weeks ago. After the capture of Erzerum only the wretched



ONE OF THE GATES OF ERZERUM.

remains of the army retreated in a westerly direction. Many battalions lost in killed, frozen, and prisoners as many as 90 to 98 per cent. of their effectives. We have seen battalions of which only a few dozen men were left. In one of the rearguard actions two Turkish battalions, one of gendarmerie and one of engineers, took part. The nominal strength of these was 2,000, whilst in reality they numbered only 100 bayonets. At another place, according to the statements made by Turkish prisoners, the Turkish rearguard consisted of the 11th Army Corps and portions of the 29th Division, nominally 30,000 bayonets and 40 guns, but in reality of only 3,000 men and eight guns." These contemporary accounts by eye-witnesses, however, although valuable as conveying impressions, have always to be regarded with caution where figures are concerned, and it is probable that the total losses in man power of the Third Army in these disastrous weeks did not exceed 50,000.

General Yudenitch, the leader of this Napoleonic campaign—in which the captures of Trebizond, Baiburt, Gumushkhane, and Erzinjan had yet to come—was not a "limelight general." He did not figure largely in the telegrams, and little appeared about him in the Western European papers. "An old

A STREET IN ERZERUM AND THE ROAD THROUGH THE CITY.

AFTER ERZERUM: THE TURKISH ROUT.

Caucasian" who had served under him wrote thus of his chief in the *Novoye Vremya*:

Whoever has had an opportunity of closely watching the activity of this general, whoever has examined even superficially the Caucasian operations, will never say that our successes are only an affair of chance and the fortunate trend of circumstances. It is not by chance that the Caucasian army, at the necessary time and on the necessary spot, always proves superior and always beats the foe. It is the result of creative labour: it is military talent of the first order.

General Yudenitch is of medium height, a compactly built, strong man, with long reddish, drooping moustache—the type of old general of the times of the conquest of the Caucasus. But this is from the outside. Under a stern exterior lies a rarely delicate and soft heart. He is unusually responsive. And everybody who has had anything to do with him, who has gone to him without ulterior motives—he is a great reader of character and divines men—unfailingly speaks of him as a man surprisingly simple and accessible. There is absolutely no affectation about him. Those marks of special respect which are paid to him by immoderately polite gentlemen weary him. His closest co-workers never feel about them the presence of a "great" general with tremendous authority. Among them he is just such a worker as they—persevering, concentrated, and deeply penetrating

into every detail. Prolonged work and effort have not erased the colours from his mind, which has preserved its youthful freshness, gloss, and acute receptiveness. In his relations with men he has never yet said a harsh and offensive word to anybody, although he loves to make fun and quickly seizes the comic side of everything; but his laughter does not sting. Himself sensitive, and even perhaps shy, he spares other people's self-esteem.

The Turkish method of dealing with the disaster was characteristic. The Russians had intercepted wireless messages from Kiamil to Enver Pasha imploring assistance, and warning him of the fall of Erzerum, but Enver and his German colleagues and advisers endeavoured to hoodwink Constantinople with bulletins of super-Teutonic mendacity. Up till two days before the fall of Erzerum they ignored the fact that their great citadel in the east was at its last gasp, or had even been approached. "Fighting between advanced posts towards the centre of the line," in which "hostile attacks were stopped by counter-attacks," was all they had to report from the front. On the day after the disaster there was "nothing to report." It was not till February 22, nearly a week after the event, that they casually mentioned that "for military reasons" they had "withdrawn without suffering loss from Erzerum to a position to the west of the city," after having destroyed "50 old guns which could not be transported." "As a matter of fact," they went on to say, "Erzerum was not a fortress at all, but is an open town, and had not the least military value." This was too much even for Berlin, which protested that Turkey had a right to learn the truth about the loss of "the sole fortified camp in the gigantic region of northern Asia Minor," and "strategically and politically an important basis of operations." Two days later the Russians published the official count of the booty: Nine standards, 323 guns, a Turkish fortress of the first class, large depôts of arms, munitions supplies, signalling, telegraph and telephone stores; and on the last day of February the story was completed by the following statement from the Russian General Staff:

THE RUSSIANS IN ERZERUM.

Cossacks on guard and civilians going about their business unmolested.

The fortress of Erzerum was the only fortified point in the interior of Asia Minor, protecting Western Armenia and Anatolia and commanding all the best roads of Transcaucasia and the interior of Asia Minor. For many years past great improvements had been carried out in the works by the Turks, with the assistance of the Germans. The *terrain* in front rendered it naturally strong, while it was covered on the flanks by mountain masses most difficult of approach and with their passes protected by powerful forts.

Such was the formidable barrier on the path of our offensive, with enormous defensive advantages on the north-east and east. During the five days' assault the fortress was defended by the Turks with a stubbornness to which the enormous quantity of killed and frozen

corpses gives testimony. The Caucasus Army succeeded in surmounting steep mountains protected not only by frost but by wire entanglements and other defences, and assaulted the fortress after an artillery preparation.

The assault on the forts and the principal position lasted from February 11 till February 15 inclusive. After we had taken the forts on the left flank of the principal Turkish line of defence, extending about 27 miles, the fate of the forts in the centre and on the right flank, and, after them of the second line forts and the principal defensive position, was decided on February 16 after short attacks. These fortifications, which were full of Turkish dead, remained in our possession.

During the assault on the fortress several Turkish regiments were annihilated or made prisoners with all their officers. On the line of forts alone we took 197 pieces of artillery of various calibres in good condition.

COSSACKS AT A MEAL.

In the defence works of the central fortress we took another 126 pieces of artillery. In the fortified region of Erzerum we took a large number of depôts of various kinds, which have already been mentioned by the Headquarter Staff. The exact number of Turkish prisoners is 235 officers and 12,753 men.

It is possible to estimate the force of the blow which we dealt the Turkish Army, whose demoralized remnants are now withdrawing in disorder towards the west, if only by the fact that some Army Corps of three divisions now only number from 3,000 to 5,000 men with a few guns. All the remainder have either fallen into our hands or perished in the fighting, or from the cold.

According to latest information received, Turkish officer and soldier prisoners, who were captured in the fortified district of Erzerum and in the course of the pursuit, complain bitterly that their Headquarter Staff was concentrated in the hands of Germans. The latter during the assault on the fortress of Erzerum were the first to abandon the fortified positions, causing a panic and disorder among the already shaken Turkish troops.

The great Russian advance west of Erzerum came to an end only with the exhaustion of the pursuers. In the south, Mush, as we have seen, had already fallen on February 19, and on March 1 the Russians were at Kamak, only seven miles north-east of Bitlis. On the following day Bitlis itself was taken, the mountain pass opening up the whole of the Tigris valley, and only 100 miles from the Turkish rail-head at Nisibin, thus coming into the possession of the victorious invaders. Here again the Russians found themselves confronted with terrible obstacles owing to continual snowstorms and severe frost at an altitude of nearly 5,000 feet. Bitlis had been an important Armenian centre, but there were few of the oppressed race left to welcome their liberators, the Turks and Kurds, under Djevdet Pasha, having massacred some 15,000 of them in the previous June.* With this success the whole of the Van region passed into Russian hands, and the connexion between the Turks in Anatolia and their forces across the Persian frontier and south of Lake Urmia was severed. "What is more," wrote one correspondent, "the Russians have completed another stage of the difficult journey, whose ultimate goal

* Vol. VIII., p. 380.

TURKISH STANDARDS CAPTURED AT ERZERUM.

is Mesopotamia and a junction with their British allies." A study of large-scale maps and of the position of the contending forces would, unhappily, have shown how far from probability or possibility was this sanguine forecast.

The Russian right wing was not less energetic than the left, and here, as we have already seen, they were assured of welcome support from the Black Sea fleet. The lower Chorok valley had now been cleared, and on March 4 the Turkish troops, pressed westward by the coastal force, suddenly found themselves taken in the rear by a new and formidable force of

ANOTHER TURKISH STANDARD CAPTURED AT ERZERUM.

RUSSIAN REINFORCEMENTS.

Russians landed from the fleet under heavy gun fire. The Turks were compelled to evacuate their positions and to endeavour to escape southward over the hills, losing prisoners and guns in the process. A similar operation drove the Turks from Mapavra, and ultimately, on March 7, the important position of Rizeh, only 40 miles east of Trebizond, was taken. The Chorok force at Ispir was now able to cross the high mountain pass between the Chorok valley and Rizeh and thus join hands with the coastal force. The combined forces then resumed the westward advance, and by March 8 the Turks were thrown back across the Kalopotamos, this bringing the Russians within little more than 30 miles of Trebizond. The doom of Turkey's chief Black Sea port now seemed sealed, and preparations for the evacuation of the civil population were hastily undertaken. As will be seen, however, more than a month was to pass before the fall of Trebizond.

From the mouth of the Kalopotamos, on the Black Sea, to Lake Van Russia was now in complete possession of western Asia Minor and the Armenian plateau, and a deep wave of depression passed over the Bosphorus as the news spread of reverse after reverse in rapid succession. As remarked by a Russian writer already quoted, the Turk is a brave and manly fighter up to a point, but if he comes to believe that fate is against him his resistance gives way. If the Young Turk officials and their German masters had only told the truth the situation was not so bad, for the Grand Duke's army—a small force considering the miracles it had wrought—was quite unprepared for a serious advance either on Baghdad or on Constantinople. Trebizond, Gumushkhane, and Erzinjan were still to fall, but with the occupation of that line General Yudenitch would be pretty well at the end of his tether without large reinforcements. And the supports from the Dardanelles and from Smyrna that were now coming up to the Turks were much greater than any that were within sight of the Caucasus. But the Turks did not know this, and they had been lied to so systematically by Enver Pasha and his clique that they were now prepared to believe the worst. There had always been an anti-German and anti-Enver party at Constantinople, and the feeling that they had been tricked into the war for the benefit of Germany found many exponents. The murder of Prince Yussuf, the Turkish Heir-apparent (February, 1916), robbed Enver of his

best-hated rival, and the evacuation of Gallipoli gave natural satisfaction, but the disastrous collapse of the Armenian campaign, which had been initiated by Enver himself, reduced his popularity to the lowest ebb. Talaat and Enver were jealous rivals, and the Germans retained their supremacy by playing one against the other, and the Old Turks against both.

The delay in sending urgently-wanted reinforcements to Armenia was another cause of difference in Constantinople. After Gallipoli some 60,000 troops, of the best in the Turkish Army, had been sent to Adrianople, where the Germans wanted them, instead of to Erzinjan, where their arrival might have turned the scale against the Russian Army, weakened by its terrible and unceasing exertions since the middle of January. Nor did the Turks of any group regard with satisfaction the growth in power and importance of Bulgaria, especially having in memory the terms of the Kaiser's Nish speech (January 18), with its references to the coming glories of King Ferdinand. With the "conquest of Egypt" a hopeless fiasco, with Arabia in rebellion, and Syria inclined to follow her example, while all Armenia was lost, and Mesopotamia bound sooner or later to go the same way, it was little consolation to any patriotic Turk to know that the Sultan's best troops were being concentrated to fight Germany's battles in Russia or on the Danube. A Constantinople correspondent of a Cairo paper, the *Mokattam*, was responsible for the statement that deputies were at this time sent secretly to Switzerland and France to discuss a separate peace for Turkey and empowered to make large concessions.

Enver and Talaat, wrote this correspondent, have lost their popularity and bombast. Formerly, when Enver drove about, the people would line the streets and salute him as the hero of Turkey, but now, especially since the death of Prince Yussuf, he drives at full speed and unacknowledged. Talaat, who used to boast that his life was perfectly safe, recently had three shots fired at him, which missed, but killed his secretary; now he only rides fully escorted. The population is furious with the Committee and the Germans, and the narrator instances the most recent Friday sermon in Santa Sophia, when the preacher ended his prayer for the preservation of the Caliph with the invocation: "Vengeance on the Germans and the Committee."

A British entry into Baghdad, coming on top of the events in Armenia, Egypt and Arabia, would have turned the scale and shortened the war in its Eastern developments, but Kut fell at the end of April, and the Turco-German régime in Constantinople received a fresh lease of life.

In Petrograd, naturally, the elation was in proportion to the depression in Constantinople, and rosy dreams were again formed of an early march on the Bosphorus and Mesopotamia. One Russian journal confidently expected "very soon to see our Cossack horses drinking the waters of the great river," whilst another

TURKISH PRISONERS IN A CONCENTRATION CAMP.



MAP OF THE APPROACHES TO TREBIZOND.

expounded an elaborate programme which involved the abandonment of the Salonika campaign, and the landing of an Anglo-French force of 250,000 men at Smyrna, a step which would not merely help the Russian army in Asia Minor, but afford it a new base.

No matter how much we strengthen further our Caucasian Army, an independent advance on Constantinople would present for it almost insurmountable difficulties in view of the great distance of the operating base, the great length of the lines of communication, and the lack of good roads. The sea line of communication with South Russia could only play an auxiliary part. The situation would be quite different if a strong Anglo-French force were landed at Smyrna, etc. It is clear that with the appearance of our troops at Sivas, and a strong English landing-force at Smyrna, all the material resources of Turkey would be paralysed, and the further development of our operations against Constantinople would be greatly facilitated.

For the present, however, the Grand Duke Nicholas and his generals had to cut their coat according to the cloth, and be content with possibilities. Trebizond, the sea-gate for all Armenia, Kurdistan and North Persia, was the first point to make sure of. The remnants of the main Turkish Army had fallen back behind Ashkala and Mamakhatun in the direction of Erzinjan, and were endeavouring to make a show of defence for that important town, scarcely second to Erzerum in its strategic value for western Asia Minor, and almost equidistant from Sivas, Diarbekr and Trebizond. Halid Bey, who had shown himself a gifted and resourceful commander, was still holding out with a force estimated at ten battalions in the Upper Chorok valley to the west of Ismir, in the direction of Baiburt. Along the coast the Turks were sending forward all the reinforcements that reached Trebizond by road with a view to stopping the Russian advance, now only 30 miles to the east. At the same time an almost desperate attempt was made to reinforce and revictual the city from the sea. With the mystery of the condition and whereabouts of the Goeben and Breslau still unsolved the Russians could not claim the absolute mastery of the Black Sea; and one of the exciting incidents of these eventful spring days was the sudden reappearance of the Breslau, acting as convoy to a number of Turkish transports and grain ships destined for Trebizond. The Turks claimed to have sunk two Russian transports, and endeavoured to bombard the Russian positions on the coast, but, on the other hand, the Russians sank and burned a considerable number of Turkish vessels, and compelled the Breslau to retire. According to a correspondent of the *Novoye Vremya*:

Not expecting a long resistance by the doomed fortress, the Turks resorted to the help of the Breslau. This

imperfectly repaired cruiser, running a serious danger of sinking, paid a short visit to Trebizond, but being in no position to lend material help to the Turkish land forces, merely showed her speed and quickly sought shelter under the cover of the land batteries. Although the Breslau escaped with impunity, the harmless demonstration proved very helpful for our Fleet. Our patrol ships now know the real value of this patched-up cruiser and its place of refuge. The Turkish-German staff have hitherto carefully kept in the dark the degree of preparedness of the Breslau, and only their desire to cheer up the Turkish troops by a show of naval strength made them disclose their cards.

The endeavour to stop the Russian coastal advance on land was as ineffective as that at sea. In the upper Chorok valley and on the coast repeated attacks were made on the advancing columns, but they all failed, and April 7 saw the Turks attacked on the right bank of the Kara Dere, little more than 16 miles from the doomed city. The valley of the Kara Dere, which means "Black Torrent," is, we are told, locally known as the Valley of Hell, owing to its wild and turbulent character, and it was eight or ten days later before the Russians were safely across. The Turkish lines had been strongly fortified during the two months that had elapsed since the fall of Erzerum with works carefully constructed under German guidance, and at least 50,000 fresh men had been brought up from Constantinople to garrison them. In all, it was calculated that more than two army corps had been collected for the defence of the Trebizond district. On April 16 the Russians forced the crossing of the Kara Dere, after a fierce and stubborn action, supported by the guns from the Fleet, the Breslau being helpless to prevent this, and retiring precipitately on the appearance of the battleship Imperatritsa Maria.

"After Kara Dere," said an exulting Russian message, "our troops no longer marched on Trebizond—we raced there." The advance was so rapid that it is recorded that General Liakhoff, in command on this wing, had to change his headquarters three times within 24 hours, moving each time several miles farther west with the fighting line. It was evident that the dashing spirit of General Yudenitch had inspired his subordinates. Meanwhile, however, the Fleet was not idle. Having materially assisted at the crossing of the Kara Dere, it steamed westward to Platana, a port ten miles beyond Trebizond, and effected a fresh landing there. Taken between two fires, the Turkish resistance broke as at Erzerum, and the whole defence collapsed with startling suddenness. Some of the Turkish troops, it was said, never came into action at all, so bewildering was the simultaneous attack from the east, from the west, and from the sea; and before the evening of the 18th the Russians were in full pursuit along the Gumushkhane road. The garrison having departed, the Russian general was received at the outskirts of the city by a deputation of citizens, headed by the American and Greek Consuls. In a brief and energetic speech the general assured them that if order were maintained life and property would be safe. "Normal life in the city," he added, "must resume at once. Let the shops open and the bakeries resume work. Anyone guilty of pillage will meet with capital punishment."*

But what of the unfortunate Moslems? Mr. Lynch had estimated the population at 45,000, composed of Greeks, Armenians, and

TREBIZOND.

* *Russkoye Slovo*, April 22, 1916.

GENERAL LIAKHOFF.
The victor of Trebizond.

Moslems. And Trebizond, it will be remembered,* had been the scene of one of the most horrible and cold-blooded of the massacres of the previous summer, batches of helpless and unarmed Armenians, men, women and children, being driven on board sailing-boats in the harbour, taken out into the Black Sea, thrown overboard, and clubbed or shot as they drowned. There was naturally some danger of reprisals on the part of the now triumphant Christian populace, such as had occurred in some places in the Van district when the liberating Russians arrived. No Moslems had joined in the deputation—no doubt they were in hiding or had fled—but the general assured the representatives of the city that his warnings extended to Moslems as well as to Armenians and Greeks. The persons and property of Moslems, he said, should be protected as well as those of the Christians. He gave instructions, added the correspondent from whom we have already quoted, that a committee should be formed to organize the civil guard of the city, half the members of which should be Moslems. When some of the deputation demurred, saying that there were no Moslems left in the city, General Liakhoff retorted severely: "Moslems must be found."

This tolerant and humane attitude of General Liakhoff, which, indeed, was typical of the

* Vol. VIII., Chap. CXXXIII., p. 382.

THE SURRENDER OF TREBIZOND: THE WHITE FLAG.

actions of the Russian command throughout the Armenian campaign, is the more worthy of notice in view of the fact that, with the taking of Trebizond, there came to light for the first time some fuller details of the official participation in the massacres of Armenians there. An experienced and trustworthy *Times* correspondent* wrote that it was now possible to lift the veil of mystery that shrouded the fate of the Armenian population of Trebizond:

The deportation of the Armenians, which began in June, was carried out here as elsewhere in accordance with instructions from Constantinople. The leading families were the first to suffer. Some 300 of these received the order to prepare for emigration and purchased a number of wagons for the transport of their property, but four days after their departure all the wagons were brought back to the town. The emigrants had been massacred and their property plundered.

Other groups, each of several hundred families, followed. This process went on for some time, but eventually new methods were adopted. The police entered the houses of the remaining Armenians, forcibly expelled them, drove them through the streets, and locked up the houses. The whole Armenian population of Trebizond, numbering some 10,000 souls, was thus exterminated. It is hoped, however, that some hundreds of persons may yet be found hidden in the villages in the neighbourhood.

At Erzerum, where the Armenian population was considerably greater, being estimated at 35,000, practically the same programme was carried out. The proceedings, which began in the middle of May, were inaugurated by the arrest and imprisonment of 400 young Armenians.

Many families, after being expelled from their houses, were kept waiting for several days in the streets before being taken to their fate. At the entrance to the town the processions of exiles encountered tax-gatherers, who insisted on the payment of arrears of taxation, although the unfortunate people had left all their property behind them. Only a few artisans, who were required to work for the Army, were allowed to remain in the town. By the beginning of August the whole Armenian population had disappeared from Erzerum. Only the Bishop remained. On August 5 two police officers appeared at his house and communicated the order of departure. The Bishop had taken precautions to secure some horses for the transport of his effects but these were now stolen. He tried to purchase others, but at the last moment he was informed that he was not allowed to take anything with him. He was then removed to an unknown destination.

German officers stationed in the town and the German Consul manifested open approval of these proceedings. Among the spoils which fell to the Turks were several Armenian girls, and a share in this living booty was conceded to the Germans.

THE RUSSIAN ENTRY INTO TREBIZOND.

Russia's new conquest was even more striking and inspiring than that of Erzerum. That great fortress, grim and forbidding on its snow-clad heights, was a symbol of forfeited power; but Trebizond, apart from its importance as a port and a mart, presented a scene of Mediterranean beauty and luxuriance. "Nowhere

* *The Times*, May 22, 1916.

else," says Mr. Lynch, "is the dawn more essentially the 'rosy-fingered.' or the sea at sunrise the 'glass-green.' . . . The scene is the same that brought tears to the eyes of Xenophon, and was associated in the mind of the Emperor Hadrian with his first view of this shore and sea." The luxuriance and variety of the vegetation are remarkable.

> The outcome of these (natural) conditions is the simultaneous exuberance of the trees and plants which flourish upon the coasts of the Mediterranean and of the leafy giants of our northern woods. Side by side with shady thickets of chestnut, elm, oak, and hazel, groves of cyprus, laurel, and olive grace the shore. The wild vine hangs in festoons from the branches, and in sheltered places the orange, the lemon, and the pomegranate thrive and yield their fruit. . . . In the middle of the seventeenth century we are told of upwards of 30,000 gardens and vineyards inscribed in the city registers, and at that time the slopes about Boz Tepe were completely covered with vines.

Coming to topographical details, Mr. Lynch* gives some idea of the city itself:

> One sees a city which, in spite of the modern aspect of certain quarters, has lost little of the romance of the Middle Age. The earlier imprint on its buildings is that of the era of Justinian; their actual appearance is due to the Grand Comneni. A great sleep has bridged the interval to the present time. Yet the life of the place, such as it is, pursues the old channels and the throng in the streets is to-day not less heterogeneous than it was four centuries ago. Strings of Bactrian camels may be seen in the streets, about to start on the long stages which separate the seaport from Erzerum and Tabriz. The peoples of Asia and Europe still meet in the bazaars.

Trebizond is older than Rome. It was already ancient in 401 B.C., when Xenophon reached it with his Ten Thousand after their long retreat from Cynaxa, and the place is still shown at the mouth of the Pyxitis where he pitched his camp and where he rested for 30 days and celebrated the gymnic games. Long afterwards it was a Roman colony, and Hadrian is claimed as the builder of the harbour. From the fourteenth century to the middle of the fifteenth it was the capital of the Empire of the Comneni—"Emperors of the Romans, Lords of all Anatolia, Georgia, and the Transmarine." With the coming of Mohammed II., in 1462, its ancient glories departed, but not even the Turks could altogether destroy it as the Black Sea gateway of commerce for the East, and the coming of the railway to the northern coast of Asia Minor, under Russian auspices, will doubtless do something to restore its importance.

As in the case of Erzerum, the Turks were coy

* *Armenia*, Vol. I., p. 32.



FLAGS OF FREEDOM IN TREBIZOND.
The scene at the house of the Vali on the entry of the Russians.

LOADING CAMELS

in admitting the extent of their disaster at Trebizond. Two days after they had abandoned the city they issued a bulletin stating that the fighting in the Chorok valley and "on the left wing of the Lazistan coast sector" was "assuming a violent character." The enemy's attempt, it was cheerfully added, "has cost him heavy losses and has been foiled by our counter-attacks." The episode of the Breslau and the coast landings was dealt with as follows: "The enemy, profiting by the fortified town of Batum and by the intermittent fire of his warships, has repulsed our coast reconnaissance detachments in Lazistan." And on the following day, April 21—still harping on Lazistan—they continued the story:

Our detachments entrusted with the supervision of the coast in the Lazistan sector since April 11 have offered extraordinary resistance to the repeated attacks of numerically superior military and naval forces and defended step by step every inch of ground which it was in any way possible to defend. Our armies worthily attained the proposed aim.

Finally, on April 18, after they had forced the enemy to fight a battle which had bloody results for him, they withdrew in accordance with instructions on to a sector where they will have a new task to fulfil.

Since in accordance with conclusions drawn from the situation of the war the result of this operation in the coast sector could be foreseen, the town of Trebizond had already been evacuated by us. Six 6-in. guns of an old pattern, which had recently been stationed in the environs of the town, were left behind after being completely destroyed.

As a matter of fact, although the booty was nothing like so great as at Erzerum, the Russians captured at Trebizond eight mounted position guns, fourteen 6-inch guns, and a large quantity of rifles, ammunition wagons, supply trains, and other war material. This triumph was unhappily followed within 10 days by the news—inevitable and long expected—of the surrender of General Townshend and his gallant little force at Kut-el-Amara. This rendered futile all the chivalrous efforts that had been made alike by the extreme left wing of the army of the Grand Duke Nicholas and by General Baratoff's force in Persia—not indeed, as already explained, to approach or to capture Bagdad—but to relieve the pressure on Kut and the Tigris valley by threatening some part of the Turkish communications, and creating a diversion on their flank. This great service had been very effectively rendered, the Russian left wing being dangerously extended for the purpose, and now the release of the very considerable force that had been besieging Kut and protecting Baghdad made necessary increased vigilance and activity on the part of the Russian generals. Within a few weeks after the capture of Trebizond General Baratoff, advancing from Hamadan through Kermanshah, had reached Kasr-i-Shirin, near the Turkish frontier, where he found himself confronted by a considerable Turkish force at Khanikin, on the other side of the frontier and in the direction of Baghdad. The situation at that time was very clearly put by a Russian military writer, who, even

COSSACK AMBULANCE CONVOY.

after the Kut disaster, still clung to the idea of an early British advance on Baghdad:

The distance between Kut-el-Amara and Baghdad is about a hundred miles, roughly the same as between Baghdad and Kasr-i-Shirin, where our advance guard is at present. Our troops are now seriously threatening the Turkish Mesopotamian Army, which has not succeeded in bringing up its main reinforcements to Baghdad. The Mesopotamian Army, basing on Baghdad, is limited in its manœuvring, and cannot advance from Kut-el-Amara direct towards Khanikin. The Turks will have, therefore, to parry General Baratoff's energetic thrust by bringing up from their southern front via Baghdad the forces which have been released by the surrender of General Townshend. This will facilitate the English advance along the Tigris through Kut-el-Amara on Baghdad.

In reality General Baratoff's spirited advance was no more than a demonstration, which had lost all its opportuneness by the long pause now rendered necessary in the British operations in Mesopotamia. If we had reached Baghdad the Russian light troops would possibly have been able to join us there. In fact, by an extraordinary feat of dash and daring on the part of a detachment of Cossacks under the command of Sotnik Gamaly, General Baratoff did succeed in getting into touch with General Lake in the third week in May. The exploit, we are told, was "the talk of the Caucasian army." Gamaly set out with his sotnia with the simple order to "get into touch with General Lake at all costs," route and everything else being left to his own judgment; and his laconic and formal answer was, "Can." He chose the southern route, which was an extraordinarily difficult one, covering at least 150 miles, but it had the advantage of being free of the enemy, and the enterprise was successful. It led to nothing, of course, but it was a demonstration of what could be done in such a country by enterprise and resource. It is pleasant to add that the three officers of this gallant little Cossack force were awarded the British Military Medal, whilst from their own Sovereign they received the Vladimir Order. The rank and file were decorated with the St. George's Cross.

Kut having fallen, and the Baghdad advance being at an end for the time being, there was no further object in the extreme lengthening of the Russian lines either on the Persian frontier or south of the Van district. Simultaneously with the Kasr-i-Shirin advance another Russian movement against the Turkish flank had taken place across the Persian frontier to Rowanduz, 80 miles north of Mosul (the ancient Nineveh), and 200 miles north of Baghdad. The Russian forces were everywhere successful, in spite of repeated attacks from Kurds and regulars, and the movement on the Persian frontier had been, on the whole, a most successful achievement; but, for the reasons already stated, the Russians halted, and, in the Hamadan-Kermanshah district, gradually fell back in readiness for the counter-stroke that was sure to come.

West of Erzerum also, on what may still for convenience be called the Caucasus front, preparations had also to be made for a vigorous Turkish counter-attack. The Russian position at Trebizond was a peculiar one, and by no means entirely satisfactory, depending, as it did, on the command of the Black Sea, and not on the land communications in the direction of Erzerum. The only road along the coast was also controlled from the sea; and the Russian command of the Black Sea was not altogether complete, as there were still several Turco-German submarines unaccounted for, not to speak of the Goeben and the Breslau. The work of the Russian Fleet throughout was beyond praise. It patrolled over 2,000 miles of coast line, forwarding the passage of Russian supplies and preventing the passage of Turkish supplies. It bombarded Turkish camps and dispersed bodies of troops, and finally it effected the two important armed landings that were absolutely essential to the capture of Trebizond. But its command of the sea was not unchallenged, and so long as a good portion of the road between Erzerum and Trebizond was in the hands of the enemy the situation could not be regarded with complacency, especially in view of large Turkish reinforcements. The capture of Baiburt and Gumushkhane, 60 and 100 miles west of Erzerum respectively, was the first essential thing, and this was now taken in hand.

The Turks, however, were the first to assume the offensive, and that in a slightly different direction. The road from Erzerum runs due west till near Ashkala, about 30 miles off, and then forks, one route going north-east across the mountains to Baiburt and Gumushkhane, the other continuing westward down the valley of the Kara Su, or Phrat, or Western Euphrates, as it is variously called, to Mamakhatun and Erzinjan. The main Turkish reinforcements in this quarter appear to have been directed at first to Erzinjan and Diarbekr. Forgetful of their previous statement that



FORT OUTSIDE THE CITY OF VAN.

Erzerum was an "open town" and "had not the least military value," the Turks now declared that it was the key of the situation; that it must be retaken at all costs, and the Russians thrown back across the frontier. The Russians, as already stated, had taken Ashkala, and their outposts were at Mamakhatun.

On May 11 fighting was reported to the south-east of Mamakhatun and south of the Tusla river, the Turks claiming the victory. Two days later the Russian bulletin stated that: "In the direction of Erzinjan detachments of our regular troops, in conjunction with our territorial reserves, following a merciless night attack, powerfully organized by the enemy, on the lofty range which dominates the whole adjoining region, took prisoners 30 officers and 365 soldiers of the Turkish infantry. Our troops forming the advanced guard easily gained the better of the enemy offensive in the region of Mamakhatun, halfway between Erzerum and Erzinjan." But on the following day it was admitted that "in the region of Ashkala in the direction of Erzinjan the Turks, after assembling very large forces, took the offensive and after a furious battle, which lasted the whole day, succeeded in forcing back our advanced posts in places, but they were then compelled to cease their offensive owing to the extremely severe losses they had suffered by our fire." Obstinate fighting continued, and, finally, on June 1 the Russians admitted that they had withdrawn from Mamakhatun in face of simultaneous attacks and a threatened outflanking movement. The Turks contented themselves with saying that their offensive had been "successful," and that the operations surprised the Russians, who were obliged to retreat without offering serious resistance. A few days later the Turks claimed to have occupied positions east, north-east and south-east of Mamakhatun, and to have pressed on to within five miles of Ashkala. Here the much-heralded counter-stroke came to an end, and the campaign in that quarter resumed the form of sporadic and ineffective raids, while the Grand Duke steadily prepared for the next advance.

We must now endeavour to estimate the strength and position of the contending forces at the opening of this, the final Armenian operation of the summer, which, like the rest, ended, on the Russian right wing at least, in complete victory and further advances by the forces under General Yudenitch. At the opening of the year, it will be remembered, Kiamil Pasha's forces—the Third Turkish Army—consisted of about 130,000 men spread out along the Caucasus frontier from the Black Sea to the south of Lake Van. The first movement ended in overwhelming defeat at Koprukeui and Erzerum, the Russians throwing the Turks back in confusion, capturing Erzerum,

Mush, and Bitlis, and the Van district to the east, thus occupying the whole Armenian plateau and holding its mountain gateways to the west and the south. In the north, however, Halid Bey still held out with a respectable force in the Chorok valley, threatening the Russian right flank and blocking the way to Trebizond. In spite of a steady stream of Turkish reinforcements, Halid was forced back to Ispir and beyond, and a junction effected between the Russian Chorok valley army and that advancing south-westward along the coast from the direction of Batum. These two columns, supported by the Black Sea Fleet, then advanced and took Trebizond. The Russian line then extended from the Black Sea, ten miles or so west of Trebizond, through Ashkala to Mush and Bitlis and across to the neighbourhood of Lake Urmia

Opposed to this force, according to the best Russian calculations at the time, there had been assembled the shattered, but now reinforced, remains of the Third Army, with some 150,000 further troops of the best quality brought up from Gallipoli. Round Trebizond, in the upper Chorok valley, and between the Russian force at Trebizond and that holding Erzerum and Ashkala, there were six divisions, amounting in strength to about 100,000 men. In the Kharput-Erzinjan district there were about 10 divisions—the pick of the Turkish Army in Asia Minor. Threatening Mush and Bitlis, which after the fall of Kut do not seem to have been held by the Russians in serious force, there were about 40,000 men, the greater number south of the important pass at Bitlis. Some of these had possibly come up from Mesopotamia, where, between Mosul and Baghdad, there were still at least 60,000 men, not to speak of swarms of Kurdish irregulars. This gives about 40,000 men free to act against General Yudenitch's left wing and 60,000 to hold the Baghdad-Mosul line and to threaten the Persian frontier.

Opposite his centre and right wing General Yudenitch had a nominal 300,000 to dispute his advance on Baiburt and Gumushkhane, Kelkid and Erzinjan. Ashkala, Erzinjan and Gumushkhane may be regarded very roughly as indicating the three angles of an equilateral triangle, the latter place pointing north towards Trebizond. The country is very rugged and mountainous, but there are good roads from the fork near Ashkala, north-west to Gumush-

KURDISH SOLDIERS IN THE TURKISH ARMY.



BAIBURT.

khane and west to Erzinjan. To complete the list of Turkish forces in Asia Minor, it was calculated further that there were at least two Army corps in South Syria with designs on Egypt, and one in Arabia and in the direction of Aden. The general commanding against General Yudenitch's front, west of Erzerum, was now Vechtib Pasha, who had taken over the command of the defeated army after Erzerum. At that time its existence was chiefly on paper, but, as we have seen, it had since been brought up to quite respectable dimensions.

It is always to be kept in mind that the armies enumerated above were not necessarily up to anything like their normal strength. In the first disastrous days of the retreat before Erzerum the ninth, tenth and eleventh army corps had lost more than three-quarters of their personnel and nearly the whole of their artillery. Such losses are not readily replaced, especially in the case of a Turkish army hundreds of miles from railway communication and cut off from the sea. Large reinforcements, however, were on the way even before the fall of Erzerum, and within a week of the close of the operations in that quarter the first échelon had begun to arrive viâ Smyrna and Haidar Pasha, a more or less steady stream being kept up afterwards. And it need hardly be pointed out that a retiring army always has this advantage, that as it falls back it shortens its lines, while its opponent, until a new base is fully organized, has to transport all its requirements over an ever-lengthening line, not to speak of the men left behind as necessary to garrison every point gained and to guard connexions. It is doubtful whether the Grand Duke Nicholas ever had under his command more than 200,000 men, whilst Vechtib Pasha was able to dispose of probably 300,000 on his main front.

During all this time of preparation and calculation the Turks continued a somewhat spasmodic offensive at various points. At Trebizond, towards the end of May, a series of attacks began without leading to any very marked result, and the Russians countered by an attack in the direction of Gumushkhane, which dislodged their opponents from a well-organized position on the northern slopes of the coast range. Baiburt, between Gumushkhane and Erzerum, and Oghnut to the south of Erzerum on the Kharput road, were the real points of interest. Baiburt is at a sharp turn in the upper Chorok valley, and had long been a source of danger. Here some very vigorous fighting took place in the first week in June, the Turks attacking with "important forces," but being repulsed and their ranks broken with gunfire. This point is the key to the whole situation between Erzerum and Trebizond, but the Turks gained nothing by their effort. Meantime, the Russians had also to deal with the offensive from Oghnut in the Kargabazar direction. The force employed here was estimated at 40,000, and at first it met with some successes, but the end was failure. The intention obviously was to break through between the Russian centre and left, and interrupt communications between Erzerum and Bitlis. It was a carefully organized and dangerous attack, and the Russians most positively asserted that the Turks had the assistance of a large number of German, Austrian, and even Bulgarian reinforcements. It was the first indication of a definite strategic plan on the part of the enemy with the object of gaining a position from which they could threaten the flank and rear of the Russian forces at Mush and Bitlis, and, indirectly, tie up their advance on the Erzerum-Trebizond road.

Meeting with no success in the centre and south, the Turks again directed their effort against the Trebizond position in the extreme north. On June 11 they developed a strong assault on Platana, the port to the west of Trebizond, where the Russian fleet-landing in April had thrown the Turks into such confusion and brought about the collapse of the defence. Repeated Turkish attacks were, however, repulsed with great losses, 100 dead being left in front of the Russian trenches. Fighting continued from time to time in this region almost till the time of General Yudenitch's great advance; and about a fortnight after the first Turkish assault the struggle here was keen and fairly evenly contested. On June 23 the Turks drove the Russians from a fortified convent at Jevizlik, 17 miles south of Trebizond. They were driven out again by a Russian counter-attack. On the same day as the final Russian bulletin (June 25) the Turks also made a statement claiming a great victory, but the locality was so vaguely given that it is impossible to say whether this was intended to refer to the same event. On the one hand, having gained a real success, if a temporary one, at Jevizlik, it was strange that they should not claim it. On the other, the Russians made no mention of fighting anywhere else about that time, and the Turks themselves never alluded to the matter again, as they would certainly have done if a sweeping victory of the kind had really been won. A range of mountains separates Jevizlik from the Chorok valley where the Turks place their battle. The following is the Turkish bulletin for what it is worth:

CAUCASIAN FRONT.—On the left wing our offensive continues against the enemy positions on the northern reaches of the River Chorok. These positions are 15 to 19 miles south of Trebizond, on a lake as well as on a chain of mountains over 9,000 feet high running from east to west, in a region where the rivers have their source which divide the two places.

In an offensive, which has continued for two days with the greatest violence, our troops have conducted themselves with the greatest bravery, especially in bayonet fighting, in which they have proved themselves superior in all respects.

The rout of the enemy, who at certain points left their encampments behind, made our soldiers forget all their fatigues. Without awaiting the order to pursue, they joyfully began the attack on the remnants of the enemy, and thus extended the sector they occupied.

In this battle we secured rich booty, consisting of all kinds of armaments and war material, including 1½ million cartridges and seven machine-guns, which are now used against the enemy. We captured 652 prisoners, including seven officers.

In spite of the difficult nature of the ground, which

RUSSIAN CAVALRY IN THE CAUCASUS.

was favourable to the enemy, his losses are estimated at at least 2,000 dead. Our losses were relatively very small.

The only reference to fighting in the Russian bulletin, issued on the following day, was to the effect that they had repulsed by gunfire, "and in many places by hand grenades," attacks "in the regions of Platana and Jevizlik." When next we hear of Platana it is to learn that the Russians were advancing well to the west of it in the direction of Tireboli.

We were then just on the eve of the great Anglo-French advance on the Somme as well as of that of General Yudenitch on Erzinjan. But in the meantime hope long deferred was having its inevitable effect and producing a certain feeling of depression and of impatience in Russia. What were the Allies doing? The Russians themselves, it was true, were making a tremendous and victorious push on the Styr and on the Dniester, but elsewhere the outlook seemed gloomy. Desperate and almost continuous attacks were being made on Verdun: the Austrians were advancing in the Trentino: Baghdad and the Dardanelles had ended in failure: nothing was being done at Salonika: the suggested scheme for a change of base and an advance from Smyrna had come to nothing: the Turkish pressure all along the Armenian front and with superior forces was vexatious: in Persia General Baratoff was being compelled to fall back: Lord Kitchener had been lost on his way to Archangel. A leading Russian newspaper openly expressed its chagrin about the Armenian situation and the attitude of France and England:

> The great battle developing on our south-western front, where the fate of the summer campaign is being decided, has completely obscured the events taking place in Asia Minor. But, as a matter of fact, the strategic situation there has undergone a radical change, and, we must say, not in our favour
>
> After the abandonment of the Dardanelles and Thrace, Enver Pasha transferred his troops to Armenia and Mesopotamia. It has been found in many parts of our Caucasian front that the Turks are facing us in superior numbers. This is a great achievement, considering that the means of communication in the rear of the Turkish Army are very poor. The advantage of quick transportation of troops and supplies is all in favour of England and Russia, and, with a few exceptions, the Allies have to traverse only 70 to 140 miles of roads, whilst the Turks have to cover from Angora some 550 miles. Moreover, the sea frontier of Turkey is everywhere open to attacks.
>
> If, then, the Turks are everywhere allowed to make attacks, it must be accounted for by the fact that England and Russia are looking upon the Turkish theatre as a secondary theatre of war, and refrain from sending adequate reinforcements. Meanwhile, the more the world-war develops the more clear it becomes that the Turkish theatre is of the greatest importance, for a decisive stroke in this theatre would alter the general situation in Europe. We would, therefore, like to believe that the delay in sending reinforcements is purely temporary, and that our troops and those of the British are confined to their present task on account of the adverse climatic conditions in Mesopotamia and Asia Minor.
>
> The real situation in Persia is cloaked with darkness. We know definitely that Halil Pasha has left only a screen at Kut-el-Amara and transferred his main force, no less than five divisions, to Khanikin. . . . A farther advance on Baghdad has become impossible for General Baratoff's army, both on account of the adverse climatic conditions and on account of the British army in Mesopotamia having assumed a waiting attitude. Earlier in the day, about the middle of May, Halil Pasha opened an offensive with three divisions and our troops retired farther and farther into the mountains. We were invariably successful from a tactical standpoint in all the rearguard actions, but we had to retreat before the superior forces of the enemy.

The first definite news of the advance of General Yudenitch was issued on July 12, although the new movement itself appears to have begun on the 2nd of the month. On the 8th a handful of Russian scouts captured a height on the Baiburt road and took some machine-guns. The bulletin of the 12th speaks of "appreciable progress" between the 2nd and the 8th, apparently on the same road, with a capture of 1,800 prisoners and 10 machine-guns. The Turks were stated to be in retreat, throwing away arms and ammunition. Later on the same day came the news that the loss of Mamakhatun on the Erzinjan road was avenged, the place being retaken by assault. The great advance on Erzinjan and Gumushkhane was now in full swing, and promised to be as swift and as irresistible as that on Erzerum and Trebizond. The Turkish bulletins began to talk of "enemy counter-attacks which were repulsed throughout the whole sector," but the movements were not counter-attacks and they were not repulsed anywhere. It will be remembered that west of Erzerum the main road forks, one branch going north-east to Gumushkhane, and the other due west to Erzinjan. Each place is distant about a hundred miles from Erzerum. On the 15th Baiburt had fallen, the Turks retiring in headlong flight, destroying their stores and setting fire to the town.

On the Erzinjan road the demoralization seems to have been quite as great. The Kerban Cossacks in their pursuit at one point surrounded a detachment of the 49th Infantry regiment, which promptly surrendered. The haul here consisted of an aide-de-camp, 29 officers, and 232 men, with several machine-guns, the regimental records, and stores and

ammunition. The advance from Mush was at first equally successful, a whole Ottoman division newly arrived from Europe abandoning its equipment and tents and retreating towards Diarbekr. On the 17th, the day after these striking events, the Turkish bulletin, which had already admitted "fighting without any decisive success for either side," spoke of "enemy attacks in large masses which were all frustrated." Kighi, an important junction of road and river between Erzinjan and Oghnut, was taken on the 18th, and a few days later Kelkid, to the north of Erzinjan, also came into Russian hands. The capture of Mertekeli quickly followed, and left the road clear for the final advance. Meantime, on the Trebizond road, Gumushkhane had followed Baiburt, and with the occupation on July 22 of Ardasa, where the route takes a sharp turn to the north-east in the direction of Trebizond, the whole of the road from Erzinjan was open. The high ground near the convent of Jevizlik, where there was a mountain pass between 6,000 and 7,000 feet high, and where such severe fighting had taken place on June 23-25—leading to very conflicting bulletins—blocked the way for a little to Trebizond, a few miles north, but with the clearance of this district the route was open and the whole district of operations put into direct connexion with the sea over what was described as "the best metalled road in Asia Minor." So long as Russia retained command of the Black Sea, the possession of this road and of the port of Trebizond would enormously simplify the task of maintaining her armies in Western Asia Minor.

RUSSIAN WOUNDED TRANSPORTED IN A BARGE.

From this time forward even the Turkish bulletins cease to speak of the fighting in the Chorok valley, where since the very beginning of the campaign a most intrepid and resourceful resistance had been kept up by a small Turkish force. No details are available of the last scenes in this wonderful struggle, but once Baiburt and Gumushkhane were taken the whole valley was definitely "stopped" from the west. The Turkistan troops who had

THE OLD TRANSPORT: A CAMEL CONVOY.

been operating on the Russian side and gradually clearing the valley had completed their task when they reached Baiburt and Gumushkhane, although it is possible that some of Halid Bey's fine fighters made their way to Jevizlik and assisted in keeping up the resistance at that point. After this we read constantly in the Russian bulletins of frequent fighting "west of Gumushkhane," the Turks being the assailants, indicating a vigorous and effective force still in being in that quarter and in the Kelkid valley, which in some degree corresponds to the Chorok valley, running west and parallel with the coast for about 200 miles. Here the Russians appear again to have come to a halt, although along the coast they continued to push westward step by step. On July 23 they were at Fol Bazar, 25 miles west of Trebizond, which place they carried by storm, capturing many prisoners and a sacred green flag. Eleu was next reached, and finally Tireboli at the mouth of the Karshut river. The point here aimed at was evidently Kerasun, from which post there was a practicable road over the Gumbat range to Karahissar and Enderes, the possession of which would materially help in the farther advance westward from Erzinjan to Sivas.

The last stride on the road to Erzinjan has still to be mentioned. With the Russians in possession of Mertekli, almost within sight of the town and the mountain passes to the north and the south, there was nothing left for the Turks, following the example of Erzerum and Trebizond, but to beat a hasty retreat, which they did, throwing away rifles and packs in the utmost disorder. On June 26 Yudenitch, the ever-victorious, entered Erzinjan. The town was practically undamaged, and as it was the headquarters of an army corps, with extensive barracks and military factories, the booty was very considerable. The Russian bulletin was brief: "On Tuesday detachments of the brave troops commanded by General Yudenitch occupied the town of Erzinjan, thus completing the conquest of Armenia." It was a message worthy to rank with that of Murat to Napoleon after his march across Germany from Jena to Lübeck:—"Sire, le combat finit, faute de combattants." In three weeks General Yudenitch had carried the Russian front 70 miles to the east and had added two or three thousand square miles to his conquests. A well-informed writer* explains the situation at this point:

> Erzinjan (on the Phrat or Western Euphrates) was a place of great military importance to the Turks. It, and not Erzerum, was the headquarters of the Turkish troops in the north-eastern part of their Empire, being chosen probably for the purpose as lying farther from the frontier than the fortress. A glance at the map will show that with Erzinjan and the Trebizond Chaussée firmly in their hands the Russians are secure from any serious menace to their right flank for a long distance to the west. The valley of the Phrat (Western Euphrates) is separated from that of the Murad (Eastern Euphrates) by a range of almost impassable mountains from the south of Erzerum to a point farther west than Erzinjan. These effectually guard a force moving west from Erzerum from any serious attack from the south. On the north, however, it is otherwise. On this side lay the old Roman province of Pontus, formed of ridge after ridge of mountains running generally from south to north from the valley of the Phrat and, farther west,

* *The Near East*, October 20, 1916.

of the Kelkid, down to the Black Sea. When the time comes the advance on Sivas, rather less than 150 miles due west, where the climate in winter is much less rigorous than on the high plateaus to which the operations have hitherto been confined, can be undertaken under much less hazardous and arduous conditions than our Ally encountered in the opening of the campaign.

At Erzinjan the Russian advance was, as at Mush, Tiflis, Baiburt, and Trebizond, on the scene of one of the most horrible centres of Armenian massacre and outrage. Erzinjan, in fact, acted as the clearing-house of the victims who were being driven west, as Trebizond did of those driven north—the clearing-house to death! It will be remembered* how the converging convoys passed through the district along roads flanked from one end to the other with the corpses of their fellow-Christians who had fallen by the way. At Baiburt the proceedings opened with the hanging of the Bishop and seven other Armenian notables and the brutal massacre of many others, and then the "deportation" began.

The extraordinary feature of the fall of Erzinjan was that the bulk of the Turkish forces based on that town did not retire westward towards Sivas, as was expected. Instead, they swept south-eastward towards Lake Van, in the hope of falling upon the Russian left flank or of cutting the line of communications; and eventually portions of these Turkish troops penetrated far into Persia. The consequence was that in the south-east and the east on the Kighi-Oghnut-Bitlis-Mosul line, the winding-up of the Armenian campaign proved a much more prolonged and complicated business than in the Erzerum-Trebizond-Erzinjan triangle, which had been brought to such a speedy and triumphant conclusion by General Yudenitch. And the story has for the present to be left incomplete. Kharput and Diarbekr were much better situated for the forwarding of reinforcements from the Levant coast by the Aleppo-Nisibin railway than Sivas or Erzinjan, and from this quarter the Russians were all along in serious danger of attack on their left flank. In July they occupied Kighi as part of their advance on Erzinjan, but at Oghnut, 30 miles off, the Turks continued to hold a strong and menacing position from which, and from Diarbekr in the south, Mush and Bitlis were under constant menace. The danger zone, indeed, extended much farther east and right up to and across the Persian frontier, the district in which frequent fighting had already been recorded. It is also necessary to point out again that the British withdrawal in Mesopotamia, like that from the Dardanelles, greatly increased the difficulties of the Russian armies by releasing Turkish troops. The best account of the district is that given by the writer in the *Near East* from whom we have already quoted:

From Rowanduz westwards the country west of Lake Van is a mass of high and difficult mountains, crossed

* Chap. CXXXIII., p. 389.



ARMOURED CARS IN ASIA MINOR UNDERGOING REPAIRS.

AFTER THE FALL OF ERZERUM.

The Grand Duke Nicholas reviews the Caucasian and Siberian troops from his field automobile.

only by rough tracks. This region is well known to the traveller, and has of recent years been regarded with some interest as the headquarters of the Chaldean Christians; but it is wild and rugged and unsuited for the advance of large armies. The first practicable pass is that at Bitlis, where a narrow and beautiful gorge, through which the Bitlis river flows, leads down from the plateau to the plains. At its lower end the pass can be approached from either Jezireh and Sairt to the south—approximately the route taken by Xenophon and the Ten Thousand—or from Diarbekr to the south-west. The town of Bitlis lies at the upper or nothern end of the pass, and it was necessary to guard against the risk of Turkish troops debouching from the pass on to the tableland above. Fifty miles north-west of Bitlis lies the town of Mush, at the farther end of a large plain once covered with prosperous Armenian villages. Mush can be reached from Diarbekr by difficult but not impracticable routes, and 50 miles farther west the Murad (Eastern Euphrates) which flows through the plain north of Mush is crossed by the main route from Diarbekr to Erzerum viâ Oghnut. No direct advance by the valley of the Murad was to be feared, but from Palu and from Kharput routes lead to Kighi, some 35 miles west of Oghnut.

It was along this line that the Turks prepared and delivered a powerful counter-stroke to the Russian advance on Erzinjan. The fighting on and across the Persian frontier may first be dealt with in a few words. General Baratoff's daring and successful advance from Hamadan to Kermanshah and to Kasr-i-Shirin on May 10, 1916, where he came to a halt in presence of a superior Turkish force at Khanikin on the Baghdad road, has been described. It was from some point on this route that he sent a sotnia of Cossacks on their splendidly adventurous ride across the mountains to join touch with General Lake on the Tigris. After Kut the Russians fell back, and in August they were attacked by the Turks at Kermanshah, and again at Hamadan, which place the Russians abandoned on August 11. Afterwards the Turkish advance seemed to have exhausted itself. Bulletins during the autumn spoke from time to time of fighting with varied fortunes in the Hamadan district, but with no marked result either way. About the same time as the capture of Kasr-i-Shirin, another Russian force crossed the Persian frontier 200 miles farther north in the direction of Rowanduz, and there threatened the Turkish communications at Mosul, but nothing came of this move, which might have proved highly important in the event of the English capture of Baghdad and an advance farther north. The Turks delivered a counter-stroke from Mosul, and the Russians fell back.

It was to guard against surprises from the south as well as to protect the Armenians and to divert Turkish troops from Baghdad that the left wing of the Grand Duke's army made its fine sweep into the Lake Van district at the beginning of the campaign. It was entirely successful in its immediate objects, but as time went on and the Turkish forces increased the position in that quarter became a very precarious one. The Russians, however, remained practically unmolested in South Armenia till the great Turkish counter-offensive was delivered towards the end of July and the beginning of August. There was obstinate and sanguinary fighting round Oghnut and Kighi, and on August 3 the Russians claimed to have captured a Turkish position near Oghnut and to have taken guns and prisoners. Three days later they made a farther advance and captured some heights. But the great blow was being delivered farther south, and there was an ominous ring in the two lines at the end of the bulletin of the 6th, in which it was stated that "In the region of Mush-Bitlis the enemy assumed the offensive, but is being held back by our fire." The Turkish version was that they had taken the Russian first line of entrenchments, capturing two officers and 20 soldiers. A day later the Russians spoke of "desperate assaults" on Mush, and on the 9th they admitted that "heavy fighting" was proceeding "in the region of Mush, Bitlis, Van, Urmia, and Sinneh, as well as between Kermanshah and Hamadan." "In the region of Mush and Bitlis," it was added, "we fell back under enemy pressure towards the north." As a matter of fact, the Turks had retaken both Mush and Bitlis on the 8th, and on the 11th the Russians admitted the loss of Hamadan, in Persia, "under Turkish pressure."

After this the fighting till the end of the month was rather confused, and the bulletins contained very little information. We hear of "fierce battles" west of Diarbekr, and on the same day, August 20, of Russian troops successfully crossing the nearly inaccessible chain of high mountains west of the Bignol Dagh—troops apparently hastening from Erzerum to the relief of the situation north of Mush. Thanks to this timely help the Russians on August 24 re-entered Mush, where they took some prisoners, but no details of the fighting were furnished by either side. On the same day, "in the direction of Mosul," and near the Persian frontier, they "dispersed" the 4th Turkish Division, took prisoners the whole of the 11th Regiment—including the commander, 50 officers and 1,600 rank and file—also "nearly all the remnants of

the 10th Regiment, with two staff officers and 650 soldiers." The Russians also claimed to be driving back the Turks in the direction of Oghnut, where their losses were very heavy. Faik Pasha, commander of the 2nd Army Corps, was seriously wounded, and the commander of the 30th Turkish Division killed and the commander of the 12th Division wounded. At Bitlis also the Russians were attacking, so that by the end of August the Turkish counter-stroke might be regarded as having exhausted itself.

"Now that the chief peril has been exhausted," wrote a well-placed correspondent in Russia, "there is no harm in admitting that at one time the situation had assumed a grave complexion. The Turco-German offensive was ably planned by the young German Major-General Gresmann, and was based mainly on a rapid advance northward from Mush and the rupture of our centre east of Erzerum, whereby it was intended to force the evacuation of that stronghold, hurl back our right wing on the Black Sea and our left on Lake Van. Simultaneously the Turkish right wing pursued the offensive on a wide front from Van to Rowanduz, apparently with the object of diverting a large portion of our forces from Erzerum." Only at Bitlis could the August counter-offensive of the Turks be regarded as securing a definite advantage, the Russians having apparently had no immediate intention of attempting to drive them from that important pass. The Turks at Bitlis constituted a menace to the Russians at Mush and in the whole Van district, as well as a very obvious barrier to any connexion between Erzerum and the Tigris valley at Mosul—a matter destined to assume importance in the event of a resumption of the British advance on Baghdad. It was obvious that the first Russian move in a new campaign would be directed to dislodging them and thereby securing a free gateway into the Mesopotamian plain.

BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

CHAPTER CLX.

MECHANICAL TRANSPORT IN WAR.

INTRODUCTION OF MOTOR TRACTION—SUBSIDY SCHEME—MECHANICAL TRANSPORT BRANCH OF THE WAR OFFICE—MOBILIZATION FOR WAR—SUPPLY AND RECEPTION OF VEHICLES—PERSONNEL—ACCESSORIES AND SPARE PARTS—TIRE STORE—ORGANIZATION FOR REPAIRS—MOTOR AMBULANCES—THE BRITISH RED CROSS—HEAVY TRACTORS—ARMED AND ARMOURED CARS—LAND-SHIPS OR "TANKS"—AN UNSOLICITED TESTIMONIAL.

FROM an early stage it became a commonplace to say of the war that it was an "engineers' war." Probably most of those who employed the phrase had in mind the fact that it was on its engineering workshops and mechanics that the country had to rely for a due supply of guns and shells; but they would have been equally justified had they been thinking of the part played by mechanical traction in the transport of men and material of every kind. The petrol motor was, indeed, ubiquitous on land; and the motor-omnibuses moving large bodies of troops rapidly up to the points where they were required, the heavy wagons delivering food and ammunition to the men in the firing line, the vans of the light delivery type carrying smaller loads, the ambulances removing the wounded to hospital, the armoured cars bringing anti-aircraft guns to bear on raiding Zeppelins, the "touring" cars conveying officers to their duties, the motor bicycles of the scout and the dispatch rider, all alike relied on its power, not to mention motor kitchens, motor wireless stations, travelling repair shops, motor bacteriological laboratories, and other miscellaneous applications.

One of the surprises of the war was the extent of the terrain over which mechanical transport was employed. Whether in the plains of Mesopotamia, the jungle of East Africa, the deserts of Egypt, or the roadless country north of Salonika, motor ambulances, cars, vans, and lorries carried the wounded and conveyed the stores and ammunition for the Armies. To this must be added the haulage of guns. The majority of the siege artillery batteries were mechanically drawn, and the ingenuity of the officers responsible was taxed to its utmost by the exigencies of the situations with which they found themselves confronted.

Two outstanding examples of the value of motor transport may be given, although, striking as they are, they must rank as comparatively insignificant beside the aggregate of the services it rendered in the daily round of warfare. The first is the "taxicab" army which decided the Battle of the Marne in September, 1914, when General Joffre hurried out his reserves from Paris in motor vehicles and drove the Germans from the gates of the city back upon the Aisne. The second is to be found at Verdun. In the early days of that mighty battle the French, since their railways had been destroyed, had to depend solely on motor vehicles for supplying a quarter of a million men with food and ammunition. It was said that by this means an entire army corps was moved up in 10 hours, and one town

[Official Photograph

A MOTOR LORRY AS TRACTOR.

Bringing up a howitzer on an improvised track.

in the rear of the lines used to see 5,000 such vehicles pass through its streets every day, or more than three every minute.

Although in the first Balkan War a few motor units had been employed, and Italy had used some light lorries in her Tripoli campaign, the Great War was the first in which mechanical transport was of any consequence. In the last war in which Great Britain had been engaged—that in South Africa—a few steam tractors had been tried without any great success, but the petrol vehicle was out of the question, as it had been "emancipated" only three years when hostilities began, and had not reached a stage of development at which it had the least chance of standing up against the rough usage of the field. Yet even at that period a German officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Otfried Layriz, realizing that the deficiency in means of transport had been one of the difficulties the Germans had encountered in 1870, foresaw the adoption of mechanical traction on an extensive scale, not only for carrying food to armies so large as not to be able to live on the country, but also for bringing up the heavy guns required to overcome the frontier forts which barred the way to a rapid advance into the territories of neighbouring States. A few years later the great European nations were taking measures to ensure themselves a supply of motor vehicles for use in the event of war. For each army to maintain as part of its estab-

[Official photograph

A MOTOR LORRY CONVOY.

lishment the large number of vehicles that would be required was seen to be impracticable, and, accordingly, arrangements were made whereby the vehicles—or a proportion of them—ordinarily employed by private users should be available for the purpose. To this end subsidy schemes were adopted by Great Britain, France, and Germany, the principle being to pay an annual subvention to owners whose vehicles, held at the disposal of the Government in case of need, were of an approved type and were found on periodical inspection to be maintained in proper condition. It may be noted that Great Britain was able to arrange this subsidy on the lowest terms, France coming next in this respect, and Germany following third.

In Great Britain a permanent Mechanical Transport Committee was formed at the War Office soon after the end of the South African War. The first mechanical transport company was established at Chatham, whence its head-quarters were removed to Aldershot in 1904. At first attention was devoted to steam tractors, but ultimately these were discarded in favour of vehicles driven by petrol engines because of the undue visibility of the exhaust steam in certain conditions of the atmosphere and because of their need for frequent replenishment of their supplies of water. Gradually the Army, like the rest of the world, took to motor-cars, and petrol lorries and other vehicles were introduced into the military organization. The question of standardization naturally arose, since the difficulties of dealing with a heterogeneous collection of vehicles of different design and construction were obvious, and in 1911 the Mechanical Transport Committee took up the matter vigorously in connexion with the subsidy scheme.

Ultimately two types of lorry were settled upon, one carrying a net load of 3 tons, and the other one of 1½ ton. As these loads excluded the weight not only of the body, but also of the men on the driver's seat, with their kit, tools, and spare petrol, the vehicles nearly corresponded to the four- and two-ton lorries of commerce, and, in fact, their total weight laden was about 7½ tons in the one case and 5 tons in the other. Standardization was insisted upon, so far as possible, not only as concerns the controls, such as the position and throw of the clutch and brake pedals, but also in regard to details of construction, such as the position of the radiator and the provision of ball bearings and grease cups. Transmission of the power of the engine to the driving wheels by chains was barred, the live axle system with propeller shaft being required; and it was stipulated that all moving parts should be adequately protected from dust, and that the vehicles should be able to pass through water a



NATIONAL MOTOR VOLUNTEERS.
Inspection of cars by General Sir Francis Lloyd at Wellington Barracks.

foot deep without danger of stopping owing to the splashing of water upon their ignition systems.

For the heavier vehicles the maximum road speed was to reach 16 miles an hour, and for the lighter 18 miles; they were to be able to climb a gradient of 1 in 6 fully loaded, and their petrol consumption was not to exceed 1 gallon per 40 gross ton-miles. The diameter selected for the road wheels, which were to be of steel, not wood, was larger than was usual in ordinary commercial vehicles—1,050 mm. for the heavier type and 1,030 mm. for the lighter—the object being to take advantage of the fact that large wheels tend to reduce the tractive effort required for propulsion, while lessening shock and vibration. Rubber tires were required, for although steel tires are cheaper and last longer, their whole width does not come down evenly on an uneven road surface; this puts excessive strain on the axles, and also is apt to be destructive to the roads.

It was realized that with strict adherence to these conditions it would not be possible quickly to ensure a sufficient supply of vehicles, and an auxiliary and temporary subsidy scheme was instituted which, with corresponding reductions in the amount of the subvention, permitted the inclusion of vehicles which did not fully attain to the standard laid down. In addition, officers were stationed in various parts of the country to take note of such suitable vehicles as were introduced into their respective districts, and by this means lists were compiled of the vehicles that were available in case of emergency. The drivers were enlisted in a Special Reserve, and this arrangement, while it could not always ensure that a particular driver accompanied the vehicle to which he was accustomed, in many cases had that result. Plans were also drawn up for allocating the vehicles, whether subsidized or merely listed, to units of the Expeditionary Force on mobilization. Down to the outbreak of war this work was carried out by the Transport Branch, under the Director of Transport and Movements in the Quartermaster-General's Department of the War Office, but in August, 1914, there was a rearrangement, and it was transferred to the newly constituted Mechanical Transport Branch, under the Director of Supplies and Transport. This branch was entrusted with everything connected with mechanical transport, except that supplies of petrol were obtained through another branch, and lubricating oil and grease through the Director of Equipment and Ordnance Stores.

ARMOURED ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN AND AMMUNITION CAR.

Brigadier-General A. R. Crofton Atkins* succeeded Major-General S. S. Long* as Director of Supplies and Transport in March, 1916, and the Assistant Director at the head of the Mechanical Transport Branch was Lieut.-Colonel H. N. Foster, who had been associated with the subsidy scheme since its inception.

When war was declared the subsidized vehicles and their drivers were mobilized first, and then, since their numbers were insufficient to meet the needs of the Expeditionary Force, the balance was obtained by the impressment of the vehicles that had been previously listed and of as many more as were required. Thus it was that in the early days at the front the familiar red omnibuses of the London streets were to be seen mingled with the brightly painted vans of well-known commercial firms and the motor chars-à-bancs which had formerly ministered to the pleasure of trippers at favourite sea-side resorts, though later the brilliant colours gave place to khaki or dull battleship grey, at once more serviceable and less conspicuous. Drivers were obtained by asking the civilians in charge of the impressed vehicles as they arrived at the port of embarcation to enlist and accompany the units overseas, and officers, especially those of whom an expert knowledge of motor machinery was required, by granting commissions to civilian motor-engineers.

* Portraits of these officers appeared in vol. iv, p. 296.

LIEUT.-COLONEL H. N. FOSTER,
Assistant Director of the Mechanical Transport Branch.

But while the immediate requirements of the Expeditionary Force were thus satisfied, it was necessary to look forward to the future, when there would be immensely larger forces in the field, and to arrange not only for obtaining



BELGIAN ARMOURED CAR FITTED WITH SEARCHLIGHT.

[Canadian War Records.

A CATERPILLAR TRACTOR MOVING HEAVY GUNS.

greatly increased numbers of vehicles, but also for receiving them, dispatching them, supplying them with tools, spare parts and accessories, maintaining them in running condition, and carrying out repairs. The first step was to requisition the whole output of such British makers as were considered able to produce suitable machines, and here it must be remembered that a number of these were already turning out subsidy models, while others were making a near approach to so doing. Of course, it was necessary to permit some deviation from the standard patterns, but aided by this relaxation the factories responded well, and their efforts resulted in a very substantial weekly output, which grew larger as time went on. But although, owing to her greater development of the use of motor traction for commercial purposes, Great Britain was probably in a better position for production, at least so far as heavy vehicles were concerned, than any other belligerent, the demand was still ahead of the supply, and it was necessary to place orders in America. This, though unavoidable, was regrettable, if only for the reason that each new make introduced meant an increase in the complexity of the organization for the supply of spare parts. The task of those responsible for mechanical transport in the Army would have been enormously simplified had it been possible to have one standard model for every class of motor vehicle, to which every vehicle in each class should conform absolutely in every particular.

The output in Great Britain was facilitated and accelerated by the efforts of the staffs of inspectors stationed in the different districts in which the vehicles were manufactured. In addition to their duty of inspecting the machines in course of production and on completion, these officers helped the makers to obtain new materials and component parts, the absence of which was delaying the progress of the work. If, for example, a firm in district A gave notice that it was not getting delivery of material promised by a contractor in district B, the inspector attached to the latter district was informed, and at once took action with the object of ascertaining and removing the cause of delay. Possibly he found that the contractor could guarantee delivery by a certain date; in that case the manufacturer was so informed, and in the light of this definite knowledge was often able to arrange his work in such a way as to prevent his men from standing idle or not working to their full capacity. Information was also obtained which enabled labour to be distributed to the best advantage, a surplus at one factory being used to make up a deficiency at another.

For the first year of the war the main depôt for the reception of the vehicles as they came

from the makers was in South London, but as the accommodation there soon proved insufficient, a tract of land which in pre-war days had served for the display of animal transport in the shape of racehorses was secured for the purpose of mechanical transport in the western outskirts of the city. A great deal of work had to be done under rather difficult conditions to fit it for its new uses. The wet grass land was so slippery that the heavy vehicles could not grip it with their wheels, and in the rainy weather which prevailed the area became a muddy morass out of which they had to be hauled by teams of "four-wheels drive" tractors or by caterpillars. One of the first tasks of the Army Service Corps on taking possession of the ground in October, 1915, was to provide reasonably firm areas for parking purposes, and with the aid of ashes procured locally the lorries and men of the Corps quickly obtained a satisfactory result. A considerable mileage of roads of access had also to be made. The various buildings of the racecourse were all turned to good account in providing for the accommodation of the small army of men who had to make their temporary home there. The Royal luncheon room formed an admirable officers' mess; one of the public refreshment rooms served as a dining hall in which all the men at the depôt could be served with meals in the space of an hour, the cooking being done on gas stoves; the stables, supplemented with huts, provided sleeping accommodation; one of the public stands was converted into a store for accessories. The covered ways leading from the railway station were found to be of just the right width to shelter scores of vehicles, and, in addition, the officer commanding, Major T. R. P. Warren, with the assistance of the Royal Engineers, erected with unskilled labour alone long lengths of sheds with corrugated iron roofing, supported by steel columns embedded in concrete. A stable was transformed into a workshop for carrying out the running repairs on the motor lorries required for what may be called domestic purposes, and the electric power for driving the tools in it was obtained by coupling to a dynamo the engine formerly employed for pumping water upon the course. For the amusement and recreation of the men in their leisure hours there were reading and billiard rooms, as well as facilities for cricket, football, lawn tennis and boating, and a very creditable illustrated magazine dealing with the corporate life of the place was published monthly.

Apart from caterpillars and "tanks," all the motor vehicles of whatever class used by the British Forces passed through this depôt, and on occasion it contained as many as 3,000



A BRITISH ARMOURED CAR.

vehicles. On arrival from the makers new vehicles were registered, and their particulars afterwards entered in a card index with a separate card for each; these cards, being written up from time to time, enabled the whole history of any particular vehicle to be ascertained immediately down to the time when it was sent on active service. The same procedure was followed in regard to the re-issue of old vehicles which had been damaged in France or elsewhere, and returned to England for repair. The products of British makers reached the depôt complete with bodies, but those from America were in the form of bare chassis, and thus entailed an extra amount of work, since they had to be sent away to coach-builders to receive their bodies, and then checked in again. It was the function of the depôt to equip the vehicles, according to fixed schedules, with tarpaulins, lamps and other accessories, ready for the road, and at any time there might be seen in different parts of the ground rows of lorries, 15 cwt. vans, touring cars, and ambulances standing in a condition to be dispatched at a minute's notice, with their petrol and oil tanks full and even their radiators charged with an anti-freezing liquid. The American vehicles were parked in a separate area by themselves, and there one could pass along an avenue exactly a mile long with ranks of lorries and chassis on either side.

The supply and training of the personnel was another important problem that had to be solved. In the earlier days men whose zeal outran their attainments occasionally found their way into the ranks of the drivers, with results that were bad for lamp-posts and even buildings; but the employment of incompetent men came to an end when a large depôt was established in the south-east of London with ample facilities for the technical and military instruction of both officers and men, and when the passing of strict tests was insisted upon as an essential preliminary to active service. The question of military training for mechanical transport drivers and mechanics was at one time rather a vexed one, and it was argued that such men need not be trained as soldiers, or even armed. It was decided, however, that at least the rudiments of military training and discipline were a necessity, and these were imparted at this depôt. The technical instruction given there was not designed for utter novices, but, on the



A BRITISH NAVAL ARMOURED CAR IN BELGIUM.

other hand, the Mechanical Transport Section had to take many recruits who were innocent of the most elementary knowledge of motor vehicles. For the benefit of these a subsidiary depôt or school was established in the west of London, and there they were taught driving, largely by a staff provided by the London General Omnibus Company. As many as 1,500 or 2,000 men were under instruction there simultaneously.

When motor vehicles had to be dispatched from England, whether as part of the original transport equipment of a fighting unit, or as "spares" to replace casualties, the necessary men were drawn from the training depôt, and sent to the reception depôt where they joined their lorries or cars or ambulances, as the case might be. They then drove to the main mobilization depôt, whence after another inspection to see that the equipment of the vehicles was complete in every detail, they passed on to the port of embarcation as the officer commanding the mechanical transport depôt there gave notice that he had ships available to take them to their destinations overseas. The convoying of a large batch of heavy lorries—say, 100—is not so easy a matter as it may look at first sight. They started at definite distances apart, and their speed was supposed to be strictly limited. But the leaders, with a clear road, were apt to push on rather too quickly, and then a slight mishap to, say, the twentieth, might delay those behind it for a few minutes. When the journey was resumed, it only required turning to the left-hand instead of the right at a fork in the road to throw the whole formation into confusion, and by the time an excited motor bicyclist sent back from the head of the column had retrieved those that had gone astray, there might easily be a gap of 10 miles between the two sections.



A TRAVELLING REPAIR-SHOP.

But the task of obtaining complete vehicles and forwarding them to the points where they were required was simple in comparison with that of maintaining them in running order and providing for their repair in the inevitable case of injury or serious breakdown. The individual parts composing a motor vehicle are to be numbered by the thousand—in one car used there were about 5,000—and the mere quantity required in view of the tens of thousands of vehicles employed by our forces on the various fronts would have formed an imposing

total, even if all the cars had been of the same type, turned out by the same factory. But so far from this being the case, there were many classes of vehicle serving different purposes, and of each class there were many different varieties and models produced by many different factories. Now, though there are many fittings that are common to practically all cars, and some of the parts may be interchangeable between all the models made by one factory, the probability that a particular piece of, say, the engine of one maker's car can be substituted for a piece bearing the same name and performing the same function in another maker's engine is somewhat remote, and certainly cannot be accepted without careful inquiry in any system aiming at certainty of results. Hence duplicate parts had to be provided, not only in quantities commensurate with the number of cars in service, but also in variety corresponding to the multiplicity of their types, sizes, and makers. Even this was not the end of the problem. The various accessories and parts had to be so stored that each of them could be found easily and surely; precautions had to be taken to ensure that the part asked for was actually supplied and to establish its identity in the event of faulty or inadequate description; and constant watchfulness was needed to see that the stock of any particular piece did not run out—even to the extent of requiring a maker whose vehicles were no longer accepted to continue the manufacture of spare parts to meet the requirements of those he had previously supplied.

The organization for the supply of accessories and spare parts had its headquarters in London, and occupied four large stores, in addition to offices for the extensive clerical staff required to deal with the issue of material and the placing of orders with manufacturers; the latter function was at first carried out directly, but later through the intermediary of the Ministry of Munitions. Three of these stores were devoted to accessories and spare parts, and the fourth to tires. Everywhere there was orderly and methodical arrangement. In the spare parts store, for example, the pièces, varying from a small pin or screw up to a complete engine unit, were grouped under the names of the makers of the vehicles, and placed, with the exception of the heaviest and largest, in stacks of bins, all numbered and labelled. The bins were made of wood, with steel supports,

FRENCH VICTUALLING CONVOY.

and the partitions were removable, so that the size of each box could be varied to suit the article it had to contain. The construction was as cheap as possible, but at the same time perfectly serviceable. Inwards goods were unloaded at the ground level and distributed to the different floors by a lift, and when they had to be sent away the process was reversed, the loading bank to which they were brought being on the opposite side of the building. The contents of the cases in which the parts arrived were carefully compared with the lists enclosed with them, and the need for this precaution is evident from the fact that there were discrepancies in about 40 per cent. of those coming from one source which need not be particularized. The staff had access by one entrance only to the different floors on which stores were kept, and this was guarded by a storekeeper who could thus turn a watchful eye on their comings and goings and detect any unauthorized removal of material. A card index enabled the state of the stock of any part to be ascertained in a moment. There was a card for every part, and these cards, arranged under the names of the makers of the cars, showed the dates and numbers of the parts received and similarly the dates and numbers of the withdrawals, the difference representing the number in hand. Another entry showed the number on order and the date when the order was placed.

Large, however, as were the numbers of articles to be seen in the stores—sparking plugs alone, for example, might run into the hundred thousand—they did not represent the full total dealt with. The Home Depôt was not, physically, a clearing house through which passed all the motor accessories and parts required by the British forces at home and abroad. The authorities in charge of it had no desire to add to the congestion of the railways or encumber the roads—and incidentally bring themselves into disrepute owing to delays in delivery—by insisting that articles made, say, in Birmingham and required in South Wales should travel by way of London; and accordingly much material was sent direct from the producers to the users or to the port of shipment, the Home Depôt directing its movements without ever actually handling it. Many requisites for American lorries, for example, were stored at the port at which they were landed and distributed thence straight to the places where they were required. There was another method by which the amount of material actually handled in London was reduced, or by which at least space was freed for dealing with articles which it was necessary to store in London. Gradually the system practised, for instance, by the Post Office, of "Stores at Makers" was introduced, according to which the stocks of spare parts, though the property of the Government, were actually kept by the manufacturers. The Home Depôt was always informed of the amount and character of the material thus held, and could draw on it at will or direct it to be sent where required. To begin with, the store in London held spare parts for all the vehicles in use, both British and American, but by adopting the "Stores at Makers" system for the British parts it found room to meet the increased requirements in respect of American parts, the stock of which was, of course, more difficult to maintain properly, owing to the uncertainty of the ocean crossing.

If the stores of accessories and parts were striking on account of the complexity of their contents, the tire store was impressive rather by reason of its magnitude, for one tire looks pretty much like another, and thus the element of variety was somewhat lacking. Placed entirely underground, it covered an area of 2½ acres, and was divided into blocks like an American city by means of numbered avenues and cross streets. It was beautifully clean and brilliantly lighted by electricity—in both of which particulars its condition was different from what it was when, before it was taken over, it was used as a beer store. It contained every sort and size of tire used by the British Army—solids piled horizontally, pneumatics standing vertically, and outer covers hanging on racks. The blocks afforded an easy means of locating geographically the stocks of each make and size, and their contents were all carefully numbered and described. Railway sidings on the surface along each side enabled the tires to be readily delivered and dispatched. Each of them, not merely one out of a batch, was individually tested on reception to see that it was not defective in any way, and any chance of deterioration through long storage was avoided by a system whereby the tires in stock were sent away in regular rotation according to age. Tires wear quickly enough even on good roads, but with motor vehicles moving under the rough conditions of war in places where the roads had been cut to pieces, or perhaps did not exist, the wastage was enormous, and, accordingly, it is not surprising that the turnover at this

depôt was sometimes to be measured in scores of wagon loads daily.

As regards the maintenance and repair of vehicles, each Command at home organized its own garages and repair shops in such numbers and positions as could deal most conveniently with the vehicles which it employed. These repair shops were usually hired, not purchased outright, so that the State might have the less left on its hands at the end of the war; and they were supervised by one or more District Inspectors of Mechanical Traction for each Command, who in turn were supervised by a Travelling Inspector.

Abroad there were depôts of two classes—advanced and base—for maintenance and the supply of parts, not heavy repairs. The former were of the nature of retail shops which kept a small stock of parts; they received indents from the units in the field, to which they issued material direct, relying for the replenishment of their supplies on the base depôts. These were big receptacles for stores and accessories, and were replicas on a smaller scale of the stores at the Home Depôt in London, to which they sent their demands direct. To a certain extent they were supplied automatically, for when a batch of vehicles was sent overseas, a supply of spare parts was also sent for them, according to a fixed schedule, in proportion to their number. To begin with, this schedule was calculated on a 10 per cent. basis—that is, 10 complete engines for every 100 vehicles, but, subsequently, a 3 per cent. basis was found to be sufficient. Tools special to mechanical transport were also obtained through the Home Depôt, but those of a general character were supplied, like ordinary stores such as clothing, through the Army Ordnance Department.

[*French Official Photograph.*

A TIRE AND ACCESSORIES STORE IN FRANCE.

For the smaller repairs, motor workshops, fitted with a lathe and other tools, were attached to each unit, or if the unit was too small to possess such a workshop of its own, arrangements were made by which it could requisition one to attend to it on the spot. If the damage was greater than could be remedied in this way, and the victim was unable to move of itself, it was towed by a salvage unit to a railway station, and taken to one of the large base repair shops, which were fully equipped with machinery for heavy repairs. These obtained their material from the base store depôts, and could deal with several hundred vehicles at a time. If they were too fully occupied, or other

reasons rendered it desirable, the damaged vehicles were sent back to England, although this course involved the objection of double transport across the sea. In England there were two large repair shops for such cases, and sometimes also the derelicts were returned to the factories of their makers; whether this was done or not depended partly on the amount of work in hand at the Government shops, and partly also on the price asked for the job by the private firms, for a careful watch on the costs of repairs enabled the advantage or disadvantage of any offer to be pretty accurately gauged. Large numbers of motor vehicles of all sorts, as well as of motor bicycles, were repaired in England and sent back as good as new for a further spell of service at the front, though those which upon inspection were not found up to the mark were retained for use at home.

In what has been said so far, the functions and organization of the Mechanical Transport Branch of the War Office have been described mainly as regards the provision of means for moving troops and conveying their supplies of food and ammunition. But as the general purveyor of motor vehicles to the fighting forces it was interested in their supply for two purposes which deserve special mention—the succour of the wounded and the active attack of the enemy—or, in other words, motor ambulances and armed motor cars.

The motor ambulance may fairly be called a product of the Great War, for though it had been a familiar object in the streets of London for some time previously, the great part it would play on the battlefield was apparently not foreseen. But the inability of the old horse ambulance to deal quickly with the huge numbers of casualties produced by the intensity of modern warfare soon became obvious. The first tentative steps towards the change were

REPAIR-SHOP OF AN AUSTRALIAN UNIT.
Exterior and Interior.



MR. E. M. CLARKE,
Director, Motor Ambulance Department, British Red Cross.

taken about five weeks after the declaration of war, when a few members of the Royal Automobile Club put themselves and their cars at the disposal of the British Red Cross Society, and were permitted to go to France and help in the task of searching for the wounded and missing; and soon the nucleus of the first motor ambulance convoy was collected at Paris, by the same Society.

At the beginning of October, 1914, *The Times* opened its appeal for funds to enable the Society to provide such ambulances in greater numbers. The result was amazing. Within a week money had been received sufficient to pay for 143 ambulance cars, costing £400 each, in a fortnight for 372, and in three weeks for 512—and this although the first modest estimate was that 200 would "suffice to meet immediate needs." By the end of January, 1915, the Red Cross had sent 446 motor ambulances to various centres abroad, and a number more had been dispatched by the Order of St. John, which had joined forces with it in October. Towards the end of 1915 there were some 650 Red Cross ambulances in France alone, and a year later the number there exceeded 1,300. There were also others in other portions of the battle area, notably in Italy, Mesopotamia, where indeed they were the only motor ambulances employed, and in East Africa. Nor was this all that voluntary effort accomplished. Each convoy sent abroad not only contained, in accordance with War Office regulations, 50 motor ambulances proper, but was also accompanied by a complement of motor store lorries, motor repair shops, ordinary "touring" cars for the staff, and motor cycles for dispatch riders. Many motor ambulances were also distributed for use at home, and in connexion with these there were cars for doctors and nurses, for consultants hurrying from case to case, and for the officers in charge of hospitals, not to mention lorries for the conveyance of stores and medical comforts. Thus it was that at the end of 1916 the total number of cars of all kinds supplied by the Red Cross for the service of the wounded and sick approached 2,500. But it must be remembered that the Red Cross, in this as in other respects, only sought to be an auxiliary to the Army organization, and that the War Office provided great numbers of ambulances and other motor vehicles for the use of the Royal Army Medical Corps.

Though the bodies constructed for the first few motor ambulances were not a success, the principles of a satisfactory design were quickly established. The War Office standard specification provided for the accommodation of four patients on stretchers placed two on each side of a central gangway, so that a nurse or orderly could sit inside. In an older type there was no gangway, and therefore the width of the vehicle was less—an advantage in passing through narrow or crowded thoroughfares. The canvas awning in this type could be rolled up at the sides, but in the newer pattern was fixed. On the other hand, in the latter an ingenious contrivance permitted the frames carrying the stretchers, when these were not required, to be folded away so as to provide eight seats for patients. Many of the cars were fitted with a device which enabled the interiors to be comfortably warmed by means of the exhaust. In some cases special modifications were introduced to meet special conditions. Thus the Red Cross cars for East Africa were fitted with an electric fan and movable louvres or shutters to give as much ventilation as possible, and others made for the Admiralty were arranged to take cots instead of stretchers, the latter not being used by the Navy.

The purposes to which the motor-ambulances

A CONVOY OF MOTOR AMBULANCES
Waiting for inspection by the King.

were put may be divided into two main classes. In the first place they passed the wounded collected by the field ambulances on to the casualty clearing stations, and on occasion they advanced still nearer the front into the firing zone, extending themselves into the area of the field ambulances. In the second place they were employed to take the wounded from the ambulance trains which had brought them down to the coast from the casualty clearing stations and convey them to the base hospitals, and again from the latter to the hospital ships. The Red Cross in 1916 had five full convoys on the front lines, and these, like the one in Mesopotamia, were staffed by Army Service Corps drivers. The Army found petrol and lubricating oil, and carried out the running repairs; but the Red Cross maintained the convoys at full strength, and had to effect the heavy repairs for itself. The convoys at various bases in France, where the Red Cross undertook, at the request of the Army, the duty of keeping a sufficient supply of ambulances and men to cope with the fullest demands that the available number of hospital beds could make, were staffed, run, and repaired entirely by its own men.

At one base alone a double convoy was kept always in readiness in the great garage on the Quai, the ambulances being divided into five sections, each under a section leader. On the arrival of a hospital train at the station the Embarcation Medical Officer telephoned to the garage for the number of cars required: these were on their way in a minute or two, and before the first stretchers had been taken from the train would be lined up in the station yard on the other side of the harbour. As soon as a car was loaded the driver was told which hospital was his destination, and went off at a slow pace to reduce jolting, returning again and again till the work was finished. The later Red Cross ambulance cars were fitted with a gear-ratio that enabled them to be throttled

MOTOR AMBULANCE FOR NAVAL USE,
Fitted for cots instead of stretchers.

down to run slowly on top-gear, thus saving the occupants the discomfort of the grinding of the gears; their chassis being obtained from one American maker, the homogeneity of the convoys could be readily preserved, and maintenance and repairs were simplified.

Owing to the need for carrying out its own repairs, the Red Cross had several workshops of its own. The largest was at a certain port in



MOTOR AMBULANCES FOR EAST AFRICA
With ventilated roofs and sides.

France alongside the garage, and included three buildings, with an area of about 2,400 square yards. Two of these were used as repair shops, while the third was fully equipped with machine tools. Such operations as cutting and hardening gear wheels and boring cylinders were regularly carried out, with results as good as could be obtained in large works at home. There was a blacksmith's shop, with smiths' forges, brazing furnaces and case-hardening furnaces, and also a tinsmith's shop, with tools for the manufacture and repair of radiators, panels, mud-guards, and similar parts. Some 90 men were employed, and the number of cars under repair at one time was about 50. On the average, about five thoroughly overhauled cars left the works daily, with about seven that had required minor repairs.

In regard to the part played by motor vehicles in connexion with direct attack on the enemy, reference may first be made to the motor tractors employed for hauling heavy guns into position. For this purpose two types of machine were used by the British Army, one the F.W.D. (four-wheels drive), and the other the caterpillar. In the former, as its name indicates, not only the rear axle, as in an ordi-



SCOTTISH WOMEN'S X-RAY CAR.

nary car, but also the front axle was connected to the engine by a propeller shaft; in this way, all the wheels being driven, the whole weight of the machine was utilized for adhesion and the tractive power was increased, so that heavier loads could be coped with. The caterpillar ran on a track which it laid for itself as it proceeded. The general principle of its construction was that there were two endless chains or bands, one on each side, passing over sprocket wheels at the front and rear of the machine. The links of which these chains were composed carried on the outer surfaces pads or feet which rested on the ground. The sprocket wheels as they were rotated by the engine pulled the chains round, and while the feet in the centre were held firmly to the ground by the weight of the tractor, those at the back rose off it one by one and corresponding ones were laid down upon it at the front. The whole weight was available for adhesion, and as it was distributed over a large area the machine could travel over soft ground impassable by vehicles with ordinary wheels however wide their tires.

An obvious method of utilizing ordinary touring cars for offensive purposes was to fit them with machine guns, and it was not difficult to protect their vital parts with thin steel plates without detracting seriously from the speed and mobility which perhaps formed their best safeguard. In the early days of the war the Germans employed many cars lightly armoured in this way for scouting purposes, the only armament, however, being the rifles of the occupants. Later these improvised arrangements gave place to completely armoured cars of various kinds, in which the occupants were well protected from bullets, and the machine guns were carried in a cupola or turret. Anti-aircraft guns were similarly mounted on armoured chassis of sufficient power to give high speed, and with a supply of ammunition arranged in lockers. Heavier guns were occasionally installed in wagons of the lorry type with solid tires, a considerable thickness of armour protection being provided. As an example of the havoc that might be wrought by an armoured car with machine guns, an incident in the German invasion of Wallachia may be quoted. According



RED CROSS REPAIR WORKSHOP
At a base in France.



Official Photograph

CATERPILLAR TRACTOR.

to a German report, one German car, after surmounting the Szurduk Pass, advanced to Valeni, and, catching a Rumanian battalion unawares, mowed it down in less than a minute at a range of 100 yards with three machine guns, killing 300 and wounding 150. It then attacked the fortifications which were being constructed east and north of Valeni, and, taking the enemy under a flanking fire, forced him to retreat. But such armed motor-cars did not always have it all their own way. Sometimes their end was sharp and sudden.

The armoured cars of the kinds referred to were, however, at the best suitable only for skirmishing or outpost action, and, no doubt, the possibility of constructing more formidable instruments of war, able to "lie in the line," or even go out beyond the front, occurred to more than one mind. The realization of this idea was seen in the Battle of the Somme on September 15, 1916, when Sir Douglas Haig reported the use, for the first time, in a successful attack on a front of six miles extending from Bouleaux Wood to the Albert-Bapaume road, of a "new type of heavy armoured car which has proved of considerable utility." These new weapons were known officially as "tanks," the name having its origin in the fact that the department which was concerned in building them called itself the "Tanks Department" in order to draw a veil of secrecy over its proceedings. According to an official explanation given in the House of Commons, the idea of such machines was suggested to officers of the Royal Naval Air Service by their experience of the naval armoured cars in Flanders in the early days of the war, and after various experiments by them, Mr. Tennyson d'Eyncourt, the Director of Naval Construction, was instructed to undertake the design of a "land-ship" capable of carrying out certain definite performances. The officers at the Admiralty primarily concerned were Commodore Sueter, Wing-Commander W. Briggs, and Squadron-Commander T. G. Heatherington, and while the principal credit for the design rested with Mr. d'Eyncourt, the latter acknowledged the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. W. O. Tritton, of Messrs. W. Foster & Co., Colonel E. D. Swinton, R.E., Major D. G. Wilson, Mr. P. Dale Bussell, of the Contract Department of the Admiralty

Lieutenant-Colonel Stern, Captain Symes, and Mr. F. Skeens. Construction was begun at the end of the summer of 1915. Major H. Knothe, A.S.C., was responsible for the repairs of these machines.

The details of the "tanks" were closely guarded, but in time some information was allowed to be published concerning them, and, finally, illustrations, from which it was obvious that they were constructed on the principles of the caterpillar tractor, made their appearance. The special correspondents at the Front exhausted their vocabularies in efforts to find descriptive names and epithets for them. They were monsters, mammoths, Leviathans, hybrids between Behemoth and the Chimaera, toad-salamanders, echidna-dragons, mastodons, pachyderms. They were the Terror that walked by noonday, as incredible as a nightmare or one of Jules Verne's most fantastic imaginations—huge shapeless bulks like vast antediluvian brutes which Nature had made and forgotten. Bigger than an ordinary motor-car, but smaller than a labourer's cottage, they resembled in general contour a toad rather elongated towards its hinder end. They waddled and they ambled, and, limbless and wheel-less, they went with a movement as smooth as that of a snake, but majestic and deliberate as a giant tortoise—a mixture of pantomime and pure horror. Their armament was of the machine-gun type, their guns being able to fire in all directions, and against their armour-clad sides, painted in venomous reptilian colours to render them invisible, bullets merely struck sparks. In woods they trampled their way through the undergrowth, and climbed over or broke down barricades, contemptuous of machine guns and rifle fire; neither the brick walls of an ordinary house nor a tree of moderate size was much of an obstacle; and lesser obstructions were merely pleasing incidents in the journey, which they climbed over, as a

MACHINE GUNS MOUNTED ON LIGHT MOTOR VEHICLES.



FUTILE GERMAN ATTACK ON A "TANK" TEMPORARILY HALTED FOR REPAIRS.

This was one of the striking incidents which characterized the introduction of the "Tanks" in the Battle of the Somme.

FRENCH ANTI-AIRCRAFT MOTOR-GUN.

slug climbs over a pebble, or squashed by their weight and passed on. They crawled laboriously but ceaselessly over trench, barbed wire, and shell crater, and sometimes they would seat themselves complacently astride of an enemy trench, and sweep it in both directions, and all the ground beyond, with their machine guns. Like a ship, each bore a name—Delphine and Daphne, Cordon Rouge and Crême de Menthe—and the men called them Willies, Rhinos, Crocodiles, Humming-birds, and other less decorous names.

Entrusted with the purchase, at first direct from the manufacturers but afterwards through the Ministry of Munitions, of huge numbers of motor vehicles of many different classes and types for the Army and Navy, and charged with the duties of maintaining them in running order and supplying them with spare parts (which had sometimes to be brought from one continent overseas and sent to another), the Mechanical Transport Branch would have been more than human had it never made a mistake. But the observer who was permitted to see something of the internal arrangements of its depôts and stores received the impression of a carefully thought-out organization imbued everywhere with a spirit of keenness and hard work. The officers, many of them engineers and accountants in civil life, certainly did their best to deserve success, and their systems of working and methods of control were worthy of the best-managed commercial firms. The following unsolicited testimonial received

by the authorities from a private in the M.T., A.S.C., may be of interest in this connexion :

As a fairly large employer of labour I often wondered, before volunteering my services and joining His Majesty's Forces as a Tommy, whether the Army methods were as up-to-date and efficient as the average commercial firm, and I am afraid that I had what is probably the prevailing opinion that the comparison would not be favourable to the Army. However, after going through the evolutions necessary to be placed in the position for which a man is most fitted, I can assure the taxpayer that I have been astonished at the extraordinary efficient method they have in the M.T. of placing the right man in the right place. Of course, the first few days are trying to the raw recruit, coming from comfortable homes and feather beds, but in a few days they get settled down, and make the best of it with that good *camaraderie* and wonderful spirit that our nation possess such a superabundance of. But it is the question of organization that will appeal to the business man, and when I see, as I do daily, the large numbers joining up as drivers of light cars, heavy lorries, and steam wagons, mechanics, turners, fitters, electricians, coppersmiths, blacksmiths, body builders, and numbers of other tradesmen, all sorted out for their various tests on the day of their arrival, clothed, fed, billeted, I marvel that more is not allowed to be written so that every resident in this country may realize what is being done for the nation's future welfare, and an abundance of skilled labour assured, for the tests are most exacting. An expert at his particular trade is over each Department, and as the men pass through his hands he gives them certain work to do, they are then graded on their merits : if a man is genuine and passes his test, he is transferred to his unit as fit and prepared for work in his particular branch or section. But this is what will please the business man of the country most: recruits who are not quite efficient, but show promise of being good workmen, pass before the M——, who questions them once more as to their experience and ability; they are then placed on instruction for a short time, under the most skilled craftsmen, and are thus brought up to that pitch of excellence so necessary to bring about a successful termination of this war, besides giving us after the war an abundance of the most skilled men it is possible to obtain, and the industries of this country will benefit accordingly. No business man need fear giving a post to any man that has passed through his Army tests, for this is the hall-mark of efficiency, and although I have been in the trade for many years, and had long experience, both practical and theoretical, I can truly say the experience of passing through has been most instructive and valuable, for there are always new methods being brought forward, and undoubtedly the M.T. has the very latest. I am sure that if only the taxpayer could see and realize the wonderful organization that deals with such large numbers in such an orderly and scientific method, placing each man where he will be of the most use to the nation, they would be more than satisfied that their money is being well spent, and instead of a sigh of regret at parting, they would have a smile of grim satisfaction, knowing that it is helping to make the bite of the British bulldog deeper and harder than this world has ever realized.

The writer, who before he enlisted in the Army was the principal of a firm of engineers, evidently came prepared to curse but remained to praise.



A "TANK" IN ACTION. [*Canadian War Records.*

CHAPTER CLXI.

PRIZE OF WAR.

HISTORY OF THE PRIZE COURTS—FOREIGN PRACTICE—THE CONSTITUTION OF BRITISH COURTS—THE PRIZE LAW—SOME FAMOUS CASES—PRIZE MONEY AND PRIZE BOUNTY—CASES IN THE DOMINION PRIZE COURTS—CONDEMNATION OF THE CHILE—SIR SAMUEL EVANS'S JUDGMENTS—THE CASE OF THE KIM—THE ROUMANIAN—THE OPHELIA.

THERE is no more romantic aspect of war than the long record of captures at sea which go by the name of Prize of War. All the glamour which attaches to the toils of the earliest adventurers in the Mediterranean, to the deathless stories of the Spanish Main, to the wonderful battling of privateers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and in later days of the Chesapeake and Shannon and of the Alabama, rise into the mind as the phrase "Prize of War" is spoken or written. The valour of adventurous sea races, the moving accidents by flood and field, the racing by wind and water from clime to clime, signify everything in the history of France and Holland, England and America, Spain and Portugal. And no whit of the adventurous spirit was dead when the Great War of 1914 broke upon Europe and the world. It will be convenient as a footnote to the history of the Great War to consider the question of the Prize Courts, their practice and their significance, both as a matter of historical evolution and as an element of the first importance in the carrying on of a naval war of the first magnitude and for the purpose of reflecting the verisimilitude of that war. In reviewing the history and the current practice of those Courts it is necessary to keep in mind the fact that the Prize Court has always been the judicial officer, so to speak, of the Royal Navy, and has placed upon a legal and unimpugnable basis its action in dealing with the merchandise of the world in time of war.

The work of the Prize Court supplements the sea toils of ships of war. Dr. Coleman Phillipson, in his volume on *International Law and the Great War*, summarizes the long early stirring history of the Prize Court in a few sentences:

> The Prize Court is an institution of long standing. Its sources may be traced back to the later centuries of the Middle Ages. In order to secure protection against pirates merchantmen associated themselves under an elected chief, called the "Admiral," and sometimes their respective States sent out armed men to put down piracy. The piratical ships thus seized were divided among the captors according to the decision of the Admiral. In the thirteenth century an attempt was made by the European maritime Powers to police the seas. Later the expeditions of these armed vessels came to be conducted under the authority of letters of marque granted by the sovereign of a maritime country, who assumed jurisdiction over the captures effected. This jurisdiction was further regularized by the establishment of a board, designated the "Admiralty." In England the Court of Admiralty appeared in the middle of the fourteenth century; the first recorded case of a judicial enquiry before the Admiral occurred apparently in 1357. In France the office of Admiral was created in the latter part of the fourteenth century, and in Scotland early in the fifteenth. With the gradual development of the law of nations it became customary for the Admiralty of maritime belligerents to set up a special Court to investigate the legality of captures made by their warships or privateers. In this country an Order in Council of 1589 required all prizes to be submitted for adjudication to the High Court of Admiralty.*

* It may be noted here that the early French practice is to be found in Pistoye and Dunerdy's *Traité des Prises Maritimes*. A French Prize Court was established at Bordeaux in September, 1914, and in March, 1915, this was removed to Paris. The Russian Prize Regulations were issued on August 22, 1914, in the Bulletin of Laws. The Japanese Prize Regulations are in Vol. II. (page 416) of Russian and Japanese Prize cases, but they are slightly varied by an Imperial Ordinance (183) of September 10, 1914. An Italian Prize

The statement gives a general idea of the position, though it could be largely supplemented. In England, in the fourteenth century, there were Admirals of the West, the South, and the North; the King's ships were few; the merchant fleet was the chief reserve of vessels of war, and these fleets as called up passed under the control of this or that Admiral. A perpetual state of sea warfare against pirates, or coast town against foreign coast town, obtained even in time of peace, and the carrying in of pirate prizes was common enough.

But we must not confuse the Prize Court with the Admiralty Court. In 1782 Lord Mansfield in the case of *Lindo* v. *Rodney*, explained the whole practice of jurisdiction. In that case the facts were that on February 3, 1781, Sir George Rodney and General Vaughan seized the island of St. Eustatius, with everything thereon, and the question was raised in the English Court whether the goods being taken on land, though in consequence of a surrender to ships at sea, excluded the British Prize jurisdiction. The question of that jurisdiction had, therefore, to be considered. Lord Mansfield pointed out that the jurisdiction in matters of prize, though exercised by the Judge of the Court of Admiralty, was quite distinct. To constitute the authority of the Prize Judge in every war a Commission under the Great Seal issued to the Lord High Admiralty (now, of course, represented by the Board of Admiralty) to will and require the Court of Admiralty, and the Lieutenant and Judge of the Court, his surrogate or surrogates, and they were thereby authorized and required to proceed upon all and all manner of captures, seizures, prizes, and reprisals, of all ships and goods that were or should be taken; and to hear and determine "according to the course of the Admiralty and the Law of Nations." A warrant issued to the Judge accordingly. The monition and other proceedings were in his name with all his titles of office, rank and degree, adding emphatically, as the authority under which he acted, the following words: "And also to hear and determine all and all manner of causes, and complaints, as to ships and goods seized and taken as prize, specially constituted and appointed." The Court of Admiralty was called the Instance Court, the other Court the Prize Court. "The manner of proceeding," said Lord Mansfield, "is totally different. The whole system of litigation and jurisprudence in the Prize Court is peculiar to itself; it is no more like the Court of Admiralty than it is to any Court in Westminster Hall." Prize is neither a civil nor a marine cause, and the appeal from the Prize Court lay to Commissioners consisting of the Privy Council. Lord Mansfield, in the special case before him, held that the goods captured were condemnable as prize. The practice of landing from ships for purposes of reprisals had been used by Rooke at Vigo, Vernon at Portobello and Carthagena, Anson in the South Seas, Pocock at the Havannah. It was the practice in the case of the Elizabethan privateers to have Commissions authorizing goods to be taken by land as well as by sea. In 1745 there was sentence of condemnation to the king where "several purses of money and jewels, amounting to £30,000 and upwards, taken and seized as plunder in the town of Peyta, being a town in the Spanish West Indies, in the kingdom of Spain, from the enemies of the Crown of Great Britain, were rightly and duly taken by the officers and mariners of His Majesty's ship," and many more recent cases of singular adventure confirmed the judgment.

The practice indicated by Lord Mansfield obtained throughout the Napoleonic Wars and during the first half of the nineteenth century. Since the Crimean War no Prize Court had sat in England until September 4, 1914, when Sir Samuel Evans first sat in Prize. The question of Prize Courts and jurisdiction had, however, been dealt with earlier—in 1864, in 1891, and 1895; by section 4 of the Judicature Act of 1891 the High Court in England was declared to be a Prize Court, and all causes and matters within the jurisdiction of the High Court as a Prize Court were assigned to the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of that Court. On the hearing of his first case—the Chile—Sir Samuel Evans began his judgment with these words:

> I am sure we all deplore the causes which render it necessary for a Prize Court to sit again within these realms after the happy lapse of about 60 years, and as you, Mr. Attorney-General, have said, in times past, and particularly during the latter part of the eighteenth century and the early part of the nineteenth century, the English Prize Courts pronounced judgments and gave decisions which commanded general confidence, and received the admiration of all countries interested in the law of nations. Our predecessors have set splendid

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Court was established in June, 1915. By a Convention between Great Britain and France of November 9, 1914 (acceded to by Russia on March 9, 1915), a mutual arrangement as to Prizes was arrived at, granting (*inter alia*) the right of adjudication to the country of the capturing vessel, even if under the orders of the naval authority of an ally. See *The British Manual of Emergency Legislation*, Supplement 3, pp. 499, 501, 575.



A SITTING OF THE PRIZE COURT,
Presided over by Sir Samuel Evans, G.C.B.

examples and established high traditions, and the Prize Court of the present day, with the assistance of the Bar, will do its best—it cannot do more—to follow those examples and uphold those traditions.

In the case of the Corsican Prince, on February 22, 1915, Sir Samuel Evans tells us something more about the character of the British Prize Court. The Prize Court Rules have always been framed especially for the Court and made by the Privy Council in recent years under the Prize Courts Act, 1894, and not by the Rule Committee which frames the rules for the High Court. Rules were issued on August 5, 1914, assimilating the form of the proceedings to the course of a civil action. But when there are no rules the practice of the old High Court of Admiralty, or such other practice as the President directs, is followed.

The powers of the Court are set forth by Mr. Justice Story (who, said Sir Samuel Evans, "as an exponent on treatises and judgments



OVERHAULING A NEUTRAL MERCHANTMAN.

of matters relating to prize law is hardly second to Lord Stowell himself") in his notes on "The Principles and Practice of Prize Courts." He tells us:

> When once the Prize Court has acquired jurisdiction over the principal cause, it will exert its authority over all the incidents. It will follow prize proceeds into the hands of agents or other persons holding them for the captor, or by any other title. . . . It may also enforce its decrees against persons having the proceeds of prizes in their hands. . . The Prize Court has also . . . exclusive authority as to the allowance of freight, damages, expenses, and costs in all cases of capture.

Sir Samuel Evans went on to deal with the long line of legal authorities, American and English, that establish the position of the Prize Court, the Court which deals with claims in accordance with the Laws of Nations, and not merely in accordance with local or municipal law. In the Corsican Prince the President applied this wide jurisdiction to the case of settling questions between the owners and all questions between them and the Russian Bank and the Société Générale. No better instance of the large jurisdiction of a Prize Court could be cited.

Some reference to two or three early cases will show the Prize Court fashion of the great days of privateers and men-of-war. The first is a case that raised the question of the person or persons entitled to the proceeds of Prize. In March, 1758, when the Seven Years' War was in full blast, in Lat. 48° N., off Cape Finisterre, a French ship, the Pacifique, was taken by H.M.S. Windsor, commanded by Captain Lane Falkner. The ship was condemned in the Admiralty Court on May 6, when leave was given for Sir Edward Hawke, who claimed one-eighth as Admiral, to appear. He had been appointed by the Lords of the Admiralty commander of a squadron of men-of-war to be employed in Channel soundings or wherever else his Majesty's Service should require. Annexed to his commission was a list of the ships of the squadron, which included the Windsor, cruising between Cape Ortegal and Ushant. Sir Edward flew his flag on the Ramillies. Captain Falkner alleged that his commission was direct from the Admiralty, and that he was directed to cruise between Lats. 48° N. and 50° N. till he should get 120 leagues to the westward and to stretch off Cape Finisterre and cruise between Cape Ortegal and Ushant, taking care to return to Plymouth Sound within one month. He took the Pacifique on March 13 and brought her into Plymouth on March 26, and then received his orders from Admiral Hawke, who had sailed from Spithead on March 11. The Judge of the Admiralty pronounced on May 13, 1761, for the Admiral, and declared that he was entitled to one-eighth of the prize, but on July 28, 1764, the Lords Commissioners of Appeal reversed this decision.

This case raised the question of prize money. It had been dealt with by the Prize Act of Queen Anne, passed in 1708. That Act ordered for the better and more effectual encouragement of the sea service that if any ship of war, privateer, merchant ship or other vessel should be taken as prize by any of H.M. ships of war or privateers and adjudged as lawful prize in any of H.M. Courts of Admiralty, the flag officer or officers, commander or commanders and other officers, seamen, and others who should be actually on board such ship of war or privateer so taking such prize should after such condemnation have the sole interest and property in such prize without further account, such ship to be sold and the proceeds

distributed according to the shares of the officers and crew declared by Royal Proclamation. The Proclamation issued in pursuance of this statute provided that the captain of the capturing vessel should be allowed three-eighths of the proceeds, but went on to say that if any prize were taken by a ship under the command of a flag, the flag-officer, being actually on board, should have one of the eighths. The provision created some dissatisfaction, and on the breaking out of war in 1740 a further Proclamation was issued giving the flag-officer or commander-in-chief one-eighth of the prizes taken by ships and vessels under his command. It was under this rule that Admiral Hawke made his claim. It may be noticed here that under the first Proclamation the fourth one-eighth was divided between the marine captains, sea lieutenants and master: another eighth between the marine lieutenants, boatswain, gunner, purser, carpenter, master's mate, surgeon, and chaplain. A sixth eighth was divided between the midshipmen, carpenter's mates, boatswain's mates, gunner's mates, corporal's mates, yeomen of the sheets, coxswain, quarter-master, quarter-master's mates, surgeon's mates, yeomen of the powder-room, and sergeants of marines; while the remaining two-eighths were divided between the trumpeters, quarter gunners, carpenter's crew, steward, cook, armourer, steward's mate, cook's mate, gunsmith, cooper, swabber, ordinary trumpeter, barber, able seamen, ordinary seamen, volunteers by letter, and marine soldiers. Here we have in brief epitome the eighteenth century in sea warfare; the very names give us the fashion and manner of the sea battles that raged through the eighteenth century, and carry the echoes of those battles into the earlier conflicts with the Dutch and the later conflicts with the French. The yeoman of the sheets and the yeoman of the powder-room are names that compare with another seventeenth century office, the yeoman of the mouth, to wit, the land cook. In vision we see these fighting seamen with Byng off Cape Passaro in the summer of 1718, when the trumpeter trumpeted to good effect. In the winter of 1739 we see them under Vernon taking Portobello. We see the war of 1756 in which the English Fleet became one of the great factors of the balance of power. In the Old Greenwich Hospital Cemetery there is a great square of grass beneath which lie the bones of some



A BRITISH DESTROYER EXAMINING A DUTCH STEAMER.

three thousand seamen who served in those wars of the eighteenth century that established (as a stone records) the naval supremacy of Great Britain. These were the men who "died the honoured recipients of her gratitude" and who with their officers had been sharers of Prize of War.

The case of the Nieuwe Vriendschap* is a

THOMAS PEMBERTON-LEIGH, BARON KINGSDOWN, 1793-1867.

For 20 years from 1844 was a leading member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and from 1854 at Lord Aberdeen's request took special charge of appeals in Prize Cases.

second instance of an old case that illustrates the law of prize. When war broke out between Holland and England in 1781, Curaçao was full of Dutch merchantmen, including the America (which was captured on March 7, 1783, by H.M.S. Dolphin), the Goede Hoep, the Nieuwe Resolutie, and the Nieuwe Vriendschap. The last had sailed from Amsterdam on October 16, 1780, and delivered her cargo at Curaçao, and war having broken out, there she dallied, taking in cargo of cotton and other goods between May, 1781, and January, 1783. Her master, Bernhardus Knuttel, was part owner of the ship and the lading. He was a Dane by birth, but Dutch by domicile. While his ship lay at Curaçao he was informed by one of his co-owners that in July, 1782, the ship had been sold to a merchant of Ghent for a fair price. He acquiesced. No money, however, was paid; payment was to take place on the safe return of the ship. Such was the wisdom of this merchant of Ghent, a subject, of course, of the German Emperor and a neutral. Meantime, Knuttel, having little to do at Curaçao, became also a burgher of Ghent and a subject of the Holy Roman Empire, and having achieved this distinction, he hoisted, on January 11, 1783, the Imperial colours and set sail for Emden in Prussia, whither his cargo was apparently safely consigned. All went well till about four in the chilly and dusky afternoon of February 21, 1783, about 150 Dutch miles W.S.W. of the Scilly Isles. At that fateful spot and moment the Nieuwe Vriendschap was suddenly brought to by gunfire. Commander George Barnewell, of the privateer or letter

SIR JOHN PATTESON. 1790-1861.

"One of the very best and ablest judges that ever sat in Westminster Hall."

of marque the Vigilant, of the Port of London, had acted up to the name of the ship and detected this floating presentment of the Holy Roman Empire. Knuttel was a cautious man, and surrendered, and he and his ship and the alleged Dutch cargo were carried into Portsmouth. On July 6, 1784, Sir James Marriott condemned the ship and cargo. This decision of the Prize Court stirred the souls

* Journal of Comparative Legislation, N.S. Vol. XV. p. 156. The Case of the Nieuwe Vriendschap, by J. E. G. de Montmorency.

of the Imperial Commander and his consignees, and they appealed to the Lords Commissioners of Appeals in Prize Courts, who sat to hear the cause in the Cockpit at Whitehall, on March 7, 1786. The Lords Commissioners were Lord Camden, Lord Grantly and Sir Lloyd Kenyon, the Master of the Rolls. Our interest in the case is that William Scott, afterwards Lord Stowell, who was destined to lay the foundations of the Prize Law of the world, was one of the counsel for the Crown, while he was opposed to that mightiest of all advocates, Thomas Erskine. Scott contended that "ships and cargo, being



DR. STEPHEN LUSHINGTON, M.P.
Was judge of the Admiralty Court 1838-1857 and took over the jurisdiction of the Prize Court.

in the situation that this ship and cargo are proved to have been, could not legally be purchased by a neutral; and the attempt to purchase them under such circumstances, in order to rescue them from the danger of capture, must be considered as a departure from their neutrality and a violation of the acknowledged rights of war." He further contended that even if such a sale were legal, in fact the sale before the Court was not a real sale. The Court was shaken by Erskine's counter-argument, and only decided against Erskine, not on the law, but on the ground that it was not a *bonâ fide* sale. Scott himself felt the difficulties of his position, and in 1807, when he heard the case of the Minerva, admitted that there could be cases where merchant ships locked into port by the enemy could be sold. But he was doubtful, and the point in 1915 was not really clear, as the case of the Dacia showed. But this may be said, that a sale to be upheld must be absolutely *bona fide* and contain no fraudulent or non-neutral element.

A third case may be briefly noted as indicating the trials, troubles and wiliness of the men of the sea a hundred years ago. The Eliza and Katy sailed with a cargo of sugar and coffee, pipes, staves, and cotton from Philadelphia to Rotterdam, which she long failed to reach for two reasons. First, she was seized by the Polecat, a nimble privateer, with a just and not very clever commander. Mr. Claasby, the master of the Eliza and Katy, was a determined seaman, who when the Polecat appeared fraudulently concealed his fraudulent papers and determined to resist capture. "If the wind had been favourable we should have clapped a stopper round the arms and feet of his honour the prize master, and have carried him carefully to a French prison in Holland." As it was, the commander of the Polecat let him go, and then (the second reason) on September 23, 1805, H.M.S. Ariadne took the Eliza and Katy in hand. The master did not surrender till several shots had been fired, and "he would not have brought to if he had known that the boat of the Ariadne had only three rounds on board." The ship was brought in for adjudication, and Sir William Scott justified the second capture under all the circumstances of the case in view of the fraudulent state of the ship's papers, but the cargo was not suspect and was restored and reached Rotterdam after all on payment of the captor's costs.

In 1864 the Naval Prize Act placed the whole question of prize on a new statutory footing. The High Court of Admiralty and every Court of Admiralty or of Vice-Admiralty or other Court exercising Admiralty jurisdiction were to be Prize Courts. The appeal from these Courts lay to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Every ship taken as prize had forthwith without bulk broken to be delivered to the Marshal of the Court, and the case was to be heard according to procedure prescribed by the Act. The question of prize bounty was specially dealt with. Prize bounty at the rate of £5 for each person on board the enemy's ship at the beginning of the engagement was to be granted by Proclamation or Order in Council to officers and crew of a ship of war actually present at the taking or destroying of any armed enemy vessel. It was a sub-

stantial encouragement. An Order in Council declaring the intention of His Majesty to grant Prize Bounty to officers and crews of His Majesty's ships of war was published on March 2, 1915. A case of the greatest interest as to Prize Bounty or "Head Money," *In the Matter of the Battle of the Falkland Islands*, was decided by Sir Samuel Evans on December 22, 1916, when he held in the Prize Court that H.M.S. Canopus was not entitled to share in the sum of £12,000 which he had awarded in August, 1916, to the squadron of Admiral Sir Frederick Sturdee for the destruction of the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Leipzig, and Nürnberg in the battle of December, 1914. She was not "actually present" at the destruction though she probably hit the Gneisenau.

By a Royal Proclamation of May 19, 1866, the distribution of prize money (which is, of course, different from prize bounty, being the proceeds of sale of a prize) was placed on a new footing. The flag officers were to have one-thirtieth of the net proceeds arising from captured prizes in certain proportions; one-tenth of the remainder was to go in the case of single captures to the officer in command of the capturing vessel, or one-tenth of the whole if there were no flag. The remainder of the net proceeds were directed to be distributed in ten classes "so that each officer, man, and boy composing the rest of the complements of our ships, sloops, and vessels of war and actually on board at the time of any such capture, seizure, etc., as aforesaid, and every person present and assisting shall receive shares or a share according to his class, as set forth in the following scale": these classes included the chief gunner, the chief boatswain, the chief carpenter, and their mates, the master-at-arms, the chief yeoman of the signals, the captain of the forecastle, the captain of the after-guard, the coxswains of the barge and pinnace, the captains of the main-top and the fore-top, the armourer's crew, the lamp trimmer, the fifer of marines. By a Royal Proclamation of September 17, 1900, Her Majesty Queen Victoria regulated according to a scheme referred to in the Proclamation the distribution of the net proceeds of prizes captured from the enemy and other captures. On August 28, 1914, it was decided by Order in Council to cancel this scheme and substitute a system of Prize Bounties or gratuities for more general distribution to the officers and men of the Naval forces, and the Admiralty was ordered to give the necessary directions to bring this into effect.

With the exception of seizures of pirates and slavers, cases that did not come before Prize Courts, the prize provisions had no significance between 1864 and 1914. On August 5 of that year the law relating to Prize Court Procedure was amended and an Order in Council was issued authorizing the Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral to require the constitution of a Prize Court with respect to the war with Germany, and this was repeated in the case of Austria-Hungary on August 20. This was followed, on September 30, by an Order in Council conferring jurisdiction in matters of prize on certain British Courts in Egypt, Zanzibar and Cyprus, and authorizing the Admiralty to require the constitution of Prize Courts under the Naval Prize Courts Acts, 1864 to 1914, including the Act of September 18 relating to Egypt, Zanzibar and Cyprus. Under the Prize Court Act of 1864 (which made provision for the formation in case of need of Prize Courts in British possessions oversea) Rules had been made by Orders in Council of July 18 and October 20, 1898. These were by an Order of Council of August 5, 1914, repealed and new and elaborate Rules and Orders, known as the Prize Court Rules, 1914, came on that day into force. These Orders regulated the procedure in prize proceedings and settled also the procedure in questions of prize bounty and the distribution of prize moneys. It was under these Rules, supplemented by the ancient practice of the Court of Admiralty and by the decision of the President in doubtful cases, that the procedure of the British Prize Courts was regulated during the Great War. These Orders were varied in certain particulars from time to time during the war by Order in Council. By a Notification of October 8, 1914, issued by the Colonial Office, the constitution of Prize Courts in the Dominions oversea was announced. These Courts were to sit, if necessary, at Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, Albany, Hobart, Nassau, Hamilton (Bermuda), Georgetown (British Guiana), Belize (British Honduras), Quebec, Halifax, St. John's (Nova Scotia), Victoria (British Columbia), Charlottetown (Prince Edward Island), Colombo, Stanley (Falkland Islands), Suva (Fiji), Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Kingston (Jamaica), Antigua (Leeward

THE "GERMANIA."
Herr Krupp von Bohlen's Racing Yacht, condemned in British Prize Court, October, 1915.

Islands), Valetta (Malta), Port Louis (Mauritius), St. John's (Newfoundland), Dunedin, Wellington, Christchurch, Auckland (New Zealand) Freetown (Sierra Leone), Capetown, Durban, Singapore, Port of Spain (Trinidad), St. Lucia, Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Karachi Rangoon, Aden in the Red Sea. It was a noble list, a sonorous tribute to the sea power and the world power of an empire that wears in its diadem the Seven Seas ; this list has a Miltonic note, rolling out, in multitudinous syllables of every tongue and race, the history of sea-toil, sea-sorrow, and sea-triumph through three centuries of time, each name recalling the endless adventures by sea and land that had made and were making the Empire of the Northern Isle.

In this place it will be useful to refer to some of the Prize Court decisions of the Dominions.* Thus the case of the Bellas, a German barque loading cargo in a Canadian port (Port Rimonski) at the outbreak of war and seized on August 5, 1914, was heard in the Exchequer Court of Canada (in Prize) by the President, Mr. Justice Cassels, on December 15, 1914. Mr. Newcombe, K.C., appearing for the Crown, said that this was the first occasion for one hundred years in which a Prize Court had sat in British North America. The ship and cargo were detained until further order, and the claim of a Portuguese subject, who alleged that the barque had been transferred to him before the outbreak of war whilst she was on the high seas, was dismissed, as the necessary conditions of such a sale had not been complied with. On January 6, 1915, Cator, J., and Grain, J., sitting at Alexandria in H.B.M. Prize Court for Egypt, found that the Enteufels of Bremen was an enemy ship that had been properly seized as prize by H.M.S. Warrior after having come out of Port Said by compulsion. On October 30, 1914, Chief Justice Coller, in the Royal Court of St. Lucia (in Prize) condemned the Norwegian s.s. Thor for the unneutral service of waiting to coal a German cruiser. Whilst on this service she was captured by H.M.S. Berwick. On November 20, 1914, Sheriff, J., Ingham, J., and Bluck, J., sitting in Prize in the Supreme Court of Bermuda, condemned the Leda, captured on voyage from

* See *British and Colonial Prize Cases*, edited by E. C. M. Treherne.

THE WARNING SHOT.

Rotterdam to Baton Rouge by H.M.S. Suffolk. On December 14, 1914, Parvis, J., sitting in Prize in H.M. Commercial Court for Malta, condemned the Erymanthos; on December 16, 1914, Acting Chief Justice Gompertz, sitting in Prize in the Supreme Court of Hong Kong, released the Hanametal, captured on August 21, 1914, by H.M.S. Triumph; in March, 1915, Acting Chief Justice Woodward, sitting in Prize in the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements, released the Pontoporos, which had been captured by a German cruiser and recaptured by H.M.S. Yarmouth. Many other oversea cases might be cited. It is sufficient here to have indicated the world-wide character of the British Prize Court system.

As a matter of record it is of interest to state briefly the facts as to the first British prize

case after the Crimean War. On August 4, 1914, the German sailing ship or barque Chile, out of Bremen, arrived without cargo in the East Bute Dock, Cardiff. She was detained next day by the Collector of Customs in consequence of the declaration of war and a writ was issued by the Procurator-General for her condemnation. Sir Samuel Evans held that the vessel was properly seized, but reserved the question of condemnation in view of the first article of the Hague Convention, 1907, No. 6. If under that article Germany had granted any days of grace to British ships in German ports of Dordrecht, and the mortgagees claimed to be paid off out of the proceeds. But Sir Samuel Evans would not listen to the claim, and said that he would not have listened to it if it had been made by a British mortgagee. "The truth is that capture of enemy vessels at sea during war would be a hazardous and almost worthless right of belligerents if the captors were confronted with such claims as are put forward in this case, or if mortgages gave to mortgagees prior rights to those of the captor." The learned President discussed the position in the light of the Declaration of Paris of 1856, which was



S.S. "OPHELIA."

Equipped as a German hospital ship, but also provided with signalling apparatus of exceptional capacity, the "Ophelia" was seized by the British in October, 1914. It was shown she had never received any sick or wounded, and she was condemned as lawful prize on May 21, 1915.

similar days would be granted by the British Government and the ship would not be condemned. The German Government, with characteristic savagery and want of foresight granted no such days, with the result that the Chile and other vessels were condemned. A more interesting case was that of the Marie Glaeser. On August 1, 1914, this steamship, of the port of Rostock, put out from Bristol, bound for Archangel in ballast. Three days later she ran into Barry for coal and left the same day, 10 hours before the declaration of war took effect. The next day, at about four in the afternoon, she was captured at sea by H.M.S. Gibraltar, and the master, Albert Schroeder, was informed of the fact of war. A prize crew was put on board and the next day the ship was taken into Glasgow and prize proceedings were begun against the owners and parties interested. Now it so happened that, though the ship was owned by a German limited liability company, it was (*bonâ fide*) mortgaged to a Dutch company and is binding law on the British Prize Courts. The Declaration stated that "neutral goods not contraband of war are not liable to confiscation under the enemy's flag." The Declaration did not deal with ships or interests in ships at all, nor has any Prize Court in any war ever held that the Declaration applied to ships. But there was another ground for refusing the claim of the mortgagees. "The fact that the vessel was sailing under the German flag, with papers entitling her to do so, and navigated by a German master in the commerce of the German Empire would be fatal to their claim." This view had been asserted by Dr. Westlake before the war and was applied in this very obvious case.

The cases of the Tommi and the Rothersand raised a different and a very interesting issue. The German sailing ship Tommi, belonging to the Norddeutsche Kraftfutter Gesellschaft, of Hamburg, sailed out of Dantzig in July, 1914, with molasses, and after calling at

Cuxhaven on July 28, arrived at Gravesend on August 5 and was detained as prize. On the same day the Rothersand, belonging to the same company, was similarly detained at Kirkcaldy. A very interesting little story is associated with these sailing ships. The German owners were nervous and by wire on August 1 offered to sell these ships to the Sugar Fodder Company, of Millwall. "The German company had control of the English company," and when it offered to sell the English company had to buy; so Mr. Gunther, representing the English company, cabled his acceptance. Now on August 1 war began between Germany and Russia, and, said the President in delivering judgment of condemnation, "I have grave doubts whether there was not an apprehension in the mind of Mr. Gunther—I have graver doubts whether there was not an apprehension in the mind of Mr. Schrader, in Hamburg—as to the imminence of war between Germany and this country at that time." But, in any event, the transfer was made in order to defeat the right of a belligerent. "Russia, or any other Power which became a belligerent, would have the right to capture the vessels at sea if they remained German ships." Could such a transfer with such an intention be rightfully made? Sir Samuel Evans, after an elaborate consideration of the cases bearing on the subject and the provision (57) of the Declaration of London, came to the conclusion that the alleged transfer was not valid, and that the ships, for all purposes connected with the Prize Court, remained German ships. But even if the property had passed, if the transfer had been valid, the case was not concluded. The English company was a mere creature of the German company, which owned nine-tenths of the shares of the English company, a company that, moreover, did not contain a single shareholder of British nationality. "Whether a company consisting entirely of aliens can own a ship is a question which probably has never arisen, and it has therefore never been decided." Sir Samuel Evans was not prepared to say that under such circumstances those vessels could not be regarded as German vessels. His view has since been upheld, and very emphatically upheld, by the House of Lords in the Continental Tyre case.

[Russell. [Elliott & Fry. [Elliott & Fry.

SIR EDWARD CARSON, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1916.

LORD FINLAY. Lord Chancellor, 1916.

SIR JOHN MELLOR, K.C.B. H.M. Procurator-General and Solicitor to the Treasury since 1909

We now turn from molasses to fish, to the very interesting coast fisheries case associated with the name of the German cutter the Berlin. The British Fleet was pretty busy on August 5, 1914, and there were not many German sea-going ships that were missed. In the forenoon of that day H.M.S. Princess Royal, a hundred miles from the British coast and some five hundred miles from Emden in Prussia, fell in with the Berlin, of Emden, a drift fishing boat, with barrels empty and barrels full of the pleasant herrings of the North Sea. The Berlin was handed over to the s.s. Ailsa, and carried into Wick in the early morning of August 6. She had been busily fishing or trawling in the mid North Sea. The question before the Court was



SIR SAMUEL THOMAS EVANS, G.C.B.,
Judge of the Prize Court.

whether she was immune from capture as a coast fishing vessel. The subject had long been one of extraordinary interest to international lawyers, and the history of the subject was reviewed at great length by Mr. Justice Gray (U.S.A.) in a case arising out of the Spanish-American war of 1898. Sir Samuel Evans laid down the doctrine and practice of the law of nations that "fishing vessels plying their industry near or about the coast (not necessarily in territorial waters), in and by which the hardy people who man them gain their livelihood, are not properly subjects of capture in war so long as they confine themselves to the peaceful work which the industry properly involves." But the learned President held that in fact the Berlin was "a deep-sea fishing vessel engaged in a commercial enterprise which formed part of the trade of the enemy country, and, as such, could be, and was, properly captured as prize of war."

One of the most important cases that came before the Prize Court during the war was the case of the Kim, the hearing of which lasted more than a fortnight during the months of July and August, 1915. The case dealt with no fewer than four ships, the Kim, the Alfred Nobel, the Björnstjerne Björnson and the

Fridland, all of which were in the same category. Nearly 40 counsel were engaged in the great suit; Sir Edward Carson led for the Crown, and Sir Robert Finlay (who became Lord Chancellor in 1916) appeared for certain parties. The Kim was a Norwegian ship under time charter to an American company controlled by Germans. It sailed on November 11, 1914, from New York with a great cargo of fats and foodstuffs, rubber and hides, consigned to Copenhagen. The Kim was captured on the high seas on November 28, 1914, and its cargo was seized on the ground that the food was conditional and the rubber absolute contraband. The other ships were in a similar case as to conditional contraband. The total cargoes of these ships amounted to 73,237,796 lbs. in weight, including 19,252,000 lbs. of lard, or thirteen times the quantity of lard normally imported into Denmark in the course of a year. This was part of a far larger operation. In October and November, 1914, the amount of lard sent to Scandinavian Europe was nearly 60 times the amount sent in the same two months in 1913. It was an overwhelming inference that practically the whole of this lard was intended for or would find its way into Germany. Direct imports into Germany had practically vanished, while in 1913 Germany had imported nearly 70 million lbs. Much of the food in these ships was of the type supplied not to civilians but by the same American firms to British troops in the field. These American firms were pleasingly neutral. They were prepared to supply the sinews of war to both armies. Now Copenhagen was a convenient spot whence to transmit goods to Germany, and the chief trade between Copenhagen and Germany was shown in this case to have been through Lübeck, Stettin, and Hamburg. Lübeck was a German naval base; Stettin was a garrison town, and the headquarters of an army corps. "It has," said Sir Samuel Evans in his judgment, "also shipbuilding yards where warships are constructed and repaired. It is Berlin's nearest seaport. It will be remembered that one of the big shipping companies asked a Danish firm to become nominal consignees for goods destined for Stettin. Hamburg and Altona had ceased to be the commercial ports dealing with commerce coming through the North Sea. They were headquarters of various regiments. Copenhagen is also a convenient port for communication with the German naval arsenal and fortress of Kiel and its Canal, and for all places reached through the Canal. These ports may properly be regarded, in my opinion, as bases of supply for the enemy, and the cargoes destined for these might on that short ground be condemned as prize. But I prefer, especially as no particular cargo can definitely be said to be going to a particular port, to deal with the cases on broader grounds."

Sir Samuel Evans, after a masterly survey of the history of the doctrine of Continuous Voyage as applied to contraband, stated that he had no hesitation "in pronouncing that in my view the doctrine of continuous voyage, or transportation, both in relation to carriage of contraband absolute and conditional by sea and overland, has become part of the law of nations at the commencement of the present war, in accordance with the principles of recognized legal decision, and with the view of the great body of modern jurists, and also with the practice of nations in recent maritime warfare." Was, then, Copenhagen merely an ostensible destination, and if so, was it possible to ascertain the real destination, in legal fashion, of these vast stores of goods? First of all, the test should be applied as to whether these stores were intended to become part of the common stock of Denmark. That was a test a century old. There was nothing new in it. Again, were the consignments "to order or assigns"? If so, it would be a circumstance of suspicion. Sir Samuel Evans had no difficulty in finding that the cargoes were on their way at the time of capture to German territory as their actual and real destination. But were they intended for Governmental or military use? They were suited to such use and "even assuming that they were indiscriminately distributed between the military and civilian population, a very large proportion would be used by the military forces." But could cognizance of this be brought home to the shippers; had they the *intention* of supplying the armed forces of the enemy? It was certainly the "highly probable destination." Such a destination satisfied Lord Stowell on the question of intention, and it satisfied Sir Samuel Evans. It was clear to him (and to everyone, even the shippers, we may presume) that the cargoes were not only on the way to Germany "but also to the German Government and their forces for naval and military use as their real ultimate

destination. To hold the contrary would be to allow one's eyes to be filled by the dust of theories and technicalities and to be blinded to the realities of the case." Consequently the cargoes (save such part as was for use in Scandinavia) were condemned as lawful prize. It was a prize that would have rejoiced the heart of Drake or any other man who ever sailed the Spanish main in search of golden galleons; perhaps the greatest prize that ever sailed the seas, these Falstaffian galleons of lard.

A reckless decision of the Hamburg Prize Court in April 1915, the case of the Maria, in which wheat shipped before the war to Ireland from the United States on a Dutch ship was condemned, was quoted in the case of the Kim by Sir Samuel Evans "as an example of the ease with which a Prize Court in Germany 'hacks its way through' *bona fide* commercial transactions when dealing with foodstuffs carried by neutral vessels."

The case of the Möwe, a German merchant sailing ship of the port of Rhandermoor, was of a considerable interest. Her master and owner had brought her out of Nordeney bound for Bo'ness in the Firth of Forth. Between 7 and 9 of the clock on the evening of August 4, 1914, the ship arrived near Morrison's Haven, and anchored a mile off the creek, and the master had conversation with the customs officer. Early next morning he weighed anchor and proceeded under way for Granton, eight miles farther up the Forth, and on this voyage was captured by H.M.S. Ringdove in territorial waters. Was the ship captured at sea or in port? It was urged that the ship was captured in port, and was therefore only subject to detention. The President allowed the owner to claim the benefit of the Hague Convention on the subject in notable words:

> The practice should conform to sound ideas of what is fair and just. When a sea of passions rises and rages as a natural result of such a calamitous series of wars as the present it behoves a Court of Justice to preserve a calm and equable attitude in all controversies which come before it for decision, not only when they concern neutrals, but also when they may affect enemy subjects. In times of peace the Admiralty Courts of this realm are appealed to by people of all nationalities who engage in commerce upon the seas with a confidence that right will be done. So, in the unhappy and dire times of war, the Court of Prize, as a Court of justice, will, it is hoped, show that it holds evenly the scales between friend, neutral, and foe. A merchant who is a citizen of an enemy country would not unnaturally expect that when the State to which he belongs, and other States with which it may unhappily be at war, have bound themselves by formal and solemn conventions dealing with a state of war like those formulated at the Hague in 1907, he should have the benefit of the provisions of such international compacts. (*The Law Reports.*)

Hence the President held that "whenever an alien enemy conceives that he is entitled to any protection, privilege or relief under any of the



SHIP'S CUTTER ON THE WAY TO EXAMINE A MERCHANTMAN.



ON PATROL DUTY.

Hague Conventions of 1907, he shall be entitled to appear as a claimant or to argue his case before this Court." The privilege did not, in fact, help the master of the Möwe, for the word "port" was held by the Court to be used in the Convention in its popular and not its fiscal sense, and that, therefore, the vessel was "taken at sea" and was condemned as lawful prize.

The story of the Roumanian is of considerable interest and importance. This large tank steamship, owned by the Petroleum Steamship Co., Ltd., of London, and under charter to the Deutsch Petroleum Verkaufs Co., of Hamburg, put out from Port Arthur, Texas, before the outbreak of war with a cargo of over 6,000 tons of petroleum, the property of the Europäische Petroleum Union Gesellschaft, of Bremen. Hamburg was the port of discharge. The Roumanian safely reached the English Channel, when the owners, on the instructions of the English Admiralty, signalled from Prawle Point that the ship should go into Dartmouth for orders. There she was directed to proceed to the Thames. Having reached Gravesend, the Channel pilot informed the master that the owners had directed him to proceed to Purfleet and discharge the oil into their tanks there. This was done by means of connecting pipes on August 21–24, and while the task was in progress the chief officer was informed that the cargo was under detention. In November the Crown applied to the Prize Court asking for the condemnation of the whole of the cargo as lawful prize, being enemy property. The Court held that it was clear that the oil remaining on board at the time of the order for detention was confiscable as prize. The Hague Convention, No. 6, was not applicable, though the oil was in port at the time of the seizure, since Germany had never assented to it. But were the 4,800 tons already discharged confiscable as prizes and droits of the Admiralty? Was the oil "on land" or still "in port," and if "on land" was it immune from seizure? The old practice was certainly to seize enemy property on land, but a tendency was operative at that date to save from confiscation private property on land. All enemy property—ships as well as cargo—may be captured *jure belli* on the sea or in rivers, ports and harbours of the capturing belligerent. Now the oil was enemy cargo and as such liable to seizure. Could that right be evaded by the simple device of racing to the enemy country and landing the cargo? "What right of entry had it into the country? What right had it to expect protection in this country at someone's care and expense, for the sake of its owners. . . . The oil came into port as maritime merchandise of the enemy subject to seizure, and, in my opinion [said Sir Samuel Evans], the whole of it remained such until it was actually formally seized on behalf of the Crown on August 22. I cannot see how or by what process the portion of it which was at one end of the pipe in the tanks on shore had ceased to be seizable enemy cargo any more than the portion remaining in the ship at the other end had. In my opinion, the view that one part was seized in port, and the other on land and not in port, would be pedantic and erroneous." This decision was affirmed by the Privy Council in November 1915. In 1805 there had been a similar case. When hostilities broke out with France on May 16, 1803, there was lying at Ramsgate for repair in the yard of John Friend a ship called the Marie Anne. Parts of the cargo had been warehoused. Mr. Friend, a shrewd fellow of excellent judgment, suspected the ship to good purpose and made up his mind that she and the cargo alike were French. He managed to secure the papers and documents relating to the ship and cargo and carried off the master of the Marie Anne to Deal for examination in order to obtain adjudication. The ship and cargo were condemned as droits of Admiralty and realized the net sum of £2,667 1s. 8d., of which sum Mr. Friend, to his great satisfaction, secured the sum of £400 as a reward. It is an entertaining case, and the action of Mr. Friend helped to settle the fate of the Roumanian more than a century later. All the oil seized in the Roumanian was, therefore, condemned to the Crown as prize in the Crown's rights as droits of Admiralty. It should be explained that all captures in port are droits of Admiralty and belong to the Crown, and not to any captor.

It is interesting at this point to notice in a few lines the position of English or neutral persons interested in enemy ships or goods at sea. Thus, as we have seen, with the Marie Glaeser it was decided that no mortgages, liens or charges upon an enemy ship could be set up in an English Prize Court against the captors. Again, in the cases of the Odessa and the Cape Corso it was held that a Prize Court does not recognize the rights of pledgees of cargo. The Prize Court had never in this matter distinguished between enemy ship and

cargo. "In my judgment, the only safeguarding principle is to ascertain who are the legal owners of the cargoes; and if the goods are found to be the property in law of an enemy to condemn them; or if they are the property of neutrals or British subjects to release them, as was done in the Miramchi." In that case a cargo had been shipped on a British vessel to a German firm by a neutral under a C.I.F. contract before the war. In such a case the property in the goods had not passed to the enemy, and so in the prize proceedings that followed capture in September, 1914, the Crown was unsuccessful. In that case it was argued that as the cargo was in a British ship it was not capturable, although it was enemy property. The President rejected this new proposition in Prize law. "In my view it is abundantly clear that enemy goods carried in British vessels are subject to seizure in port and capture at sea in times of war."

The case of the Ophelia is one that affords the student of German methods peculiar satisfaction. This German steamship formerly traded between London and Hamburg, and belonged to the Kierstein Company, Hamburg, and on August 3, 1914, was in the port of London. On that day she was directed by the German Government to proceed to a German port on military duties, and here begins the romance of a German hospital ship. She sailed at noon on the fateful 4th of August with 344 passengers. On August 5 she was directed by a torpedo boat to go to Heligoland, and thence she went up the Elbe and reached Hamburg on August 10. There (her log stated) she was refitted as a hospital ship, and on August 13 was piloted down the Elbe, passed through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal into the Baltic and to Kiel, and (so said the log) fitted as a hospital ship. By September 5 she is at Cuxhaven, on September 12 at Brunsbuttel in the North Sea. The previous day she received her certificate for use as a hospital ship. On September 18 she leaves Brunsbuttel Koog and passes down the Elbe to Cuxhaven, the open sea and Heligoland, where she loiters for three weeks and then moves to Wilhelmshaven roadstead and wanders up and down the German coast, is at Heligoland again on October 16, and, resuming her wanderings, reaches the coast of Holland. On October 8 submarine D 4 had her under special observation. She was painted as a hospital ship, but flew no national flag. On sighting the submarine she hoisted the Red Cross flag, and fled to escape search, subsequently hauling down the Red Cross flag. "There was nobody in the neighbourhood, and nobody for a hospital ship to aid. With the exception of a German submarine, which I saw about 20 miles farther west at 10.30 a.m. on the 7th, and a Zeppelin at about 2.45 p.m. on the 7th, I saw nothing besides the Ophelia on the 7th, 8th or 9th. The German submarine dived as soon as she saw me. She appeared to be outward bound to sea." The lieutenant-commander of the British submarine had no doubt that the Ophelia was scouting. The log of the Ophelia seemed to confirm this view. H.M.S. Meteor on October 18 stopped the Ophelia, searched her, dismantled her wireless, and carried her into Sheerness. The British Government were anxious if the innocence of the ship was proved to restore her to her rightful status. The case was argued at immense length on May 3, 4, 5, 6, 1915, and eventually on May 21 the President held that she was on the evidence lawful prize, having forfeited the protection of the Hague Convention by the fact that she was not used for the special and sole purpose of affording aid and relief to the wounded, sick and shipwrecked; that she made no real effort to render such service; that she was well equipped as a signalling vessel, and had used her equipment for this purpose without satisfactory explanation. The case of the Ophelia was a striking lesson in the abuse of the Hague Conventions by the Germans.

It is not necessary here to deal further with the numerous cases that arose in the Prize Courts of Great Britain and are fully reported in *The Law Reports*, *The Times Law Reports*, and other law reports. Sufficient has been said to indicate the enormous importance and wide range of this branch of law; the extreme value of its historical associations, and its significance as a link between many nations as the only Court which administers in entirely judicial fashion the Law of Nations without fear or favour. It was fortunate for Great Britain that at the appointed time there arose in Sir Samuel Evans a judge who could carry on in adequate fashion the great work that Lord Stowell performed in the Napoleonic wars.

COMBRAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL AGIATIO SOCIETY

CHAPTER CLXII.

MUNITIONS OF WAR, 1916.

NATIONAL FACTORIES—OUTPUT OF EXPLOSIVES—GUN AND SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION—"PREMATURES" AND "BLINDS"—MANUFACTURE OF GUNS, MACHINE GUNS AND RIFLES—LABOUR SUPPLY—WOMEN IN MUNITIONS FACTORIES—INDUSTRIAL FATIGUE—WELFARE WORK.

MR. JOSEPH PENNELL'S pictures of war work may be regarded as symbolical of the mighty effort put forth by Great Britain for the production of shells and ammunition after the formation of the Ministry of Munitions in May, 1915, and therefore they may fitly be accompanied with a brief account of the results of that effort down to the period of the Battle of the Somme, with which they were, roughly, contemporaneous.

It has already been told (Chapter XCIII.) how prompt were the measures taken by Mr. Lloyd George, the first Minister of Munitions, to mobilize the engineering resources of the country, and how, with the cooperation of the great armament firms, a score of national munitions factories had been erected by the following autumn, while arrangements had been made to set up 11 others. Less than a year later there were 95 national factories working for the land Service. Among these were 22 concerned with the manufacture of explosives and the raw materials for them; 18 for filling gun and trench mortar ammunition, one of which was dealing with nearly twice as much as Woolwich Arsenal, which for the first 18 months of the war carried practically the whole burden of completing ammunition; six employed in turning out cartridges and cartridge cases; 32 shell factories managed by local boards of management under the supervision of the Ministry; and 12 projectile factories engaged, under the management of large engineering firms supervised by the Ministry, in making heavy shell in buildings all ordered, planned and built by the Ministry. These last were in various stages of completion, but though they had developed barely half of their full productive capacity, they were already turning out 25 per cent. of the heavy shell produced in the country. Their buildings covered an area of 70 acres, and the bays of which they consisted, with an average breadth of 14 feet, had a total length of 15 miles. They contained 10,000 machine tools, driven by 17 miles of shafting with an expenditure of 25,000 horse-power, and their daily output would fill a train a mile long composed of 400 wagons.

The results yielded by this vast array of manufacturing capacity may be exhibited by means of a few comparative figures. To take explosives first, for every ton used in September, 1914, there were 350 tons used in the following July. At the latter date the new factories were only in their initial stages, but as they gradually got into working order the effect is apparent from the circumstance that in July, 1916, the corresponding figure was 11,000 to 12,000. If the average amount of explosive used in charging shells in one week in January, 1916, be taken as 100, the figure had risen to 180 in April, 590 in July, 920 in October and 1,120 in November. For trench mortar ammunition and grenades the consumption of explosives increased, on the basis of 100 in March, 1916, to 121 in June, 146 in September and 151 in November; at the last date indeed the production had reached a point beyond which it scarcely seemed necessary to go. In the year ending May, 1916,

the number of bombs was multiplied 33 times, and in the same period the weight of the explosive contained in them increased 150 times. In one year the output of rifle and revolver cartridges was nearly trebled, for calling the weekly production 100 in June, 1915, it was 280 in the following June and 290 in November, 1916.

Similar advances were made in artillery ammunition. If the average weekly production at the end of June, 1915, be taken as 1, then for 18-pounders it was 6½ on the average for the succeeding year, 17½ in the last week of June, 1916, and 43 in the week ending November 25. For 4·5-inch field howitzers it increased from a weekly average represented on the same basis as 8 in 1915-16, to 27 at the end of June, and to 46 in November. The improvement in ammunition for medium guns and howitzers was even more marked, the corresponding figure for the weekly average rising to 34½ at the end of June, 1916, and to 66 in November, as compared with an average of 7½ in 1915-16; while the supplies for heavy howitzers (above 6-inch) grew in a not less striking manner, from 22 in 1915-16 to 94 in July, 1916, and to 323 in the following November. The matter may be put in a still more graphic way, by stating the time needed near the end of 1916, to produce a number of shells equal to the whole output in the first year of the war, from August, 1914, to August, 1915. For 18-pounder shells this was 8½ days, for field howitzer shells 8 days, for shells for medium guns and howitzers 5½ days, and for projectiles for heavy guns and howitzers little more than one day. The progress made during the autumn may be gauged from the fact that, speaking in the House of Commons in the middle of August, Mr. Montagu, then the Minister of Munitions, gave the equivalent figures as three weeks, two weeks, 11 days and four days for the same four classes of ammunition. Indeed towards the end of 1916, the weekly output of 155 mm. shells was three times, of 200 mm. shells five times, and of 230 mm. shells three times as great as the production during the whole of the first year of the war; and in one week in November the number of shells completed or filled was about 30 per cent. greater than the stock of munitions held in reserve at the outbreak of war.

This increase in quantity was accompanied by an improvement in quality. Every maker of shells has to steer between two dangers—to avoid the Scylla of "prematures," which burst as they are being fired and damage the gun, and the Charybdis of "blinds" or "duds," which either do not explode at all or explode so late, perhaps after they have buried themselves in the ground, as to do little or no harm to the enemy. Every army, the German included, had experience of failures of both these kinds. At the battle of Loos, as Mr. Lloyd George informed the House of Commons, our "prematures" were so bad that we had to give up firing such high explosive shells as we had. The Germans and the French gained their experience of such shells in February and March, 1915, but ours came months later, because we fired scarcely any high explosives till late in that year. Then we in turn had to learn how to eliminate the dangerous element, and we were so successful that Mr. Lloyd George was able to declare in the middle of August, 1916, that our "prematures" had become so few as to be almost negligible. At the same time he stated that the number of "blinds" was gradually and steadily decreasing with improvements in the processes of manufacture and in the fuses and filling. In this connexion a great part was played by the inspectors and examiners whose duty it was to see that the shells and fuses complied strictly with the specifications laid down. The staff available for this purpose was exiguous at the beginning of the war, and had to be gradually built up to keep pace with the growth in the output of ammunition. There was a small body of artillery officers who possessed the necessary knowledge and experience, and with their aid a large number of engineers were specially trained at the Ordnance College to act as inspectors and assistant inspectors all over the country. The examiners who, under the supervision of the inspectors, handle the gauges and carry out the actual operations of inspection had also to be found and trained. In August, 1916, the staff employed in the Inspection Department numbered about 30,000, of whom 14,000 were women.

To turn from ammunition to artillery, when the Ministry of Munitions came into existence, the output of the factories equipped for the manufacture of big guns was mostly absorbed by the Navy, and the armament firms had not sufficient plant to undertake more than a mere fraction of the gun programme of the Army. It therefore became necessary to provide them with very large extensions, equipped with new

machinery, and this task was undertaken so vigorously that in little more than a year new buildings occupying an area of 1,000,000 square feet had sprung into existence, with over 2,500 new machine tools at work in them. In addition to the armament firms hundreds of other engineering concerns all over the country were engaged in contributing a share to the carrying out of the programme, by constructing gun-carriages, ammunition wagons and the various accessories and spares required for artillery. The consequence was that if the number of guns manufactured during the first year of the war be called 100, then in the second year the production of 18-pounders was 240, of 4·5-inch pieces 654, of medium guns (60 pounders and 6-inch) 1,848, and of heavy guns (above 6-inch) 623. But these figures did not by any means represent the limit of productive capacity, and the output continued to grow, at least for the natures of which an increase was needed by the armies in the field. Thus for the first four months of the third year of the war the output of medium guns was represented by 1,200, and of heavy guns by 363, these figures being equivalent, even supposing the rate not to be increased, to 3,600 and 1,089 respectively for the whole year. That the output of 18-pounders and 4·5-inch howitzers showed a diminution in the four months period, the figures for them being 45 and 104, was accounted for by the fact that the equipment of the British Army in such field pieces had become approximately complete, so that the plant which had been employed for their manufacture could be utilized for other purposes. But the production of medium and heavy calibres continued to grow, and if the average number of them turned out monthly in the first year of the war be taken as 100, then the output of the former in the five weeks ending December 2, 1916, was 4,100 and of the latter 1,250.

About machine guns and rifles the same tale has to be told. Taking 100 to represent the total number of machine guns delivered to the Army in the first year of the war, the corresponding figure at the end of the second year was 1,250 and 2,000 on December 2, 1916, and the weekly production in November, 1916, was more than four times greater than in November, 1915. The supply of rifles is particularly important since they are the chief factors limiting the number of men that can be put in the field, while at the same time technical manufacturing reasons render it an especially difficult matter to increase the output of them; yet we succeeded in furnishing from home sources all the rifles, and also all the machine guns, required for the equipment of our Armies overseas. The Royal Small Arms Factory, which assisted and coordinated the other factories, deserved the credit for this achievement, and it was largely through its efforts that for every 100 rifles made per week in June, 1915, 160 were made in the following June and 173 in November, 1916. In addition hundreds of thousands of rifles were repaired and re-sighted, the number which it was thus possible to return to service being about equal to half the total production of new ones.

But to build all these factories—which in some cases completely transformed the appearance of manufacturing towns, while in others they changed remote country districts into busy industrial centres—and to fill them with machinery and tools was only half the battle; labour had also to be found to work them, and that although large numbers of the skilled mechanics of the country had left the bench for the firing line. By inducing the trade unions to abandon the restrictive rules and customs which throttled production Mr. Lloyd George did much to increase the efficiency of the skilled workers who remained, and by the process known as "dilution" this skilled nucleus was supplemented by the introduction of semi-skilled and unskilled workers, many of them women. The women indeed rose to the occasion magnificently, and after some training in one of the various centres provided for that purpose proved themselves able to undertake work which formerly was regarded as the preserve of men, and often of highly skilled men. Of some 500 processes in munitions manufacture upon which women were engaged, two-thirds had never been performed by a woman before the war, and in some of the national factories woman labour amounted to as much as 95 per cent. of the whole. At the end of the second year of the war some 400,000 women were employed under the Ministry of Munitions, and they were not merely attending to automatic machines which go on producing repetition work so long as they are fed with new material, but were also carrying out the more intricate operations of the machine-shops. In some cases mechanical appliances enabled them to deal with weights (such as 9·2-inch shells) which in general might

be supposed to be beyond their strength; indeed, the 12 national projectile factories referred to above were largely operated by women, and Mr. Montagu stated in August, 1916, that about 15,000 were already employed in them. They also found their way into the heavier branches of general engineering work, and one engineer, who was not singular in his opinion, went so far as to declare that when they had had two years' more experience he could build a battleship complete from keel to aerial entirely with the aid of their labour.

The extensive employment of women was largely responsible for the fact that the Ministry of Munitions took special measures to inquire into questions of industrial fatigue and the influence of hours of labour upon output. In the earlier days of the war the expedient of working long hours for seven days in the week was adopted rather indiscriminately, but it came to be realized that this was not the way to get the best out of the workers, who required reasonable periods of rest and recreation to maintain their productive capacity at its fullest. A Health of Munition Workers Committee was appointed to consider and advise on matters of this kind, and one result was that Sunday labour was abolished so far as possible in works under the Ministry of Munitions. The establishment of a Welfare Department at the Ministry, charged, under the direction of Mr. B. S. Rowntree, with a wide range of duties concerning the social and other conditions under which the employees worked, was a recognition of the close relationship that exists between good industrial environment and industrial efficiency. Women welfare supervisors with a roving commission as regards the industrial well-being of the girls were made obligatory in all the national factories, their functions being to assist in selecting employees suitable for particular work, to investigate grievances and cases of dismissal, and to advise in connexion with such things as the provision of hygienic conditions, canteens for the supply of proper food, recreation rooms and lodgings. It was found that attention to matters of this sort, as well as to conditions of defective lighting, heating and ventilation, had a beneficial influence on both quality and quantity of output, and tended to improve the relations between the management and the workers.

The notes which face the pictures are from Mr. Pennell's own descriptions of his work.

Plate I.

Plate 1.

MAKING PIG IRON: THE BASE OF THE BLAST FURNACES.

Across the great work avenue, half filled with plots, not of flowers but patterns of cooling metal, are other furnaces seen amid rising smoke and steam.

Plate 2.



Plate 2.

FROM THE TOPS OF THE FURNACES.

A subject like one seen from the top of a sky-scraper—only that is soundless, this is endless sound. From the sky-scraper you look down on little dots of men; here on trains and cranes. And as you look a charge is emptied into the furnace—and a whole place bursts into flame, trembles, roars, then sighs and dies away. Always down below the little figures wheel barrows and push carts.

Plate 3.

Plate 3.

THE GREAT TOWER: PIG IRON.

From the blast furnaces the iron is brought to this yard, and carried by the cranes to the floor, to be seized by the great tongs and jaws and thrust into the furnaces and turned into steel.

Plate 4.



Plate 4.

"BOTTLING" THE BIG SHELL.

This shop was an old factory where a big press had been set up. The walls had all been whitewashed, and against them the press and the figures told stunningly. The crane which was to carry the big shells from the furnace to the press was not ready, and the work was done by men. In these works it is seldom you see "the man power."

Plate 5.



Plate 5.

THE SHELL FACTORY.

One of the shell factories that have grown up all over the country within the last year.

Plate 6.



Plate 6.

FINISHING SHELLS.



Plate 7.

CUTTING AND TURNING A BIG GUN.

The big gun stood on a great trestle, and all the while the great lathe or plane kept turning and turning at the end of it; once in a while a man would look at it, or do something to it, or pick up steel shavings, but all the while the machine kept turning, and all the while nothing seemed to happen; it was all silent, ceaseless force.

Plate 8

THE GUN SHOP.

When the guns are forged, either whole or in part, they are brought into the gun shop, bored and planed. They come in silently, high in air, and then are lowered in place, lie in rows, in piles, in masses, waiting their turn to be finished.

Plate 8.



Plate 9.



Plate 9.

THE NEW GUN PIT.

The new pits are like the old, only they are in a great hall, and instead of monstrous forms, there are marvellous effects--suggestions in mighty, lofty vagueness.

Plate 10.

BRINGING IN THE GUN.

On one side was the river, on the other "the bank"; between, the glass and iron palace, where the great turret was being built. Then the engine dragged in a gun to be fitted in the turret.

Plate 10.



Plate 11.

BUILDING THE GREAT TURRET.

Storey above storey, all glass and iron, rises the shop where the great turrets are built, and below the floor in deep pits their bases stand. This is the other end of the shop in the previous picture. The open part of the turret made a design—the Pediment of War and Labour. Here was the Greek idea carried out by British workmen, and no British artist has ever seen it. But from something of this sort in Greece, Greek artists got their scheme of decoration when they were building the earliest temples.



Plate 11.

Plate 12.

FITTING GUNS IN TURRETS.

These smaller guns were being fitted in a turret in another shop. They are put in and then the turret is tried.

Plate 12.



Plate 13.

THE OLD SHIPYARD.

Here were merchant ships being built. The ships just grew, and the cranes came and helped to build them.



Plate 14.

THE GANTRY.

A merchant shipyard. The gantry was more like those I have seen in Germany.

Plate 14.



Plate **15.**

THE GREAT CRANE.



Plate 15.

Plate 16.

THE BALLOON SHED.

Around and about, all over the plain, the birds and bugs lie at rest, their wings making wonderful lines against the sky, wonderful colours on the grass. Then they stir and hum, and skim over the ground, and roar, and rise into the air, and sail away, and only the huge empty shed remains, and the long box on a lorry which, too, is leaving, with the sign on it: "Mesopotamia viâ Cardiff," whither another air machine is being shipped.

CHAPTER CLXIII.

DECLINE AND FALL OF THE COALITION GOVERNMENT: JUNE, 1915, TO DECEMBER, 1916.

CHARACTER AND HISTORY OF THE COALITION—ITS EARLY ACHIEVEMENTS—FINANCE AND THRIFT—FOOD PROBLEMS—CONTROL OF WHEAT SUPPLY—PROMISE OF A "FOOD CONTROLLER"—MUNITIONS AND LABOUR—THE CLYDE AND SOUTH WALES—SIZE OF THE CABINET—A WAR COMMITTEE—CONSCRIPTION—IRELAND—MR. HUGHES'S TOUR—THE PARIS ECONOMIC CONFERENCE—THE PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER—REFORM OF THE GENERAL STAFF—AIR POLICY—PENSIONS—THE URGENT PROBLEM OF MAN-POWER—ADMIRALTY CHANGES—THE CRISIS—MR. LLOYD GEORGE ACTS—THE HISTORY OF SEVEN DAYS—MR. ASQUITH RESIGNS—MR. LLOYD GEORGE PRIME MINISTER—THE NEW GOVERNMENT—MR. LLOYD GEORGE AND "PEACE TALK"—THE NEW POLICIES.

IN earlier chapters an account has been given of the circumstances which led up to the formation in May-June, 1915, of a Coalition Government, of the gradual failure of voluntary recruiting and the adoption in Great Britain of compulsory military service, and of some outstanding episodes in domestic history, of which the most momentous was the Irish Rebellion of April, 1916. It is now necessary to review the chequered career of the Coalition Government, to trace the course of its declining fortunes, and to show how, in December, 1916, Mr. Lloyd George succeeded Mr. Asquith as Prime Minister and converted the Cabinet into a small war executive, which was to be supported by new Ministries for the control of food and shipping, for labour, pensions, and the air, and with experts in place of politicians at the head of some of the most important departments.

The Coalition Cabinet, as was explained in describing its formation, "marked a definite and most necessary stage in the process of replacing party Government by a Government for War." It was "undoubtedly stronger" than Mr. Asquith's Liberal Government, but it was "too much to expect that it would show itself permanently more efficient than its predecessor." For its membership "was limited to the politicians, and party considerations were still the basis of its composition," and "it was likely to suffer, even more than its predecessor, from its own unwieldy bulk, which necessarily hampered the swift decisions required of a Cabinet in time of war."* Those predictions and fears were more than justified in the event. For eighteen months the Coalition Government proved in almost every sphere of war direction and war administration that it was stronger than its predecessor, but not strong enough, that it acted more swiftly but yet acted too late, that its measures were better adapted to the needs of the time than the measures of the first year of war, but yet were almost invariably only half measures. By far the most remarkable success of the whole period was the success of the policy which took shape in the establishment of the Ministry of Munitions and the passing of the

* Vol. V., p. 320.

Munitions of War Act. It will be remembered that the disclosures of *The Times* in May, 1915, showing that, in the British attacks at Fromelles and Richebourg, "the want of an unlimited supply of high explosives was a fatal bar to our success,' really gave the last blow to the tottering Liberal Ministry. The whole situation was transformed under the Coalition Government, with Mr. Lloyd George as Minister of Munitions and subsequently as Minister of War, and a year's work culminated in the Battle of the Somme. Yet the life of the Coalition saw disappointment after disappointment—the comparative failure of the Battle of Loos, the Balkan fiasco, which ended in the overthrow of Serbia and Montenegro and the opening of the German road to Turkey, the withdrawal from the Dardanelles, the tragedy of Kut, the second Balkan fiasco and overrunning of Rumania. It took the Coalition a whole year to proceed from the taking of a National Register to the passing of the second Military Service Act, and even that legislation was of such a kind that in less than six months there was no more urgent problem than the problem of Man Power—and meanwhile a host of other problems were accumulating. Public opinion became ever more insistent in its demand for vigorous conduct of the war, at the cost of whatever sacrifices, and ever more intolerant of the Government's conduct of blockade policy, air policy, labour policy, food policy, shipping policy, and even naval policy. Again and again Mr. Asquith was urged to reduce his unwieldy Cabinet of 23—a Cabinet many of whose members were suffering from physical exhaustion—and to place the real conduct of affairs in a few able hands. But the situation dragged on, until at last the Coalition died, as it were, a natural death. There was some talk of intrigue, but in reality the end had long been inevitable, and when it came it was hailed with almost universal relief.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, MR. RUNCIMAN AND MR. HENDERSON MEET THE COAL-OWNERS AT CARDIFF.

There was little disposition, either in the country or in the House of Commons, with its party lines now obliterated, to criticize the Coalition Government in the first month or two of its existence. In a speech on June 15, 1915, in which he asked for a new Vote of Credit of £250,000,000, Mr. Asquith enlarged upon the repugnance with which he had undertaken the task of reconstruction. He spoke of the "upheaval" which he had "brought about, for the time being," of "this transformation of the normal conventions, the inveterate traditions and the well-settled practice of our political

MR. LLOYD GEORGE ADDRESSING THE SOUTH WALES MINERS AT CARDIFF, JULY 21, 1915.

He inaugurated a new departure in thus appealing direct to the miners' delegates.

THE OPENING OF THE TRADE UNION CONGRESS AT BRISTOL, SEPTEMBER 6, 1915.

This Congress was described by "The Times" as the "most memorable gathering in the history of Trade Unionism." Mr. Lloyd George as Minister of Munitions plainly put before the representatives the failure of labour to fulfil its obligations.

life." "The word 'coalition,'" he said, "has not a pleasant savour in the vocabulary of British politics," and he gave instances in which the name recalled "ill-assorted, and in the results more or less ill-starred, arrangements which, with the best intentions, were proved by experience to be lacking in practical efficiency." He added:

> It is a great, and, as many people consider, a hazardous experiment that none of us would have chosen. . . . Our friends in the country on both sides are, as everybody knows, doubtful, suspicious, bewildered, perhaps pained.

But the truth was that, to all but irredeemable party politicians, to whom considerations of persons, of place, and of votes are as the breath of their nostrils, the change was welcome as giving rise to hopes that the war would henceforth be prosecuted in the more vigorous and enlightened spirit which events had shown to be urgently needed.

For a time the new combination showed more energy than its predecessor in the work of mobilizing the nation on a war footing. Before Parliament adjourned at the end of July Ministers had certain achievements to their credit.

The National Registration Bill, which was passed after some opposition from those who saw in it the thin end of the wedge of conscription, had for its object the discovery of the present occupations of every person in the country between the ages of 16 and 65 (with certain exceptions) and whether he or she was skilled in and able and willing to perform any other than the work (if any) at which he or she was at the time employed, and if so, the nature thereof. So far as it went, the Registration Law was a useful, if belated, preliminary to national organization.

On June 22 a second War Loan was issued, which, introduced without warning and backed by a great outburst of advertisements, had, by July 10, when it closed, produced a sum of about £600,000,000.

The War Loan was followed by a so-called campaign for thrift, to the vital necessity of which the attention of the Government had been continually directed by *The Times*. This campaign, so far as the Government were concerned, was inaugurated by Mr. Asquith, who, in a speech at the Guildhall, on June 29, urged the importance of reducing personal expenditure and increasing savings. "If you save more," he said, "you can lend the State more, and the nation will be proportionately enabled to pay for the war out of its own pocket. If you spend less you either reduce the cost and volume of our imports or you leave a larger volume of commodities available for export." But the force of this appeal was considerably modified in the eyes of the public by the fact that the Government themselves set a thoroughly bad example. Not only the Admiralty, the War Office and the rest of the Government departments were squandering money without stint, but the expenditure of local administrative bodies was proceeding unchecked. On July 8 Lord St. Davids invited the Government to appoint a departmental committee to consider suggestions for the improvement of the public service during the war. Lord Crewe threw lukewarm water on the proposal. He held out no hopes that the Government would adopt it. But before the end of the month a Retrenchment Committee had been appointed.

While it pursued its investigations, the necessity for saving continued to be urged upon the public by the Parliamentary War Savings Committee, who sought to bring home to women especially the part which they could play in reducing expenditure and waste. Their exhortations fell, for the most part, on deaf ears. Money, the result of high wages, was plentiful, and women, with their more primitive instincts, preferred rather to put it on their backs than in the banks. Food, mainly imported from abroad, had "risen" less than wages and was also plentiful, and the average housewife's ideas of economy were rudimentary. Economic arguments were useless in the face of public extravagance. Nothing short of compulsion could suffice to produce serious results. By November Mr. Asquith was able to report that certain recommendations had been made for reform in expenditure on Army rations, but he showed no inclination to take steps in the direction of enforcing general economy. Mr. McKenna, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, did indeed announce the incubation of a new scheme for making a particular form of thrift more attractive, by enlarging the facilities for investing in War Loan Stock, but when, in December, he addressed a conference of organized labour on the subject he found that he had mischosen his audience. There existed in many sections of the working classes—and of other classes as well—a desire to "make hay while the sun shines," and this tendency was in no way discouraged by Mr. Asquith's point-blank refusal to reduce Ministerial salaries. Ministers apparently lacked the vision and

THE AUSTRALIAN WHEAT HARVEST.
Ox-teams arriving at a railway station.

enthusiasm to realize for themselves the effect of an example of self-sacrifice. While private local effort did much useful work by house-to-house visiting on a comparatively limited scale, the Government did nothing to warn the public that the sun would not shine for ever.

At Christmas, 1915, *The Times* urged that a list should be published of "a few of the main articles in which saving is most needed in the national interest," while a number of the best-known men in the City reinforced its arguments with a manifesto in favour of economy. They pointed out that "the nation's energies must be completely concentrated upon the production of all really essential things," and that the production of all non-essentials must be wholly stopped. They further urged that "not only must the nation avoid the consumption of all non-essentials, but must even restrict the consumption of essentials to the limit of efficiency."

It was not until the end of January, 1916, that the Home Secretary, Mr. Samuel, in a speech in which he admitted that the Government appeal "had in the main fallen on deaf ears" (though he did not mention the true causes, namely, the Government's failure to combine example with precept), declared that "he doubted very much whether anything short of severer taxation and more rigid restrictions in the supplies of articles of unnecessary consumption would really have the desired effect." At the same time Mr. Runciman, President of the Board of Trade, announced that restrictions or prohibitions would be imposed on the importation of certain bulky commodities. Thus tardily the Government were awaking to the situation. They further took steps to carry out the recommendations of a committee appointed on December 7 to consider the best means of obtaining contributions to War Loans from the "small investor" and the working classes, which included a scheme to create voluntary local organization all over the country for stimulating savings and bringing them to the Exchequer. By the middle of July, on the occasion of a War Savings Week organized by the National War Savings Committee, *The Times* was able to say:

> The spirit prevailing to-day throughout the country is very different from that of a year or six months ago. The foolish complacency which too long encouraged the indolent and self-seeking has been changed by recent events [the Battle of the Somme] into a juster appreciation of the national trial. Men who at one time seemed only concerned about their own "rights" now avow their readiness to make any sacrifice for the good of the war. And that spirit has been shown in the matter of war saving, too.

Closely allied with the question of financial

economy were the questions of food economy and supply. The war was gradually resolving itself into a trial of endurance, in which the food problem was to assume an increasing importance. By the middle of June, 1915, *The Times* was urging upon the Government that it was high time to think about the country's food supply, and demanding that the new President of the Board of Agriculture, Lord Selborne, should take action and give the required lead. In Lord Selborne had been chosen a man with first-hand knowledge both of farming at home and of the resources of the Empire overseas. Without delay he appointed a special committee, under the presidency of Lord Milner, who had as his colleagues Lord Inchcape, one of the first authorities on shipping and freights; Mr. A. D. Hall, Mr. Rowland Prothero, and Mr. Edward Strutt, all pioneers in practical agricultural management and research; Sir Harry Verney and Mr. Acland, representing the Board of Agriculture, old and new; Mr. Charles Fielding, a well-known business man who had made a special study of the question of food supply; and Mr. J. A. Seddon, representing the interests of labour. A few days later a similar committee was appointed for Scotland. In exactly a month Lord Milner's committee presented an interim report in which they recommended that farmers should be encouraged to grow more wheat by being guaranteed a minimum price of 45s. a quarter for the four years following the harvest of 1916. The Scottish Committee considered and rejected this proposal, and the Government decided against it. The main reason given by Lord Selborne, in announcing this decision towards the end of August, was that "the navy have the submarine menace well in hand." He added that the area under wheat had already been largely increased and that very large crops were reported from Canada and Australia. For these reasons the Government were not prepared to incur the additional financial liability involved in the guarantees. But he warned farmers that they were going to have great difficulties in getting labour and machinery, and outlined a large scheme of organization and cooperation, in which the County Councils would act as a medium between the farmers and the Board of Agriculture. His forecast as to difficulties about labour was soon to be fulfilled. A discussion in the House of Commons in the Spring of 1916 revealed a very

THE AUSTRALIAN WHEAT HARVEST.
Shipping wheat at Adelaide.

unsatisfactory state of things. Owing to the lack of labour, there was no hope of maintaining the level of production of the previous year. Farmers were complaining of the lack of labour before the war, and the withdrawal of a quarter of a million men for the Army had not been compensated for by the registering of 35,000 women for farm work. It was necessary to

A TYPICAL SOUTH WALES MINING SCENE: TREHAFOD COLLIERY.

re-employ soldiers still in the preliminary stages of their training. The employment of prisoners of war, of interned aliens and of "conscientious objectors" to military service was naturally suggested, but at the time met with little support from the farmers themselves.

It was not until October, 1916, that the Government decided to control the wheat supply. There had, indeed, been a Cabinet Committee on Food Supplies since a very early period in the war, which had repeatedly arranged for the purchase of large quantities of wheat and their gradual sale in the country. In April, 1915, the Government decided not to make any further purchases of wheat, on the ground that their operations had had the effect of restricting normal trade. But at the end of the year arrangements were again made for the accumulation of stocks, and a joint international policy of wheat purchase was arranged with the French and Italian Governments. What the Government did now was to appoint Commissioners, with Lord Crawford as chairman, with full power to purchase, sell and control the delivery of wheat and flour in the United Kingdom, and to take such steps as might seem desirable for maintaining the supply. The popular outcry caused by the rise in prices at this period, based largely on the belief that undue profits were being made was met by a Report of the Food Prices Committee and by a statement in the House of Commons by Mr. Runciman that there was no evidence of exploitation.

It has been seen that the Government had decided in August, 1915, that the submarine menace was "well in hand," and that therefore no action was necessary on the proposal of the Milner Committee to guarantee a minimum price for wheat. But in November, 1916, the submarine menace, so far from being "well in hand," was at least as serious as it had been in the worst period of the preceding year. The Government had gambled on the hope that the war would somehow or other come to an end in 1916. But meanwhile the lack of tonnage, partly due to the renewed submarine activity, was contributing to a further rise in prices. There was an uneasy feeling in the country that the submarine menace might be more serious than was admitted and that the Admiralty was not sufficiently alive to it. A cry

went up for the more efficient arming of merchantmen.

On November 15 Mr. Runciman made a speech in the House of Commons which showed that the Government had at length made up their minds to "do something." Apologising for the drastic character of his proposals, though the only complaints made of them were that they were not drastic enough, he announced the appointment of a "Food Controller" with extensive powers. The Government also proposed to take powers under the Defence of the Realm Acts to proceed against persons who wasted food; to prescribe the purposes for which articles of food might or might not be used; to regulate the manufacture of certain articles of food, and particularly of flour; and if necessary, to regulate the sale and distribution of food and to regulate market operations and "corners." Mr. Wardle, who welcomed the proposal, in the name of the Labour members, pointed out that Mr. Runciman's confession that he had been forced to enter upon a course which he was reluctant to take involved a condemnation of the inaction of Ministers in the past. The new regulations were published on November 18. But even now, to the astonishment of the country, which was only waiting to be controlled, no Food Controller was forthcoming. The truth was that Mr. Runciman's promise had been made without any measures having been considered for carrying it out, and it does not appear that the Prime Minister ever gave his consent to the new appointment.

The most important of the early achievements of the Coalition Government was the passage of the Munitions of War Act, introduced by Mr. Lloyd George, the newly appointed Minister of Munitions. This Act, which, among other provisions, suspended trade union regulations restricting output and limited the profits of employers, raised hopes that the



CHANGING SHIFTS AT PONTYPRIDD.
Inset: A group of miners wives and children at Coed Ely.

unsatisfactory relations still existing between employers and employed would be placed upon a more healthy basis. These hopes were rudely shattered by the South Wales coal miners, to whom, as has been described in Volume V., Chapter XC., Mr. Lloyd George was obliged to make humiliating concessions. The trouble, as *The Times* pointed out, arose from the attempt to maintain the ordinary peace relations in war time. The men had never been convinced either of the necessity of an uninterrupted output or of the good faith of the employers. Nor, in view of the inertia of the Government and of the pettifogging attitude of some of the employers, can it be said that the men were greatly to blame. The activity of a small section of irreconcilables, fostered, as was believed, by German propagandists, unduly influenced the main bulk of the miners, who in their hearts were no less determined than any other section of the working classes to win the war. Nothing but strong action by the Government could have any effect, and this was not to come until the war had lasted for over another year.

Meanwhile the labour situation could not but fill the Government with anxiety. The Trades Union Congress at Bristol in September gave Mr. Lloyd George an opportunity for a candid and courageous declaration of the failure of the working man to carry out his obligations and of the inevitable disaster which must follow unless he reformed his ways. At a conference of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain in October a scheme for a triple alliance between miners, railwaymen and transport workers was adopted unanimously. In the following August this alliance was to make demands upon the Government upon questions connected with demobilization after the war, to which Mr. Asquith had little difficulty in replying. The deficiency of skilled labour greatly hampered the operations of the Ministry of Munitions, which by November 8 already controlled 1,670 works and factories. A number of great new national factories were approaching completion. There were nearly 1,000,000 workpeople employed in establishments where there were no profits, or only limited profits, for the private employer. One of the achievements of the

WELSH MINERS AT THE MINE-HEAD.

This well-clothed crowd contrasts with the men in working clothes on the preceding page.

Ministry had been to centralize the purchase of all materials for all the Allied Governments. Another had been to place all the important tool-makers under Government control. But unless fresh supplies of skilled men could be found large numbers of semi-skilled and unskilled workers, both men and women, who were offering their services could not be adequately utilized. Further, there existed in some districts complaints that employers were taking advantage of the Munitions Act to treat their men harshly. To meet the emergency, Lord Murray of Elibank was appointed to act temporarily as Director of Recruiting for Munitions Work, while in the matter of grievances the messages brought back by parties of munition workers who had visited the front and seen for themselves the urgent need for increased output did something to make the workers at home realize the truth about the war. By December it had been found necessary to amend the Munitions Act in such a

HOTEL METROPOLE, LONDON.
Taken over by Ministry of Munitions in 1916.

manner as to remove most of the grievances arising from its working. Mr. Lloyd George was indefatigable in addressing deputations and meetings of workpeople on the necessity for thoroughgoing dilution of labour—a point on which, regardless of the Munitions Act, the extreme sections of the men had remained obdurate, and which was not settled in the Clyde district until the following June. In an eloquent and prophetic speech to trade union officials at Glasgow he said:

> I wonder how many people realize the magnitude of the war and the tremendous issues that depend upon it. Sometimes I fear that they treat it as a passing shower—heavy, drenching perhaps, but transient—soon the sun will shine again and quickly dry up the puddles, and we can once more walk along the same old roads in the same old shambling way. But this is not a passing shower, it is not a spell of bad weather—it is the deluge, it is a convulsion of Nature. If you will carefully watch

GREAT CENTRAL HOTEL.
Another of the large buildings early commandeered by the Government.

> what is going on in the belligerent lands you will find that this war is bringing unheard-of changes in the social and industrial fabric. It is a cyclone which is tearing up by the roots the ornamental plants of modern society and wrecking some of the flimsy trestle bridges of modern civilization. It is an earthquake which is upheaving the very rocks of European life. It is one of those seismic disturbances in which nations leap forward or fall back generations in a single bound.
>
> All this chaffering about relaxing a rule here and suspending a custom there is out of place. You cannot haggle with an earthquake. . . .

If the truth of these words had been taken to heart by the Coalition Government, it would have been better both for them and for the country.

By January 1, 1916, a total of 2,422 establishments had been declared as controlled under the Munitions Act, and by March 27, 3,337.* The Hotel Metropole, in Northumberland Avenue, was taken over by the Ministry of Munitions—the first of a number of great public and private buildings in London to be "commandeered" by the State. The Government dealt with unwonted firmness with a strike in the Clyde area in April. The sympathy of the great majority of the workmen was against the agitators, as to whom Mr. Arthur Henderson, President of the Board of Education

* By August, 1916, there were more than 4,000 controlled establishments and 95 national factories. The latter were working entirely for the Army.

and Chairman of the National Advisory Committee of War Output, declared with great truth that "there were those connected with industrial life as there were with political affairs who, after 20 months' unprecedented fighting, failed to realize either the grave nature of the position or the magnitude of the task which this country and the Allies had in hand."

For such as these the postponement, by agreement, of the Whitsuntide holidays—the result of holidays as usual at Easter had been to reduce the output of munitions by one-half for a fortnight—had doubtless an educative effect. An appeal to postpone the August Bank Holiday was also, for the most part, patriotically observed.

June saw a recrudescence of trouble among the South Wales miners, and in August the National Union of Railwaymen put forward a demand for an all-round increase of 10s. a week in wages. After prolonged negotiations an agreement was reached on the basis of an increase of 5s. on the war bonus of 5s. which had been granted by the railway companies in October, 1915. But the coal question remained grave, and the large amount of avoidable absenteeism, estimated to represent a shortage of output of 15,000,000 essential tons a year, called forth from Mr. Asquith an appeal which was not without effect. The main cause of slackness among the miners was the belief that the owners alone profited by any increase in the coal raised. To the demand of the South Wales miners for an advance in wages of 15 per cent. the owners replied with a demand for a reduction of 10 per cent. In November, just 16 months since the last controversy had compelled the Government to intervene, matters reached a climax. The miners flatly refused to believe the contention of the owners that the increased cost of production had cancelled the advantage to them of the rise in prices, and they demanded a joint audit of the costs of production, which the owners refused, on the ground that it involved "a departure from the customary method of procedure." Suddenly, on November 29, the Government took over the Welsh coal-field—a step which, though it came as a surprise to the men, was welcomed by many of them as a move in the direction of that nationalization of the whole mining industry

A CROWD OF CLYDE STRIKERS ON GLASGOW GREEN.

MR. HUGHES PRESENTED WITH THE FREEDOM OF THE CITY OF LONDON.

MR. HUGHES INSPECTING THE GUARD OF HONOUR OF AUSTRALIANS IN THE GUILDHALL YARD

On the occasion of his receiving the Freedom of the City.

MR. HUGHES AS LL.D. OF EDINBURGH.
One of the many honours conferred on the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth.

which they had long demanded. It was, indeed, one more instance of the Socialistic influence of the war, illustrated in the State control of railways, food, and other matters, and destined to leave its mark upon the industrial organization of the country for all time. A few days later the Government granted the men's demand for a 15 per cent. advance, subject to the report of an independent auditor.

The main defects of the Coalition Government were variously attributed to the size of the Cabinet, its composition, and the character of the Prime Minister himself. That the Cabinet was too large was unquestionable, and was admitted frankly by members of all parties. A body of 23 men of very unequal degrees of ability, tired by their departmental labours, and meeting every few days for a couple of hours, was, indeed, an impossible machinery for making war. As early as September, 1915, *The Times* was urging the necessity of substituting a smaller Cabinet, meeting every day. The result, it said, of the size of the Cabinet was "postponement, want of grip and prevision, superficial and ill-considered plans, a failure to 'see the war steadily and see it whole.'" It added:

> For the purposes of the war we need a far smaller Cabinet, fortified by a proper General Staff, and assisted (not dominated) by as many Special Committees as may be required. Its members should be relieved as far as possible from departmental detail, and they should meet every day for as many hours as may be necessary to take prompt, considered, and effective action.

On November 2, 1915, Mr. Asquith, in a speech in which he admitted the differences of opinion existing in the Government on the question of compulsory service, announced that it had been decided to create a War Committee for "the higher direction of the war." Ten days later the names of its members were given. They were to be the Prime Minister himself, the Secretary of State for War, the First Lord of the Admiralty the Minister of Munitions, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Committee was to have the assistance of naval, military and diplomatic advisers. It will be seen that this Committee was still open to the objection that it was composed of heads of departments. It was welcomed, however, as a step in the right direction, and with the reconstitution of the General Staff and the prospective formation of a common War Council among the Allies, there was reason to hope for a more efficient prosecution of the war.

The formation of the War Committee was immediately followed by the resignation from the Cabinet of Mr. Winston Churchill, who, not being on the Committee, felt that he "could not accept a position of general responsibility for war policy without any effective share in its guidance and control." Mr. Churchill was doomed to discover that his services could very well be spared. The Cabinet had been more seriously weakened by the resignation, on October 12, of Sir Edward Carson, who protested against the "gyrations" of the Government's policy in the Balkans.

These resignations were but the outward and visible signs of the internal dissensions

which manifested themselves in the Government as each fresh problem arose for solution. There were months during which the Cabinet, while withholding from the public the realities of the situation, appeared incapable of arriving at any decision whatever. It is needless to recall the delays and hesitations which marked the introduction of compulsory military service, and the conflicting influences which revealed themselves in the half-hearted efforts of the politicians to adjust their ideas to the new conditions and the nation's need. The extraordinary situation produced at the end of the year by Mr. Asquith's "pledge" to the married recruits has been fully described in Vol. VIII., Chap. CXXVI. That the tragic failure of the Dardanelles Expedition did not lead to a popular explosion was evidence not of the country's confidence in its leaders, but of its amazing self-control. Meanwhile the aberrations of the censorship exasperated and misled public opinion alike at home and in Allied and neutral countries.

The year 1916 opened with the Coalition Cabinet faced by a very serious state of things. The Government had decided in the last week of 1915 in favour of compulsorily enlisting the large number of single men who had not attested voluntarily under Lord Derby's recruiting scheme. On New Year's Day it was announced that Sir John Simon had resigned as a protest against this decision. The new policy was embodied in a Bill which Mr. Asquith introduced into the House of Commons on January 5. As was shown in the chapter above cited there was at first considerable opposition from the Labour Party, who decided to withdraw from the Coalition, and from the Nationalists, who voted in a body against the first reading, although Ireland was excluded from the operation of the measure. But public opinion was so unmistakably in favour of the proposals that the opposition steadily dwindled into insignificance. The three Labour Ministers withdrew their resignations on Mr. Asquith's giving a guarantee that the Bill would not be used as a weapon for industrial compulsion, and the Nationalists exchanged their first attitude of hostility for the more logical one of neutrality.

With the passing of the first Service Bill on January 27 the Session came to an end. The new Session began on February 15, and in a short time the question of military service

MR. HUGHES'S VISIT TO THE FLEET.
He is seen speaking to a ship's company.

THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AFTER THE WAR, JUNE 19, 1916.
M. Briand, French Premier, presided. Lord Crewe, Mr. Bonar Law, and Mr. Hughes are seen on the left.

again became the chief pre-occupation of the country. The first Service Act had not long been in operation before it became clear that the number of single men provided by it was not sufficient to meet the national requirements. A Cabinet crisis was postponed for a few days by the introduction of Mr. McKenna's Budget, which set out to raise the unprecedented revenue of £500,000,000. But no sooner was this out of the way than the situation in the Cabinet became acute. On the eve of the Easter recess Mr. Asquith announced that there were still "material points of disagreement in the Cabinet, and if these points are not settled by agreement, the result must be the break-up of the Government." He added that the Cabinet was united in believing that such an event would be a national disaster of the most formidable kind.

The matter was settled by a compromise, at which the House of Commons, more statesmanlike than the Ministry, refused to look, and the intended Bill, which would have applied compulsion to boys and old soldiers, while leaving masses of unattested married men free from service, was never actually introduced. The Cabinet now decided to take the plunge. The second Service Bill, extending the principle of compulsion to all men of military age, was introduced, and with its passage into law on May 25 the long recruiting controversy was closed, so far as the main principles of service were concerned.

Meanwhile, the Government had been confronted with the situation in Ireland, which appeared, for the moment, the gravest of all the grave difficulties with which the Coalition had had to contend. The full history of the Irish rising has been given in Vol. VIII., Chaps. CXXXIV. and CXXXV. It will be remembered that efforts were then made to bring about a solution of the Irish question. It is only necessary to say here that the failure of the negotiations, although it might not be final as regarded Ireland, was a fresh blow to the prestige of the Government, which was held to have given another exhibition of helplessness and lack of cohesion and driving power.

At the beginning of March, 1916, the Prime Minister of the Australian Commonwealth, Mr. W. M. Hughes, reached England on a visit which lasted until June 24. Passing through Canada on his way, he had taken part in a Cabinet meeting at which questions of war organization were discussed. He had also recently had a meeting with the Prime Minister of New Zealand. He came, therefore, with fresh and exceptional knowledge of the views of large portions of the Empire. On March 9 he attended a meeting of the Cabinet—a landmark in Imperial development for which the only precedent had been in July, 1915, when Sir Robert Borden had done the same. Thereafter he delivered in various parts of the country a series of astonishing speeches, which for their vigour and directness contrasted very favourably with the hesitating utterances of most English politicians. His principal topics were the necessity of clearing British commerce from the alien and hostile influence which German intrigue had everywhere woven into its fabric, the vital interconnexion between a nation's economic policy and national safety, and the urgent necessity of devising a policy for the British Empire as a whole. The following are typical examples of the idea which for many weeks he laid before enthusiastic audiences :

> I want to make one thing quite clear, that what I am advocating is not merely a change of fiscal policy, not merely, or even necessarily, what is called Tariff Reform, although this may, probably will, incidentally follow, but a fundamental change in our ideas of government as applied to economic and national matters. The fact is that the whole concept of modern statesmanship needs revision. But England has been, and is, the chief of sinners. Quite apart from the idea of a self-contained Empire there is the idea of Britain as an organized nation, organized for trade, for industry, for economic justice, for national defence, for the preservation of the world's peace, for the protection of the weak against the strong. That is a noble ideal. It ought to be, it must be, ours. . . .
>
> When I speak of our Empire and the great destiny that opens before it, I do not speak of territorial expansion nor of increase of wealth, but of wider opportunities for the development of the institutions of free government and of such economic and social conditions as are worthy of a great people, compatible with the integrity of the Empire, and which will ensure the peaceful nations of the earth absolute security from all who seek to disturb the world's peace.

Mr. Hughes's visit coincided with the meeting in Paris of an Economic Conference of the Allies. This conference aroused great anxiety in English Radical and Free Trade circles, which supposed that France was seeking to lure England into some kind of Protectionist ambush. Mr. Asquith hastened to assure these persons that the British representatives would return from Paris uncommitted to any specific measures, and that nothing would be said by them which would in any degree fetter the free action either of the Government or of the House of Commons. But an incident which occurred at the Manchester Chamber of

MR. LLOYD GEORGE AT THE FRONT: DISCUSSING THE SHELL QUESTION WITH M. THOMAS.

Commerce, the citadel of Free Trade, confirmed the belief that the country, as a whole, had definitely made up its mind upon certain broad principles of England's future trade policy. A split having occurred over an attempt made by the directors of the Chamber to commit the Chamber to the maintenance of the policy of free imports, and a memorandum of the directors having been rejected by a large majority, an election was held to fill the places of the directors who had consequently resigned. Of the 22 elected, 18 were definitely pledged against Free Trade with Germany after the war, while two were in favour of it and two were not committed either way. In fact, as Mr. Herbert Samuel, the Home Secretary, declared, "there was undoubtedly at this moment throughout the nation a widespread and intense feeling that after the war we should not be able to enter again into friendly equal trade relationships with those who were now our enemies." It was therefore with much satisfaction that the country learned that Mr. Hughes was going to be present at the Paris Conference. To the French his participation was especially gratifying, for they recognized in him a truer representative of British opinion than were some of those who had been loudest in the expression of their views about the desirability of the Conference.

The Conference met on June 14 at the Quai d'Orsay and sat for four days. Besides Mr. Hughes, the British delegates were Mr. Bonar Law, Lord Crewe (in the absence of Mr. Runciman, President of the Board of Trade) and Sir George E. Foster, Canadian Minister of Commerce. The result was a comprehensive agreement, not merely upon the financial and economic measures to be taken against the enemy as military weapons during the struggle and during the period of reconstruction to follow it, but also upon the main lines of the common policy on these subjects when the period had come to an end. The resolutions of the Conference were published on June 21, and on June 23 Mr. Bonar Law, speaking at a dinner given to Mr. Hughes by Australians in London, declared:—"I am certain that these resolutions will be adopted not only by the present Government but by the present House of Commons, and that they may be taken as representing the settled policy of the British Government." It is not surprising, in view of the qualities of the Government, that doubts were nevertheless expressed whether, after the departure of Mr. Hughes, who had contributed

much to the passing of the resolutions, and who had been one of the few men during the war to display a really great Imperial conception, these extensive ideas would not be submerged in the welter of party politics.

In view of the General Election which, although once more deferred by the extension, on August 17, of the life of the existing Parliament for a period of seven months—*i.e.*, until April 30, 1917, must inevitably be held sooner or later, there was a strong demand among members of all parties for a new register of electors. The question of registration had been the subject of pledges and assurances and "earnest consideration" ever since the previous prolongation of Parliament in January. It was now further complicated by a movement in favour of extending the franchise to soldiers and sailors on active service. The Government failed to agree, and attempted to shift their responsibility on to the House of Commons by proposing that the whole matter should be referred to a Select Committee. But the House refused the proposal, and the Government had no alternative but to try again. This time they fell back upon their usual compromise; a Special Register Bill was introduced by Mr. Asquith on August 15 which, while making no fundamental change in the franchise law, would in fact have added to the register a large number of soldiers and sailors who had not been qualified to vote before by the presumption that their process of qualification had not been interrupted by their engagement in military service. This scheme, however, failed to secure general assent and the Bill had to be withdrawn. It was not until October that a Conference of members of both Houses invited by the Speaker, who had consented to act as Chairman, met to examine the whole question, including the reform of the franchise, the basis for the redistribution of seats, the reform of the system of registration, and the method of elections, and the manner in which their costs should be borne. The Conference had not reported when the Government fell.

The administration of the War Office under Lord Kitchener did not escape the general criticism of indecision and delay to which the whole proceedings of the Coalition Government were exposed in ever increasing measure. The

MR. LLOYD GEORGE IN A CAPTURED GERMAN TRENCH ON THE BRITISH FRONT IN FRANCE.

munitions crisis which brought down the Liberal Government created, as has been seen, the Ministry of Munitions under Mr. Lloyd George. That was the first large encroachment upon the powers and responsibilities of the overburdened Secretary of State for War. Lord Kitchener's great public prestige remained, and unfortunately his colleagues remained at all times ready to shelter behind it. But more and more the war outgrew the possibilities of an organization the central feature of which of the Government in regard to military operations." This meant that Sir William Robertson would enjoy far greater powers than the chief of the General Staff had possessed hitherto, and that orders to commanders would go out in his name and no longer in that of the Secretary of State for War. Even so, the centralization at the War Office remained the subject of severe criticism up to the eve of Lord Kitchener's tragic death at sea at the beginning of June.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE AS SECRETARY FOR WAR, IN CONSULTATION WITH M. BRIAND, THE FRENCH PREMIER.

was concentration of responsibility in Lord Kitchener's own hands, while every day increased the necessity for delegation of responsibility. At last, just before Christmas, after Lord Kitchener had returned from the visit —a preface to the evacuation of Gallipoli— which, "at the request of his colleagues," he made to the Eastern theatre of war, the Imperial General Staff was reorganized with Sir William Robertson as its chief. Subsequently it was laid down by an Order in Council (Jan. 27, 1916) that "the Chief of the General Staff shall be responsible for issuing the orders

When Lord Kitchener died Mr. Lloyd George became Secretary of State for War, being succeeded as Minister of Munitions by Mr. Montagu.

The question of the country's position with regard both to home defence against the raids of aircraft and to the supply of suitable and sufficiently abundant aeroplanes for offensive purposes at the front was at times the source of considerable public anxiety—an anxiety which the reticence of official *communiqués* and the unsatisfactory answers of the Under Secre-

THE CALL-UP OF "COMBED-OUT" MEN, JANUARY 1, 1917.

tary of State for War in the House of Commons tended rather to increase than allay. The raids themselves, as is shown in Chapters CVIII. and CXXVIII., while they caused a number of casualties among harmless men, women and children, signally failed to produce either the material or the moral effects intended by the enemy. But while the public never regarded them otherwise than as an inconvenience—as time went on the restrictions with regard to street, shop and house lighting grew more severe—the difficulty of discovering exactly who was responsible for anti-aircraft defence produced a marked sense of irritation. This led in some cases to demands for reprisals which, whether they would have been effective or not, were excluded for the simple reason that, at the time, machines suitable for the purpose of long distance raids could not be spared from the urgent needs of the various fronts in sufficient numbers to produce a serious effect. Nevertheless, some raids were made on Zeppelin sheds, and by the middle of February, 1916, the duties of home defence had been definitely divided between the Navy and Army, the former being responsible until hostile aircraft reached the coast, and thereafter the latter, under the direct control of

WIVES AND SWEETHEARTS OF THE "COMBED-OUT" MEN ACCOMPANYING THE RECRUITS.

THE VISIT OF FRENCH PARLIAMENTARIANS TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, APRIL, 1916.

The group, taken at their hotel, includes M. Stephen Pichon, Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, M. Franklin Bouillon, Comte d'Aunay, MM. Doumer, Jenouvrier, Dupont, Guerin, Steeg, d'Aubigny, Maurice Bernard, Emile Broussais, Cachin, Cels, de Chambrun, Guernier, Lebrun, Georges Leygues, Maurice Long, Montet, Outrey, General Pedoya, MM. Piou, Henry Simon, and Klotz.

Field-Marshal Sir John French, Commander-in-Chief for Home Defence. As the output of the factories increased, it became possible greatly to increase the supply of anti-aircraft guns, and with increased practice in night-flying and improved methods of attack highly satisfactory results were attained in the destruction of six hostile airships in September—November, 1916. By that time the authorities had learnt a lesson which *The Times* had been inculcating ever since the raids began, and had realized that nothing but good resulted from permitting full, though of course duly censored, descriptions in the Press.

The efficiency of the administration and command of the Royal Flying Corps was a further question which gave the Government much trouble in the first six months of 1916. There had long existed a feeling, based, indeed, for the most part, on ill-informed assertions, that the authorities were not fully alive to the growing importance of the part played by aircraft in the war, and were more concerned in inventing ingenious replies to criticisms in the House of Commons than in "thinking ahead" on the lines of a large policy. Matters were brought to a climax by some dramatic speeches by Mr Pemberton Billing, M.P., in which, in addition to serious complaints regarding the Royal Naval Air Service, he charged the Royal Flying Corps authorities with criminal negligence, mainly in causing Army pilots to fly unsuitable machines. The Government replied by appointing a Committee of Investigation, which, between May 18 and August 1, heard 54 witnesses, and which issued two Reports (August and December). These reports showed that the allegations, largely depending on hearsay evidence, were, as regards the charge of criminal negligence, devoid of foundation, while the heads of the Royal Flying Corps, in the general matter of unpreparedness and errors in judgment, were found to have made, in very difficult circumstances, extraordinarily few mistakes, and those of no vital importance. In any case, the magnificent work of the Royal Flying Corps at the front, in spite of such temporary disadvantages as the occasional production of exceptional machines by the enemy, went far to restore to the public the confidence which it had failed to derive from the official explanations of the Government. The Royal Naval Air Service escaped investigations for the time being.

Meanwhile, the vexed question of the organization of the Air Service as a whole, and the problem, amidst the growing competition for materials, machinery and labour, of reconciling the claims of the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps, revived once more the suggestion that a Minister of the Air should be appointed. Although this idea never found favour with the Government, the advantages of entrusting construction, experiment, and *matériel* generally to one body were vaguely admitted. A halting step in this direction was made in the appointment of a Joint Air Committee, but inter-departmental and inter-Service jealousy and the absence of any real power soon led to the resignation of the chairman, Lord Derby, and Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, and the Committee's collapse. It was succeeded, in May, by an Air Board, with Lord Curzon as President. This Board, although it did good work within its limited powers, suffered from the same defects as the Air Committee Commenting on its appointment, *The Times* remarked: "Frankly, we regard the Board as one more stop-gap, which can only succeed by a miracle." The miracle did not happen. The refusal of the Admiralty to fall in with a scheme which would in any degree rob the Royal Navy of its independence led to incessant controversies. No proper co-ordination existed with the Ministry of Munitions—the body ultimately responsible for the materials and labour required. Mr. Balfour was immovable; the air was full of resignations, and a deadlock appeared to have set in, when a greater crisis supervened.

The question of pensions for disabled officers and men, and of allowances and grants to wives, widows, children and other dependants, proved a very thorny one. For over two years, during which the matter became steadily more complicated and chaotic, the Government sought to rely upon voluntary effort rather than to place the business under the immediate control of the State. When the war broke out the only official organization in existence for the Army was the Commissioners of the Royal Hospital for Soldiers at Chelsea, who had to administer the payment of the flat-rate pensions and allowances laid down by Royal Warrant. Not only were these so inadequate in themselves as to require supplementing from voluntary sources, but, owing to the great variety in the circumstances of the officers and men in the new Armies, a very elaborate



CHELSEA HOSPITAL.

THE ENTRANCE TO THE HOSPITAL.

investigation into individual cases was needed to bring the total received into a proper proportion to the necessities of the recipient or his dependants. The work of investigating the cases and supplementing the flat-rate pensions was in the hands of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Help Society and the Royal Patriotic Fund Corporation.

By November, 1914, these voluntary societies had been simply overwhelmed by the growth of the Army, and much dissatisfaction was expressed at the inequalities, overlapping and anomalies arising out of the purely voluntary system of supplementing the pensions granted by the State. Numerous conferences and a vigorous Press campaign finally led to the appointment of a Select Committee of the House of Commons, which recommended a revision of the scale of flat-rate pensions and the establishment of a new central body which was to represent not only the three voluntary societies above mentioned but the Government as well. The sum of £1,000,000 was to be given to this body by the Treasury to form the nucleus of a fund (which was to be mainly voluntary) for the purpose of supplementing the flat-rate pensions. A Bill was introduced and after a somewhat stormy passage became law on November 10, 1915. The Naval and Military War Pensions, etc., Act, as it was called, set up a Statutory Committee of the Royal Patriotic Fund Corporation, consisting of 27 members with the Prince of Wales as Chairman. The acting chairman was Mr. Cyril Jackson. The duties of the Statutory Committee were mainly to supplement existing pensions, grants and separation allowances, and to make grants or allowances in cases where no separation allowances or pensions were payable out of public funds. They were also to make provision for the care of disabled officers and men after they had left the Service, including provision for their health, training and employment. Their first task was to establish local committees all over the country to assist them. But a keen controversy had raged throughout as to whether voluntary funds should enter into any Government scheme, the view being held, especially in

Labour circles, that as a supplement in itself implied the inadequacy of the flat-rate, the State should shoulder the whole burden. And now the question arose whether the Statutory Committee should take into account, in arriving at the amount of its supplements, the grants made by local funds to local pensioners. The acute differences between the Statutory Committee and the holders of these local funds postponed for a time the coming into operation of the local committees upon which the Statutory Committee was forced to rely. Nevertheless, much good preliminary work was done under great difficulties, and by October, 1916, after much negotiation, in the course of which Mr. McKenna promised to increase the nucleus fund in the hands of the Committee to £6,000,000 and to revise once more the flat-rate scale, an agreement was reached between the Statutory Committee and the Lord Mayors, Mayors and other local authorities.

By this time the number of cases to be dealt with had become altogether unmanageable. The chief authorities involved were no fewer than six in number—namely, the Admiralty, Greenwich Hospital, the War Office, Chelsea Hospital, the Statutory Committee and the Civil Liabilities Commission. There was also the Central Army Pensions Issue Office, which was responsible for making the actual payments. Among all these bodies there was naturally a certain amount of overlapping and considerable delay and friction due to the incessant need of reference from one body to another. In consequence, it too often happened that, while the conflicting authorities were composing their differences, the unfortunate discharged soldier or his dependants were left penniless. The commonest case of hardship was due to the practice of the War Office of stopping the separation allowance on a man's discharge, instead of waiting until the matter had been dealt with locally—with the result that the man might be practically destitute for months. These and similar cases amounted to a public scandal, which was boldly and successfully exposed by Sir Frederick Milner.

The only remedy was obviously some central controlling authority, and early in October a Committee of the Cabinet was appointed to

THE GREAT HALL OF CHELSEA HOSPITAL.

Used by the in-pensioners as a recreation-room.

inquire into the whole question. The Committee recommended the institution of a Pensions Board, with a Minister responsible to Parliament at its head, the chief function of the Board being to co-ordinate the work of the existing bodies. Mr. Arthur Henderson, who had been acting as Chairman of the Chelsea Commissioners, and had been working energetically to accelerate their operations, was indicated as Minister. As President-designate of the new Department he explained that the Board would concern itself exclusively with military pensions (not being service pensions, which would continue to be administered by the War Office) and that the Admiralty was to be left out of the scheme. The Bill was given a very unfavourable reception in Parliament. It was described by Mr. Hayes Fisher, Parliamentary Secretary of the Local Government Board and one of the Government members of the Statutory Committee as "a half-way house towards unification," and on November 27 Mr. Hogge moved an amendment which completely changed the structure of the Bill and established a single centralized scheme with a Minister and no Board. This was accepted by the Government under extreme pressure, and on November 30 the Government themselves proposed a number of amendments carrying out Mr. Hogge's purpose. The powers and duties of the Admiralty in respect of pensions other than service pensions were handed over to the new Ministry and the Statutory Committee was retained to exercise its original duties, subject to the instructions and control of the Minister. The Bill was passed on December 22. It remained to be seen how far the experiment of a political Minister would prove desirable. There were many who feared that it carried with it the disadvantage that pensions might become the shuttlecock of parties.

As the autumn of 1916 wore on, the Government was seen to be faced by a whole series of grave problems, all directly connected with the war, and all overripe for solution. Most of the issues have already been described. But last and by no means least there was the problem of man-power, which, in spite of the reluctant and belated Military Service Acts, dogged Mr. Asquith's footsteps to the end. It will be remembered that the main difference between the second Military Service Act and the first was the application of compulsion to married as well as unmarried men, and that the second Act, passed in May, 1916, closed some of the worst loopholes for evasion of military service. But the system of local tribunals and the network of exemptions, exceptions and reservations remained, and it was soon discovered that the system even as amended by no means represented the "complete and rounded policy" of which Mr. Asquith had boasted. The technical defects of the Military Service Acts were obvious to all who were acquainted with conscription in other countries; it remained to be seen whether the Government would repair the defects by skilful and determined administration. But in the event the administration of the Acts under the Coalition Government proved to be one long story of departmental wrangling and official inertia. The processes of "combing out" and "debadging" were slow and ineffective, and when the Government fell the number of exemptions of men of military age still numbered millions. "There must be a great tightening up," said Sir William Robertson in a stirring speech at the beginning of October. "We have adopted the principle of National Service in theory. We must see to it that we put that principle into practice. We want men, more men. We want them now, and in due course we shall want all men who can be spared." The Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that the question was "always receiving constant and most careful attention from the Government." But, although the Government survived for two months more, its "constant and careful attention" bore little fruit. What a contrast to the methods of Germany! There, too (a letter subsequently published from Marshal von Hindenburg to the Imperial Chancellor was dated September 27), the Chief of the General Staff was calling attention to the urgent need for men. But there the result, precisely within these months of October and November, was the invention, adoption and application of the Auxiliary Service Law—the most remarkable extension of military conscription ever conceived.

For a time it was even feared in some quarters that the Government would prefer to raise the military age rather than deal drastically with the administration of the Service Acts. It was clear that they would not face the application of conscription to Ireland. The very suggestion produced a speech from the Nationalist leader, Mr. Red-



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MR. LLOYD GEORGE IN 1916.

mond, at Waterford, on October 6, in which he agreed, indeed, that "it would be a disgrace to Ireland if Irishmen who are fighting at the front were left in the lurch and if Irishmen did not come to their assistance," but talked about the "sinister aspect" of the "conscription threat," which he called "a base political device." Mr. Redmond added:

I cannot believe that the Government will be insane enough to challenge a conflict with Ireland in the matter of conscription. Conscription in Ireland, so far from helping the Army and forwarding the interests of the war, would be the most fatal thing that could happen. It would be resisted. Every man in Ireland knows the truth of what I say. It would be resisted in every village in Ireland. Its attempted enforcement would be a scandal which would ring round the whole civilized world.

The Government then concentrated its energies and built its chief hopes on "combing out." Towards the end of September they appointed a "Man-Power Distribution Board,"

consisting of Mr. Austen Chamberlain (Chairman), Viscount Midleton (Vice-Chairman), Mr. A. Balfour (of Sheffield), Mr. G. N. Barnes, M.P., and Mr. Stephen Walsh, M.P. The wide duties assigned to the Board were "to determine all questions arising between Government Departments relating to the allocation or

GENERAL SIR WILLIAM ROBERTSON.
Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

economic utilization of man-power for the purpose of the successful prosecution of the war, and, in order to give effect to its determination, to direct the Government Departments concerned to create the machinery necessary to co-ordinate their activities in regard to the distribution or utilization of men and women."

It was known that, apart from the exemptions by tribunals, there were over 1,000,000 men of military age who had received exemption badges without reference to the tribunals, and that at least 50,000 men of military age were employed in Government Departments, while there were some 400,000 "temporary" exemptions, and 200,000 unsettled appeals. The Man-Power Board began work very vigorously. Its first step was to issue instructions declaring certain classes of men ineligible for badges, placing highly skilled men of certain trades at the disposal of the Ministry of Munitions, requiring extended "dilution" of labour, and calling upon the tribunals to deal more rapidly and thoroughly with appeals. In these and other ways, and thanks very largely to the work at the War Office of Sir Nevil Macready as Adjutant-General and Brigadier-General A. Campbell-Geddes as Director of Recruiting, a good deal was effected. But the Government was still not ready for thorough measures when it received on November 9 the main report of the Man-Power Board, and its recommendations were most carefully withheld from Parliament and the public during the remaining weeks of the Coalition's existence. The situation was really pretty clear. What was to be expected was a clean sweep of semi-skilled and unskilled men under a certain age and fit for general military service from civil employment into the Army. While the Government still hesitated the public was perfectly prepared for this policy, and expected its application to begin with a clean sweep of the men under 25 or 26 years of age. The Government at last fixed December 7 as the date for a discussion of the Man-Power problem in the House of Commons. It was high time. Even the Ministerial *Daily Chronicle* (November 29) put the truth as follows: "Ten weeks ago the Man-Power Board was appointed; and a great many weeks ago Parliament was promised an early date to debate its Report. The Report and the Debate are still not forthcoming—not because the Board did not submit a prompt Report, but because the Government cannot make up its mind what to do with it." When the day fixed for the debate arrived the Government had fallen.

On November 29 *The Times* declared that the growing unpopularity of the Government was due entirely to their failure to take decisions to wage the war with vigour, and to organize the nation and themselves. There were then six

urgent issues—the "man-power" question, the Air Board crisis, Admiralty reorganization, the arming of merchantmen and organization of merchant shipbuilding in reply to the German submarine and destroyer campaign, the question of increasing the production of food at home, and the organization of food control and prevention of waste. Few people, however, had any idea that, serious though the situation was, the Government was at last on the very eve of collapse. Efforts were subsequently made by over-zealous party supporters of Mr. Asquith to represent him as the unsuspecting victim of an elaborate intrigue. Mr. Asquith himself, in his speech at the Reform Club on December 8, spoke of "a well-organized, carefully engineered conspiracy." It was an unfortunate assertion, for which there was extremely little foundation in fact. In reality there is no reason to believe that any of the supposed "conspirators" were even aware that the end of the Government was at hand, and it is certain that Mr. Lloyd George, for his part, made a swift and independent decision as to his duty, and took action without regard for any consequences—least of all for his personal fortunes—apart from the certainty that change would lead to vigorous conduct of the war.

It was a curious coincidence that changes at the Admiralty immediately preceded this crisis, just as the resignation of Lord Fisher immediately preceded the crisis which brought the Coalition Government into existence. And the coincidence was all the more curious because in neither case was the Admiralty the chief centre of trouble. In November, 1916, as in May, 1915, it was the sailor—the First Sea Lord—who went first, but in both crises the politician—the First Lord—was soon transferred elsewhere. Lord Fisher resigned; Sir Henry Jackson retired. Mr. Churchill survived the crisis of 1915 to become Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster; Mr. Balfour survived the crisis of 1916 to become Foreign Secretary.

As early as November 7 *The Times* had expressed the conviction "that Mr. Balfour would do better with a more active body of naval advisers, or alternatively that Sir Henry Jackson and his colleagues require a chief with more initiative and force." But matters dragged on week by week, only confirming the universal belief that the Board of Admiralty was "stale," and that it grasped the naval situation with less than the requisite imagination and alertness. There was no doubt, moreover, that public opinion was also the opinion of the sailors at sea. As to the probable changes, it was everywhere regarded as certain that Sir John Jellicoe was marked out for the office of First Sea Lord. On November 29 Mr. Balfour definitely announced the appointment in the House of Commons, adding that

ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELLICOE.
First Sea Lord, 1916.

Sir David Beatty, hitherto in command of the Battle-Cruiser Fleet, had assumed command of the Grand Fleet, that Sir Henry Jackson had been "appointed to the vacant post of President of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich," and that these decisions had been taken some time previously, although the announcement had for military reasons been delayed. Presumably it was the intention of Mr. Asquith and his

colleagues that Mr. Balfour, in spite of the growing volume of criticism, should remain First Lord. But in a few days the whole Government was in the melting-pot.

During November the public had learned with some amusement that the remedy for the general unrest prescribed by the Government Whips was a speech-making campaign in the country. Half a dozen meetings were actually arranged for Ministers, but the only speech that was delivered was that of Mr. Henderson, the Labour leader, at Northampton on November 30, and it was rendered memorable not by any success for the Government but by the universal acceptance of a single phrase—"Let us cease playing"—used by Mr. Henderson in regard to the "man-power" problem, but readily taken to apply to the whole situation. It subsequently appeared that during all this time tentative efforts were being made to reform the Government from within, by dealing afresh, as *The Times* had so often urged, with the constitution and functions of the War Committee. In his speech at the Reform Club on December 8 Mr. Asquith indicated that, as the result of considerable and prolonged discussion, he and his colleagues were agreed that the Committee's "efficiency might be increased if it were possible to reduce its numbers and to multiply the frequency of its sittings." The War Committee of the Cabinet then consisted of Mr. Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Balfour, Mr. McKenna, Lord Curzon, and Mr. Montagu.* While, as was well known, the War Committee controlled the day-by-day conduct of the war without reference to the Cabinet of 23, which almost automatically ratified its acts, it had gradually expanded, with its official advisers and regular Ministerial visitors, into almost as cumbrous a body as the Cabinet itself. The extent of Mr. Asquith's readiness to reduce membership was not made clear, but it was stated that he proposed to reduce the number of members from seven to five. In any case the proposed changes were inadequate, and on Friday, December 1, Mr. Lloyd George made it clear that he could not remain a member of the Government unless the machinery for directing the war was drastically overhauled.



GREENWICH HOSPITAL (ROYAL NAVAL COLLEGE).
Of which Sir Henry Jackson was appointed president.

Mr. Lloyd George made a specific proposal. Mr. Asquith afterwards described this proposal as being that the War Committee should consist of three members, one of the three members being chairman; that the Prime Minister should not be a member of the Committee; and that the Committee should take full power, subject to the supreme control of the Prime Minister, to direct any questions connected with the war. It was understood that Mr. Lloyd George proposed that the War Committee should consist of himself, Sir Edward Carson, and Mr. Bonar Law, with the possible addition of Mr. Henderson as representative of Labour, and with, of course, the close cooperation of Sir William Robertson and Sir John Jellicoe. Three main principles were clear—withdrawal of certain prominent Ministers from the War Com-

* The War Committee (see p. 338) had been increased from six to seven members by the addition of Lord Curzon in July, 1916, when Mr. Lloyd George became Secretary of State for War and Mr. Montagu succeeded him as Minister of Munitions. This arrangement, whatever its merits, illustrates the care with which the "balance of parties" was still guarded under the Coalition.

mittee, the infusion of new blood, and the transference from the Cabinet to the War Committee of independent control of the war in all its aspects, from the conduct of operations to such semi-domestic questions as supplies, blockade, food control, and man power.

On the following day, December 2, *The Times*, in a leading article entitled "The Turning-point of the War," wrote:

> Mr. Asquith has many great qualities, but initiative and prompt decision are admittedly not among them. It has suited him to be the Chairman of a debating society when he should have been the Commander-in-Chief surrounded by a well-organized General Staff. An amazing power of keeping his colleagues together has never inspired him with the true instinct of leadership. That is his condemnation; and, though we think it conceivable that he might be willing, under sufficient pressure, to undertake any imaginable system of Government, we have no confidence whatever that there can be any real break with the present methods so long as he presides. Moreover, Mr. Asquith's colleagues, to whom he clings with disastrous fidelity, are many of them worn and weary men. A Commander-in-Chief who resolutely placed efficiency before friendship would long ago have sent them out of the firing-line.

And, after referring to several members of the Cabinet, *The Times* added:

> It is this innermost circle which needs purging and strengthening to-day. Place that on a real war footing and the rest will very quickly follow. Leave it as it is and the whole machine remains out of gear.

Mr. Asquith at once took issue on the proposed exclusion of the Prime Minister from the War Committee, and wrote to Mr. Lloyd George on the same day (December 1) that, in his opinion, whatever changes were made in the constitution or functions of the Committee, the Prime Minister must remain its chairman. Mr. Asquith's "suggestion," as he himself said, "did not commend itself to Mr. Lloyd George," but the day of December 2 passed uneventfully. On Sunday, December 3, however, the Unionist members of the Government held a meeting, after which they urged Mr. Asquith to tender his resignation, and informed him that, if he did not do so, they would tender theirs. Mr. Asquith advised delay, and met Mr. Lloyd George. Late on the same night it was announced that "the Prime Minister, with a view to the most active prosecution of the war, had decided to advise His Majesty the King to consent to a reconstruction of the Government."

As Mr. Asquith said, he and Mr. Lloyd George were at issue on two points—the relation of the Prime Minister to the War Committee and the *personnel* of the War Committee. Their difference of opinion was "sharp and strong," but, the question of *personnel* being put aside, they reached the following "suggested arrangement": "The Prime Minister to have supreme and effective control of war policy. The agenda of the War Committee will be submitted to him; its chairman will report to him daily; he can direct it to consider particular topics or proposals; and all its conclusions will be subject to his approval or veto. He can, of course, at his own discretion attend meetings of the Committee." There, according to Mr. Asquith, "the matter was left for further consideration," and the Prime Minister was on the following day to make a written communication to Mr. Lloyd George. But when the morrow came the Prime Minister actually wrote:

> Such productions as the first leading article in *The Times* of to-day, showing the infinite possibilities of misunderstanding and misrepresentation of such an arrangement as we considered yesterday, make me at least doubtful as to its feasibility. Unless the impression is at once corrected that I am being relegated to the position of an irresponsible spectator of the war I cannot possibly go on.



[*Lafayette, Glasgow.*

SIR J. P. MACLAY.
Shipping Controller.

The passage in *The Times* leading article to which Mr. Asquith referred ran as follows:

> The gist of his proposal [Mr. Lloyd George's] is understood to be the establishment forthwith of a small War Council, fully charged with the supreme direction of the war. Of this Council Mr. Asquith himself is not to be a member—the assumption being that the Prime Minister has sufficient cares of a more general character without devoting himself wholly, as the new Council must be

[Hoppe, photo.
EARL CURZON.

[Vandyk, photo.
VISCOUNT MILNER.



MR. LLOYD GEORGE.
[Vandyk, photo.

[Swaine, photo.
MR. ARTHUR HENDERSON.



[Lafayette, photo.
MR. BONAR LAW.

THE WAR CABINET.

devoted if it is to be effective, to the daily task of organizing victory. Certain of Mr. Asquith's colleagues are also excluded on the ground of temperament from a body which can only succeed if it is harmonious and decisive. . . . On the top of all this comes the official announcement that the Prime Minister had decided upon reconstruction. . . . It means, we assume, that he consents in principle to Mr. Lloyd George's proposals. The conversion has been swift, but Mr. Asquith has never been slow to note political tendencies when they become inevitable. The testimony of his closest supporters . . . must have convinced him by this time that matters cannot possibly go on as at present. They must have convinced him, too, that his own qualities are fitted better . . . to "preserve the unity of the nation" (though we have never doubted its unity) than to force the pace of a War Council.

Mr. Lloyd George replied to Mr. Asquith that he had not seen *The Times* article, and he ended his letter by confirming his acceptance of the "suggested arrangement"—subject to settlement of the differences about *personnel*. Mr. Asquith, however, now consulted his chief Liberal colleagues. He declared it to be "absolutely untrue" that he "acted under their pressure or the pressure of any of them." But he wrote to Mr. Lloyd George that he had come to the conclusion that it was not possible for such a Committee as was suggested to be made workable and effective without the Prime Minister as its chairman, and also that, if the Committee were reconstituted, the Prime Minister must choose its members. The "suggested arrangement" had disappeared. Mr. Lloyd George promptly resigned office. On the same evening (December 5) Mr. Asquith tendered his own resignation. The King accepted it, and sent for Mr. Bonar Law.

Within 24 hours of this announcement, however, Mr. Bonar Law had definitely failed to form an Administration. On the afternoon of December 6 the King summoned Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Balfour and Mr. Henderson to Buckingham Palace. The suggestion had been made that Mr. Asquith should become Lord Chancellor in a Bonar Law Government, going to the House of Lords with an earldom, as Mr. Disraeli and other Prime Ministers in the past had done. From Buckingham Palace Mr. Asquith went once more to a meeting with his chief Liberal colleagues. It soon became known that he had refused to serve under Mr. Bonar Law, who thereupon informed the King that he could not proceed with his task. The King sent for Mr. Lloyd George, and it was announced that, with Mr. Bonar Law's cooperation, Mr. Lloyd George had undertaken to endeavour to form an Administration. Before another 24 hours had passed his success was sure, and on the evening of December 7 the new Prime Minister had kissed hands upon his appointment. The whole "crisis" had lasted only six days.

It was obvious that Mr. Lloyd George had the support of Mr. Bonar Law, of Sir Edward Carson, and of a great body of Liberals which included his Welsh colleagues and also the



[*Elliott & Fry, photo.*

LORD COWDRAY.
Chairman of Air Board.



[*Elliott & Fry, photo.*

LORD RHONDDA.
President of Local Government Board.



[Lafayette, photo.

LORD DEVONPORT.
Food Controller.

members of the Liberal War Committee. But official Liberalism stood aside with Mr. Asquith, and for a moment seemed almost to expect his return to office. The attitude of Labour settled matters. After brief deliberations, a joint meeting of the Parliamentary Party and the National Executive decided that Labour should take part in the new Government.

Mr. Lloyd George was now free to apply all the principles for which he had been striving. He was able, as *The Times* remarked, "to effect a thorough reform in our antiquated peace methods of Cabinet making, and to adapt them to the necessities of war." Above all, he could form at last a small War Cabinet, constantly and uninterruptedly devoted to the prosecution of the war, he could bring in practical men with large experience and special knowledge, and he could restore to the public service the invaluable abilities and character of Lord Milner. The only matter for regret seemed to be that considerations other than the undiluted principle of selection of the fittest dictated, on the one hand, such appointments as those of Mr. Balfour to the Foreign Office and Mr. Walter Long to the Colonial Office, and, on the other hand, the abstention of at least two Liberal Ministers, Mr. Montagu and Mr. Herbert Samuel, whose merits deserved consideration.

As regarded the War Cabinet it was not at first clearly understood that, in the new circumstances, Mr. Lloyd George intended to drop the idea of a "War Committee," and to make the Cabinet and War Council one and the same. After some consideration of the best appointment to the Admiralty, Sir Edward Carson became First Lord, and the War Cabinet was formed of Mr. Lloyd George as Prime Minister; Lord Curzon as Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Lords; Mr. Henderson without portfolio; and Lord Milner without portfolio. Mr. Bonar Law, who became Chancellor of the Exchequer and acting Leader of the House of Commons, was also to be a member of the War Cabinet, but was not to be expected to attend regularly.

A popular appointment, which was hailed with approval on all sides, was that of Lord Derby to be Secretary of State for War. Otherwise, the two most prominent features of the new Administration, apart of course from the creation of the small War Cabinet, were the appointments of new and practical men to control departments, old and new, which so urgently required the guidance of real experience and proved ability, and, on the other hand, the prominence of Labour. As for Labour, Mr. Hodge and Mr. G. Barnes filled respectively the new posts of Minister of Labour and Pensions Minister, Mr. Brace remained Under-Secretary at the Home Office, Mr. G. H. Roberts became Parliamentary Secretary to the Board



[Elliott & Fry, photo.

SIR ALBERT STANLEY.
President of the Board of Trade.



[Elliott & Fry, photo

MR. H. A. L. FISHER.
President of the Board of Education.



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MR. R. E. PROTHERO.
President of the Board of Agriculture.

of Trade, and, as already stated, Mr. Henderson became a member, without portfolio, of the War Cabinet.

Business men were brought in to fill the new offices of Food Controller and Shipping Controller—Lord Devonport, well known as the chairman of the Port of London Authority, and Sir Joseph Maclay, head of a great Glasgow firm of shipowners. And not only was Mr. R. E. Prothero, a real authority on agriculture, made President of the Board of Agriculture, but Captain Charles Bathurst became Parliamentary Secretary of the new Food Control department. Another appointment of great importance was that of Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sheffield, to be President of the Board of Education

The following shows the composition of the new Government and of its two predecessors. The names of those constituting the Coalition Ministry when it came to an end are printed in Roman characters, and those of Ministers who left it or were transferrred during its existence are given in italics. An asterisk is prefixed to the names of Ministers constituting the several Cabinets:

OFFICE	LIBERAL MINISTRY.	COALITION MINISTRY.	NEW MINISTRY.
Prime Minister ... ... / First Lord of the Treasury	*Mr. ASQUITH	*Mr. ASQUITH (L)	*Mr. LLOYD GEORGE
Minister without portfolio	—	*Lord LANSDOWNE (U) ...	*Lord MILNER
Minister without portfolio	—	—	*Mr. HENDERSON
Lord Chancellor	*Lord HALDANE	*Lord BUCKMASTER (L) ...	Lord FINLAY
Lord Pres. of the Council...	*Lord BEAUCHAMP ...	*Lord CREWE (L)	*Lord CURZON
Lord Privy Seal	*Lord CREWE	*Lord CURZON (U)	Lord CRAWFORD
Chancellor of the Exchequer	*Mr. LLOYD GEORGE ...	*Mr. MCKENNA (L)	*Mr. BONAR LAW
Secretaries of State:			
Home Affairs	*Mr. MCKENNA	*Sir J. Simon (L)	
		*Mr. H. SAMUEL (L) ...	Sir GEORGE CAVE
Foreign Affairs	*Sir E. GREY	*Viscount GREY (L)... ...	Mr. BALFOUR
Colonies	*Mr. HARCOURT	*Mr. BONAR LAW (U) ...	Mr. LONG
India	*Lord CREWE	*Mr. CHAMBERLAIN (U) ...	Mr. CHAMBERLAIN
War	*Lord KITCHENER... ...	*Lord Kitchener	Lord DERBY
		*Mr. LLOYD GEORGE (L)	
Minister of Munitions ...	—	*Mr. Lloyd George (L)	
		*Mr MONTAGU (L)	Dr. ADDISON
Minister of Labour ...	—	—	Mr. HODGE
Pensions Minister	—	—	Mr. G. BARNES
Minister of Blockade ...	—	*Lord R. CECIL (U)	Lord R. CECIL
First Lord of the Admiralty	*Mr CHURCHILL	*Mr. BALFOUR (U)	Sir E. CARSON
Food Controller	—	—	Lord DEVONPORT
Shipping Controller ...	—	—	Sir J. P. MACLAY
President of the Board of Trade	*Mr. RUNCIMAN	*Mr. RUNCIMAN (L)	Sir A. STANLEY
President of the Local Government Board ...	*Mr. H. SAMUEL	*Mr. LONG (U)	Lord RHONDDA

OFFICE.	LIBERAL MINISTRY.	COALITION MINISTRY.	NEW MINISTRY
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster	*Mr. MONTAGU	*Mr. Churchill (L) *Mr. McKINNON WOOD (L)	Sir F. CAWLEY
Chief Secretary for Ireland	*Mr. BIRRELL	*Mr. Birrell (L) *Mr. H. E. DUKE (U)	Mr. DUKE
Secretary for Scotland	*Mr. McKINNON WOOD	*Mr. McKinnon Wood (L) *Mr. TENNANT (L)	Mr. MUNRO
President of the Board of Agriculture	*Lord LUCAS	*Lord Selborne (U) *Lord CRAWFORD (U)	Mr. R. E. PROTHERO
First Commissioner of Works	*Lord EMMOTT	*Mr. HARCOURT (L)	Sir A. MOND
President of the Board of Education	*Mr. J. A. PEASE	*Mr. Henderson (Lab) *Lord CREWE (L)	Mr. H. A. L. FISHER
Postmaster-General	*Mr. HOBHOUSE	Mr. H. Samuel (L) Mr. J. A. PEASE (L)	Mr. A. ILLINGWORTH
Attorney-General	*Sir J. SIMON	*Sir E. Carson (U) Sir F. E. SMITH (U)	Sir F. E. SMITH
Solicitor-General	Sir S. BUCKMASTER	Sir F. E. Smith (U) Sir G. CAVE (U)	Sir GORDON HEWART
Chairman of Air Board	—	Lord CURZON (U)	Lord COWDRAY
Parliamentary Under-Secretaries:			
Home Affairs	Mr. C. HARMSWORTH	Mr. W. BRACE (Lab)	Mr. BRACE
Foreign Affairs	Mr. PRIMROSE	Lord Robert Cecil (U) Lord NEWTON (U)	
Colonies	Lord ISLINGTON	Mr. STEEL-MAITLAND (U)	Mr. STEEL-MAITLAND
India	Mr. C. H. ROBERTS	Lord ISLINGTON (L)	Lord ISLINGTON
War	Mr. TENNANT	Mr. Tennant (L) Lord DERBY (U)	Mr. J. I. MACPHERSON
Financial Secretaries:			
To the Treasury	Mr. ACLAND	Mr. Montagu (L) Mr. McKINNON WOOD (L)	Mr. S. H. LEVER
To the War Office	Mr. BAKER	Mr. H. W. FORSTER (U)	Mr. FORSTER
To the Admiralty	Dr. MACNAMARA	Dr. MACNAMARA (L)	Dr. MACNAMARA
Civil Lord of the Admiralty	Mr. LAMBERT	The Duke of Devonshire (U) Lord LYTTON (U)	Mr. PRETYMAN
Parliamentary Secretaries:			
Board of Trade	Mr. J. M. ROBERTSON	Mr. PRETYMAN (U)	Mr. G. H. ROBERTS
Local Govt. Board	Mr. J. H. LEWIS	Mr. HAYES FISHER (U)	Mr. HAYES FISHER
Board of Agriculture	Sir H. VERNEY	Mr. ACLAND (L)	Sir R. WINFREY
Board of Education	Dr. ADDISON	Mr. HERBERT LEWIS (L)	Mr. HERBERT LEWIS
Munitions	—	Dr. ADDISON (L)	Sir L. WORTHINGTON EVANS and Mr. KELLAWAY
Food Control Dept.	—	—	Captain C. BATHURST
Air Board	—	—	Major BAIRD
Ministry of Pensions	—	—	Col. Sir A. GRIFFITH BOSCAWEN
Shipping Control Dept.	—	—	Sir L. CHIOZZA-MONEY
Ministry of Blockade	—	—	Mr. F. LEVERTON HARRIS
Ministry of Labour	—	—	Mr. BRIDGEMAN
Paymaster-General	Lord STRACHIE	Lord Newton (U) Mr. HENDERSON (Lab)	Sir J. COMPTON RICKETT
Assistant Postmaster-General	Captain NORTON	Mr. PIKE PEASE (U)	Mr. PIKE PEASE
Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury	Mr. GULLAND (Joint)	Mr. GULLAND (L) Lord EDMUND TALBOT (U)	Lord EDMUND TALBOT Mr. NEIL PRIMROSE
Lords Commissioner of the Treasury:			
	Mr. WEDGWOOD BENN	Mr. G. H. ROBERTS (Lab)	Mr. J. F. HOPE
	Mr. BECK	Mr. HOWARD (L)	Mr. PRATT
	Mr. WEBB (unpaid)	Mr. BRIDGEMAN (U)	
	Mr. WALTER REA (unpaid)	Mr. WALTER REA (unpaid) (L)	
SCOTLAND.			
Lord-Advocate	Mr. MUNRO	Mr. MUNRO (L)	Mr. J. A. CLYDE
Solicitor-General	Mr. MORISON	Mr. MORISON (L)	Mr. MORISON
IRELAND.			
Lord Lieutenant	Lord WIMBORNE	Lord WIMBORNE (L)	Lord WIMBORNE
Lord Chancellor	Mr. I. J. O'BRIEN	Sir I. J. O'BRIEN (L)	Sir I. J. O'BRIEN
Attorney-General	Mr. J. PIM	Mr. JOHN GORDON (U)	Mr. J. O'CONNOR
Solicitor-General	Mr. J. O'CONNOR	Mr. J. O'CONNOR (L)	
Vice-President of Department of Agriculture	Mr. T. W. RUSSELL	Mr. T. W. RUSSELL (L)	

A number of changes were also made in the appointments to the Royal Household.

Owing mainly to the illness both of Mr. Lloyd George and of Mr. Asquith, who was naturally expected to take part in any debate, a fortnight elapsed between the formation of the new Government and the first explanation of its policy to Parliament. The political crisis in England has been examined in the preceding pages purely as a crisis in the conduct of the war, a crisis arising out of the conflict of opinion concerning the methods required to secure the victory at which all parties were aiming. It was, however, no accident that the period of the crisis coincided with the most formidable outburst of "peace talk" that there had yet

[Swaine, photo.

MR. J. HODGE.
Minister of Labour.

[Swaine, photo.

MR. W. BRACE.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office.

been, and that Mr. Lloyd George, owing to circumstances only very indirectly connected with the political crisis itself, came into power with the task not only of reorganizing and readjusting methods, but of reaffirming the determination of the Empire and its Allies to win the war. His first speech as Prime Minister had to deal with formal German peace overtures; the first task of his War Cabinet was to reply to Notes about peace from the enemy Powers and from the President of the United States. The story of the German overtures of December, 1916, and of President Wilson's intervention must be told elsewhere, but the sequence of events is essential to an understanding of events in England. On December 7 Mr. Lloyd George became Prime Minister; on December 12 the Central Powers sent their proposal of peace negotiations to the Allies; on December 20 the American Note "suggesting a course of action with regard to the present war" was communicated to all the belligerents.

[Lafayette, photo.

MR. G. H. ROBERTS.
Parliamentary Secretary, Board of Trade.



MR. G. N. BARNES.
Pensions Minister.

The truth was that the delays and hesitations and weakness of the Coalition Government had during the last months of its career been rendered infinitely more perilous by the fact that Germany was seen to be preparing for what her Press called "the diplomatic initiative"—a desperate and determined effort to obtain peace by compromise. Mr. Lloyd George arrived in office at this time not least because he was pledged to defeat this effort, which he had clearly foreseen. At the end of September he had spoken as follows to Mr. Roy Howard, President of the United Press of America:

CHELSEA PENSIONERS

Making cigarettes for their comrades wounded in the war.

Sporting terms are pretty well understood wherever English is spoken. I am quite sure they are understood in America. Well, then. The British soldier is a good sportsman. He enlisted in this war in a sporting spirit—in the best sense of that term. He went in to see fair play to a small nation trampled upon by a bully. He is fighting for fair play. He has fought as a good sportsman. By the thousands he has died a good sportsman. He has never asked anything more than a sporting chance. He has not always had that. When he couldn't get it, he didn't quit. He played the game. He didn't squeal, and he has certainly never asked anyone to squeal for him.

Under the circumstances the British, now that the fortunes of the game have turned a bit, are not disposed to stop because of the squealing done by Germans or done for Germans by probably well-meaning but misguided sympathizers and humanitarians.

For two years the British soldie. had a bad time—no one knows so well as he what a bad time. He was sadly inferior in equipment. The vast majority of the British soldiers were inferior in training. He saw the Allied causes beaten all about the ring. But he didn't appeal either to spectators or referee to stop the fight on the ground that it was brutal. Nor did he ask that the rules be changed. He took his punishment, even when beaten like a dog. He was a game dog. When forced to take refuge in a trench, when too badly used up to carry the fight to his enemy, he hung on without whining. He fought off every attack. He bided his time. He endured without wincing. He worked without flagging.

And at this time and under these conditions what was the winning German doing? Was he worrying over the terrible slaughter? No; he was talking of annexing Belgium and Poland as a result of his "victory." And while he was remaking the map of Europe without the slightest regard to the wishes of its people the British people were preparing to pay the price we knew must be paid for time to get an Army ready. It is one thing to look back on the pounding the British soldier took in the first two years of the war; but it was a different thing to look forward as he did and know that beating could not be avoided.

During these months, when it seemed the finish of the British Army might come quickly, Germany elected to make this a fight to a finish with England. The British soldier was ridiculed and held in contempt. Now we intend to see that Germany has her way. The fight must be to a finish—to a knock-out.

The whole world—including neutrals of the highest purposes and humanitarians with the best of motives—must know that there can be no outside interference at this stage. Britain asked no intervention when she was unprepared to fight. She will tolerate none now that she is prepared until the Prussian military despotism is broken beyond repair.

In the British determination to carry the fight to a decisive finish there is something more than the natural demand for vengeance. The inhumanity and the pitilessness of the fighting that must come before a

lasting peace is possible is not comparable with the cruelty that would be involved in stopping the war while there remains the possibility of civilization again being menaced from the same quarter. Peace now or at any time before the final and complete elimination of this menace is unthinkable. No man or no nation with the slightest understanding of the temper of the citizen army of Britons, which took its terrible hammering without a whine or a grumble, will attempt to call a halt now.

There is neither clock nor calendar in the British Army to-day. Time is the least vital factor. Only the result counts—not the time consumed in achieving it. It took England 20 years to defeat Napoleon, and the first 15 of those years were black with British defeat. It will not take 20 years to win this war, but whatever time is required it will be done.

And I say this recognizing that we have only begun to win. There is no disposition on our side to fix the hour of ultimate victory after the first success. We have no delusion that the war is nearing an end. We have not the slightest doubt as to *how* it will end.

There are, and there will be, no quitters among the Allies. "Never again" has become our battle cry. At home the suffering and the sorrow is great and is growing. As to the war zone, its terrors are indescribable. I have just visited the battlefields of France. I stood as it



[Elliott & Fry, photo.

MR. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.
Director-General of National Service.

were at the door of Hell, and saw myriads marching into the furnace. I saw some coming out of it scorched and mutilated. This ghastliness must never again be re-enacted on this earth, and one method at least of ensuring that end is the infliction of such punishment upon the perpetrators of this outrage against humanity that the temptation to emulate their exploits will be eliminated from the hearts of the evil-minded amongst the rulers of men. That is the meaning of Britain's resolve.

It was because he held such convictions that Mr. Lloyd George, patient yet a little longer, at last overthrew a Government and a system which were incapable of securing victory.

When Mr. Lloyd George met the House of Commons on December 19 his first business, as has been seen, was to deal with the German peace overtures. As to the fall of the Coalition, he contented himself with saying that he could not accept as complete the various accounts which had been given, but that this was not the time for "issues that excite irritation or controversy or discussion." He then turned to the new Government and its tasks. He pointed out in the first place that the functions of the Prime

[Russell, photo.

CAPTAIN CHARLES BATHURST.
Parliamentary Secretary, Food Control Department.

Minister and the Leader of the House had been separated because it was utterly impossible for any one man to undertake both functions. In three main characteristics the new administration departed from precedent; they were the concentration of the Executive in a very few hands, the choosing of men of administrative and business capacity rather than men of Parliamentary experience, and a franker and fuller recognition of the partnership of labour in the government of the country. "A Cabinet of 23," said Mr. Lloyd George, "was rather top-heavy for a gale." And again, "You cannot run a war with a Sanhedrin."

Having replied to various criticisms of the new system, Mr. Lloyd George sketched in outline the main problems before the new Government and the main features of their policy. He attached great importance to the new Ministry of Labour. As to shipping, it was "the jugular vein which, if severed, would destroy the life of the nation," and the Government intended to treat shipping as the railways had been treated, and during the war "to

nationalize shipping in the real sense of the term." The "prodigious profits made out of freights" were contributing to the high price of commodities, and making it difficult to deal with labour: this was "intolerable." They intended to deal not only with existing ships but with new construction to make up "the wastage which is inevitable when you are dealing with such piratical methods as those which have characterized the maritime policy of the German Empire." The food problem was a double problem—of distribution and production. They had secured the best brains in the country to deal with it. They must ask the country to make sacrifices, but the sacrifices must be equal; "over-consumption of the affluent must not be allowed to create a shortage for the less well-to-do." As to production, "every available square yard must be made to produce food." As to man-power, Mr. Lloyd George said:

I have hitherto talked largely of the mobilization of the material resources of the nation. I now come to the mobilization of the labour reserves of the country, which are even more vital to our success than the former. Without this—let us make no mistake—we shall not be able to pull through. It is not the mere haphazard law of supply and demand that will accomplish that which is necessary to save the nation within the time that it is essential it should be accomplished. It is not a question of years; it is a question of months, perhaps of weeks. And unless not merely the material resources of the country, but the labour of the country, is used to the best advantage, and every man is called upon to render such service to the State as he can best give, victory is beyond our reach.

The problem with which we are confronted is a difficult one. Nearly a year ago we decided that in order to maintain our armies in the field the nation must have complete control over all its military resources in men. But it is impossible to take men into the Army without withdrawing them from civil employment of greater or less utility, and it has been our object—an object that becomes more and more plain as time goes on, and which was patent to the late Administration as well as to ourselves—to establish such a system of recruiting as will ensure that no man is taken into the Army who is capable of rendering more useful service in industry. To complete our plan for the organization of all the national resources, we ought to have power to see that every man who is not taken into the Army, whatever his position or rank, really is employed on work of national importance.

Mr. Lloyd George announced that Mr. Neville Chamberlain, Lord Mayor of Birmingham, had accepted the new office of Director-General of National Service. The civil and military sides of the directory would be entirely separate, and it was not proposed to make any changes as regarded recruiting for military service. As regarded civilian service, Mr. Lloyd George explained the new plan as follows:

It is proposed that the Director of National Service shall proceed by the scheduling of industries and of services according to their essential character during the war. Certain industries are regarded as indispensable, and the Departments concerned will indent upon the Director of National Service for the labour which they require for those services, and other services will be rationed in such matters as labour, raw material, and power. Labour that is set free from non-essential and rationed industries will be available to set free potential soldiers who are at present exempted from military service, and to increase the available supply of labour for essential services.

This labour will be invited to enrol at once and be registered as war workers on lines analogous to the existing munitions volunteers, with similar provisions as to rates of pay and separation allowance. I have no doubt that when it is realized how essential to the life of the nation it is that the services of every man should be put to the best use we shall secure an adequate supply of volunteers. We are taking immediate steps to secure by this means the men we want. We shall begin as soon as may be to classify industries and invite the enrolment of volunteers. If it is found impossible to get the numbers we require—and I hope it will be possible—we shall not hesitate to come to Parliament and ask Parliament to release us from pledges given in other circumstances and to obtain the necessary power for rendering our plans fully effective. The nation is fighting for its life, and it is entitled to the best services of all its sons.

The new Government got quickly into their stride, and, when Parliament was prorogued in Christmas week, it was on a note of confidence inspired by the coming of new men and the promise of new measures.

CHAPTER CLXIV.

THE CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN EGYPT, 1915-1916.

SUMMARY OF EVENTS IN EASTERN EGYPT, 1915–1916—SIR ALEX. WILSON'S CANAL DEFENCE PLANS—MINOR RAID ON THE CANAL IN 1915—GERMANS AND TURKS PREPARE A NEW OFFENSIVE—EFFECT OF RUSSIAN SUCCESSES IN ARMENIA—GEN. MURRAY TAKES OVER THE COMMAND—THE "OFFENSIVE DEFENCE"—BUILDING OF A RAILWAY ACROSS SINAI BEGUN—THE KATIA REVERSE—DUEIDAR ATTACK REPULSED—EL ARISH BOMBED—SECOND TURCO-GERMAN INVASION—BATTLE OF ROMANI—TURKS DRIVEN BACK—BRITISH ADVANCE TO EL ARISH AND RAFA—EVENTS IN THE SUDAN, 1915–1916—ALI DINAR OF DARFUR KILLED—GUARDING THE RED SEA COAST—ADEN OPERATIONS—SHEIKH SAID TAKEN—TURKISH ATTEMPT TO SEIZE PERIM ISLAND—BRITISH REVERSE AT LAHEJ—MEASURES FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE PORT.

AFTER the defeat, in February, 1915, of the first attempt by the Turks to invade Egypt by way of Sinai and the Suez Canal, described in Vol. IV., Chap. LXXIII., there followed a period of comparative calm on the Eastern frontier of that country. The Dardanelles expedition held a large part of the Ottoman forces in Gallipoli and Turkish troops had also to be found to make good the wastage caused by the successes of the Russian Army of the Caucasus. The situation was altered to the advantage of the Turks by the withdrawal of the Allies from Gallipoli at the close of 1915, but the entry of the Russians into Erzerum, in February, 1916, again caused a depletion of the Turkish garrison in Syria. The Turks, however, had not abandoned their design of again invading Egypt, and this design was facilitated by their continued occupation of the Sinai Peninsula. When Turkey joined in the Great War the Anglo-Egyptian authorities had made no attempt to defend Sinai, which though geographically part of Asia has politically always been an Egyptian dependency. Save for one or two stations on the Gulf of Suez Sinai was abandoned and the defence of Egypt on the east undertaken on the banks of the Suez Canal itself. Military exigencies may have necessitated this decision, but it was clearly undesirable that the enemy should be allowed closely to approach the main artery of communication between Europe and the East, an artery of the greatest importance to the British Empire. The true line of defence was to the east, in the Sinai Peninsula. Up to the beginning of 1916 it was not found possible, however, to do more than guard the Canal, and small parties of the enemy were able throughout 1915 to carry on a policy of pin-pricks against the Suez defence forces.

Gen. Sir Archibald Murray, who in January, 1916, took over the defence of Eastern Egypt from Gen. Sir John Maxwell, besides completing the defences of the Canal zone, decided to press back the Turks from the Sinai Peninsula. His first objective was the cultivated area or oasis of Katia, through which runs the northern road across the peninsula from Egypt to Palestine and Syria. Gen. Murray began to build a railway to Katia, and several places in that region were occupied by British troops with the object of protecting the railway parties. Here in April, 1916, two squadrons of Worcestershire Yeomanry were overwhelmed in a surprise attack by a largely superior body

COL. KRESS VON KRESSENSTEIN,
Commanded the Turkish forces.

of the enemy, while at another spot a third squadron of Worcestershires and a squadron of Gloucestershire Yeomanry were almost entirely wiped out. Not long after this reverse British forces were nevertheless firmly established just west of Katia. The British in Eastern Egypt then consisted chiefly of English yeomanry, English and Scots Territorial regiments, the 2nd Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (which included the Anzac Mounted Division) and Indian troops (including Imperial Service troops).

In July, 1916, at the hottest season of the year, when operations in the desert on a considerable scale were not probable, the Turks began an advance from El Arish, a town near the eastern end of the northern route across Sinai and within the Egyptian border. The enemy force, commanded by Col. Kress von Kressenstein, consisted of some 18,000 picked troops admirably equipped. It speedily established itself in the eastern part of the Katia area. Major-Gen. Lawrence was given local command of the British force and in a series of engagements early in August the Turks were completely defeated, their casualties amounting to 50 per cent. of the troops engaged. The enemy retired to El Arish. The British line was then advanced and the building of the railway, and the laying of water pipes, was pushed on energetically. The result of much preparation was seen in December, 1916, when the British reoccupied El Arish, and defeated at Maghdaba, south of El Arish, a Turkish column 2,000 strong, over 1,300 men being made prisoners. The Maghdaba success was followed by another British advance, and on Jan. 9, 1917, the Turks were driven from Rafa, on the borders of Palestine. Thus northern Sinai was completely cleared of the enemy.

It was not only by direct attacks upon Egypt that the Turks sought to threaten British communications with India and the Far East. They endeavoured to strike a blow at the entrance to the Red Sea, and they advanced to the neigh-

BIVOUAC OF NEW ZEALANDERS.

bourhood of Aden, the safest natural harbour between Suez and India. As early as November, 1914, Ottoman troops from Yemen entered the Aden Protectorate, and from Sheikh Said made an attempt to seize Perim, an island in the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb. In July, 1915, an attempt to prevent the Turks from occupying Lahej, a town some 25 miles north of Aden, proved unsuccessful, and the British were forced to retreat. Two months later the Turks encamped near Aden were severely handled by Indian troops and steps were taken which ensured to the British control of the landward approaches to the port. The Turks, however, remained in possession of most of the Aden protectorate and the situation had not materially altered at the close of 1916.

In the Sudan, during the period under review, the campaign against Darfur (April-Dec., 1916) was brought to a successful conclusion and other measures taken for the tranquillity of that country. Moreover, a vigilant land patrol of the African shores of the Red Sea by Egyptian forces greatly aided the ships of the Royal Navy in preventing hostile communications with the Turks on the Arabian coast of that sea.

Major-Gen. Alex. Wilson, who was in command of the Suez Canal defences when Djemal Pasha made his attack in February, 1915, continued to hold that post for nearly a year.* In his difficult task he displayed, to quote Sir John Maxwell, "ability, tact and resource," and in recognition of his services he was created a K.C.B. That he did not undertake "the organization of the offensive defence . . . a pressing matter hitherto untouched," as Sir Archibald Murray stated in dealing with the situation in January, 1916, may be explained by the constant changes in, and great diminution of, the strength of the troops under his command. The force originally allotted to the defence of the Canal was that known as the Indian Expeditionary Force "E." In February, 1915, it was increased by the East Lancashire Division, Territorial Force, the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, and other troops, and in that month and in March Sir Alex. Wilson had under his command 30,000 men. But it was one of the difficulties of the position in Egypt that frequent and urgent calls were made upon the forces there to supply troops for other theatres of war. Some idea of the impediments under which Gen. Wilson laboured was given by Sir John Maxwell in his despatch of March 1, 1916:

Sir A. Wilson's force (wrote General Maxwell) was gradually reduced by calls on it for other theatres; thus

Swaine, photo.

GENERAL SIR ARCHIBALD MURRAY, K.C.B., D.S.O.,
Commanding in Egypt, 1916.

the 29th Brigade, under Major-General Sir H. Cox, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.S.I., was sent to Gallipoli; subsequently the Punjabi-Mahomedan battalions of that brigade were withdrawn from the Peninsula and replaced by Gurkha battalions taken from brigades on the Canal; two double companies of Sikhs from the Patiala Imperial Service Regiment were sent to replace losses in the 15th Sikhs, and every British and Indian officer who could be spared was sent to replace casualties; the 30th Brigade, under Major-General C. J. Melliss, V.C., K.C.B., was sent to Basrah; the 28th Brigade, under Major-General Sir G. Younghusband, K.C.I.E., C.B., was sent first to Aden and then to Basrah; the force was further weakened by the exchange of tired units from the Indian divisions in France with some of the best battalions on the Canal.

In these circumstances it was hardly possible effectively to organize the Canal Defence Forces for the "offensive defence." It should also be remembered that during a large part of 1915 hopes were centred on the success of the Dardanelles adventure, which would have rendered an offensive defence in Sinai unnecessary, nor is there any indication in Gen. Maxwell's dispatches that he contemplated anything

* The first officer in command of the Canal Defences was Col. W. G. Walker (commanding 9th Indian Brigade). General Wilson took over the command on November 16, 1914.

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL SINAI.

more than the "stationary" defence of the Suez Canal. But the governing factor was the number of troops available, and in November, 1915, Gen. Maxwell was hard put to find an adequate force to deal with the peril to Egypt caused by the Senussi invasion on the west. Nor was it until the arrival of South African troops from England that the decisive blow against the Senussi could be struck (March, 1916).*

The physical features of the Sinai Peninsula are described in Chapter LXXIII. Here it is necessary to deal in any detail only with the northern third of the peninsula, that facing the Mediterranean. This third is mainly a sandy desert, with occasional areas of cultivation and a sufficient number of wells to enable small bodies of travellers to cross without serious discomfort. The central section is a stony tableland girded by high hills; the southern third is a mass of rugged mountains, in which military operations on a large scale are practically impossible. The central, tableland, section is that most easily traversed by troops with guns and heavy equipment, and over it Djemal Pasha had passed in his abortive attack on the Canal. After that event the main military operations were confined to the northern, or sand desert, section of the peninsula.

* For the Senussi invasion see Vol. IX. Chapter CXLV.

The Turks maintained small garrisons at several places in the tableland and a larger force at Nakhl, in the central part of that region,



FORT KOSSAIMA.

whence the Pilgrims' road goes south-east to Akaba, and to Ma'an on the Hedjaz railway; and north-east to Kossaima, El Audja and Beersheba. By the autumn of 1915 the Turks had carried the railway from Damascus and Jerusalem south to Beersheba and it was thence continued towards Audja. All the indications pointed to their intention of again using the route across the tableland for an advance on Egypt. They appear to have been deterred from this enterprise by the measures taken by Sir Archibald Murray to deny them the use of the watering places at the western end of the

CAMEL POLICE AT FORT NAKHL.

tableland. Moreover, while the tableland route was the best for the enemy the caravan road across the desert a little south of the Mediterranean was the most natural route for a British advance, and that advance being made the Turks were compelled to meet it. (On this route the railway base of the Turks was at Gaza.) Thus the chief fighting took place on terrain chosen by General Murray.

The raids met with scant success, but they necessitated constant vigilance on the part of the Defence Force. Gen. Wilson had one hundred miles of front to guard, from Suez to Port Said, and on over two-thirds of this front enemy parties might be expected on any and every night. Gen. Wilson, ably assisted by his Chief of Staff, Brig-Gen. A. H. Bingley, C.I.E., had divided the Canal zone into four sections—

ONE OF THE SUEZ CANAL DEFENCES.

The minor encounters were, however, the result of the activity of small enemy parties in every section of the peninsula.

Considerable enterprise was shown by the enemy in carrying out their pin-prick policy, which may be said to have lasted from the repulse of Djemal Pasha in February, 1915, to the end of November in the same year.* The chief object was to damage the Suez Canal and block the traffic. They also tried to damage the railway The leader of most of the raids was a certain Beduin chief named Rizkalla Salim.

No. 1 at Suez, No. 2 at Ismailia (where were general headquarters), No. 3 at Port Said, and a naval section on the Bitter Lakes. Constant patrols were maintained on the Canal and on its east or Sinai bank. The defenders had a tiresome and onerous duty, aggravated by the great heat and blinding dust-storms, and, at first, lack of adequate shelter from the sun. In March, 1915, an outbreak of dysentery occurred in one battalion, while others were affected, though less seriously. Later on the health of the troops steadily improved, one thing which helped to maintain it being the ability to bathe in the Canal. The moral of the men was well maintained. Great credit was due

* The more important encounters between the enemy and the defence force in the period February-June, 1915 are described in Chapter LXXIII.

to the troops for the way in which the duty of guarding the Canal was performed: indifferent troops would have been demoralized. They received valuable help from part of the 30th Squadron, Royal Flying Corps, under Major S. D. Massy. From their headquarters at Ismailia the airmen carried out daily reconnaissances without a single important accident.

The daring of the raiders was illustrated by a little incident which happened on May 29. Under cover of darkness a small party reached the shore of the Little Bitter Lake, and wading out, boarded a pile driver, destroying one small boat and taking prisoner an Italian employed by the Suez Canal Company. An alarm was given and pursuit undertaken from the nearest post, but the Beduin got away, taking the unfortunate Italian with them. Enterprises of this kind were simply annoying. The only occasion on which the Turks did damage of any moment was on June 30 when the British merchant steamer Teresias struck a mine near the south end of the Little Bitter Lake. An enemy party had succeeded in passing the British outposts, had reached the lake, waded out to the main channel, eluded the naval launches on patrol duty and laid the mine in the fairway. Owing to the skilful handling of the Teresias, and the prompt action of the Canal Company's officials, the ship, though somewhat badly damaged, was towed clear and taken to Alexandria for repair. The accident blocked the traffic on the Canal for 14 hours. This was the greatest success achieved by the enemy in his endeavours to cut communications between the Mediterranean and India.

AN ARAB.

The photograph illustrates the difficulty of obtaining foothold in the sand.

Imperial Service Troops had the credit of a little affair in which the organizer of the Canal

TURKISH AND GERMAN OFFICERS.

raids lost his life. On November 23 a squadron of Mysore Lancers, operating 15 miles east of Kantara came upon a force of 60 to 70 Turks, the advance body of a raiding party 200 strong. The Lancers pursued the enemy for several miles, killing seven, capturing 12, and wounding many others. Among the dead the body of the sheikh Rizkalla Salim was identified.

At this period, the close of 1915, the Turks and Germans were making serious preparations for another advance on Egypt. The Allies' campaign in Gallipoli had failed, and the advance on Bagdad had turned into a retreat, while the conquest of Serbia by the Central Powers and

AUSTRALIAN FIELD AMBULANCE.

Bulgaria allowed both men and munitions to be sent from Germany to Constantinople. During November some 150 German officers designated for service with "the Army of Egypt" passed through Sofia on their way to Syria, where Djemal Pasha was gathering together a big army. The Germans talked of sending four army corps to his aid and of an invasion of Egypt by half a million men. Feverish haste was shown in pushing forward the construction of the tunnels on the Taurus and Amanus sections of the Bagdad railway, as their completion would give continuous railway connexion with Southern Syria, while the Berlin newspapers were instructed to declare that the "decisive action" which was to end the war was to be an irresistible blow at Britain's highroad to India. Much effort was indeed expended in Germany on "the Army of Egypt" and German troops were sent to Constantinople—though not four army corps. Few Germans, save officers, reached Syria. But German guns, German ammunition, and German equipment of all kinds arrived in Syria, where in January, 1916, Djemal "undoubtedly had at his disposal the troops, amounting to 250,000 men or more, necessary for" an attack on the Suez Canal.* An attack at that time, while the campaign against the Senussi on the western border of Egypt was in full progress, seemed very promising to the enemy and was expected in England. The work of the Royal Flying Corps in Sinai and that of the Naval Air Service, which observed by seaplane the garrisons of Southern Syria, did not, however, disclose any concentration of enemy troops for an attack on the Canal on a large scale. And whatever plans the enemy may have made had soon after to be put aside. The remarkable winter offensive of Gen. Yudenitch in the mountains of Armenia, crowned by the capture of Erzerum in February, 1916, with losses to the Turks approximating 100,000 men and many guns, completely altered the situation. The garrisons in Syria were gradually reduced until it was estimated that not more than 60,000 soldiers were left in that province.

Gen. Sir Archibald Murray took over the command in Eastern Egypt at the moment

* Gen. Sir Archibald Murray's dispatch of June 1, 1916.

AUSTRIAN TROOPS FOR EGYPT AT THE CHURCH OF THE HOLY SEPULCHRE, JERUSALEM.

when expectation of a renewed invasion was greatest. He opened general headquarters at Ismailia on January 22, 1916. On February 16 following the fall of Erzerum dissipated the danger for the time being of an attack on the Canal, as climatic reasons rendered it essential that an offensive by an army large enough to cross Sinai and retain strength to strike a hard blow against the Canal must be begun before the middle of March. The success of the Russian Army of the Caucasus allowed the British time to reorganize their defences. Sir Archibald Murray had difficulties to meet of the same character as those which had hampered Sir Alex. Wilson. Egypt had developed into an intermediate base and clearing station for the Indian troops serving in France and the Mediterranean, and for the Salonika force. It

A NOVEL RAFT ON THE NILE.

was also a training centre for Australian and New Zealand troops, while the Imperial School of Instruction at Zeitun trained officers in all branches of warfare. The Medical Branch was of very large proportions, as to Egypt had come the bulk of the sick and wounded from Gallipoli. The number of these men was so great as almost for a time to turn Egypt into one huge hospital.

These factors made more arduous the work of perfecting the offensive-defence in Sinai. Sir Archibald Murray, however, obtained a freer hand on Sir John Maxwell's departure for Europe. He took over the command of all the Imperial forces in Egypt on March 19. The period of dual control had lasted barely two months. The Egyptian Army remained under command of the Sirdar, Sir Reginald Wingate, who at that time (March, 1916) had to meet the threatening situation in the Sudan caused by the renunciation of his allegiance by the Sultan of Darfur. Sir Archibald Murray had in this connexion to contemplate the "loan" of British troops to the Sirdar, and he did, in fact, take over the defence of the reach of the Nile from Assuan to Wadi Halfa.

From March onward the rapid embarkation of troops for France considerably depleted Gen. Murray's forces. Among the troops to leave was the famous Anzac Corps. Gen. Birdwood left behind, however, the Light Horse regiments of that Corps. These were formed into the Anzac Mounted Division and were incorporated in the 2nd Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, composed partly of contingents recently arrived in Egypt. This corps came formally into existence on March 27. It was commanded by Lieut.-Gen. Sir Alex. Godley, and consisted of the 4th Australian Division (under Gen. Sir Herbert V. Cox), the 5th Australian Division (Major-Gen. Hon. J. MacCay) and the Anzac Mounted Division (Major-Gen. H. G. Chauvel). This corps was assigned to the No. 2, or Ismailia, section of the Canal Defences, but it was later on employed in the No. 1, or Port Said, section, reinforcing the Territorials and Yeomanry there. In the Port Said section Gen. Horne at first commanded. On his departure for France the command devolved, on April 12, upon Major-Gen. the Hon. H. A. Lawrence.

With regard to the stationary defences of the Suez Canal, Gen. Murray completed the work begun by Gen. Wilson. They consisted in the construction of fortified works, the building of roads and light railways and the laying down of pipe-lines. "Difficulties of water supply on the east bank of the Canal were increased by shortage of piping; labour troubles had delayed the progress of roads and railways, guns had still to be emplaced, and no part

of the front defence line was actually occupied by troops [in January, 1916]." *

The supply of deficiencies was taken in hand and by the end of May 114 miles of roads, 154 miles of pipe-lines and 252 miles of railway were laid. The railways were mostly of narrow gauge running alongside the Canal and to neighbouring permanent posts. There was, however, one important exception. Gen. Murray had planned, and had begun to build, a broad-gauge line which, starting from Kantara, on the Suez Canal between Ismailia and Port Said, was designed to be carried across the Sinai Peninsula and to serve as the main artery of supply of the troops as they advanced eastward.

Gen. Murray rightly believed that the defence of Egypt should be undertaken not at the Suez Canal but on the southern frontier of Palestine.

For the force under my command (he wrote) the only possible line of advance was along the northern line from Kantara towards Katia and El Arish, and the task was at once taken up of examining the possibilities of an offensive on this line and solving the problem of maintaining a considerable force at Katia during the summer months. . . . In my memorandum of February 15 addressed to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff . . . I stated that the first step towards securing the true base for the defence of Egypt was an advance to a suitable position east of Katia, and the construction of a railway to that place.

* Sir Archibald Murray's dispatch, June 1, 1916.

Sanction was given Gen. Murray to carry out his project, and henceforth an advance to El Arish was the ultimate objective of his operations. Up to nearly the end of February aerial reconnaissance was the only active military operation possible. The most notable achievement of the airmen at this period was the destruction of the enemy's power station at Bir Hassana, a place in the tableland 85 miles south-east of Kantara, the base of the British air service. This raid of 170 miles out and home was carried out on February 20 by six machines, four making the main attack, and the others following to complete the work of destruction. Forty bombs were dropped on the reservoir, buildings, and trenches at Bir Hassana, and one airman, descending to 600 ft., destroyed the electric power station with a 100 lb. bomb. According to one observer, the enemy camp, when the airmen left, looked like a volcano in eruption. As

KEEPING THE TROOPS IN EGYPT IN GOOD HEALTH.
A welcome refreshment after the day's work.

Turkish infantry were firing on the aeroplanes one of the airmen swooped down from behind to within 200 ft. of the ground and opened fire with his machine gun on the troops, causing them to scatter in all directions.

The airmen not only bombed enemy posts and depots in Sinai and kept Gen. Murray well informed as to movements of enemy troops, they gave invaluable aid in the construction of much-needed maps of the district over which the British advance was to be made. A new survey, on a large scale, initiated by Mr. E. M. Dowson, Director General of the Egyptian Survey Department, was carried out by the Topographical Section of the Intelligence Branch. Cooperation in this survey was part of the routine work of the Royal Flying Corps. The survey was based on experience, gained in Gallipoli, of the production of trench maps from aeroplane photographs, controlled by ordinary field survey methods; and the map based on this double plan was, it is believed, the first entirely constructed on this principle.

While preparations for the advance from Kantara to Katia were in progress, and after that advance had begun, there was considerable activity in the other sections of the Canal defences. One of the main concerns of Gen. Murray was to obtain control of the water supplies near the Canal which might serve the enemy should he cross the tableland from the Beersheba-Audja base. By the middle of April all water supplies of any importance within 30 miles of the Canal were patrolled by British troops, and mobile columns were ready to deal with enemy parties which approached them. If the enemy were to appear in strength the instructions to the mobile columns were to demolish the rock cisterns before retiring. (In the central section of the peninsula water is not always found in wells, it is also collected in cisterns cut so as to catch the waters brought down the wadis after rain.) The work of guarding the watering places led to many encounters with bodies of Turks and Beduin. The most notable was the result of a reconnaissance carried out between April 11 and 15 to Jifjaffa, where a fairly strong Turkish party, accompanied by Europeans, was engaged in boring operations.



AUSTRALIAN ARTILLERY.

Jifjaffa (Bir Gifgaffa) is a halting place, east of the great pool at Er Rigm, on the route across the tableland taken by Djemal Pasha in 1915.

The troops for this enterprise (said General Murray) were a squadron of the 9th Australian Light Horse Regiment, accompanied by a detachment of Bikanir Camel Corps, and commanded by Major Scott, D.S.O., 9th Australian Light Horse. The objective was fifty-two miles from the starting-point, and a jumping off place for the attack, eight miles south-west of the objective, was reached at 2.30 a.m. on April 13. From here an attack was launched by three troops upon the enemy's position at 9 a.m. The enemy, cut off in their attempted retreat by the right flanking party of the attack, stood at bay on one of the hills above the village, and lost six men killed and five wounded before surrendering. One Austrian lieutenant of engineers and 33 other prisoners were captured, our own casualties being one man and one horse killed. The destruction of the enemy's camp was thoroughly carried out, a quantity of correspondence was taken, and the elaborate well-boring plant, which had been at work for five months, was completely



MEN OF THE AUSTRALIAN LIGHT HORSE IN CAIRO.

A CAMEL TRAIN.

demolished. The manner in which this operation was carried out was most creditable, both to the commander of the column and to all ranks composing it.

The cisterns and pools at Er Rigm—40 miles S.E. of Ismailia—supplied by the waters of the Wadi Um Muksheib, and the wells at Moia Harab, to the south of Er Rigm, were within the regular patrolling area of the British. As the line of the British advance was not across the plateau this water was not needed by the British, and to guard against any possibility of its use by the Turks the decision was made to empty Er Rigm. This task was sucessfully executed in June by a column of Australian Light Horse, with detachments of engineers and of the Bikanir Camel Corps, under the command of Lieut.-Col. T. J. Todd, D.S.O. In four days and nights of continuous effort some 5,000,000 gallons of water were emptied from the pools and rock cisterns, and this with the destruction of the wells at Jifjaffa rendered waterless the last 60 miles of the tableland route to the Canal. A column of yeomanry co-operated with Col. Todd's force and did very good work. The safe return to rail-head of every man and animal of the force was testimony sufficient to the efficiency of the arrangements made for this little expedition.

In the southern section of the Canal defences particular attention was paid to the construction of forts which should effectually protect the town of Suez and Port Tewfik. Djebel Murr, overlooking the Pilgrims' Road as it approaches Suez, was rendered almost impregnable by the labour of Indian troops, who also strongly fortified the neighbouring Wells of Moses (Ain Musa), traditionally identified with the Elim of the Old Testament. Ain Musa, the only place in Sinai where water was so abundant as greatly to impede the digging of trenches, lies some 10 miles south-east of Suez, and to it a light railway was built. The work of fortifying the oasis was in progress in March when the Prince of Wales came to Egypt as a staff captain, and at Musa the Prince spent some time. Before leaving Egypt (on May 1) the Prince also visited every section of the Canal defences, and was present at inspections of the British, Australian, New Zealand and Indian troops. His powers of endurance were marked, especially in long desert rides to visit the front-line trenches, while the simplicity of his life and his unaffected and unceremonious nature won for him the affection of all ranks.

There was little opposition from the Turks to the advance to Katia. South and south-east of the village of that name is a zone extending some 15 miles with a water supply sufficient to maintain permanently a large body of troops. By the beginning of April the broad gauge railway from Kantara was approaching the oasis, and to protect the workmen building the line it was necessary that the region immediately east of Katia should be kept clear of the enemy. On April 2 a squadron of the Royal Gloucestershire Hussars (Gloucestershire Yeomanry) under Lieut.-Col. R. M. Yorke, with a detachment of the ever useful Bikanir Camel Corps, reconnoitred as far as Bir el Abd, 15 miles east of Katia village, meeting with no resistance, and the next day Worcestershire Yeomanry reconnoitred to Bir el Mageibra, 10 miles S.E. of Katia. Following these reconnaissances a larger body was moved into Katia, and on April 6 Brig.-Gen. E. A. Wiggin, commanding the 5th Mounted Brigade, took over the command from Col. Yorke, being made responsible direct to the headquarters of No. 3 (Port Said) section. He speedily found that the Turks did not intend quietly to acquiesce in the British occupation of the region. When on April 9 another reconnaissance was made to Bir el Abd by Worcestershire Yeomanry a strong enemy party was encountered, and, though the Worcestershires drove the Turks from the ridge they occupied, yet owing to the heavy sand their horses could not keep up the pursuit and they withdrew. It was three days later that the change in command of the Port Said section of the Canal Defences, which included the Katia area, took place, Gen. Lawrence succeeding Gen. Horne.

By April 21 the railway had reached a point which justified measures being taken for the permanent occupation of Katia by the British. The enemy, well informed, determined not to await the arrival of British reinforcements, and orders were issued to some 5,000 Turks to occupy and hold Katia. By means of aeroplane reconnaissances and by the work of their patrols the Turks were aware of the scattered disposition of the Yeomanry under Gen. Wiggin. They planned to make sure of capturing these posts not simply by direct attack but by cutting the railway line in their rear. By a surprise attack, made under cover of dense fog, on the morning of April 23 the enemy did succeed in capturing two of the four posts held in the Katia region by Gen. Wiggin's brigade, and they caused the British to withdraw from the other two. But they failed in the attack on the line of com-



PANORAMIC VIEW OF

munication and their victory was so dearly bought that the enemy almost immediately retired. For many months the details of this affair, in which the Worcestershire and Gloucestershire Yeomanry suffered severely, were wrapped in official obscurity. The story redounds to the credit of the regiments engaged, who exhibited a steadiness, valour and fortitude worthy of the best traditions of the British Army.

The 5th Mounted Brigade on April 21 was distributed as follows: The Worcestershire Yeomanry at Katia village (which is 28 miles east of Kantara); the Warwickshire Yeomanry (less one squadron) at Hamisah, three miles S.S.W. of Katia; Brigade Headquarters and the Gloucestershire Yeomanry at Romani (El Ruman), five miles N.W. of Katia. Railhead was at El Aras, seven miles from Romani. The nearest post held by infantry was Dueidar, 12 miles west of Romani and 18 east of Kantara. The orders given to Gen. Wiggin were "to dispose his brigade in such a way as to protect all railway, topographical and water survey parties, with special attention to the exploitation of the water supply; also to observe the route eastwards towards Bir el Abd, but not to take any serious offensive measures without further orders. It had also been impressed on Gen. Wiggin . . that, since it would take two days to reinforce him with infantry, he was, in the event of a heavy attack, to manœuvre back on Dueidar . . . or upon the railhead near El Aras" (Sir Archibald Murray's dispatch of June 1, 1916). A regiment of the Anzac Mounted Division was due to reach Katia on April 24, and the remainder of the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade was due at Kantara on the 23rd.

Such was the position as viewed from a distance. In practice the protection of the water and railway parties, with the force at the command of Gen. Wiggin, led to a dangerous weakening of the British posts. The force sent to Katia was too small and too isolated to have any real chance against a sudden attack by a large enemy body, and it was not till it was too late that the British Intelligence Service learned that the enemy were in strength near the borders of Katia. On April 21, as has been seen, the 5th Mounted Brigade held three posts, separated by several miles of heavy sand; the same day a fourth post was occupied.

On the evening of April 21 a squadron of Worcestershire Yeomanry was moved into bivouac at Oghratina, seven miles E.N.E. of Katia, to cover a party of some 60 dismounted Royal Engineers detailed to prepare wells.



THE SINAI PENINSULA.

On April 22 a second squadron of Worcestershire Yeomanry was also sent from Katia to Oghratina, a squadron of Gloucestershire Yeomanry being sent from Romani to take their place at Katia. The disposition of the brigade was now such as to offer opportunities to an enterprising foe, and there were not lacking incidents which proved that the enemy was on the alert. At Romani on April 21 a listening post of the Gloucesters discovered a patrol of two German officers and 15 Turks; on the previous day an outpost of the Warwicks had been attacked by Arabs. But it was not until April 22 that the Royal Flying Corps reported the arrival of new bodies of enemy troops at Bir el Bayud, 15 miles E.S.E. of Katia, and at Bir el Mageibra, 10 miles S.E. of Katia. Gen. Wiggin obtained the permission of Gen. Lawrence to attack the enemy at Mageibra, and he did so with the two squadrons of Warwickshires and the one remaining squadron of Worcestershire Yeomanry. Lieut.-Col. C. Coventry (commanding the Worcestershire Yeomanry) accompanied the raid to Mageibra, as also did Gen. Wiggin. Thus the posts at Romani, Katia and Oghratina were left without the guidance of their commanding officer. Finding very few enemy, the Yeomanry destroyed the camp at Mageibra and returned to Hamisah, the station of the Warwickshires, about nine o'clock in the morning of April 23 (Easter Day).

On his return Gen. Wiggin learned that some hours earlier the posts at Oghratina and Dueidar had been assailed by considerable enemy forces. Half an hour later news came by telephone from Capt. M Ll. Baker, the officer commanding at Katia, that his post was also being attacked. It appeared subsequently that the strength of the enemy force engaged at Oghratina and Katia was about 3,000, with 2,000 in reserve at Bir el Abd. Of the troops engaged in the attack the majority were picked regulars of Turkish infantry. There was also a cavalry force equal to a squadron, and 500 irregulars—camelmen. The report made by prisoners that with the Turks was a battalion composed entirely of Austrians and Germans was not confirmed, but there were some European infantry present, and among the bodies found on the field was that of a German officer, who was said to have led the attack on Katia.

Though at the time the full strength of the assailants was not known, the seriousness of the situation was at once recognized by Gen. Wiggin. He instructed the Katia garrison to hold on, and promised to bring reinforcements; there was scant prospect of being able to give

help to the Oghratina garrison. The instructions to that force had been to push on entrenchments with all possible speed, and it was Gen. Wiggin's intention that if it were attacked in force it should retire on Katia. That it would be able to retire was now seen to be its only possible chance of safety. The position of the

[*Lafayette, photo.*

LIEUT. LORD QUENINGTON.
Mortally wounded at Katia.

5th Mounted Brigade at this critical moment was :—At Oghratina two squadrons of Worcesters (with one machine gun) and half a company of Royal Engineers from the 52nd Division ; at Katia one squadron of Gloucesters (with one machine gun), about 40 details of the Worcesters and R.A.M.C. and Mobile Veterinary detachments ; at Romani two squadrons of Gloucesters (with one machine gun) and 20 men of the Bikanir Camel Corps (the Bikanirs were employed as ambulance men) ; at Hamisah two squadrons of Warwicks and one squadron of Worcesters (with three machine guns in all). The force at Hamisah under Gen. Wiggin was, however, not able to make an immediate start for Katia. The troops had but just returned from the night march to Mageibra, and the horses, if not the men, required to be watered and fed before they could start again. And the force at Romani was in the predicament of being between two fires, with Dueidar attacked in its rear and Katia in its front. Moreover, Romani had also the task of covering railhead, where a gang of 400 unarmed Egyptains was working at the line. At Hamisah the watering of the horses proceeded with all speed. and the Worcesters being first ready. Gen. Wiggin detached Col. Coventry and sent him with that squadron (that of Major W. Wiggin) direct to Katia. The Worcesters got through, reaching Katia about 11 a.m. Meantime Gen. Wiggin with the two squadrons of Warwicks pushed forward against the enemy's left. The going was very heavy, and the Turks offered most determined resistance. The advance was thus slow, and Gen. Wiggin succeeded only in pushing the enemy back about a mile.

Indications that the enemy was very watchful had been observed for some days at Romani. The demeanour of the "friendly" Arabs, the daily reconnoitring of the British positions by a German aeroplane and the discovery of enemy patrols close to their outposts had aroused suspicion. In consequence the posts were strengthened, barbed wire entanglements put up, and mounted patrols were out all night. By four o'clock in the morning of April 23 Col. Yorke had his force saddled up. Telephone communication between Romani and Katia had been cut, but this might have been the work of an enemy patrol which had taken advantage of the fog,* and in fact the first alarm at Romani that day came from an unexpected quarter. At 5.30 news was received that Dueidar, Romani's base of supplies, was being attacked. Orderlies sent to Katia returned with the news that about the same time the Gloucester squadron there had been lightly attacked, that the attack had been beaten off, but that heavy firing had been heard from Oghratina. About 9.30 a.m. Dueidar telephoned that the attack on that place had been beaten back. Col. Yorke decided to try and cut off the retreating enemy. As the Gloucesters were starting the sound of heavy firing from the direction of Katia decided Col. Yorke to change his direction, and his troops moved straight towards the enemy's guns. which could be seen shelling Katia camp. The heavy sand here, as was the case with Gen. Wiggin, made the advance comparatively slow, but Col. Yorke came into action at 10.45, about the time Col. Coventry reinforced Capt. Baker at Katia, but of that fact the Romani troops were ignorant.

* By 8.30 the fog had lifted sufficiently to allow of visual communication—*i.e.*, by heliograph,—between the British positions.

The Gloucesters advanced with great dash, taking up alternate positions, covered by their machine gun, and they succeeded in driving the Turks back about a mile and a half. More they could not do. The enemy were well led, their rifle and gun fire was excellent, and during the morning they brought up reserves. Col. Yorke, who had attempted an outflanking movement, found himself being outflanked, and he was forced to order a retirement for about 400 yards. This was the signal for the Turks to advance. With bayonets fixed they thrice charged to within 300 yards of the Yeomanry, but on each occasion were driven back. The casualties on the British side up to this point had not been numerous; among the mortally wounded was Lieut. Lord Quenington, the son and heir of Lord St. Aldwyn (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach). An expanding bullet smashed his thigh, and he died halfway back to camp. Having got his wounded away, Col. Yorke ordered a further retirement, preparatory to another attempt to get through to Katia. Before, however, anything further could be done it was seen that Katia camp was in the hands of the Turks, and Col. Yorke then retired to Romani, and thence to railhead, where infantry reinforcements arrived at midnight. Gen. Wiggin, realizing also that Katia had fallen, likewise fell back (about 3.30 p.m.), retiring by Hamisah to Dueidar.

The garrison at Oghratina had been wiped out early in the day. A telephone message received at Hamisah from the officer commanding stated that, in the dense fog, he was attacked about 5.30 and had beaten off his assailants. No further news came through until 7 a.m., when the officer reported that he was being heavily attacked "on all sides." This was his last message, for the telephone line was then cut. For half an hour afterwards very heavy firing was heard from the camp. It ceased suddenly—the camp had evidently been rushed. Four days later, when Oghratina was reoccupied by troops of the Anzac Mounted Division, evidence was found of a desperate hand-to-hand struggle. Many dead bodies both of friends and foe lay on the ground, and among the British two, though sorely wounded, were found still alive. Of these two one died shortly afterwards. The little garrison had obviously sold their lives dearly, probably realizing from the first that they were without hope of relief, and that retirement if attempted would be rendered doubly difficult by the fact that the Engineers were without horses.

At Katia the first attack appears to have been made by a reconnoitring party only. The main attack was begun about 9.30 a.m., when patrols reported the approach of 1,000 to 1,500 men from the direction of Oghratina.

[*Lafayette, photo.*

LT.-COL. THE HON. C. C. COVENTRY
(Commanding Worcestershire Yeomanry).

The Gloucesters were getting hard pressed, when Col. Coventry's squadron of Worcesters arrived from Hamisah, taking up a position on the left of the line. This for a time relieved the situation, and the advance of Gen. Wiggin on the right and of Col. Yorke on the left compelled the Turks to divert their main strength from the attack on the village. When, however, about 2 p.m., the enemy saw that they were holding off the relieving forces, they concentrated the fire of their 12-pounders and machine guns on Katia, and under cover of this fire their infantry, despite serious losses, crept close to the camp, which at three o'clock they carried with a rush. Col. Coventry then gave the order "Every man for himself," but escape for most of the defenders was impossible. All the horses of the Gloucesters had been killed by shell fire at the very outset of the action, but fortunately the led horses of the Worcesters had found safety in a hollow. These were galloped up, and on them about 60 men and

one officer made their escape. Of the Gloucesters nine or ten got away: of the Worcesters about 25. Col. Coventry and 23 other officers and 202 men were taken prisoners by the Turks and removed to Damascus. These prisoners included apparently the survivors from Oghratina as well as Katia. With the 60 who made their escape they represented all that was left of four squadrons of Yeomanry, the half-company of Royal Engineers, and the R.A.M.C. and Veterinary Detachments with them. In the list of missing officers were Capt. M. Ll. Baker and Lord Elcho.

There was a happier ending to the attack on

NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED RIFLES.

Dueidar. That post was garrisoned by infantry—100 men of the 5th Batt. Royal Scots Fusiliers (Territorials), a small detachment of the Bikanir Camel Corps and a party of A.S.C (Territorials), under Capt. A. C. A. Bruce (Lowland Mounted Brigade). Altogether there were 156 men at Dueidar, Capt. Roberts of the R.S. Fusiliers being in command. Throughout this affair on Easter Day, Capt. Roberts showed conspicuous ability. The Turkish force, about 1,000 strong, with one field gun and machine guns, came from the south, and delivered its first assault at 5.30 a.m. This was evidently the prearranged hour, for it was at the same time that Oghratina, 18 miles distant, was attacked Dueidar, a palm grove a quarter of a mile long and a hundred yards wide, lies in a depression, eastward of which are several sand ridges, the highest 900 yards distant. On these ridges the British held small redoubts, the chief being on a crest south-east of the oasis. This redoubt, which dominated the position, the Turks tried desperately to capture, but the steadiness of the defenders and the accuracy of their fire drove back the assailants. Their machine gun did excellent work, and many Turkish dead were found in front of it. The Bikanir Camel Corps men seized a part of the ridge to the right of this post, and though without cover other than that afforded by the sand dunes held their ground, though their only officer was wounded. Further to the left a small redoubt held by the Scots Fusiliers was in great danger, and Capt. Bruce with some A.S.C. men went to lengthen the line. Their first attack having been beaten the enemy renewed the attempt at 8.30, but again failed to get through. Reinforcements were now on their way, and at 9.30 Major Thompson, with two companies of the 4th Batt. of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, arrived from a post seven miles distant. These were sent to strengthen the redoubts. This gave rise to a notable instance of gallantry:—

One party went to the aid of Capt. Bruce and men. An open space, under heavy fire, had to be crossed, and the leader of the reinforcing party, Lieut. Crawford, fell wounded. Captain Bruce at once went to his aid, but himself fell mortally wounded and died in a few minutes. Thereupon Corp. Clifford left his sandbag shelter, crossed the deadly space, rescued Lieut. Crawford and brought back the body of Capt. Bruce.

STAFF-CAPTAIN THE PRINCE OF WALES IN EGYPT (MARCH–MAY, 1916).

Other reinforcements sent by Gen. Lawrence arrived and at 12.30 a counter attack was launched. It was delivered with such spirit that the enemy was forced to retire, leaving behind 70 dead and 30 prisoners. At this juncture—1 p.m.—the 5th Australian Light Horse arrived from Kantara, and they at once took up the pursuit of the Turks, who in their retreat were also bombed by aeroplanes. The enemy turned south, eventually joining their comrades at Katia.

Apart from the losses at Oghratina and Katia the British casualties on April 23 were two officers and 18 men killed, four officers and 21 men wounded. The enemy losses were estimated at 700 to 800—over 200 dead were found at Katia alone by the Australian troops when they re-entered the village on April 26. The costliness of such success as they attained and the repulse of the attacks on Dueidar had a discouraging effect on the Turks, who made no attempt to carry out their orders to hold the Katia area. On the night of the 23rd the enemy had already begun to retire. This retirement was turned into a flight by the daring of the Royal Flying Corps, which followed the enemy up and on April 25 bombed Bir el Abd and Bir el Bayud with great effect. The enemy had gained little by his raid—in territory nothing, nor were Gen. Murray's plans affected.

Romani was henceforth occupied by infantry and the railway from Kantara was pushed on with all speed. Permanent lines of defence

TURKISH PRISONERS FROM ROMANI ARRIVING IN CAIRO.

were also constructed from Romani to Mahemdia. This line rested in the north on the Mediterranean, Mahemdia being on the Bay of Tineh, at the western end of the Serbonian Lake. By taking up this position Gen. Lawrence secured for his left flank the support of the naval forces under Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn E. Wemyss. The Anzac Mounted Division, which, as Sir Archibald Murray said, proved itself a unit upon which absolute dependence could be placed to display energy, resource and endurance, carried out a number of successful reconnaissances. These proved a source of constant annoyance to the enemy, who early in May had again increased his force in Sinai and was watching Katia from the east and south-east. Two instances may be cited, illustrative of the powers of endurance of these Australians and New Zealanders. The Canterbury Mounted Rifles covered 40 miles in 30 hours, in intense heat, and the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, in the same conditions of intense heat, covered 60 miles in 30 hours, besides destroying the enemy camp at Hod el Bayud and bringing back 36 camels. The most successful raid at this period was on May 31. On that occasion the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, one regiment of Australian Light Horse and a sub-section of the Ayrshire Battery R.H.A., attacked the enemy's post at Bir Salmana, 20 miles E.N.E. of Katia.

The post (said the official report) was surrounded before dawn, and an enemy post on the Ganadil road was rushed, while a camel detachment was seen making off to the south-east. The enemy lost 15 men killed and 2 men captured. Our cavalry pursued till 8 a.m., when the pursuit was taken up by aeroplanes, which bombed scattered parties with effect, killing 20 camels and 8 more men. The force returned, having covered 60 miles in 36 hours, besides fighting an engagement. The only casualties were two men slightly wounded.

May, 1916, was also distinguished by aerial activity. The Turks' air service was in the hands of Germans, and the machines were of German make. Up to May they had been used only for reconnoitring the British camps; in that month two attacks (May 8 and May 21) were made on Port Said. In neither case was much material damage done; two civilians were killed and 5 soldiers and 16 civilians wounded. In each case the attack was answered by prompt and successful retaliation by the Royal Flying Corps. On May 23 there was an effective bombardment by four machines of the R.F.C. of all enemy camps on a 46-mile front from Bir el Mazar in the north to Rod Salem, in the south. The water tanks at Rod Salem, upon which, since the destruction of the drilling plant at Jifjaffa, the enemy set great store, were smashed by direct hits, and much damage was done to buildings at Bir Hamma and Bir el Mazar. But the most important operation in May was a combined sea and air attack on El Arish. On May 18 two monitors and a sloop, their fire directed by naval seaplanes, for two hours bombarded the fortified works, the camp and the aerodrome at Arish. Altogether 34 shells were fired by the heavy guns of the monitors, two of which hit the aerodrome, while most of the others

burst in the camp. Some shells were spared for the fort S.W. of the town, which was reduced to ruins. The enemy, completely demoralized, made no attempt to reply. Many soldiers sought cover among the palm groves near the coast, but unavailingly. Protected by the fire of the monitors the sloop stood in close to the shore and with salvoes of medium-sized shells thoroughly searched the palm groves. To complete the work six machines of the Royal Flying Corps now appeared, among other exploits exploding three bombs in the middle of a body of 1,000 enemy troops, troops which a War Office *communiqué* asserted were "evidently Germans."* A close reconnaissance of El Arish was made and many valuable photographs taken.

This visitation of El Arish much perturbed the Turks, who, besides providing the town with anti-aircraft guns, retaliated by several daring raids. Their airmen on June 11 attacked Kantara with bombs and Romani with gun-fire, but were driven off by the British aircraft. Two days later a hostile aeroplane attacked Serapeum, on the Suez Canal, and afterwards tried to bomb ships in the Canal.* On the same day British airmen again visited Bir el Mazar and El Arish. On this occasion an enemy aeroplane came out to engage the British. The machine, a Fokker, was driven down. The purpose of the visit to El Arish was to locate an aerodrome known to be somewhere south of the town. Its position was found, and on June 18 a raid was made by eleven machines with the object of destroying it. This attack, which, out and home, was a journey of 200 miles, was most successful. "The first machine to arrive (wrote Sir Archibald Murray) descended to 100 feet and attacked, blowing to pieces an aeroplane on the ground and its attendant personnel. A second machine on the ground was also put out of action by bombs. Heavy fire from rifles and anti-aircraft guns was now opened on the attackers, but the British pilots carried out their orders most gallantly. Altogether six out of the 10

* On this point Sir Archibald Murray in the dispatch covering this operation was silent.

* Another air attack was made by the Turks on the Canal on August 3, the day the battle of Romani began. On that occasion two aeroplanes dropped bombs on Ismailia and on the shipping on Lake Timsah, but the bombs fell harmlessly. Again on August 8, during his retreat from Romani, the enemy made air attacks both on Suez and Port Said, doing some little damage.

TURKISH PRISONERS TAKEN IN THE ROMANI BATTLE.

hangars were hit, and two, if not three, were burned to the ground. A party of soldiers on the aerodrome was also successfully bombed, and at the close one of the observing machines attacked the hangars with its machine gun from a height of 1,200 feet."

During the action three British machines were lost; the pilot of one set his machine on fire to prevent the enemy from capturing it. A second machine fell into the sea, the pilot being rescued by a motor-boat. The third was compelled to land about eight miles west of El Arish; the pilot endeavoured to carry out repairs, and, while doing so, he was seen by one of our escorting machines, which at once landed at considerable risk, picked him up, and flew back a distance of 90 miles to Kantara, carrying two passengers in addition to the pilot—an extremely gallant feat.

FITTING WATER-TANKS ON CAMELS.

Despite the inconvenient attentions of British ships and British aeroplanes El Arish remained the Turkish base in Sinai, and during July, 1916, the enemy assembled there a considerable force. Although it was the hottest period of the year, and with the knowledge that in following the El Arish-Katia caravan route their right flank would be exposed to attack from the sea, the Turks had decided to take the offensive along that line. The reason for their action remained obscure. The belief in Egypt was fairly general that the advance was undertaken by the Turks to retain the support of the Arabs of Southern Syria, many of whom sympathized with the Sherif of Mecca, who had thrown off Turkish allegiance and had made himself master of almost the whole of the Hedjaz. It was not without significance that at the same time that the advance in Sinai was undertaken Turkish troops were also sent to the Hedjaz in an effort to relieve the besieged garrison of Medina. Various indications were, however, forthcoming which tended to show that the enterprise was undertaken not on Turkish but on German initiative. The Germans had cause sufficient on the Somme to wish to detain in Egypt as many troops as possible. They had, too, been making preparations for months for a descent upon the Suez Canal, and these preparations had to be justified. They had got together a force admirably equipped and in fine physical condition. It consisted of the Turkish 3rd Division, with eight machine-gun companies officered and partly manned by Germans, mountain artillery, and some batteries of 4-inch and 6-inch howitzers and anti-aircraft guns, manned chiefly by Austrians. There was also a body of Arab camelry. The German personnel of the machine-gun units, heavy artillery, wireless sections, field hospital and supply section had been organized in Germany as a special formation for operations with the Turkish forces.* The commander-in-chief was a German (Bavarian), Col. Kress von Kressenstein, Djemal Pasha's chief of staff in the 1915 attack on the Canal. He had gained experience in that expedition, and his present force, if smaller, was much

* *Vide* Sir Arch. Murray's dispatch of October 1, 1916.

more homogeneous and transport arrangements were infinitely better. At El Arish he was not more than 60 miles from the railway at Beersheba or Gaza. Supplies of all kinds were plentiful, and, as indicating the thoroughness with which the Germans had endeavoured to provide for every contingency, they had distributed to the transport drivers books in Arabic on the care of camels.

Yet Col. Kress von Kressenstein must have been very sanguine if he thought that a force of 20,000 men could achieve anything effectual against the defenders of Egypt. Probably he did not so think, and the original object of the advance may have been to block the road to a British advance on El Arish, and to prevent them from denying the Turks the whole of the well-watered Katia area—the

STARTING OUT ON A DESERT JOURNEY.

only district on the northern route across Sinai where a considerable force within striking distance of the Suez Canal could be collected. Such was Gen. Murray's supposition until the attack on the Mahemdia-Romani lines was actually launched.

Up to the middle of July there was no indication in Sinai itself of a Turkish forward movement. Small parties of Turks were hovering as usual on the outskirts of Katia, but there was no considerable body of the enemy farther west than Bir el Mazar, 35 miles from Katia village. There the enemy had from 1,500 to 2,000 troops. Credit must be given to Kress von Kressenstein for the secrecy with which he collected his army at El Arish. The first sign of the coming movement noted by Gen. Murray was the appearance of numerous enemy aircraft over the Dueidar-Romani district on July 17. Yet at that date Kress von Kressenstein had begun his march westward, and on July 19 the British air scouts reported that the Turks had reached Bir el Abd, and that from that place their front extended south-west through Bir Jamiel to Bir el Bayud. Along this line the enemy had, it was estimated, 9,000 men. Their disposition disclosed an intention of enveloping the Katia oasis, which since the reverse to the Yeomanry in the previous April had been daily patrolled by the British. Cavalry were posted in Katia village. Kress von Kressenstein may have wished to repeat the April coup, but he was denied the opportunity. The British troops fell back towards the Mahemdia-Romani lines. Sir Archibald Murray sent reinforcements to Romani, and instructed Gen. Lawrence that the advance of the enemy was not to be hindered by a premature counter-attack. If Kress von Kressenstein chose to involve himself in an attack on the British lines he was to be allowed so to do. The cavalry therefore contented themselves with keeping in touch with the Turks, whose movements were further closely watched by airmen. The enemy swung forward his left flank on July 20 from Bir el Bayud to Mageibra, and his front advanced to and entrenched itself among the date palm groves at Oghratina, the spot where the two squadrons of Worcesters had been overwhelmed in April.

For the next few days there was no particular change in the situation. Patrol encounters, in which the enemy handled his covering troops well, showed that Kress von Kressenstein had made his position strong. On

TRENCH-DIGGING IN THE DESERT.

AUSTRALIAN LIGHT HORSE.

his left flank Mageibra, with the help of large numbers of labourers brought from Palestine, was entrenched with a series of strong redoubts and held by some 3,000 troops; in the centre, around Oghratina, were 5,000 men; and entrenched positions covered his right flank. Between the Turkish positions and the main position of the British there extended a desert strip 15 miles wide.

Having considered the situation, Sir Archibald Murray determined to attack the enemy. But for the moment he could not act. The very large camel transport needed by a force which crossed the 15 mile desert strip to attack a strong enemy position was not immediately available. Orders were, therefore, issued for the mobilization of a striking force on a pack basis with camel transport, and by August 3 all formations were ready to take the field. Gen. Murray's intention was, unless himself previously assailed, to attack the enemy about August 13, the date of the full moon. Gen. Lawrence, already in command of this section of the Canal zone, was given local command of the whole force collected.

On the night of July 27–28 the Turks advanced their whole line, chiefly on the left flank, which swung up in a north-westerly direction. The advance of the right flank was checked by the Canterbury Mounted Rifles, who, in a sharp skirmish, accounted for 50 of the enemy, while themselves losing only two or three men. After this advance another pause followed; the enemy entrenched his new line and brought up a steady stream of reinforcements. By July 31 all Kress von Kressenstein's available troops seem to have reached the front. His force then numbered some 18,000 men. Pending the completion of his preparations for the offensive Gen. Lawrence did his best to keep the enemy distracted. On July 28 a mobile camel column (under Lieut.-Col. C. V. Smith, V.C.) was formed, its duty being to harry the enemy's left flank and left rear in the neighbourhood of Mageibra and Bir el Bayud; from July 29 the Royal Flying Corps, which hitherto had conducted observation only, constantly harassed the Turks with bomb attacks; and from July 30 two monitors in the Bay of Tineh began to shell the enemy's right flank. These monitors were commanded by Lieut.-Comdr. A. O. St. John, R.N., and Comdr. E. Robinson, V.C.,* R.N., respectively. On August 2 the enemy made a strong reconnaissance towards Hamisah and Katia village. They had sharp encounters with the Anzac Mounted Division and only made progress on the north (right flank). On the evening of that day Gen. Murray was still uncertain as to whether he or the enemy would attack first, but the matter was settled on the morrow when the Turks made a general move forward. They took up a position north-west of Hamisah and east of Katia village, with their right flank approaching the Mediterranean.

* Commander Robinson had gained the Victoria Cross for distinguished gallantry at Gallipoli.

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE KATIA-ROMANI OPERATIONS.

At midnight on August 3 the Turks began their attack on the Mahemdia-Romani lines. Those lines consisted of strongly entrenched posts extending from the sea and facing eastward to a point on the east of a sand dune 300 ft. high, named Katib Gannit, thence curving first southward around Katib Gannit and later north-westward to a hill known as Et Maler. Behind the position was a station on the new railway from Kantara, called Pelusium. South-west of the point where by the Katib Gannit the British position turned south was a hill named Hod el Enna, whence the approach of the enemy from the south-east (between Kaha and Bir el Nuss) could be observed. Midway between Katib Gannit and Hod el Enna was a high sand dune called Mount Meredith, and between Mount Meredith and Katib was an elevated stretch of bright yellow sand called Wellington Ridge. West-north-west and two miles south of Pelusium station was a third sand dune known as Mount Royston.*

The line of outposts on Hod el Enna, Mount Meredith and Wellington Ridge was the first point of the Turkish attack. Their design was to press back the line, cut the railway to Romani and take the British position in the rear. At first the Turks gained ground, and at midday on August 4 the southern flank of the British was forced north of Mount Royston. Then the tide turned, counter-attacks were made, and by midday on August 5 the whole enemy force was in retreat.

From Kabit Gannit to Mount Meredith the British line was held by the First Brigade Australian Light Horse; towards Mount Royston New Zealand mounted troops were posted. In the darkness of midnight the Australians were attacked by 3,000 Turks, who, despite serious losses from machine gun fire, got within 100 yards of the British posts. Between 2.0 and 3.0 a.m. they delivered a bayonet charge against Mount Meredith. It failed, but the enemy, reinforced, increased their pressure, and by 4.20 a.m. the Australians had been forced back from the hill.

The Turks now began with strong forces to outflank the cavalry on the right, and advanced their line towards Mount Royston. In face of this movement the cavalry fell back slowly towards the railway. By daylight on August 4 the battle was general, for at 5 a.m. the enemy had opened the attack on the east face of the British position, that is the line of fortified works running south from Mahemdia. These works were garrisoned by Scottish and Welsh infantry and by artillery. For several hours the fire from the enemy field guns and heavy howitzers was intense—one fort more exposed than the others alone received about 500 8-inch shells. The enemy also persistently bombarded railhead, where considerable supplies of ammunition were stored, without, however, effecting any great destruction. But in more than one instance the fire of the howitzers caused severe casualties among the defenders, while the task of the British artillery was rendered more onerous

* Mount Meredith was named after Lieut.-Col. J. B. Meredith, commanding the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade; Mount Royston after Brig.-Gen. J. R. Royston, commanding 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade; and Wellington Ridge after the Wellington (N.Z.) Mounted Rifles.

by requests, as the day wore on, that they should shell the enemy on the southern front. Happily this was not necessary until the afternoon, by which time the edge of the Turks' attack on the eastern front had been blunted. The British batteries did excellent work in stopping the enemy and in shelling his position, notably reducing to silence the guns at Abu Hamra, a strong position about four miles east of the British lines. Notwithstanding the punishment to which they were subjected the Turks delivered several assaults, but the Territorials acted with admirable steadiness and all the attacks were repelled. Towards evening the enemy fire slackened and then died down altogether, and on the eastern front the night passed calmly. The guns of the monitors in Tineh Bay, aided by bomb attacks by the Royal Flying Corps under Lieut.-Col. P. B. Joubert, had rendered valuable help during the engagement in keeping down the fire of the enemy howitzers.* From first to last the situation on the eastern front gave very little anxiety to Gen. Lawrence

On the southern front the Turks gained ground somewhat rapidly, and as delay occurred in moving up infantry to Pelusium Station the whole brunt of the fighting on this side fell on the cavalry. The First Australian Light Horse, reinforced at daylight by the Second Brigade, held on to Wellington Ridge for some hours under heavy artillery and infantry fire. "I saw," wrote Mr. W. T. Massey, the correspondent of the British Press with the Egyptian Forces, "the Light Horse on Wellington Ridge when shrapnel was bursting over them with wonderful accuracy, but the Australians never showed the slightest sign of movement until the enemy attempted a rush," the Turks shouting a new battle cry, "Allah finish Australia."

But the Turks had seized Mount Royston, and a retreat from Wellington Ridge and positions farther east was imperative. At one point one squadron of cavalry had held off heavy attacks for three hours. At 12.30 p.m., August 4, the Turks reached their farthest point north, being within a mile and a half of the railway. Their line ran north of Royston, along the south slopes of Wellington Ridge, and then east and north facing the most southern British infantry posts. The situation called for prompt measures, and these were taken. Gen. Lawrence had directed two mounted brigades to be ready to operate on the enemy's rear, but he now called upon them to strengthen the line holding back the Turks from the railway. On

* Throughout this period the enemy aircraft was active and their anti-aircraft fire very accurate. British airmen were also frequently engaged with enemy machines of superior power.

CAMEL TRANSPORT: LOADING.

their arrival a counter-attack was begun, Yeomanry and New Zealanders being the first to advance. This was at 1 p.m. ; an hour or so later the longed-for infantry reinforcements arrived. These were two brigades of the East Lancashire Regiment (Territorials), under Maj.-Gen. Sir William Douglas.* They detrained at Pelusium Station, and by 3.30 p.m. were on the way to Mount Royston, marching across the dunes through sand ankle deep and under a blazing sun most trying to infantry ; the thermometer that afternoon registered over 100° F. "A little later," wrote Mr. Massey, "I saw Warwickshire and Gloucestershire Yeomanry marching over flatter country with flankers advanced and squadrons as well aligned as on parade." Already the cavalry had begun to throw back the enemy ; at 4 p.m. the infantry also received orders to attack Mount Royston and Wellington Ridge. The Yeomanry dismounted and fought their way forward in company with the East Lancashires, veterans of Gallipoli, who advanced with easy confidence. The enemy was, however, still full of fight, and though they suffered severely from machine gun and rifle fire the Turks held on till 6.30, when Mount Royston was recaptured by a fine charge in which the Lancashire Territorials showed the utmost gallantry. Over 500 prisoners (some of them Germans) were taken, besides machine guns and a battery of mountain artillery. Wellington Ridge was taken by assault at daylight on August 5 by Scottish Territorial infantry under Maj.-Gen. W. E. B. Smith aided by Anzac troops. With the ridge 1,500 prisoners (including more Germans) fell into the hands of the victor.*

The enemy's offensive was clearly spent, and an advance was ordered all along the line. In this advance the infantry took part, Scottish troops carrying the strong position of Abu Hamra, but the burden of the pursuit fell naturally upon the cavalry. These (including the Gloucester and Warwick Yeomanry) were all placed under Gen. Chauvel, the commander of the Anzac Mounted Brigade. With the cavalry were batteries of horse artillery (T.F.), whose fine work won the admiration of the whole force. The Turks manned their Katia lines with a strong rearguard, which held up the pursuit whilst the rest of the force retired, and this process was repeated at the Oghratina

* A third brigade of the East Lancashires arrived later in the afternoon, but did not take part in the fighting on August 4.

* The German detachments of the enemy force had a separate commissariat and were splendidly fed, much better than the Turkish troops. Among the good things left behind by the Germans in their retreat were a quantity of wine and preserved fruits.

EL ARISH.

lines on August 7. On that day Col. Smith's mobile column, operating in the desert south of the main body of mounted troops, caught up the enemy's extreme right flank at Hod el Muhammar and severely mauled it. The British casualties were slight, but among the killed was Major de Knoop, who had handled the camel detachment with great skill and judgment. Their experience here was probably an important factor in determining the enemy to continue the retreat. On August 8 Kress von Kressenstein evacuated the strong lines at Oghratina and fell back on Bir el Abd. Here Gen. Chauvel's cavalry, reinforced, made an effort to envelop the Turks, who were 6,000 strong and well supplied with artillery. The effort failed. Strong opposition was encountered on each wing, and a dismounted attack was met by heavy fire from the Turkish howitzers. The enemy made three counter-attacks, all of which were driven back by rifle and machine gun fire, followed up by what appeared to be a general advance by fresh forces. This attack was eventually also driven back, with heavy loss, while the artillery were firing on the enemy depôts at a range of only 2,000 yards. The situation slightly favoured the Turks. On August 11 they pushed out a force south-west toward Bayud. There it met Col. Smith's mobile column, and a sharp action followed in which all the baggage camels and ammunition mules of the enemy were destroyed. Col. Kress von Kressenstein, if he had contemplated holding on to Bir el Abd, now changed his mind; on the night of August 11 his force—or what was left of it—retired east and did not stop until it reached El Arish. A rearguard only was left at Bir el Mazar.

The "second invasion of Egypt" had proved a complete fiasco, galling alike to the Germans and to the Turks. It also clearly demonstrated the wisdom of Gen. Murray's plan of the "offensive-defence"—that the true line for the defence of the Suez Canal was not on its banks but away to the east.

The complete result of the operations in the Katia district (wrote Sir A. Murray in his dispatch of October 1, 1916) was the decisive defeat of an enemy force amounting in all to some 18,000, including 15,000 rifles. Some 4,000 prisoners, including 50 officers, were captured, and, from the number of enemy dead actually buried, it is estimated that the total number of enemy casualties amounted to about 9,000. In addition there were captured one Krupp 75mm. mountain battery of four guns complete with all accessories and 400 rounds of ammunition, nine German machine guns (dated 1915) and mountings, with specially constructed pack saddles for camel transport, 2,300 rifles, 1,000,000 rounds small arms ammunition, 100 horses and mules, 500 camels, and a large amount of miscellaneous stores and equipment. Two field hospitals, with most of their equipment, were also abandoned by the enemy in his retreat, and large quantities of stores were burnt by him at Bir el Abd to prevent their capture.

Pursuit of the Turks after Romani would



CAMEL AMBULANCE.

have been impossible but for the excellence of the transport arrangements, while detachments of the Bikanir Camel Corps were invaluable in reconnaissances and as escorts to small parties. As to the transport arrangements Mr. Massey wrote:

When our troops began the pursuit they had to move well away from the railway. All the drinking water had to be carried to the men, for many of the wells on the line of advance, though yielding an abundant supply, are brackish and undrinkable for the British troops. The foresight of the supply branch overcame the difficulties. As soon as the forward movement began many thousands of transport camels carrying water, food, ammunition, and material for entrenching stretched over the desert like veins in all directions. For three days and nights, as far as the eye could reach, there was a never-ending procession of this transport. No other animals than camels could carry loads in the Sinai desert.

Col. Kress von Kressenstein, finding that the British advance was stayed at Bir el Abd, strengthened his force at Bir el Mazar, where the Turkish lines had a front of three or four miles. The enemy were well entrenched and had the support of field guns and howitzers. On September 16 and 17 Gen. Chauvel, starting from Bir el Abd, with Australian Light Horse,



BIVOUAC OF TURKISH TROOPS OUTSIDE JERUSALEM.

Imperial Camel Corps, R.H.A. batteries and a mountain battery, reconnoitred Bir el Mazar, receiving help from the Royal Flying Corps, while naval seaplanes engaged the enemy aircraft at El Arish. No attempt was made to seize Mazar, but the Turks' outposts were driven in and serious losses were inflicted by Chauvel's artillery, which partly enfiladed some enemy trenches. The aircraft followed and bombed several parties of the enemy, who fled back to El Arish, among them being German officers. The success of this operation gave the

enemy an unexpected proof of the extended radius of British action, with the result that a few days later Bir el Mazar was evacuated. The Turkish advanced positions were drawn in to Masaid, only five miles west of El Arish.

Gen. Murray was now free to develop his plans for clearing the northern part of the Sinai peninsula of the enemy. The railway was pushed on from Romani through Katia to Bir el Abd and beyond ; its rate of progress was two-thirds of a mile a day. A force was also organized to strike a blow at El Arish as soon as the transport arrangements permitted. During this period of preparation the airmen of both sides were busy. The new Turkish camp at Masaid was repeatedly bombed, and El Arish received the usual attentions. In mid-November a long-distance raid was made on Beersheba, bombs being dropped on the railway station, sidings and rolling stock. In the same month El Audja and Kossaima, on the Turks' line of communications to Nakhl, were also bombed. The most notable achievement of the enemy was a retaliatory raid on Cairo, following the bombing of Beersheba. This raid was of the approved German type of "frightfulness," for no attack was made on the citadel or barracks. Instead an aeroplane, flying very high, dropped bombs on the business and residential quarters of the city, killing and wounding a number of civilians.

In the central and southern sections of the Sinai peninsula several interesting operations were carried out in the last half of 1916. From the strongly fortified position at Ain Musa, which guarded Suez town, patrols were sent out. Farther south, on the Sinaitic side of the Gulf of Suez, the small ports of Abu Zeneima and Tor were garrisoned by Sikhs and Bikanir Camel Corps detachments. A notable reconnaissance was made from those stations in July by Major W. J. Ottley (who had already served with distinction at Aden). He harried several enemy posts, captured an Arab sheikh and other prisoners, and brought in much live stock. In three days he had traversed 60 miles of difficult mountain country and his casualties were *nil*. In the tableland area a well-planned raid was made by Brig.-Gen. A. Mudge in September against Bir el Tawal, on the Pilgrims' Road to Mecca and 30 miles east of Kubri on the Suez Canal. The Turks, completely surprised, took to flight, after a short engagement, leaving behind all their stores and personal effects. The wells were destroyed, and such stores as could not be brought away burned. In October a reconnaissance was made to Maghara, a mountain stronghold, on the southern edge of the Jifar desert, about 65 miles east of Ismailia. Making two night marches over the drift sand a mounted force discovered the enemy's outposts entrenched among high, precipitous hills. After a fight lasting two hours the British troops, aided by aeroplanes, dislodged the Turks, whose casualties were 28 against 3. The position of the main enemy camp at Maghara was noted, and in mid-November it was visited by the Royal Flying Corps. Descending to a very low altitude, the airmen dropped 400 lbs. of explosives on the camp and storehouses with good results. These little affairs called for as much, and sometimes more, endurance on the part of the troops as did the larger operations, and they served a very useful purpose. They demonstrated to the Turks that, apart from their main line of advance on El Arish, the British were within striking distance of every place within 60 or 70 miles of the Canal.

Anxiety also began to be felt by the enemy regarding his position in central and eastern Sinai. Communication between Beersheba and Nakhl, the chief Turkish post in the tableland, was threatened by General Murray's advance, and the line of retreat towards the south-east began to appear not over safe. Nakhl lies on the Pilgrims' Road from Egypt to Mecca, a road which at Akaba touches the sea. Inconvenient attentions were paid to Akaba by ships of the British Navy, and the forts were occasionally shelled. Though no expedition was undertaken in 1916 against Nakhl its position was threatened, and in December a mobile column advanced more than halfway from Suez to that place, destroying two enemy camps.

By the middle of December General Murray's plans for the advance on El Arish were complete. The striking force was composed of practically the same regiments which had fought at Romani — the Anzac Mounted Division, Yeomanry, Territorial infantry and artillery, and the Imperial Camel Corps. Starting from Bir el Abd on the morning of December 20, the British force took the road to El Arish, expecting to find opposition at Masaid, which was known to be strongly fortified. Numerous airmen escorted the column, and kept off the attentions of enemy machines. Otherwise the Turks made no sign.

It would seem that the suddenness of the British advance and the rapidity with which it was carried out had upset Kress von Kressenstein's calculations. There was no time for him to bring up reinforcements, and he consequently decided to abandon El Arish. On receipt of the news that the Turks were beginning to leave the town General Murray ordered the Anzac Mounted Division and the Camel Corps to push on at once and occupy El Arish. They had been marching all day, but before midnight were again on the move, over a toilsome and waterless road. Passing deserted Masaid, horsemen and camelry arrived at El Arish as dawn was breaking. A few prisoners were taken, but otherwise the enemy had got clear away. Some had retreated along the coast to Rafa, just within the Egyptian border, others had gone south by the dry bed of the Wadi el Arish to Magdhaba, where they believed themselves safe from immediate pursuit. They had underestimated the powers of endurance of their opponents. The Anzac Mounted Division (with their accompanying Territorial artillery) and the Imperial Camel Corps had only reached El Arish on December 21 ; three hours after sunset on December 22 they were assembled south of the town by Gen. Chauvel, where the troops were rationed and the horses fed and watered preparatory to another night march. Gen. Murray had decided to strike at Magdhaba without delay. At 1 a.m. on December 23 the column started up the Wadi el Arish, and by 4.50 a.m. had reached Magdhaba, the second 25 miles night march accomplished by the same troops in three days. The fight opened at 9 a.m., the enemy position being strongly entrenched, and containing five redoubts armed with Krupp and mountain guns. The defenders, many of whom were Syrians, offered a determined resistance, and the fight lasted eight hours. At 4 p.m. the defence collapsed. A few of the enemy got away towards Audja, but practically the whole garrison was captured or killed. Of a force 1,900 to 2,000 strong, 1,350, including 45 officers, were made prisoners. There were also taken 4 mountain and 3 Krupp guns, a large number of rifles, 100,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, and some gun ammunition, besides horses and camels and telephone and other equipment. Col. Kress von Kressenstein was reported to have been in Magdhaba on the 22nd, and to have left in his motor-car at 3 a.m. on the 23rd for Beersheba.

RAFA, ON THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN EGYPT AND PALESTINE.

MOUNTED AMBULANCE-MEN'S IMPROVISED STRETCHER,
In which a rifle is used as an extemporized splint.

This brilliant exploit was followed up on January 9, 1917, by the capture of Rafa. The Anzac Mounted Division and the Imperial Camel Corps stormed the enemy position covering that place and defeated a column marching to its relief. The enemy casualties were over 2,200, of whom 1,600 were unwounded prisoners —Turkish regulars. The title of the Suez Canal Defence Force had become a misnomer, the "offensive-defence" had become a true offensive; in northern Sinai there was not a Turk left.

During 1916 the internal situation in Egypt steadiiy improved. This was due not only to the success of the British troops in Sinai, but also to the defeat of the Senussites and their gradual ejectment from the oases west of the Nile, and to the achievements of the Egyptian Army in the Sudan. In the Darfur campaign, except for the air service, Egyptian troops were exclusively employed. An account of the political situation in Darfur and of Col. Kelly's capture of El Fasher in May, 1916, is given in Vol. IX., Chap. CXLV. The campaign was notable for the way in which great natural obstacles were overcome.

Unusual measures had to be adopted to transport a force of 3,000 men to the desert battleground. The base at Khartum is 500 miles by rail from the nearest seaport, thence to railhead is another 428 miles, and from this point the expeditionary force, with its stores, guns, aeroplanes, and other bulky equipment, had to proceed across a desolate tract of roadless country for nearly 400 miles and there occupy the stronghold of an enemy numerically superior and armed with modern rifles. To facilitate the task a makeshift motor-road was prepared, over which aeroplanes with their repair shops were taken, as well as the other supplies of the force. When this motor-road was ready the camel transport was supplemented by a mechanical transport service, by which means the rapid convoy of supplies, on which depended the safety of the force, was ensured.

There was but one drawback to the complete success of Col. Kelly's operations; Sultan Ali Dinar made his escape. The inhabitants of Darfur, Arabs and negroes alike, in general welcomed their liberation from the tyranny of their late ruler, but on the western border of the state Ali Dinar still had a small following. His presence close to the frontier of French Central Africa constituted a menace to settled government which could not be allowed to continue indefinitely, and to check Ali Dinar's movements the post of Dibis, 118 miles south-west of El Fasher, was, in October, 1916, occupied by a detachment of the Egyptian Army 300 strong. Late in that month a column set out in chase of Ali Dinar. It was a difficult march over desert country, and when on November 3 the enemy camp was reached it was found that

Ali Dinar had fled still farther west. The pursuit was continued for another 75 miles, and on Nov. 6 Ali Dinar was overtaken and his followers routed. The body of Ali Dinar, with those of some of his principal adherents, was found about a mile from his last camp. He had again attempted flight, but unavailingly. The Egyptian force captured 200 prisoners, 340 rifles, 2,500 rounds of ammunition, ivory, grain, some horses, 300 camels, and 6,000 cattle—in short, Ali Dinar's force was wiped out. By December all the sons of the late Sultan had surrendered, there was not an important enemy chief left in the field, and although in a few districts hostility to the Government was still manifested, organized resistance in Darfur was at an end. The State was incorporated as a province of the Sudan, much to the satisfaction of the neighbouring French authorities, who had suffered from the support Ali Dinar had given to their opponents in Wadai.

Apart from the Darfur campaign there were during 1914-1916 operations on a minor scale in various parts of the Sudan. In these operations "the necessity for which," wrote Sir Reginald Wingate, "has been generally due to the native unrest consequent on the war and to anti-Government propaganda," only units of the Egyptian Army were employed. The chief of these "little wars" was caused by the disaffection of Fiki Ali, the powerful Mek (chief) of Jebel Miri, in the Nuba Mountains, against whom Major H. J. Huddleston (Dorset Regt.) was dispatched in April, 1915, with a force consisting of 46 officers and 1,007 rank and file (cavalry, camel corps and Egyptian and Sudanese infantry). On April 20-22 Major Huddleston attacked the Mek in his strongly fortified mountain fastness. The enemy were driven out of their stronghold, a large number of prisoners being captured. Fiki Ali escaped, but, after being hunted from place to place for several months, he was finally compelled to surrender.

The Sirdar had not only to guard against revolts within the Sudan, but from dangers from without due to Turco-German activity. The sections of the frontier which were specially exposed to raids had to be constantly patrolled. The patrols gave proof on several occasions of their efficiency. The arduous character of the work they had to perform may be gathered from the following extract from Sir Reginald Wingate's dispatch of Oct. 25, 1916:

> Throughout the winter of 1914–1915, and during the following summer, a complete system of land patrols along the Eastern (Red Sea) littoral was carried out by Camel Corps and Police, and proved very efficacious in preventing the establishment of hostile communications with the Arabian coast. Great credit is due to Major (temporary Lieut.-Col.) C. E. Wilson, Governor and Commandant of Troops in the Red Sea Province, for his excellent organization of these patrols.
>
> Similarly, on the Western frontier, some 600 miles of desert frontier was observed by a chain of Arab posts, which stretched from west of Halfa, in the north, to the S.W. limits of Kordofan, and afforded a measure of protection alike from Furs, Tuareg, and Senussist raiders. In May last a small regular mounted force was also dispatched to Dongola, whilst the Dongola and Halfa-Shellal reaches of the river were patrolled by gunboats, the former manned by Egyptian Army Artillerymen, and the latter by a detachment from the Royal Navy.

While, as has been seen, there was disaffection —the result of German propaganda—in certain parts of the Sudan the great majority of the people of that vast dominion remained perfectly loyal. When, in April, 1916, the Prince of Wales paid an official visit to Khartum he received unmistakable evidence of the attachment of the principal native notables, civil and religious, to the British connexion. Many of them had already given practical proof of their expressed desire to uphold the Sudan administration, and of their confidence in Sir Reginald Wingate. Towards the end of 1916 it was announced that Sir Reginald would at the New Year succeed Sir Henry McMahon as High Commissioner for Egypt. This announcement was received with genuine regret by the inhabitants of the Sudan, but it was arranged that Sir Reginald Wingate, who had already ruled the country with conspicuous ability for 17 years, should remain both Sirdar and Governor-General, being represented when at Cairo by an acting Governor at Khartum.

In their attacks on the Aden Protectorate, which is politically a dependency of Bombay, the Turks directed their energies first to that part of the territory bordering the eastern entrance to the Red Sea. The town of Aden lies on the southern coast of Arabia, 100 miles east of the Red Sea, and its value as a port of call on the Suez Canal route to and from India needs no emphasis. The protectorate covers a very wide area; indeed, the chiefs of Hadramut and of the whole coast of southern Arabia are in subordinate treaty relations with the Government of India. In the north-west the protectorate adjoins the Turkish province of Yemen; the frontier between British and Turkish territory had been delimitated as recently

A STREET IN ADEN.

as 1902-5. The frontier starts at Sheikh Said, the peninsula which divides the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden, running thence in a general north-east direction. Save for part of its southern beach, Sheikh Said was left in Turkish territory. Only two miles from the Arabian shore, in the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, lies the British island of Perim, largely used by merchant vessels as a coaling station. Guns mounted at Sheikh Said might be therefore a direct menace to all users of the Red Sea. The Turks had in fact several batteries in position, and with these they shelled, ineffectively, Perim lighthouse and coaling station. Moreover, the enemy plans included the capture of Perim Island. The project, in view of British naval supremacy, may seem to have been foolish, but even temporary success would have caused serious inconvenience.

On the outbreak of war with Turkey reports from the Resident of Aden indicated that the enemy were in some strength in the Sheikh Said peninsula and were preparing a force to invade the Aden Protectorate. Accordingly, on Nov-

THE ADEN PROTECTORATE.

ember 3, 1914, orders were issued to Brig.-Gen. H. V. Cox, commanding the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, then on the voyage to Egypt, to capture Sheikh Said and destroy the enemy works, armaments and wells there. To carry out his orders Gen. Cox detailed three battalions from his brigade and the 23rd Sikh Pioneers. Naval cooperation was essential, and this was afforded by the cruiser Duke of Edinburgh, Capt. H. Blackett, R.N. On November 10 the transports conveying the troops arrived off Sheikh Said, but bad weather rendered impossible a landing at the point first selected. While the transports moved off to an alternative landing place, the Turkish batteries were engaged by the Duke of Edinburgh, with satisfactory results. Covered by the fire of the naval guns a landing was effected. After a sharp engagement the Turks were beaten and driven inland, abandoning their field guns. The next day, aided by a naval demolition party, the troops destroyed Fort Turbah and other works, re-embarked and continued the voyage to Egypt. No troops were left at Sheikh Said, with the natural result that not long afterwards it was reoccupied by the Turks. But the British naval forces in the Red Sea kept it under surveillance, and the enemy accomplished nothing. The only noteworthy incident was a belated and not very serious attempt to seize Perim. On the night of June 14-15, 1915, a party of Turkish soldiers stole across in small dhows from Sheikh Said and tried to land on the north side of the island. The party were driven off by the detachment of the 23rd Sikh Pioneers, which, under command of Capt. A. G. C. Hutchinson, formed the garrison of the island.

This "attack" on Perim coincided with enemy activity in other parts of the Aden Protectorate. For some months the Turks had massed troops on the northern frontier, and in June Major-Gen. D. G. L. Shaw, commanding the Aden Brigade, learned definitely that Ali Said Pasha, governor of Yemen, with part of the 39th Turkish Division, had entered the protectorate. Gen. Shaw had no anxiety as to the safety of the port of Aden. It is built on a barren volcanic peninsula (15 square miles in extent) connected with the mainland by a flat narrow neck of sandy ground and is strongly fortified. No land force, however strong, if supplied with no other artillery than ordinary field guns could hope to capture Aden peninsula. But with respect to the *hinterland* the case was different; its defence could only be by an offensive movement, and for an offensive campaign no force was available. The plan adopted was to abandon to the Turks the greater part of the protectorate, while endeavouring to keep them from the neighbourhood of Aden and to prevent enemy interference with the trade route from the east to the port. Some 25 miles north of Aden and at the foot of the high barren mountains which fill the north-west part of the protectorate is Lahej, the capital of an Arab state, whose territory included Aden until, in 1839, in consequence of numerous outrages on ships using the port, it was annexed by Great Britain, being the first addition to the Empire in the reign of Queen Victoria. Between Aden peninsula and Lahej the road passes through a level arid country, partly scrub covered, partly sand, partly bare rock. The village and oasis of Sheikh Othman, whence Aden derives part of its water supply, lies on the route, 7 miles north of Aden.

Ali Said Pasha moved his troops from the Yemen border across the mountains towards

Lahej. General Shaw at first sent the Aden Camel Troop north of Lahej to reconnoitre. They reported the presence of a Turkish force with field guns and a large number of Arabs, and fell back on Lahej. Meantime, on July 3, the Aden Moveable Column, under Lieut.-Col. H. F. A. Pearson, had moved out to Sheikh Othman, and early the following morning the advance was continued to Lahej. The intense heat, sand, and shortage of water rendered the march most trying, and the difficulties of the column were increased by the desertion of the hired camelmen, with their camels. Only the advanced guard of the column—250 rifles with two 10-pounder guns—had reached Lahej by the afternoon, and shortly afterwards they and the Camel Troop were attacked by the enemy —Turks and Arabs—several thousand strong, with 20 guns. The small British force maintained its position in face of the enemy's artillery fire until night, when part of Lahej was in flames. During the night some hand-to-hand fighting took place. Among the slain on the British side was Sir Ahmad-bin-Fadthl, K.C.I.E., the Sultan of Lahej, a loyal feudatory, who had been a prominent figure at the great Imperial Durbar held at Delhi by King George V. The enemy attacks were beaten off, but the Turks began to develop an outflanking movement. In view of the delay which had occurred to and the distressed condition of the main column, a retreat from Lahej was ordered. This was carried out in the morning of July 5, General Shaw paying a special tribute to the "devotion to duty" of the men of the Royal Artillery, who brought away their guns under the most trying conditions. The whole force retired within the Aden lines, and the Turks thereupon occupied Sheikh Othman. They did not attempt an attack upon Aden.

The operations had been badly managed, and the retreat to Aden, coupled with the death of the Sultan of Lahej greatly weakened British prestige among the Arab tribes from Hadramut to Muscat. The Indian Government, which should not have waited until the Turks were at the gates of Aden to take measures adequate for the defence of the protectorate, now set about strengthening the force there, and appointed Major-Gen. Sir George J. Younghusband to the command. On July 8 Gen. Sir Alex. Wilson received orders that from the Suez Canal Defence Force two batteries of artillery and one infantry brigade were "to proceed urgently" to Aden. Accordingly "B" Battery, H.A.C., the Berkshire Battery R.H.A. (Territorials), and the 28th Brigade (51st and 53rd Sikhs, 56th Rifles and 62nd Punjabis) were dispatched from Suez. Other troops dispatched to Aden included the South Wales Borderers (Brecknockshire Batt., T.F.), the 60th and 89th Punjabis, the 109th Infantry (Indian Army), the 126th Baluchistan Infantry, and the Malay States Guides, though not all were there at the same time.

On the morning of July 21 an offensive movement was begun. Col. A. M. S. Elsmie (56th Punjabi Rifles) with the 28th Brigade and other troops completely surprised the enemy at Sheikh Othman, driving them northward. Their casualties were 50 to 60 killed, in addition to several hundreds taken prisoners,



SHEIKH SAID.

mostly Arabs. The British casualties in this affair were 25, all told. The next month two other Turkish garrisons were routed, and on September 25 Col. Elsmie surprised the enemy at Waht, south-east of Lahej, dispersing the garrison, whose strength was about 700 Turks with 8 guns and 1,000 Arabs.

With this clearing of the enemy from the vicinity of Aden the British offensive came to an end. Sheikh Othman was turned into a strongly entrenched camp, and was connected with Aden by railway. From a little north of this place the British front line spread out fanwise. Ali Said Pasha remained at Lahej, which place he made his headquarters. Thence he directed occasional raids on the British posts, and now and again tried to shell the railway. A stretch of No Man's Land about six miles wide lay between the opposing forces. Towards the close of 1915 the Turks sent troops to coerce the tribes living in the eastern part of the protectorate. In January, 1916, the Aden Moveable Column inflicted considerable losses on the enemy near Subar, thus relieving the pressure on the friendly Arabs. The British casualties were five men killed and 35 wounded. Two months later a Turkish *communiqué* described this affair as a big battle, in which 6,000 British infantry and 600 cavalry were defeated with great slaughter, "and compelled to flee into their entrenched camp under the protection of the guns of a fleet anchored in the Gulf of Aden." This was a specimen of several Turkish reports concerning the Aden operations, some of them describing purely fictitious encounters.

On March 20, 1916, an India Office report made the first reference to Germans being with the army of Ali Said Pasha. It was then stated that a Turkish force which on March 16 had unsuccessfully attacked Imad, the village through which passes the trade route to Aden from the east, was accompanied by three German officers. The Germans who joined the Turks in Yemen were not numerous. They were believed to be members of the crew of the Emden. When that raider was caught by H.M.A.S. Sydney off Cocos Island on November 9, 1914, a party of 43, sent to destroy the wireless station, was on shore. The Emden, in an endeavour to escape, left those men behind. They seized an old schooner, in which they made their way to Java, where they obtained provisions, and eventually got to Jidda. Thence, apparently, the majority joined Ali Said Pasha, though one or two returned to Germany.

In the attack on Imad the enemy employed 900 Turks and 300 Arabs, and had six small field guns. They were defeated and pursued for four miles, the British losses being one killed and 17 wounded. In another engagement the same month (March, 1916), at a place six miles north of Sheikh Othman, a Turkish column on the march was surprised and suffered 300 casualties, against eight killed and 33 wounded on the British side.

There was no further fighting of consequence in the protectorate during 1916. General Sir George Younghusband and part of the troops left for Basrah, but a force sufficient for the defence of Aden remained. The declaration of independence by the Sherif of Mecca in the summer of 1916, and the adhesion to his cause of the Arabs of the Hedjaz, cut off Ali Said Pasha's communications with Syria, but this made no apparent difference in the situation. Turkish governors of Yemen had grown accustomed to have their communications cut and to fend for themselves, and Ali Said Pasha was fortunate in not having to face more than the normal hostility of the Yemen tribes to Ottoman rule. So long as the British remained quiescent he could hold the hinterland.

CHAPTER CLXV.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME (III.).

THE CAPTURE OF POZIÈRES—DELVILLE WOOD AND LONGUEVAL—THE CAPTURE OF DELVILLE WOOD—SIR HUBERT GOUGH AND THE FIFTH ARMY—SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S PLANS—COOPERATION WITH THE FRENCH—GAINS AND LOSSES—FIGHTING ABOUT GUILLEMONT—END OF THE SECOND YEAR OF WAR—THE THIÉPVAL SALIENT ATTACKED ON AUGUST 4—THE KING'S VISIT TO THE SOMME BATTLEFIELDS—WET WEATHER—BRITISH AND FRENCH ADVANCES, AUGUST 18–19—POSITION ON AUGUST 22—THE GERMAN LOSSES.

CHAPTER CLIV. brought the narrative of the Battle of the Somme up to the end, on July 25, of what may be called the Pozières phase. It will be remembered that the Australians played a very important part, and it may be well to give here an Australian account of the gallant conduct of their own men. Admirable in every way, it drew from the British Division acting with them a message saying that they were proud to fight by their side. The following description of the great engagement was addressed to the High Commissioner for the Commonwealth :—

On the night of July 22, our field artillery lashed down its shrapnel upon the German front line in the open before the village. A few minutes later this fire lifted and the Australian attack was launched.

The Germans had opened in one part with a machine-gun before that final burst of shrapnel, and they opened again immediately after. But there would have been no possibility of stopping that charge with a fire twenty times as heavy. The difficulty was not to get the men forward, but to hold them. With a complicated night attack to be carried through it was necessary to keep the men well in hand.

The first trench was a wretchedly shallow affair in places. Most of the Germans in it were dead—some of them had been lying there for days. The artillery in the meantime had lifted on to the German trenches farther back. Later they lifted to a farther position yet. The Australian infantry dashed at once from the first position captured across intervening space over the tramway and into the trees.

It was here that the first real difficulty arose along parts of the line. Some sections of it found in front of them the trench which they were looking for—an excellent deep trench which had survived the bombardment. Other sections found no recognizable trench at all, but a maze of shell craters and tumbled rubbish or a simple ditch reduced to white powder. Parties went on through the trees into the village searching for the position and pushed so close to the fringe of their own shell-fire that some were wounded by it. However, where they found no trench they started to dig one as best they could. Shortly after the bombardment shifted a little farther, and a third attack came through and swept in most parts right up to the position which the troops had been ordered to take up.

As daylight gradually spread over that bleached surface Australians could occasionally be seen walking about in the trees and through the part of the village they had been ordered to take. The position was being rapidly "consolidated." . . . That night, after dark, the Australians pushed across the road through the village. By morning the position had been improved, so that nearly the whole village was secure against sudden attack.

In the heart of the village itself there was little more actual hand-to-hand fighting. All that happened there was that from the time when the first day broke and found the Pozières position practically ours, the enemy turned his guns on to it. Hour after hour—day and night—with increasing intensity as the days went on, he rained heavy shell into the area. It was the sight of the battlefield for miles around—that reeking village. Now he would send them crashing in on a line south of the road—eight heavy shells at a time, minute after minute, followed up by burst upon burst of shrapnel. Now he would place a curtain straight across this valley or that till the sky and landscape were blotted out, except for fleeting glimpses seen as through a lift of fog. Gas shell, musty with chloroform, sweet-scented tear shell that made your eyes run with water, high bursting shrapnel with black smoke and a vicious high explosive rattle behind its heavy pellets, ugly green bursts the colour of a fat silkworm, huge black clouds from the high explosive of his 5·9's. Day and night the men worked through it, fighting this horrid machinery far over the horizon as if they were fighting Germans hand-to-hand—building up whatever it battered down ; buried some of them not once but again and again and again. What is a barrage against such troops ? They went through it as you would go through a summer shower—too

GERMAN GUN WRECKED AT POZIÈRES.

proud to bend their heads, many of them, because their mates were looking. I am telling you of things I have seen. As one of the best of their officers said to me, "I have to walk about as if I liked it—what else can you do when your own men teach you to?" The same thought struck me not once but twenty times.

On Tuesday morning, July 25, the shelling of the day before rose to a higher note and then suddenly slackened. The German was attacking. It was only a few of the infantry who even saw him. The attack came in lines at fairly wide intervals up the reverse slope of the hill behind Pozières Windmill. Before it reached the crest it came under the sudden barrage of our own shrapnel. The German lines swerved away up the hill. The excited infantry on the extreme right could see Germans crawling over as quickly as they could from one shell crater to another, grey-backs hopping from hole to hole. Our guns blazed away hard, but most of our infantry never got the chance it was thirsting for. Our artillery beat back that attack before it was over the crest, and the Germans broke and ran. Again the enemy's artillery was turned on. Pozières was pounded more furiously than before, until, by 4 in the afternoon, it seemed to onlookers scarcely possible that humanity could have endured such an ordeal. The place could be picked out for miles by pillars of red and black dust towering like a Broken Hill duststorm. Then Germans were seen to be coming on again exactly as in the morning. Again our artillery descended upon them like a hailstorm, and nothing came of the attack.

During all this time, in spite of the shelling, the troops were slowly working forwards through Pozières. Every day saw fresh ground gained. A great part of the men who were working through it had had no more than two or three hours sleep since Saturday—some of them none at all, only fierce, hard work all the time.

This is a good description of the heroic struggle.

July 26 was not marked by any important engagement, though two strong trenches to the west of Pozières were taken by Territorial troops, and some prisoners, including five officers, were captured: the day was generally spent in consolidating the position won. The French, too, were engaged on similar work.

The next day saw a recrudescence of the struggle and some fierce contests took place. Our line here ran through the lower part of Delville Wood and of Longueval, whence it turned south. There had been heavy fighting about these parts for the past 10 days, and on both fronts our men had made progress, but in each instance the Germans had been able to cling on to part of their defences, notwithstanding the terrible artillery fire which had been brought to bear on them, sheltering to a great extent in their dug-outs. It will be

LONGUEVAL.

remembered that Delville Wood had actually been overrun by us on July 15, and part of the defences of Longueval occupied, that the enemy had counter-attacked on the evening of the 18th and, after a severe artillery fire during the night, had, on the 19th, succeeded in regaining a footing in the wood and also in the northern portion of Longueval. For the next week there had been fierce artillery bombardment and the tide of battle ebbed and flowed. But we never altogether lost our foothold.

It was in Delville Wood that the South African Brigade distinguished themselves by their bravery and tenacity so as to elicit commendation from the General commanding them. South Africa might justly be proud of the achievements of her representatives with the British Expeditionary Force.

Throughout the night of July 26–27 a crushing fire of shells had been directed against that portion of the Delville Wood to which the Germans still clung, and hand-to-hand encounters took place frequently. The "Devil's Wood," as our men not inappropriately called it, considering the horrible scenes which took place there, was some 159 acres in extent. It had almost ceased to be a wood in anything but name and had become a mass of broken timber. Yet this offered, perhaps, even more difficulty to the movement of our troops than if all the trees had been upright, for the interlaced and matted mass of broken trunks and branches formed an extremely difficult obstacle while enough trees remained standing to afford fair cover from view for the defenders. In addition, the heavy shells of both sides had turned the surface of the ground into a series of pitfalls made by the craters of explosion. Over all were the ghastly sights of the unburied dead lying about, torn to pieces by explosions of shells or bombs and bearing but small resemblance to the living beings they had once been. Such was the field of battle on which Briton and German strove for mastery.

A HEAVY HOWITZER IN ACTION ON THE SOMME.

Slowly but surely our men pushed on, the guns preparing the way by a curtain fire about 75 yards ahead of our attacking line.

It speaks volumes for the ability of our gunners that they should have been able to carry on this advancing curtain of crashing shells continuously and without injury to our following infantry. "It was queer," said a soldier who had been through the attack, "to see the shells bursting in front of one; the line



THE DEFENCE OF DELVILLE WOOD BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS.

was just about 75 yards ahead of us, flinging up the ground and smashing everything. It was wonderful how the gunners kept it just ahead of us."*

To the artillery, indeed, a great share of the success of the British arms was due. The enemy's positions had been subjected to such a fire as had surpassed all previous efforts. From June 27 onwards, said a correspondent of *The Morning Post* (on the authority of an artillery officer), we had fired an average of half a million of shells *per diem*. This, of course, was spread over the whole position of the enemy, highly concentrated against the parts to be assaulted, less against others.

On July 27 our cannonade was so fierce as to surpass all previous efforts, and yet, although it might have been thought impossible for men to have lived under it, there was still a sufficient number of German infantry left, and there were still sufficient of their machine-guns in place, to afford a considerable degree of resistance to the advance of our troops.

It will be realized that under these circumstances progress was slow: but assuredly it was certain. This was not only due to the artillery, but also to the excellent way in

[*Official Photo.*

SUMMER-TIME IN PICARDY.

which the bombers acted with the rifle-carrying infantry, and to the way in which no effort was spared to bring up machine-guns to support the latter. It is true that this bold action sometimes resulted in the loss of a machine-gun if the infantry were driven back, but that was only a small set-off to the advantage gained generally by bold handling of these weapons.

* From the *Daily Telegraph*, July 31.

On one occasion a party of Germans were seen carrying a machine-gun across a drive in the Delville Wood. One of our men moved out to a point whence he could bring a Lewis gun (which can be fired from the shoulder)

[*Official Photo.*

MAMETZ CHURCH.

to bear on the enemy, and completely wiped out the whole party. With some of his comrades he smashed the German machine-gun and then returned. The next day the same men pushed farther into the wood, but their weapon became jammed owing to a rough tumble over the broken wood; it was rendered useless and abandoned.

It was not alone physical difficulties which made our rate of advance slow. Every yard of progress on our part was met by a corresponding counter-attack, made often in the massed form to which our troops were now accustomed, and this was especially the case when we had won through to the edge of the wood. For us then it was the old problem how to advance from such a position over the open ground to the next hostile line. It was exactly this task which was imposed upon the enemy in his endeavours to regain the ground he had lost; he had to advance over a space without shelter to reach his objective. Every device was employed; interspersed with the shrapnel and high explosive fire were mingled gusts of poison and lachrymatory shells. But secure in their masks our men were undismayed, and held firmly to the ground they had won so bravely. The thick German columns formed admirable targets for our gunners. "You could see the Germans coming towards you in great waves of grey," said an officer present at the engagement.



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE CAPTURE OF DELVILLE WOOD.

But our infantry was ready for them, ready to ply them with machine-gun and rifle fire, ready to cover them with bombs. It was no case of coming to handy strokes, for of the multitude only individuals arrived anywhere near our line. It was mainly the artillery which stopped them, mowing them down so that they lay in long swathes, cutting deep lines through the solid columns, as shell after shell struck them full. The attack at last came to a standstill. Several times was the effort renewed, and each time in vain. Three fresh regiments, which one after another came on with great bravery, were almost annihilated, and when the few survivors straggled back to their trenches the ground between the two hostile lines was covered with the bodies of the dead and wounded. As our troops advanced, bombing here, bayoneting there, with an accompaniment of rifle shots and machine-gun fire, they gathered by the way many prisoners who had been hiding for safety in shell-craters or behind any available cover to guard themselves from the terrible artillery fire. Finally our men won their way to the extreme limit of the wood to the east and north-east, and commenced to consolidate their position.

They had also strengthened their hold on Longueval by seizing a portion of the northern end, and, advancing beyond it, had taken the orchard just on the outskirts of the village towards the north-west. It was a gain of some importance, as fire from it swept the valley which led upwards behind Bazentin-le-Grand towards Bazentin-le-Petit. We also took a redoubt, known to our soldiers as the Machine-gun House, which protected, with a flanking fire, this part of the Delville Wood position. Creeping up under what cover was available, several of our officers led forward parties of bombers. These managed to get within heaving range, and then threw bomb after bomb into the work, killing nearly all the machine-gun detachments and capturing their weapons.

By the fall of night Delville Wood was entirely captured except for a small point in the northern end. We had inflicted very heavy losses on the enemy, while our own were, considering the magnitude of the success, comparatively slight. This, as we have seen, was largely due to the part played by our guns.

A subaltern, who arrived home in a Red Cross ship, after being wounded in Delville Wood, told an interviewer that there were "some real brave things" done at the end of that great fight. "They can't give D.C.M.'s to everyone, you know," he said, "but honestly, all those men earned it, just as well as any of the chaps who get it. What I am thinking about is the lot of things that nobody at all ever knows about; not even a man's own mates." And he told this story :—

We had to fall back a bit once, from a shallow trench at the top, after we'd been in it, and thought we'd got it. Well, we fell back for, oh, it must've been 10 minutes, the time I mean, and a lot more Boches came up along those communicating saps, and it almost looked once as though we would'nt get it back again. I got my dose in the trench, you know. When I saw our men all falling back I tried like the devil to get out. I was in quite a deep bit, and I nearly broke blood vessels trying to get out; but it was no go. My shoulder was giving me hell, and the right arm would not work at all. Well, you know I'd rather have been sent West altogether. I always did feel I'd rather anything than be taken by the Boches. I had my revolver, of course; but I'm

not much good with my left hand. Ten to one they'd have got me alive. I could see over the edge, and I was cursing my luck when I saw a chap deliberately stop, turn round and look at me, and sort of weigh up his chances; and then go on again. He was falling back with the rest of our lot, you know.

Just then a Boche machine-gun opened as it seemed right alongside me. It was really just round the big traverse. "That settles it," I thought. "I'm done now." And it did settle it, too. That chap I'd seen, who'd evidently decided once that it wasn't good enough, he altered his mind when the typewriter began. Down on his hands and knees he went, and scuttled all the way back to where I was, like a lizard. He fairly gasped at me; no breath, you know. "On my back, sir," says he. And, somehow, he hauled me out, and slung me over his back.

I fell off three separate times, while he was scrambling down the slope with me, and three separate times he stopped, in all that fire, and fixed me up again. And then I felt him crumble up under me, and at the same time I got—this, through the left arm.

I rolled clear, and looked at his face. I'll never forget his face, but he had no coat or cap, and I didn't know his battalion. His forehead was laid open, and bleeding fast. I dragged him behind a stump, and laid him with his head on my haversack. Then I scrambled out to find a stretcher-bearer for him. But I got caught up in our advance then. You know what it is. And I went on, thinking I'd find my man after. Glad I went, in a way, because I had three bombs a wounded corporal gave me, and it was easy lobbing them with my left, at close quarters. By gad, I lobbed 'em all right; nearly lobbed myself to Kingdom come, too.

BRITISH BOMBERS ATTACKING THROUGH POISON GAS.

The German smoke-helmet has a round chemical filter, much larger than the nozzle of the British type.

But those bombs did their job all right before we cleared the trench. It was hours after before I could get a man to help me look for that good chap who'd dragged me out; and we never found him, never a sign of him. But to do what he did; thinking it out, too, in all that hell; why, many a chap's got the V.C. for no more than that, I think.

Yes, and there were dozens of things like that, in Delville alone, and the same all along the front, right through the push.*

Men like these were grand fighters, worthy of the noblest and best traditions of our fighting men.

It is interesting here to note the views of a German Commander, as to the main lesson of the fighting on the Somme, expressed to Mr. Cyril Brown, a correspondent of the *New York Times*:

Artillery! Artillery! Artillery! The side that can put most ammunition into the other fellow's face, and whose infantry can throw its hand grenades best, will gain ground. But artillery plays the main rôle in this battle. At the start when it was necessary to lay a barrier of fire on the enemy lines one battery had to cover a front segment of 800 yards. Now I have a battery for every hundred yards of the curtain fire.

To this it may be justly replied, in the language of one of Reuter's correspondents:—

This may possibly be true, for it is certain that the Germans have hurried up every available gun to this part of the front. But what the German Commander-in-Chief omitted to say is that he is in an infinitely worse position in regard to being able effectively to emplace his artillery than he was at the beginning of the British offensive. This is so conspicuously a war of artillery that, as has been said, the gain of a few yards, giving command of a ridge and observation, may make all the difference between dominance and untenability.

We have been steadily gaining ground that should be valuable for artillery work. The ponderous process of creeping forward is always going on, which means that the German artillery must either be always slowly withdrawing or courting destruction. As an artillery officer put it to me yesterday, in discussing the effects of Friday's and Saturday's fighting, the time is rapidly approaching when the German gunners from Beaumont Hamel to Bapaume must choose between Scylla and Charybdis: they must either stop and be knocked out, or get out. For we are fighting a great winning battle of position.

This means that as we progress over the Thiépval-Morval ridge the ground slopes down towards the Germans and this gives us the advantage of command.

The German General also went on to say, in reply to a question put by him as to whether the British showed signs of weakening:

No. The English are tough. One must be just to one's enemies. One must see them as they are. The English have not lost hope of success as yet. Despite their very heavy losses, which are known to me, they come back again and again. They are stubborn foes. One has to give them credit for trying again and again to break through my front. The English soldier is a worthy, excellent soldier, but his newer leadership is not on the heights.

The last few words are quite typically Prussian—*i.e.*, proof positive of the inability of

* *Morning Post*, August 2.

[Official photograph.

TRENCH PERISCOPE IN USE.

[Official photograph.

GETTING A HEAVY GUN INTO POSITION.

the race ever to judge their opponents fairly. Of course, the German General knew nothing whatever about the actual work of the leaders of the British Army; he had never been within miles of them. He admitted that in the western theatre of war there had been no scope for strategy. "It is all tactics now," to quote his exact words. But he surely must have remembered what his compatriot May pointed out in his celebrated pamphlet, *Die Preussische Infanterie in 1866*, that, in front-line fighting, above all in attack, there is but little room for anyone between the General and the actual troop-leaders, a dictum of which the truth has been proved in all subsequent wars. If this be the case, then it is a fair inference that if the British infantry beat the Germans, as the logic of facts proved that they had, some part of this result must be due to their leaders. Incidentally, it would also seem that the German subordinate leaders had shown themselves inferior to ours, unless the German general was prepared to admit that his troops were so hopelessly inferior to the British that even their company leaders could do but little with them.

The loss of Pozières the Commander-in-Chief ascribed to an unlucky combination. "Somebody blundered," he said. A certain new formation had let itself be surprised by the enemy. Whether the blunder was due to the Generals, the regimental officers or the men, the German Commander did not say.

While the fighting had been going on in Delville Wood the attack on Longueval had also been progressing. There, too, the struggle had been in progress since the middle of the month, and the Scottish troops, who had hung on in spite of heavy losses from the continuous fire to which they had been exposed, had behaved with the greatest gallantry. They had been relieved by others who made some further progress, while English and Scots had combined to take Waterlot Farm and then secured a line back towards Trônes Wood. But the whole of Longueval was not yet ours. The Orchard had been won in this day's fighting (July 27); the northern end of the village, however, still gave a foothold to the Germans at the end of the day, though considerable progress had been made towards the desired goal.

South of the Somme the French made some progress to the east of Estrées and there was

RUSSIANS IN CHAMPAGNE.
Mounting a machine gun on a parapet.

a fairly lively fusillade in the outskirts of Soyécourt.

The chief event on this side was the enemy's effort to assume the initiative and create a diversion from the Somme fighting by attacks upon the centre of the western front north of the Aisne, at Ville-au-Bois, and in Champagne west of Prosnes. The latter attack was the more important. Delivered on a front about one mile wide, it gave the Germans no permanent advantage. For a time they succeeded in occupying a few trenches, but a counter-attack dislodged them without great difficulty.

The Germans made a small raid on our trenches just to the west of the Ypres-Pilkem road, but were at once counter-attacked and driven back. We also raided the German trenches farther to the south, after a preliminary bombardment. Here the enemy was first met outside his own wire and forced to retire with a loss of some 30 killed. Our troops, following up the retreating Germans, then pushed through into their trenches, where they found many casualties among the defenders caused by our artillery fire.

Both British and French airplanes did good work in locating the German batteries and newly constructed works. Owing to the clouds and mist our machines had to fly low and two of them did not return.

At 12.30 p.m., at another part of the line, four bombing airplanes, armed with heavy bombs, set out to attack an important railway centre on the enemy's lines of communications where large quantities of ammunition had recently been reported. East of the line clouds were below 5,000 feet, which considerably favoured the expedition. The machines arrived over their objective between 2 and 2.30 p.m., and all four descended to heights of from 2,000 feet to 4,000 feet to drop their bombs. The station, which was crowded with rolling stock, and the sheds, containing ammunition, were attacked. Both were hit and fires were seen by our pilots to be started at four different points. The expedition was practically unmolested by anti-aircraft guns or hostile airplanes, and all our machines returned safely and landed on their home aerodrome within four minutes of one another.

On July 28, after severe fighting, the British drove the last remnants of the German garrison, which seems to have been furnished by the 5th Brandenburg Division, out of Delville Wood, and took prisoners 3 officers and 158 men. Twice did the enemy direct heavy counter-attacks against the British newly won positions, but on both occasions they were driven back. This day also saw the completion of the conquest of Longueval Village. Thus the German position here was completely conquered.

During the whole day there was considerable artillery action on both sides. In the Champagne the auxiliary Russian corps employed there penetrated into a German trench and brought away German prisoners. Little more than a hundred years before their countrymen had been acting with the Prussians against the French in the same country.

It was the right wing of the British Fifth Army, under Sir Hubert Gough, which had been brought up the Albert-Bapaume road into and through Pozières, while the left wing of the Fourth Army, under Sir Henry Rawlinson, was now on the crest of the main ridge between Pozières and Delville Wood. But the enemy still retained most of High Wood, from which he was not finally ejected until September 15; he also made desperate efforts to recover Delville Wood, and during the night of July 28–29 two violent but unsuccessful attacks were made on it. On Saturday the 29th the hand-to-hand struggle north and north-east of Pozières, in the neighbourhood of High Wood, and in the outskirts of Longueval, continued without intermission, and the British, despite the increased artillery fire from the German batteries, made some slight progress. The northern portion of Longueval and its orchards were carried by our men, and the German trenches entered at a few points. Three enemy aeroplanes were destroyed and a kite balloon set on fire. South of the Somme, between Vermand-Ovillers and Lihons, the French rifle fire dispersed two strong German detachments endeavouring to reach the lines of our Allies, and French aeroplanes made a retaliatory attack during the night, dropping 40 bombs of 120 kilos on enemy stations in the Noyon district.

Pozières had been won by Sir Hubert Gough on July 25 and 26, but Thiépval, the strongly defended plateau between Thiépval and the Ancre, with the village fortresses of Courcelette north and Martinpuich south of the Albert-Bapaume road, were still in the possession of the Germans. Sir Douglas Haig therefore decided that it would be preferable for Sir Hubert Gough, who formed still the left of the attack, to confine himself to a "steady, methodical, step by step advance," while Sir Henry Rawlinson, in conjunction with the French north of the Somme, endeavoured to extend farther eastwards from Delville Wood.

THE REMAINS OF DELVILLE WOOD.

Maltz Horn Farm was now the spot where the British joined on to the French, but it was arranged that in the advance northward, in order to bring up the British right, the

GEN. SIR HUBERT DE LA P. GOUGH, K.C.B.
In command of the Fifth Army.

French should cooperate so as to prolong the line of battle to the east and do away with the objectionable salient which existed when our line ran back south from Delville Wood towards Maltz Horn Farm, and which was a source of danger. It was agreed that, advancing up the Combles Valley, the British right should move on Morval, the French left on Sailly-Sallisel. If the joint advance were successful, the Thiépval position, Martinpuich, and High Wood could be turned from the east.

To understand the next step taken by Sir Douglas Haig it is necessary to have some knowledge of the configuration of the ground in front of Sir Henry Rawlinson's centre and right and of the French left.

From Delville Wood the main plateau extends for 4,000 yards east-north-east to Lesbœufs and Morval, and for about the same distance south-eastwards to the woods of Bouleaux and Leuze. These woods were some 1,000 yards west of the considerable village of Combles, another village fortress below Leuze Wood in a valley, at the northern head of which were Morval on the west and Sailly-Sallisel on the east.

The high ground on each side of the Combles Valley sweeps the slopes of the ridge on the opposite side.

Pivoting on Delville Wood, Sir Henry Rawlinson was to swing his centre and right wing from the line Delville Wood-Maltz Horn Farm to the line Delville Wood-Morval, the French the meanwhile advancing simultaneously between Maltz Horn Farm and the Somme on Sailly-Sallisel. The capture of Morval and Sailly-Sallisel would inevitably result in the isolation and capture of Combles, and of most of the main ridge west of the Tortille, a tributary of the Somme, which enters that river two miles below Péronne.

To reach their objective, Morval, the British had to take, first, Guillemont, Falfemont Farm south of it, and the wood of Leuze, due east of Guillemont, and next Ginchy, and the wood of Bouleaux between Ginchy and Morval. From the former village the crest of the high ground runs northwards for 2.000 yards, and

LIEUT.-GENERAL THE EARL OF CAVAN, K.P., C.B.
In command of the 14th Army Corps.

then eastwards in a long spur for nearly 4,000 yards. Morval is at the eastern extremity of the spur and its garrison had a wide field of view and fire in every direction. A broad and deep branch of the Combles Valley separated Morval from Leuze Wood.

Between Sailly-Sallisel and the French line at the end of July lay the strongly fortified villages of Maurepas, Clery-sur-Somme, Le Forest, Rancourt and Fregicourt, and several

woods and strongly entrenched positions. If the troops crossed the Péronne-Bapaume road and were on the eastern side of the Combles Valley, they would find themselves enfiladed by the Germans concealed in the fortress and wood of St. Pierre-Vaast.

During the night of July 29-30 the Allied guns were busy and a German ammunition depot near Courcelette was exploded by them. Feint attacks were made by the Canadians in two places south of Ypres and by the Royal Munster Fusiliers in the Loos salient, where a couple of raids by the Germans near the Hohenzollern Redoubt were easily repulsed.

At 4 a.m., Sunday, July 30, the bombardment preliminary to the battle between Delville Wood and the Somme opened, and the inhabitants of Amiens, 20 miles away, were awakened by the thunder of the Allied artillery, which steadily increased in intensity up to 6 a.m. The weather was of the sultriest, and the roads, where they still existed in the fighting area, were ankle deep in dust. The moment the bombardment ceased troops advanced from their entrenched positions in Delville Wood, amid the ruins of Longueval and Waterlot Farm and across the space between it and Maltz Horn Farm. In the centre the attack was successful. A battalion carried Guillemont and was preparing to debouch from the village when news came that the advance on Ginchy and Falfemont Farm had failed. For some hours our men held on to Guillemont and were then withdrawn. About 250 German prisoners had been taken.

The day's fighting on the British front had

LIEUT.-GEN. SIR JULIAN BYNG, K.C.B
In command of Canadian Army Corps.

to some extent, justified the Order of the Day issued by the Kaiser a few hours later:

> To the leaders and to the troops of the First Army I express from the bottom of my heart my deep appreciation and my Imperial gratitude for their splendid achievement in warding off the Anglo-French mass attacks of July 30th. They have accomplished, with German faithfulness, what I and their country expected of them. God help them further.

In the "further" fighting the Germans were destined to want all the help which they

Official photograph.

A SUPPLY DUMP IN THE REAR.

[Canadian Official photograph.

SHELLING THE GERMAN TRENCHES NEAR COURCELETTE.

could get, and if mere mortals may judge events it does not seem that the Deity helped them. The German official *communiqué* of July 31 was as follows :

The British continued their operations near Pozières and Longueval yesterday, and they led up to a new great Anglo-French attack in the morning, undertaken by at least six divisions, between Longueval and the Somme.

The attack between Pozières and Longueval during the day was frustrated by our fire and did not materialize till the evening. This was also made by very strong forces.

The enemy was repulsed everywhere with heavy casualties and did not gain an inch of ground.

Wherever fighting at close quarters developed it resulted entirely in our favour.

In a dashing assault by our Bavarian and Saxon Reserves and our brave Schleswig-Holstein troops we captured 12 officers, 769 men, and 13 machine guns.

South of the Somme there were artillery engagements.

This report was in flagrant contradiction with the British *communiqué* issued at 11.12 p.m. on the 30th. "In the neighbourhood of Pozières," it ran, "the day has been spent in strengthening the ground gained during the last week, and there has been no infantry fighting in that area to-day." The advance in the Longueval region, too, did not begin in the evening, but in the morning.

"The enemy," said the German bulletin, "was repulsed everywhere." Let us see what had really happened between Maltz Horn Farm and the Somme.

After a tremendous bombardment, to which the German artillery replied violently but ineffectually, our gallant Allies in the morning carried the whole system of enemy trenches for a depth varying from about 300 to 800 yards. They reached the outskirts of Maurepas, captured the remnants of the wood north of the station of Hem, the quarry near it, also Monacu Farm on the road from Hem to Clery-sur-Somme. During the afternoon Monacu Farm, whose square, grey-roofed tower had up till then escaped destruction, was attacked again and again by the Germans, moving along the edge of the thick green wood in the marshes on the right bank of the Somme. Though the enemy advanced bravely, he was shattered by the French guns and rifles, and by sunset

[Official Photograph.

STRETCHER BEARERS IN NO MAN'S LAND.

Monacu Farm, its tower now in ruins, remained in the possession of the French.

During the night the German assaults on the farm and the Hem Wood were renewed. The French guns on the south bank of the Somme enfiladed the charging masses and inflicted heavy losses on them. Monacu Farm was for a time recaptured by the Germans, but it was speedily recovered by the French. South of the Somme a German trench between Estrées and Belloy-en-Santerre and 60 prisoners were captured in the course of the next day, the 31st.

Meantime the British, under cover of night, had been strengthening the positions gained by them near Guillemont, and had advanced their posts at some points on the plateau, north of Bazentin-le-Petit. The summer heat of this day was, however, so fierce as to restrain active movements, so that there was comparative quiet along the battle-front. Vast clouds of dust raised by the motor-lorries added to the discomfort of the soldiers working manfully in a sweltering atmosphere. The combined dust and haze impeded aerial observations for artillery purposes, but without preventing the Royal Flying Corps that day doing a good deal of useful work in the shape of several bombing raids. Seven tons of bombs were dropped on the German communications and billets; a train was blown up, an ammunition depôt fired, and an airplane resting on the ground destroyed. The enemy air squadrons ventured to engage ours; several were damaged, but at nightfall three of our own were missing. A *Times* correspondent enables us to understand the feelings of the officers responsible for the planning of those aerial raids:

It is immensely interesting to watch a squadron starting off on some distant and daring enterprise, but vastly more thrilling to see them come home. It is during the time that his men are away that the commanding officer has the most anxious time that he has to go through. I have shared, in minor degree, the anxiety of such a vigil.

They had gone, very cheerfully and with almost no words said, on a long and dangerous flight over the enemy's territory. A large flight of our fighting machines soaring in the sunlight, into and beyond the clouds, is a sight more beautiful than any flock of birds that fly. They had all disappeared into the distant blue, and nothing then remained but to wait. Would they attain their end? And if they did, how many would come back? It is nervous work waiting, even for an accidental outsider. For the commander who has sent them on their errand it is trying to a degree.

At last they came—one singly, and, after some minutes, another and then another and another, till at last the tale was complete. They had all come home safely, and they had done what they had been sent to do—as the way of our airmen is—down to the last detail.

Arrived at their destination, they had dropped down from the dizzy heights at which, on such an errand, they

[*Official Photograph.*

INTERIOR OF SIGNAL EXCHANGE DURING THE BATTLE.

fly, and then methodically, one after another, they had done their work. From that height an airman's trained eye can watch the course of his bomb in clear weather until it actually strikes the ground. So they had seen them fall; they had seen them strike the railway trucks and station and the depôt where the stores were kept. Each had had his object and each had found it. They had seen the bombs—explosive and incendiary—strike true, they had seen the wreckage and the smoke and the flames and they knew that their work had been thorough. And only the last had been fired at.

At less than 2,500 feet an anti-aircraft gun should have little trouble in finding an airplane. Perhaps the men with the "Archies" were having their after-luncheon nap—the day was very hot. So all our machines but one had dropped their bombs—not hurriedly, but with precision—before the enemy's guns spoke—and then they spoke harmlessly

"Oh, yes; they came pretty near," the pilot of the last machine said casually; "nothing unusual." For these men to have the shells exploding "pretty near" about their ears is a daily incident. They merely report it, saying they were fired at by a gun at such-and-such a place, much as if they said that they had lunched there.

On Tuesday, August 1, the enemy, whose artillery, like our own, had been very active during the preceding night, attacked the British trenches north of Bazentin-le-Petit and was repulsed. To cover his discomfiture he claimed to have beaten off a British assault near High Wood. At the same time the Germans alleged that a French advance at Maurepas, "carried out by eight waves of attackers," had been completely defeated, and that in the evening a French attack at Monacu Farm had been utterly repulsed "after violent fighting." As the French did not take the offensive, but victoriously beat off several counter-attacks during the day, and as Monacu Farm was not assaulted, but continued to be held by the French, the German statements were entirely without foundation. Perhaps the imaginary success was claimed in celebration of the second anniversary of the outbreak of war.

The next day (August 2) the Chief of the German Army Command painted a picture of the battle of the Somme for the German people:

Since the beginning of the Anglo-French offensive on the Somme sector—called in England "The Great



[Official photograph.

SERVING OUT WATER TO GERMAN PRISONERS.

Inset: German Trench near Estrées.

[Official photograph.

BRITISH SOLDIERS TOSSING CIGARETTES TO GERMAN PRISONERS.

Sweep"—a month has now elapsed, during which, according to earlier announcements by our enemies, an encircling movement was to be completed at all costs. It will now be useful to examine briefly what has been achieved.

Though on a front of about 28 kilometres (15½ miles) they have driven a wedge of about four kilometres (2½ miles) depth, they themselves will not assert, after their experiences of July 20, 22, 24, and 30, that the German line has been shaken at any point.

This success cost the English, according to careful estimates, a loss of at least 230,000 men.

For an estimate of the French losses in this fighting no definite basis is at our disposal, but, as they had to bear the brunt of the battle, their losses must also be heavy, in spite of their greater military skill.

The total losses of our enemies must, therefore, amount to about 350,000, while ours, though regrettable, cannot be compared with theirs so far as numbers are concerned.

The truth was better stated by General Joffre in his Army Order of August 1:

Your third year of war begins. For two years you have borne without flinching the weight of an unrelenting struggle. You have brought to nought all the plans of the enemy. You beat them on the Marne, stopped them on the Yser, and defeated them in Artois and Champagne while they were vainly seeking victory on the Russian plains.

Then, by your victorious stand in the five months' battle, you have shattered the German striving before Verdun. Thanks to your stubborn valour the Armies of our Allies have been able to forge weapons the weight of which our foes are to-day feeling upon all fronts. The moment is at hand when, under our common pressure, German military power will collapse.

Soldiers of France, you may be proud of the work already accomplished. You are resolved to carry it through to the end. Victory is certain.

Sir Douglas Haig, too, was no less confident. He said:

Great Britain, which has sealed on the battlefield an eternal *entente* with France, will range herself to the end beside her noble Ally in the attainment of the necessary reparation for the unjust aggression of the Germanic Empire.

To Great Britain's services General Roques, the French Minister of War, replying to a letter of Mr. Lloyd George, bore ungrudging tribute:

I greet your soldiers, our gallant brothers in arms, who have hastened from all parts of the British Empire for the defence of civilization against the Germanic hordes and are formed in Armies whose powerful organization, effected in so short a time, will remain in history a subject of admiration. In the battles which they are waging at our sides your splendid soldiers daily give us a proof of their unshakable firmness and heroism. The soldiers of the Republic are proud to have such comrades and greet with enthusiasm their brilliant successes.

Decisive battles are raging. At the hour chosen by the Allies, in complete unity of action, we are attacking the enemy, who will soon see his dream of domination vanish and will totter on all fronts. Powerfully organized for these battles, abundantly provided with all the means and materials which they lacked at the beginning, and deeply conscious of the *rôle* they are playing at this moment in the world for the triumph of right and justice, your Armies and ours, with those of our faithful Allies, will continue without cessation this struggle, which will, perhaps, still be long and fierce, but which will bring victory to our glorious flags.

On August 2 a light breeze tempered the great heat. The air remained hazy, but did not prevent our artillery, in cooperation with the Royal Flying Corps, from destroying seven gun emplacements, six ammunition dumps near Grandcourt, two miles north-east

[Official photograph.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN IN A HARVEST FIELD.

of Thiépval, another ammunition depôt at Courcelette, and several other emplacements. A few hostile airplanes crossed our lines, but were speedily driven back, one being brought down and another injured. The French chaser-planes were still more successful. Sergeant Chainat brought down his seventh and eighth German machines, and 14 other enemy airplanes were seriously damaged. North of the Somme the French stormed a work between Monacu Farm and Hem Wood. One hundred German corpses were found in it, and four mitrailleuses were taken. Several German attacks against Monacu Farm, delivered after sunset, were repulsed, and the new positions between the farm and Hem Wood were put in a proper state of defence.

In the Estrées region south of the river a German trench north-west of Deniécourt and some prisoners were captured. Two counter-attacks by the enemy for the recovery of the lost position were repulsed.

August 3 was the sixteenth day on which no rain had fallen, and the heat continued to be very trying to the opposing soldieries. All through the night the German artillery had been pounding our line from Maltz Horn Farm to Longueval, the village of Pozières and points in the background, such as Fricourt, Bécourt, and what had once been Mametz Wood, but was now little more than a confused heap of timber with a few upstanding tree stumps. At dawn the enemy fire slackened, but later the Germans intermittently maintained a barrage west and south-west of Pozières, Longueval, Mametz and Caterpillar Woods. Under the cover of darkness four strong German detachments moved on Delville Wood. Their approach was detected, but no notice was taken of it until they were within close range. Then they were greeted with machine-gun and rifle fire and with bombs. They quickly turned back, leaving heaps of dead and wounded behind them. We, in our turn, took the offensive on the 3rd and gained some ground north of Bazentin-le-Petit by a bombing attack, and there was severe fighting round Pozières and farther west. Our heavy guns, which had also been actively engaged through the night, drove the enemy by their fire of high-explosive shell from a strong point between Pozières and Thiépval. The Germans scuttled back from it across the open, and were mowed down by the shrapnel of the British field artillery. It was an admirable example of the combined use of heavy and field artillery.

North of the Somme battlefield, in the Loos salient, German and British trench mortars were engaged in a brisk exchange of projectiles, and we bombarded the enemy's lines near the

Hohenzollern Redoubt, while the German guns shelled villages near Arras and Armentières and exploded a small mine near Souchez. The French during the night had dropped projectiles from their airplanes on the stations of Ham and Noyon, and on the 3rd, French airplanes brought down four enemy machines, one near Guillemont, two near Maurepas, and a fourth in the Barleux region. Sub-Lieutenant Guynemer was responsible for the last. It swelled his bag of German aeroplanes to twelve. South of the Somme a German attack south of Estrées was beaten off.

It will be remembered that, according to Sir Douglas Haig's plan, Sir Hubert Gough was to make "a steady, methodical step-by-step advance." On August 4 it was decided to attack the Thiépval salient, which formed a strongly prepared fortress jutting out towards our fronts. The assault was to be made from the south side, between Ovillers-la Boisselle and Pozières. About Pozières the highest ground is just above and north-eastward of the village along the Albert-Bapaume road. There we had already bitten into the German second line system of trenches just east of the top of the village. On a front of some 3,000 yards westward from this point to another point almost due north of Ovillers-la Boisselle Sir Hubert Gough made preparations for an advance. From Pozières Australian troops with Englishmen from Surrey on their left in the open, and beyond this Sussex and then Kentish regiments, were to push forward. Opposite to them in two parallel lines of trenches, in intermediate and support trenches, in deep dug-outs and redoubts, lay hidden detachments of the German 17th and 18th Reserve Divisions of the 9th Reserve Corps, reinforced by units of the 11th Prussian Corps and by Ersatz Battalions. Behind the German defences above Ovillers-la Boisselle stood out the ruins of Mouquet (called by our men "Moo-Cow") Farm, fringed by shattered trees. It was another of those formidable forts with which the British had become so familiar.

All through the previous day (Thursday, August 3) our guns ceaselessly rained shells on the selected objective. Barbed wire entanglements were torn to pieces, and shell craters and tumbled earth replaced the clean-cut trenches. Courcelette and Martinpuich, in which the

[French official photograph.

FRENCH SOLDIERS HARVESTING IN PICARDY.

German reserves were hidden, began visibly to crumble away.

Towards dusk the crescent moon rose, while distant cornfields were still red in the rays of the disappearing sun. Darkness set in, and the Germans, alarmed by the violence of our gunfire, discharged coruscations of brilliant lights in the direction of the British trenches. At great risk men jumped up and kicked off the burning projectiles. Bouquets of gas shells descended in the British lines and masks had to be donned. About 9 p.m., when there was still some twilight left, our troops leapt forward. On the left the Kentish soldiers' immediate objective was a trench running diagonally across the ground in front of Mouquet Farm. The ground in front of it had been reconnoitred before the attack began by the colonel in command, accompanied by one of his captains. He now led his men against the trench, or what was left of it. With bomb and bayonet it was rapidly cleared. Many of the enemy surrendered, others fled from the farm or took refuge in the numerous dug-outs. Some of these were more than usually elaborate. One of them was a veritable two-storey subterranean villa. It consisted of six rooms, a kitchen and signalling station. The upper rooms were 15 feet, the lower 30 feet, beneath the surface. Beautiful tapestries, handsome carpets, comfortable furniture, cupboards full of wine, spirits, liqueurs and cigars, female apparel, revealed the tastes of its occupants. Water and electric light were laid on. In another dug-out there were camp beds for 120 soldiers.

The Germans rallied, and bombing parties from Mouquet Farm advanced against our men, but were cut down by a young officer with a Lewis gun.

To the right of the Kentish troops the men of Sussex and Surrey carried all before them, while the Australians from Pozières burst

[Official photographs.

THE BATTERED REMAINS OF FRICOURT.
Inset: Martinpuich Church.

[Official photographs.

A GERMAN TRENCH.

Inset: German dug-out.

through the German lines and captured the crest of the ridge above Courcelette and Martinpuich. In places we had gained as much as 600 yards in depth.

Of the incidents which occurred some may be related.

Before the enemy parapet was reached a soldier, wounded in the knee, fell into a crater, where he rested with his feet in the air. When the stretcher-bearers arrived they found him singing at the top of his voice, "Send shot and shell." The leader of a bombing party was twice blown off the steps descending into a trench. He picked himself up, took possession of an enemy bomb store and, at the head of his men, used the bombs to such effect that the trench was quickly his. A patrol which had got ahead of the line found itself isolated and fired at on both flanks. One of the men, silhouetted against flares and Verey lights doubled back to report his comrades' position. He was told that the patrol was to retire. He returned safely to it, and with a Lewis gun covered its retreat, killing some 50 of the enemy.

During the night of the 4th-5th the enemy delivered a series of counter-attacks, employing, among other weapons, the horrible flame-throwers, but their efforts to recover the lost position were unavailing.* Opposed by the

* The effect of the burning liquid was to saturate and set on fire the clothing of the men it hit. That the results gained by this brutal weapon were of no military value was indicated by the following report of an officer:—"Its effect may be very easily exaggerated. When you see it for the first time it rather gives you the jumps. It looks like a big gas jet coming towards you, and your natural instinct is to jump back and get out of the way. A man who thinks nothing of a shell or a bullet may not like the prospect of being scorched or roasted by fire. But in my experience the effective range of the *flammenwerfer* is very limited, and the man who manipulates it as often as not is shot or bombed by our fellows. They call it devil's fire, but when they recover from their first fright they care for it as little as they do—well, say for the devil himself. The actual cases of burning by devil's fire have been very few." There was, however, evidence to show that at first the *flammenwerfer* did produce considerable effects, and it is certain that these were obtained at the cost of great torture to the men hit.

THE GERMAN FLAME-THROWER.

fire of our guns and mitrailleuses, the attacks were shattered one after another, and day-break revealed the usual result of the ill-conceived assaults—hecatombs of dead and dying on the ground in front of our trenches. The counter-attacks had been accompanied by an extraordinary fire of artillery, which was continued on the 5th. Nor were our gunners backward in the duel. They exploded ammunition reserves in Courcelette and Miraumont north of it and in the valley of the Ancre, besides wrecking ten gun emplacements, while Guillemont and High Wood also received especial attention. On the French front there was some fighting in the air, two enemy machines being wrecked.

On Sunday, August 6, the weather was less hazy, and in conjunction with the aeroplanes our artillery put out of action a number of the enemy guns. Early in the morning the Germans twice attacked in the area north-west of Pozières; in the afternoon we progressed along the trenches east of Pozières in the direction of Martinpuich. The *flammenwerfer* enabled the foe to enter one of the trenches captured by us, but later it was almost entirely recovered. For the French the day was comparatively quiet, but south of the Somme they advanced on the German trenches south-east of Estrées.

Monday, August 7, was more eventful. After a heavy bombardment the enemy between 4 and 5 a.m. once more attacked our new lines north and north-east of Pozières. For two days he had been bombarding this position fiercely. Suddenly the guns lifted and a comparatively fresh regiment rushed for a trench held by Australians. The latter and those near them were not to be caught napping. Headed by an officer who had won the V.C. in Gallipoli, they captured all who reached the trench and caught the remainder while retiring with so heavy a fire that "No Man's Land" was soon strewn with German bodies. A party of the Australians were, however, isolated. They remained fighting for five hours, when, their leader being wounded, they asked for relief. At 8.50 a.m., and again at 4 p.m., further assaults were delivered and failed. During the

[*Official photograph.*

PUTTING-UP A FIELD TELEGRAPH.

night the Australians in the face of shrapnel and machine-gun fire stormed some German trenches. Part of the troops missed their way, with the result that only a fraction of the attackers reached their objective. They were led by a young Tasmanian officer, rear. The Tasmanian dragged a prisoner with him to a spot where Germans were waving a white cloth. They surrendered, and he went next to the end of the trench still held by the enemy and bombed him for an hour. After receiving two orders to retire, he



ENEMIES IN THE SAME TRENCH.

French soldiers in the foreground are divided from the Germans in the distance only by sandbag traverses.

who ran along the trench with a revolver, shooting German after German. Refilling his revolver he killed four more. A German then threw a bomb at him, but he was fortunately not injured. The bomber was at once shot, and his companions bolted to the withdrew with his prisoners. "There is no reason, as far as I can see," Lord Kitchener had said on January 11, 1910, at Melbourne, "why the national forces of Australia should not make their standard of efficiency on a par with, if not higher than, those of the military Powers

[Official photograph.

AWAITING THEIR TURN IN THE TRENCHES.

of Europe and elsewhere." That judgment had been proved to be correct in Gallipoli, in Flanders, and in Picardy.

While the Germans were taking the offensive against Sir Hubert Gough, Sir Henry Rawlinson resumed his in the Guillemont region. During the night of the 7th-8th the British advanced between Longueval and Maltz Horn Farm. The troops on the extreme right carried the trenches in their way and pushed on to the high ground due south of Guillemont; but their neighbours got hung up in the darkness. The centre, on the other hand, traversed the German lines and entered Guillemont itself. They worked through the ruins to the south-eastern corner and dug themselves in. Separated from their supports by the enemy in the east of Guillemont and unsupported by their comrades on their right who had been hung up, they were isolated. In the course of the 8th some made their way back. Others were killed or taken prisoners. North of Guillemont some ground was gained, and a machine-gun position near the railway station taken. But our men were not able to capture the ridge, and, as the ground to the south of Guillemont was dominated by the garrison of this village and by the Germans on the plateau and in the woods to the north, it had become evident that Guillemont could not be captured as an isolated enterprise without very heavy loss. Arrangements were therefore made with the French for a series of combined attacks to be delivered in progressive stages against Maurepas, Falfemont Farm, Guillemont, Leuze Wood, and Ginchy. The French at the end of the afternoon of the 7th had prepared for this by carrying a line of trenches between the Hem Wood and the Somme east of Monacu Farm. They had captured 120 prisoners and 12 machine guns. By this success they threatened the flank of the Maurepas-Combles-Sailly-Sallisel position. South of the river their artillery had destroyed enemy batteries in the region of Lihons, while their aeroplanes had wrecked two German captive balloons and brought down several machines. During the 8th our Allies assisted Sir Henry Rawlinson by advancing east of Hill 139, north of Hardecourt, and seizing a small wood and a trench north of the Hem Wood. Two counter-attacks by the enemy east of Monacu Farm were beaten off, and 230 prisoners, including two officers, taken.

On August 16 it was announced that the King had just returned from a week's visit to his Army. His Majesty arrived in France

on Tuesday, August 8, and after his formal reception by French officers of high rank and by a guard of honour of the North Staffordshire Regiment, three-quarters of whom were men convalescent from wounds, he went to Sir Douglas Haig's headquarters, where the situation was fully discussed and the details of his Majesty's tour mapped out. With his characteristic energy every hour of his time was fully employed, and thus he was able to make a thorough inspection of the forces. From front to rear he saw everything there was to be seen—men and material, trenches and the avenues of supply to them, sick and wounded, and the organizations which look after them. Many of his soldiers were spoken to, many hundred thousands of them saw him. He visited them at rest in their billets, reposing from their arduous work at the front, and also in the advanced line within sound of the guns, ready to attack.

The King saw General Joffre and General Foch, who had been commanding the French advance on the Somme, and gave the G.C.M.G. to General Fayolle and General Balfourier, besides investing other officers with the C.B. or C.M.G. and giving twelve D.S.O.'s to French officers. He also pinned the V.C. on the breast of Private A. H. Proctor, of a Territorial Battalion of the Liverpool Regiment.

On Sunday the 12th the King visited the left of the Line and attended Divine Service, and then went on to see the King and Queen of the Belgians, and distributed the Distinguished Service Order and the Military Cross to Belgian officers and the Distinguished Conduct Medal to Belgian soldiers. To the Queen he gave the Royal Red Cross in token of his appreciation of the excellent work she had done in the military hospitals.

Before his excursion to left of the line the King had gone to the immediate front of battle on the 9th, and he had been taken to a position from which a front view of the opposing trench lines was to be had. From it a wide expanse of country, from Souchez on the left, by La Folie Farm, and Neuville St. Vaast to Arras on the right, was clearly visible, while immediately in his front was the Vimy Ridge where so much severe fighting had previously taken place. To reach this view point, it was necessary to pass through ruined villages and along a road which had been recently shelled and which was well within reach of hostile guns.

On August 10 the King visited the actual scene of the Somme fighting. He was on ground

[Official photograph.

WOUNDED SOLDIERS WATCHING A TRANSPORT COLUMN.



[Official photograph.

THE KING ON THE BATTLEFIELD NEAR POZIÈRES.

which was more or less frequently under fire of the Germans, whose shells were often placed not only on the section where he was but also on the country behind it. Leaving their motor-cars at a point near our old front trenches (see coloured map which forms frontispiece of Vol. IX.) the King and his staff walked over the ground on which some of the fiercest fighting of the early days of July took place. The position as it was at the time when our forward movement began was explained to him and then the party went over what had been the intervening space between the hostile lines before the British advance, but which was now included within our own occupation. It was a desolate and horrifying sight. The whole surface was pitted with shell holes or by the craters of mines, while scattered about were broken fragments of war material—sandbags, wire entanglements, timber which had served to shore up trenches, scraps of uniform, and the thousand and one things which the terrible fire had twisted and turned out of shape till their original purpose could be with difficulty discerned.

Next the King visited some of the captured German trenches. Here he could see the thorough way in which our artillery had done the work of destruction, parapets levelled with the ground, wire entanglements torn to fragments. One of the German dug-outs was visited. The King then returned to a position behind the British line which afforded a fair view of the area of actual conflict. Mametz was immediately below him, Contalmaison behind it and higher up, Fricourt on the left, and Thiépval beyond on the spur which forms the south side of the Ancre Valley. Rather more to east but on the same long ridge of high ground was Pozières, which we had taken little over a fortnight before and which was now being actively shelled by its late possessors. The King could also see Montauban, and part of Bernafay and Trônes Wood, and more to the north above the latter Longueval and some indication of Delville Wood, names which will be for ever associated with the deathless courage of his troops.

It is easy to understand how much the soldiers appreciated the King coming up to the front into the area of danger. On his way home the King's way led through miles of delighted soldiers; at every village and camp he was given a great reception. He passed through the Headquarters of the Anzac troops, and here he stopped to express his high appreciation of the glorious work his troops had done. Once more he was greeted with hearty cheers, as he was again when he encountered an Australian brigade on its way back from the front to a well-earned rest behind the lines. The brigade was halted when it learned the King was coming, and when he reached them and drove slowly by the cheering was tremendous.

After a week of strenuous work the King returned to England, having first issued the following Order to his troops :—

OFFICERS, N.C.O.'S AND MEN.

It has been a great pleasure and satisfaction to me to be with my Armies during the past week. I have been able to judge for myself of their splendid condition for war and of the spirit of cheerful confidence which animates all ranks, united in loyal cooperation to their Chiefs and to one another.

Since my last visit to the front there has been almost uninterrupted fighting on parts of our line. The offensive recently begun has since been resolutely maintained by day and by night. I have had opportunities of visiting some of the scenes of the later desperate struggles, and of appreciating, to a slight extent, the demands made upon your courage and physical endurance in order to assail and capture positions prepared during the past two years and stoutly defended to the last.

I have realized not only the splendid work which has been done in immediate touch with the enemy—in the air, under ground, as well as on the ground—but also the vast organizations behind the fighting line, honourable alike to the genius of the initiators and to the heart and hand of the workers. Everywhere there is proof that all, men and women, are playing their part, and I rejoice to think their noble efforts are being heartily seconded by all classes at home.

The happy relations maintained by my Armies and those of our French Allies were equally noticeable between my troops and the inhabitants of the districts in which they are quartered, and from whom they have received a cordial welcome ever since their first arrival in France.

Do not think that I and your fellow-countrymen forget the heavy sacrifices which the Armies have made, and the bravery and endurance they have displayed during the past two years of bitter conflict. These

[Official Photographs.

THE KING'S TOUR.

Mine Craters on either side.

Inset: Making friends with peasants.

sacrifices have not been in vain; the arms of the Allies will never be laid down until our cause has triumphed.

I return home more than ever proud of you.

May God guide you to victory.

In two days (August 7 and 8) the French had secured the whole line of German trenches on a front of $3\frac{3}{4}$ miles to a depth of 350 to 500 yards. It was an excellent adjunct to the forward movement of Sir Hubert Gough between Ovillers-la Boisselle and Pozières. The latter's line on the 8th, it should be added, was vainly attacked by the enemy in two places. On the eastern portion of the Leipzig salient, south of Thiépval, German bombers approached our trenches. They were easily repulsed. North-west of Pozières, four attacks supported by *flammenwerfer* were delivered by the Germans, but they only managed to seize about 50 yards of our trench. It was but a small set off to the heavy loss sustained by them.

To appreciate what was being achieved by Sir Hubert Gough's right wing we must remember the difficulties encountered by it. The southern face of the Thiépval plateau was a bare surface pitted all over with a perfect network of craters caused by our high-explosive shell, the only variant to this destruction being a few isolated tree trunks. On the west there was a steepish dip; but from Ovillers-la Boisselle to Mouquet Farm the rise in 3,000 yards was only 30 feet. Every foot of ground on this natural glacis was exposed to the fire of the field artillery in Thiépval and the heavy guns and howitzers hidden in or in the outskirts of Courcelette and Grandcourt and the rifle and machine-gun fire of the Germans. The glacis itself was intersected by a skilful

network of trenches of the most carefully constructed kind, flanked by machine-guns in the caponier-like protrusions such as have been already described.*

On Wednesday, August 9, north-west of Pozières—in the region above described—the Australians advanced their lines 200 yards on a frontage of 600 yards, and north of Pozières they bombed enemy trenches and captured 25 prisoners.

The fighting from Guillemont to the Somme continued, the Germans in the night of August 8–9 counter-attacking north of the Hem Wood. They were repulsed with loss except at one point where they gained a footing, from which they were soon ejected by our men on the 9th. Between the Hem Wood and the river the Germans bombarded the French organizations with large calibre shells. South of the river they attacked between Lihons and the Chaulnes railway. They temporarily gained a footing at one point, but were thrust out with the bayonet. Several enemy guns were destroyed by our artillery, and some of his

* See Vol. IX., p. 483.

THE KING VISITS A GERMAN TRENCH.

[Official photographs.

THE KING ON THE BATTLEFIELD WITH SIR HENRY RAWLINSON AND GENERAL CONGREVE.

magazines exploded. A train was set on fire by our airmen.

The day was signalized by another experiment in devilry made by the Germans. Shrapnel imbedded in phosphorus which burned the flesh were fired at the Australians. This was quite useless from a military point of view, and did nothing but add torture to the wounds. The night before in the Ypres salient there had been a German gas attack, which was ineffectual.

The spell of dry weather now came to an end, and welcome showers fell on the night of August 9. The next day, Thursday, in the afternoon, two regiments of fresh German troops were mustered in the quarries and gully behind Mouquet Farm. Soon after 5 p.m. they topped the ridge behind the Pozières windmill and charged down on the Australians. The charge was preceded by a heavy shell fire, but ran into a barrage from our guns behind our lines. Under shrapnel, high-explosive and machine-gun fire the waves thinned visibly. Only a few of the bravest reached our lines, where they were promptly laid by the heels. In the region of Hem Wood the French, through rainy and foggy weather, continued to progress during the night of the 9th–10th, and south of the Somme a German reconnaissance accompanied by bearers of *flammenwerfer* was repulsed west of Vermand-Ovillers.

Another step preliminary to the advance on Sailly-Sallisel was taken by the French on August 11. The portion of the enemy's trenches north of the Somme between the Hardecourt region and the river opposite Buscourt was the objective, it being intended to bring the French front up to that point on the south of the Somme. The third line of the enemy, four miles or so long, consisted of three and, in some places, four trenches, and was liberally provided with redoubts and dug-outs. In the morning of the 11th the French seized a wood half a mile north of Maurepas, on the ridge commanding the valley up which ran the Péronne-Combles railway. A few hours later they gained a quarry and two little woods north of the Hem Wood. The two attacks, which resulted in the capture of 150 unwounded prisoners and 10 machine-guns, had been preceded by a severe bombardment. A counter-attack by the enemy on the quarry at 9 p.m. was repulsed with heavy loss. The next day our Allies pushed on to assault the main German position. Their advance parties

[*Canadian official photograph.*

TESTING THE TELEPHONE OF A KITE BALLOON BEFORE ASCENDING.

[Canadian official photograph.

AN OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHER AT WORK ON THE FIELD OF BATTLE.

penetrated into the Hem Wood and east of the station of Hem, where a great many German corpses were discovered; the southern part of Maurepas and the cemetery were carried, and the French front extended eastwards to a depth of from 660 to 1,100 yards. North of the road from Maurepas to Clery-sur-Somme and the crest line of the ridge west of Clery village, unwounded prisoners numbering over a thousand and 30 machine-guns were secured by this brilliant action. A counter-attack by the Germans failed under French fire, and they were unable to recover the church or cemetery of Maurepas. The same day south of the Somme the enemy tried to assault La Maisonnette, but the attacking waves of men were caught by the French barrage and literally swept away. When night fell our Allies were victorious at all points. In the Estrées region they had also executed numerous destructive bombardments on the hostile organizations.

Nor had the British been inactive. On the night of the 10th-11th they had progressed north of Bazentin-le-Petit. At 5.45 a.m. on the 11th they had repulsed a determined counter-attack and north-west of Pozières they had continued to advance. Late in the day the Germans delivered desperate charges against the Australians north of Pozières. They were defeated with heavy loss. These successes must have rejoiced the heart of President Poincaré, who on the 12th had visited the British Headquarters Staff, and inspected the ground which had been conquered east of Albert. Thence he proceeded to the Somme, where he met General Joffre.

On Sunday, August 13, rain fell in plenty. During the preceding night we had pushed forward south of Guillemont. North-west of Bazentin-le-Petit, we forced our way up Munster Alley and broke into the new German line running due west of High Wood on a front of between 600 and 700 yards to a depth of 500 yards, while Sir Hubert Gough on a curve approximately a mile in length brought his front to within about 200 yards of Mouquet Farm. A part of the captured German trenches was, however, in the night recovered by the enemy.

Large numbers of Germans observed by an aeroplane to be concentrating north of Pozières were dispersed by artillery fire.

North of the Somme battlefield raids were carried out on the Vimy ridge, in the region of Calonne and east of Armentières. Mines were fired by the British south of the Hulluch quarries, and north of Neuve-Chapelle, and by the Germans a mine was exploded south of

[Official Photograph.

WOUNDED GERMANS AT A BRITISH ADVANCED DRESSING STATION.

Souchez. The Royal Flying Corps had on the 12th sent out a squadron of 68 machines, which, with a loss of three, bombed airship sheds at Brussels and Namur and railway stations and sidings at Mons, Namur, and Courtrai.

On the 14th and 15th there was little to record. Sir Hubert Gough's troops, however, recovered nearly the whole of the trenches on the southern face of the Thiépval salient north-west of Pozières, abandoned on the 13th. During the night of the 14th-15th we also forced an entry into the enemy's lines near Mouquet Farm.

The next day, Wednesday, August 16, Sir Henry Rawlinson commenced to carry out Sir Douglas Haig's plan for the advance on Combles and Morval. The French, after intense artillery preparation, in the afternoon captured 1,650 yards of German trenches north of Maurepas, and at certain places reached the Guillemont-Maurepas road. To the south of Maurepas, on a front of a mile and a quarter, they pushed forward some 600 yards, and cleared the enemy out of their positions east of the Maurepas-Clery road. Numbers of prisoners were taken and heavy losses inflicted on the enemy. South of the Somme our Allies stormed a powerfully organized trench system on a front of 1,300 yards south of Belloy-en-Santerre. We, in our turn, at the same time captured 300 yards of trench west of High Wood, and advanced our line west and south-west of Guillemont. Here there was a deep wooded ravine, some 550 yards in length, which started from just below Angle Wood and ran north-west towards Maltz Horn Farm. The ravine had been stormed by the French and our business was to seize a trench going north-eastwards from the top end of the ravine. This was successfully accomplished and another mesh added to the net being cast round Guillemont.

While we took the offensive in this quarter soon after sunset on the 16th, early on the morning of the 17th a violent attack was delivered by the enemy against our position north-west of Pozières on a broad front. Six waves of infantry advanced, but, coming under our artillery and machine-gun fires, they were driven off, suffering severe losses. Two advances from Martinpuich were also repulsed, and north-west of Bazentin-le-Petit we captured 100 yards of trench. The French on the 18th repulsed several counter-attacks south-east of Maurepas.

At noon on Friday, August 18, the continuous roll of our heavy artillery announced that a battle along the whole semicircle from Ovillers-la Boiselle to the Somme was about to begin. After a tremendous bombardment of the enemy's trenches and works the Allied infantry delivered their attack all along the line, at 3 p.m. on the right and soon after 5 p.m. on the left. The French between Maurepas and the Somme extended their positions farther east of the Maurepas-Clery road. They captured the Calvary Hill, south-east of Maurepas, and expelled the enemy from several ruins in the village.

North of Maurepas the British cleared out a labyrinth of trenches at the head of the Maltz Horn Farm ravine and joined hands with the French who had taken Angle Wood copse on the eastern side of it. The quarry on the southern outskirts of Guillemont was stormed by South Midland troops. Two waves of German infantry, which were seen to be mustering for a counter-attack by an aeroplane, were promptly dispersed by shrapnel. During the night the survivors received reinforcements and returned once more to the charge, but the quarry on the western side of Guillemont remained in our possession.

Above Guillemont the British from Waterlot Farm and Delville Wood advanced their line half way to Ginchy, and captured 211 prisoners. The ground in this region was a maze of trenches and the performance of the English county regiments engaged here was particularly creditable.

On the west of Delville Wood the British line was pushed forward some distance north of the orchards, and we gained a footing in High Wood. Between High Wood and the Albert-Bapaume road our men approached closer to Martinpuich.

Sir Hubert Gough had been equally successful. His troops had drawn nearer to Thiépval, had seized points on both sides of Mouquet Farm, and gained the quarry 300 yards south of the latter. Hundreds of prisoners, some of them of the 29th Prussian Regiment, were taken.

Such was the battle of Friday, August 18. The account of it transmitted on Saturday to the German people ran as follows:

Our brave troops, in self-sacrificing perseverance, yesterday resisted victoriously the gigantic efforts of our allied enemies. In the afternoon, after an artillery preparation which increased to the utmost violence, the British and French masses attacked almost simultaneously north of the Somme on a front of about

[French official photograph.

M. POINCARÉ (in light coloured uniform) AND GENERAL JOFFRE AT THE FRONT.

20 kilometres (12½ miles) long between Ovillers and Clery. The battle raged far into the night.

At several points the enemy penetrated our advanced line, but was ejected from both sides of Guillemont, which is firmly in our hands. The enemy occupied portions of the trenches.

Between Guillemont and Maurepas during the night we shortened the salient of our line a little, according to plan.

The enemy paid for his unsuccessful efforts with the bloodiest sacrifices.

The Prussian Guard and the Rhenish, Bavarian, Saxon and Wurtemburg troops firmly maintain their positions.

During the night of August 18–19 the enemy had delivered several very determined counter-attacks, but except in the Guillemont-Maltz Horn Farm area, where he regained a little ground, these were everywhere repulsed. At 3.7 p.m. on August 19 the British Headquarters telegraphed the facts, so far as the British were concerned, facts which may be contrasted with the fiction of the German Staff above quoted:

From High Wood to the point where we join up with the French we have advanced our line over a frontage of more than two miles for a distance varying between 200 yards and 600 yards.

We now hold the western outskirts of Guillemont and a line thence northwards to midway between Delville Wood and Ginchy; also the orchards north of Longueval.

Between High Wood and the Albert-Bapaume road we have captured some hundreds of yards of enemy trench.

East and south-east of Mouquet Farm we have advanced our line by some 300 yards.

Between Ovillers and Thiépval we have pushed forward on a front of over half a mile.

As a result of these operations several hundred prisoners have been taken by us.

In the course of Saturday the Germans confined themselves to shelling our positions, though there were some attacks by bombers after dark. We made a further advance on both sides of the Albert-Bapaume road for some 300 yards north-east of the Pozières windmill, the ruins of which still stood up above ground. The situation at 11.45 p.m. was, according to the British Headquarters, this:

As a result of these operations we have captured the ridge south-east of, and overlooking, Thiépval and the northern slopes of the high ground north of Pozières, from which we get an extensive view of the east and north-east.

We are holding the western edge of High Wood and the trenches made by the enemy extending for some half mile to the west of the wood.

We have advanced our line half way to Ginchy and to the edge of Guillemont, where we now hold the outskirts of the village, including the railway station and the quarry, which is of considerable military importance.

The number of prisoners passed back up to 4 p.m. to-day as the result of these operations is 16 officers and 780 other ranks.

[*French official photograph.*

DRIVING A MINE.

The *Times* Correspondent reported on the fighting as follows:

Among troops which had done conspicuously well in the fighting have been some battalions of the Warwicks; they fought with the greatest dash and determination and accomplished very gallantly a difficult and important undertaking. Very early in this battle battalions of the same regiment did very well indeed, and they have every right to be proud of themselves.

Mention ought also to be made, in another connexion, of the Suffolks, and of the heroism which they showed at a critical moment in another stage of this battle. It would be absurd, in such splendid fighting as has been done here, to say that any one regiment or class of troops had done better than any other. But none certainly have a finer record than the Suffolks.

Yet, when one talks in this way, the names of a score of other English regiments leap immediately to one's mind and shame one. Lancashire, Yorkshire, Stafford, Leicester, and Lincoln; Middlesex, Berkshire, Bedford, Essex, and Kent; Hampshire, Gloucester, Sussex, Wilts, Devon, and Somerset; Durham, Northumberland, Shropshire, Northampton, Cheshire . . . one must call the roll of the English counties if one would praise all who have behaved in a way for which all praise is too faint. Territorials, Kitchener's Army, and Derby Recruits, Infantry, Light Infantry, and Fusiliers—there is no drawing the line anywhere. All have shared alike, and there is glory enough to go round and to spare.



[*Official photograph.*

A MINE EXPLOSION.

Inset: Crater left by a mine explosion.

It may be well here to record a typical example of German treachery (from a report in the *Morning Post* of August 25) which took place on the 18th:—

A German rushed forward with his arms in the air in token of surrender. Then, when he got near to the Warwicks, who were preparing to accept him as a prisoner, he suddenly produced a couple of bombs from some receptacle in his uniform and hurled them at the men who were advancing towards him. "What did you do?" I inquired of a sergeant. "Well, sir," came the reply, "he bolted away back, but we eased him up with three bayonets."

The following incidents from the same source are also interesting:—

One of the many heroic episodes of the attack concerns a captain who borrowed rifles from his men and fired furiously from a bomb-stop—a small barricade hurriedly erected to check the operations of hostile bombers—against a party of Boches who were dodging behind a traverse and throwing explosives at our men. The company commander is an expert rifle shot, and in order that he might fire as many rounds as possible within a given time he employed two of his men as loaders—just as if he had been engaged in a grouse-drive and the bomb-stop was a butt. He killed and wounded a number of the enemy, and ultimately forced them to retreat. The Warwicks advanced so fast that the Germans fled from dug-outs, leaving half-consumed meals behind them. In one instance a party of our men descended into a luxuriously-equipped "funk hole" and finished off a meal of coffee and sausages which some Boche officers had been partaking of when they suddenly decided to "bolt for it." One soldier finished a half-smoked cigar and another had the good fortune to find an unbroken box of cigars as a souvenir. Obviously there is no shortage of the good things of life at the German front, whatever may be the condition of the people who still dwell in the Fatherland.

The French from the Maltz Horn Farm ravine to the outskirts of Clery-sur-Somme had on the night of the 18th-19th beaten off several violent assaults with machine-gun fire and grenades. All that the Germans succeeded in gaining to counter-balance their losses was a small section of trench north of Maurepas. It was recovered the next day, Sunday the 20th, and our Allies also carried a wood strongly organized by the Germans between Guillemont and Maurepas. At noon and later the British repulsed several attacks delivered against the new line established half a mile from the western corner of High Wood;

a little to the west, north of Bazentin-le-Petit, we also made some further progress.

Thus by August 20 the Allies had seized a large part of the ridge in the semi-circle from Thiépval to the Somme. They were on the heights above Thiépval and Bapaume, and approaching the Bapaume-Péronne highway. Their leaders had decided that only the barest details of the fighting on the 18th and 19th and the preceding days should be published, but the reader must not forget that the battle between the Ancre and Lihons was one of the greatest and most important, forming as it did a considerable step towards the final capture of the dominating ground. Both British and French were assaulting fortified positions compared with which those of the Turks at Plevna or Kuropatkin at Liao-Yang and Mukden were insignificant. It was impossible to manœuvre against the enemy's flanks and the battle had to be won by driving wedges into the German lines, and capturing the salients thus created. The wonder was not that progress was slow but that any progress was made. When it is remembered that most of the men at Sir Douglas Haig's disposal had been a few months before civilians unacquainted with the rudiments of war and that the opponents of the British were the soldiers of a nation in arms which had been trained from childhood to consider war and the training for war as the highest objects of existence, one is lost in admiration at the British achievements.

Not less astonishing were the feats performed by our French Allies. At the opening of the war they had not been so ready for the fray as their cunningly organized opponents. In August 1914 the French Army had sustained defeats. Yet two years later we find them attacking the enemy with that confidence which the latter had displayed when, in overwhelming numbers, he had driven Lanrezac from his unfortified position on the Meuse and Sambre. The men of the Argonne, the Champagne and Picardy had shown they were true to the traditions of Jena, Auerstedt and Friedland.

Seeing the vital importance to them of retaining the Thiépval salient and preventing the British and French from seizing the whole summit of the ridge which commanded the Bapaume-Péronne road, it was not to be expected that the Germans after their defeats on the 18th, 19th and 20th would be content with a passive defensive. Their military teachers since Frederick the Great had always

[Official photograph.

SOME OF THE LEICESTERS BACK FROM THE BATTLE.

Photographed from an Aeroplane.

SHELL-PITTED GROUND ON THE SOMME FRONT.

insisted that the best method of defence was counter-attack. About noon on Sunday, August 20, they advanced against half a mile of our trenches west of High Wood. If they could maintain themselves in the angle where Sir Hubert Gough's and Sir Henry Rawlinson's lines met they could bring a flanking fire to bear upon the British pressing their way up the southern face of the Thiépval salient, and also those moving on Ginchy. Here and there the enemy entered the British trenches, but were promptly driven out again. On Monday, the 21st, the same experiment was repeated by the Germans in the same region. A tornado of shells was launched on our men in High Wood at 1.30 a.m., and subsequently three bombing attacks were made. All were repulsed. North-west of High Wood some of our covering parties withdrew before strong forces of the enemy, but when the latter pursued they were brought up short by fire from positions west of the wood. The Germans also bombarded the Pozières region and the area north-east of Contalmaison with gas shells, and made an ineffectual attack near Mouquet Farm. South of Thiépval our guns caused a conflagration in one of the enemy's batteries, which burned fiercely for some time, and they also forced a hostile balloon to descend. Meanwhile the French in the wood between Guillemont and Maurepas had taken six field guns, and their aeroplanes had brought down two German machines, one south of Estrées and the other near Berny.

On Tuesday, August 22, while the French were south of the Somme, seizing trenches south-east of Estrées and east of Soyécourt and, north of the Somme, advancing into the outskirts of Clery and capturing prisoners north of Maurepas, Sir Hubert Gough gave the Germans another demonstration of the power of the British artillery and the cool courage of the British infantry. The blow this time was aimed at the south-western end of the Thiépval salient. As already narrated, we had taken the Leipzig Redoubt north of Ovillers-la Boisselle. Between the redoubt and the few shattered trees beyond the ridge which marked the position of the ruins of Thiépval, extended tier after tier of German trenches. Away to the right a valley rose up to Mouquet Farm. Our men had to storm the trenches and to cross the bullet-swept valley.

The weather was bright and cool, perfect for aeroplane and artillery observation. During the afternoon our 9·2 howitzers methodically shelled the enemy trenches and dug-outs, but there was little else to indicate that one of the most frightful bombardments ever delivered was imminent. About one shot in three fell full in



CAPTURED GERMAN GUN NEAR HIGH WOOD.

the front line of the Germans. Half of the rest hit fairly the communication trenches. "It was pretty shooting," says an eye-witness, "closer on its target from three miles away than the average man would get with a cricket ball from 30 yards." At intervals other guns joined the howitzers in their deadly work. Giant spurts of sand and smoke, brown and grey-black, intermingled, mounted upwards, while explosions of white shrapnel smoke aided the grim preparatory action now in hand. Then suddenly the fire gained tenfold in intensity; the real work of annihilation had begun. What next happened may be left to the pen of Mr. Beach Thomas, the correspondent of *The Daily Mail*:

I had grown tired of looking and listening and expecting, when the heavens opened. It was as if someone, as in the legend, had unbarred the cave of the thunder and the winds. You could not, of course, distinguish one gun, one battery, from another; but there was just a single standard of comparison or contrast to keep one sane. Two sorts of noise conflicted. Which was louder: the honk and whinney of the shell, splitting the air, or the joint explosions from the gun and from the shell? The nature of the effect was that the thinner, nearer, shrewder noise of the split atmosphere seemed to be laid on the top of the general thud. One copied the other.

The shrapnel and the high explosive, bursting over the German trenches, gave a similar impression in the domain of sight. The wicked lightning of the shrapnel, bursting extremely low, topped the heavy smoke and earthy columns from the heavy shells. For a few seconds I could distinguish separate hits: a shrapnel, that raked an alley, a heavy shell that struck a parapet; but such distinctions were soon wiped out. The valley, "the shooting gallery," running towards Mouquet, even the line of scarred trees that stand for Thiépval, were lost in smoke; and in front a mass of fumes and dust moved like a great cumulus cloud before the western wind, and as it moved it was ever renewed at the base.

To another correspondent—the *Times* correspondent—the bombardment was no less unprecedented:

In the course of my life I have seen many gigantic things, like typhoons and prairie fires and forest fires and most of the great volcanoes of the world, and some battles, and the fall of Antwerp. But merely as a spectacle, for the splendour and the power of it, I doubt if anything ever resembled what went on then for the next 20 minutes. The young officer beside me sat muttering "Oh, my God! Oh, my God!" For me, I wished to shriek, to bite my fingers, to do I knew not what. And all one could do was to drum one's heels on the ground and gasp.

How many guns we had at work I do not know, and could not tell if I knew. Hundreds—thousands—millions—I do not know. But they began all at once, breaking suddenly on the sunlit silence. In 10 seconds hundreds of shells had plunged upon that one devoted spot of earth. In 20 seconds it seemed that there must have been thousands. Hurricanes, whirlwinds, thunderstorms, and gigantic conflagrations; bring them all together and concentrate them on all in a ring of a few acres, and you will have only a suggestion of what went on immediately before our eyes. One almost sobbed from sheer exaltation; for the overmastering sensation was astonishment at the power of it—at the power of British artillery and the splendour of its accuracy. I do not think that one shell dropped three yards on this side of the German trenches; and I do not think there was one stretch of 10 square yards on and beyond the trenches, over all the area attacked, on which a dozen shells did not fall in as many seconds.

Of course, it was a small area. We could concentrate here on less than 1,000 yards the guns which ordinarily have charge of miles of enemy front. So terrific was it that, above all the roar of the explosions, the sound of the shells passing overhead filled the ears with a shrieking louder than any wind. As for the ground where the shells fell, it simply was not. Rent and torn in every direction, it heaved itself into the air, not in spurts or bursts, but universally in one great duststorm. There was no ground, no trench, no brown earth or green; nothing but chaos, swirling and incredible, until the smoke grew and blotted even chaos out.

And still the hail went on. At last the order for the advance was given, the artillery fire was lifted and became a barrage behind the enemy's trenches. Our men left their own trenches and ran forward to the edge of the whirlwind of fire, smoke, dust and heaving ground which receded before them up the slopes of the ridge. So well had the gunners performed their task that the Germans scarcely offered any resistance. With less than 100 casualties we had taken positions fondly believed to be impregnable, and a couple of hundred prisoners to boot.

The same evening the Australians gained a little more ground near Pozières, and we brought our line closer to Courcelette. Between Martinpuich and Bazentin we had gained another hundred yards of trenches. In Guillemont the fighting with the Wurtembergers continued, and south of that village we penetrated the enemy's lines and captured a machine-gun.

The gains made were substantial and had been won with surprisingly small losses—a proof that the tactical methods employed were thoroughly suited to the situation and a happy augury for the future. So complete was the command of our guns over the ground behind his front trenches that the enemy found it very difficult to bring up reinforcements, and experienced considerable losses in doing so. "The enemy's losses," wrote the *Times* correspondent, "in killed and prisoners alone were about five times our total casualties, including even the lightest flesh wound. If their wounded were no more than equal to their killed and missing—a most improbable thing—their losses were ten times as big as ours. Nor does this make any allowance for what may have been done—and it must have been much—by our artillery fire when it lifted to beyond the trenches which we took."

The terrible conditions in the German lines when reinforcements reached them were well

[Official photograph.

GERMAN TRENCH NEAR THIÉPVAL.

exemplified in a letter written on August 10 by a German officer of the 133rd Infantry Regiment: *

The relief yesterday (he wrote) is incredible. The route taken—Ligny, Warlencourt, Pys, Courcelette—on the way to the trenches was very dangerous. During the first part the thunder of the guns was very disagreeable, and the second part was very unsafe. Heavy shells fell right and left of the road. Mounted troops, cars, field kitchens, infantry in column of route, were all enveloped in an impenetrable cloud of dust. From Courcelette to our position in the line we relieved across the open. If the enemy had only noticed that what a target he would have had!

Our position was, of course, quite different from what we had been told. Our company alone relieved a whole battalion. We had been told we were to relieve a company of 50 men weakened by casualties. The men we relieved had no idea where the enemy was, how far he was, or if any of our troops were in front of us. We got no idea of our supposed position until six o'clock this evening.

To-night I am taking my platoon out to form a covering party. My men and I are to lie in shell holes in part of an old demolished trench of ours. The English are 400 metres away. The Windmill is over the hill. The hundreds of dead bodies make the air terrible, and there are flies in thousands. About 300 metres from us is a deserted artillery position. We shall have to look to it to-night not to get taken prisoners by the English. We have no dug-outs. We dig a hole in the side of a shell-hole, and lie and get rheumatism. We get nothing to eat or drink. . . . The ceaseless roar of the guns is driving us mad. Many of the men are knocked up.

From another man, in the 3rd battalion of the 124th Regiment, there is a letter which pays a doleful tribute to our flying men:

I am on sentry duty, and it is a very hard job, for I dare not move. Overhead are the English airmen and in front of us the English observers with telescopes, and as soon as they perceive anything twenty-four "cigars" arrive at once, and larger than one cares to see—you understand what I mean. The country round me looks frightful. Many dead bodies belonging to both sides lie around.

* From the *Daily Telegraph*.

CHAPTER CLXVI.

THE RELIEF OF VERDUN.

POSITION AT VERDUN AT END OF JUNE, 1916—A LAST GERMAN EFFORT, JULY 11—PREPARATION FOR FRENCH OFFENSIVE—GERMAN CROWN PRINCE'S BOAST—GENERAL NIVELLE'S PLAN—THE GERMAN FORCES—THE GREAT ASSAULT OF OCTOBER 24—GRAPHIC DESCRIPTIONS OF THE BATTLE—THE RECONQUEST OF DOUAUMONT AND VAUX—FORT VAUX—FRENCH GAINS DURING NOVEMBER—THE FRENCH VICTORY OF DECEMBER 16—END OF BATTLE OF VERDUN, FEBRUARY-DECEMBER, 1916.

IT is now necessary, having traced the history of the battle of the Somme during the months of July and August, 1916, to return to Verdun, and to see how the great Franco-British offensive, which began on July 1, completed the failure of the tremendous German effort on the Meuse, which had been continuous since February.

As has been seen (Vol. IX., Chapter CXXXVIII.), May and June were in many ways most grave and critical months on the western front. The enemy was well aware of the growing accumulation of British forces in the north, and it was clear from the general situation that the summer could not pass without a vigorous blow being dealt by the British. The Germans, therefore, concentrated all their energies upon Verdun in the effort to gain a decisive victory there before having to meet British attacks in the north. At the beginning of May—on May 7—the enemy renewed his attempts upon Douaumont and the Mort Homme. By the third week in May he had made appreciable progress, and was able to envisage a direct drive down upon the inner lines of Verdun's defences. By June 25 he had reached Fleury, the village which commanded the direct approaches to the important Souville plateau—one of the inner bulwarks—and in spite of the heroic resistance of the French the situation had become as dangerous as it was in the very earliest days of the battle in February.

With the closing days of June it became evident that the defenders of Verdun were about to receive relief. At many points along the whole line trench raids were being carried out, the enemy being kept constantly on the alert and made to feel that something was coming somewhere. The storm burst upon the Somme on July 1, and all the events in the Verdun region for the rest of the year were affected and controlled by the Franco-British operations in the north.

Sir Douglas Haig, in a dispatch dated December 23, dealing with the battle of the Somme, pointed out that by then one of the main objects of the Somme battle had been achieved. Verdun had been relieved. He continued :—

"The desperate struggle for the possession of Verdun had invested that place with a moral and political importance out of all proportion to its military value. Its fall would undoubtedly have been proclaimed as a great victory for our enemies, and would have shaken the faith of many in our ultimate success. The failure of the enemy to capture it, despite great efforts and very heavy losses, was a severe blow to his prestige, especially in view of the confidence he had openly expressed as to the results of the struggle.

"Information obtained both during the progress of the Somme battle and since the suspension of active operations has fully established the effect of our offensive in keeping the

enemy's main forces tied to the western front. A movement of German troops eastward, which had commenced in June as a result of the Russian successes, continued for a short time only after the opening of the Allied attack. Thereafter the enemy forces that moved east consisted, with one exception, of divisions that had been exhausted in the Somme battle, and these troops were always replaced on the western front by fresh divisions. In November the strength of the enemy in the western theatre of war was greater than in July, notwithstanding the abandonment of his offensive at Verdun. It is possible that if Verdun had fallen large forces might still have been employed in an endeavour further to exploit that success."

Not only was the enemy forced to abandon his offensive at Verdun, but the Somme

THE GERMAN CROWN PRINCE.
The would-be victor of Verdun.

operations so altered the situation on the Meuse that the French were enabled in highly successful engagements to recapture much of the ground lost and to seal quite definitely the defeat of the German Crown Prince. It is with this altered situation that this chapter deals.

The Germans fought hard in the first three weeks of the Somme fighting to get in a knock-out blow on the Meuse, before the Franco-British offensive in the north became positively dangerous. On July 11, upon a front of 2½ miles, the enemy tried to reach the forts of Souville and Tavannes through Fleury and Damloup. The fighting spread, and in two days it had developed into another colossal attempt to batter through the trench defences with sheer weight of men and metal. By July 15 all the enemy's hopes of success had been shattered, and shattered so completely that the French were able at once to begin a process of steady nibbling which led to the recapture of many of the positions lost in the early weeks of the battle.

General Nivelle, in an Army Order, had indeed held out the promise of offensive action to his troops when he said, in conveying to his men the congratulations of the French Academy: —"It will be one of the prides of the Verdun army to have merited the testimony of the distinguished Assembly which embodies and immortalises the genius of the French tongue and race. The Verdun army has had the happiness of responding to the appeal addressed to it by the country. Thanks to its heroic tenacity, the Allied offensive has already made brilliant progress—and the Germans are not at Verdun. But its task is not finished. No Frenchman will have any right to rest so long as a single enemy remains upon the soil of France, of Alsace and Lorraine.

"In order to allow the Allied offensive to develop freely, and to result in early and definitive victory, we shall continue to resist the assaults of our implacable enemy, who, in spite of the sacrifice of the half-million men that Verdun has already cost him, has not given up his vain hopes. And not content with resisting, soldiers of the eleventh army, you will bite again and without ceasing, so as to hold by a continual menace as many of the enemy's forces as possible until the nearing hour of general offensive. The past is a guarantee of the future; you will not fail in your sacred mission, and you will thus acquire new claims upon the gratitude of the country and the Allied nations."

On July 11 the enemy attacked along the Thiaumont-Vaux front. The centre of his effort was the little village of Fleury-devant-Douaumont, through which easy access could be had to the inner defence lines. The German



GENERAL NIVELLE.

Appointed Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the West after his success at Verdun.

attack drove the French out of the few houses they still occupied in the village, and swept them down beyond the railway station. The enemy got to within a kilometre of Souville Fort before his progress was stayed. The first and most immediate business of General Nivelle, once his troops had again asserted their ascendancy, was to dislodge the Germans from the village of Fleury and the slopes north and south of it, and at the same time to push him back in the direction of Thiaumont.

On July 15, General Mangin, the great hard-hitter of the French Army, began a series of terribly arduous attacks upon Fleury which gradually spread along the whole front on the right bank of the Meuse, and six months after the Verdun battle began showed how completely the situation was altered. The Germans, instead of being able to launch their big attack upon the last defences of Verdun, were forced to battle furiously and unsuccessfully in the defence of positions captured at tremendous cost in the first month of the battle.

By August 1 it became evident that a French offensive of some importance was in progress of development. The French by no means



GENERAL MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE FRENCH VICTORIES, OCTOBER–DECEMBER, 1916.

had it all their own way. Fleury and Thiaumont Work changed hands time after time, but by August 18 the site of Fleury village, for by then even the ruins no longer existed, was entirely in French hands.

The Germans renewed the fighting on September 3, bringing their weight to bear upon the Vaux-Chapitre line. Their action was met by vigorous French counter-attacks, and when the Verdun front relapsed at the beginning of September into a stagnation which lasted for over six weeks, the French held the line of the road running from Thiaumont Work to Vaux-Chapitre Wood. This line was an improvement on the July positions, but it still gave the Germans good jumping-off points for the further prosecution of the direct attack upon Verdun.

General Nivelle decided that it would be necessary for him to undertake action on a large scale in order to get back the Douaumont line of forts and bring the Verdun battle to a close. The effect of the Somme upon the German position at Verdun was felt at the beginning of August, when artillery and aviation details were detached from Verdun and sent to the Somme. On July 21, the Crown Prince, addressing the 53rd Regiment of the 50th Division, said: "The French imagine that we are going to slacken our grip on Verdun because they have at last begun their great offensive on the Somme. They will be disappointed, and we will show them that things are not going to happen that way." In spite of this boastful optimism, by the end of August three of the Verdun divisions had gone to the Somme. When the action decided upon by General Nivelle was taken the whole Verdun front from Avocourt Wood to Les Eparges was held by only fifteen divisions.

The point of attack selected by General Nivelle was the Douaumont front. Upon this line the Germans had eight divisions, going from west to east in the following order: 14th Reserve Division, 13th Reserve Division, 25th Reserve Division, 34th Division, 54th Division, 9th Division, 33rd Reserve Division, and 50th Division. The front line was held by twenty-one battalions with seven in support, ten in reserve, and heavy forces available in case of necessity. The French in their effort to break through placed three divisions in the front line. General Guyot de Salins, with his division strengthened by the 11th Infantry

Regiment, attacked on the left from Haudromont to Thiaumont. General de Passaga held the centre, and General de Lardemelle, with the 30th Infantry Regiment reinforcing him, attacked Vaux on the right. All these troops had previously fought in this part of the line. In preparation for the attack they were sent for special training for some weeks in the rear, a training which was so thorough that it was carried out on ground which was a miniature reproduction of the country over which they were to fight. The men who were later to have the duty of capturing Douaumont Fort were made familiar with all its features in a replica of the fort built on their training ground.

These men were of the finest stuff of France Well could General Nivelle, in a note written a week before the battle, say: "Twenty-seven months of war and eight months of the Verdun battle have shown and confirm every day still more the superiority of the French soldier over the German soldier. This superiority, of which all must be persuaded, has been still further increased by the progressive falling off in the quality of the troops we have before us, many of whom have come back from the Somme very much weakened in material and in *moral*. This superiority shows itself in the readiness with which prisoners have surrendered in large groups during the recent fighting, even before the assault has started. There could, therefore, not be a more favourable moment in which to attack the enemy, to make many prisoners, to give Verdun definite protection against the enemy undertakings, and still further to lower the *moral* of the enemy nation and army. Artillery of exceptional power will master the enemy artillery and will make a way for the attacking troops. The preparation of the operation is as complete and as perfect as possible in every detail. The execution cannot fail to be equally perfect, thanks to the discipline, good training, confidence and resolute dash of the troops who will have the honour of being entrusted with it. Their will to conquer, to gain a further guarantee of the final victory, to cover their flag with fresh glories, makes a magnificent success absolutely certain."

The chief feature of the complete preparation was without doubt the work of the artillery.

A FRENCH "155" AT VERDUN.

Never before had the ground to be attacked been so closely studied in its minutest details from the air, from a large number of observation posts specially created for the purposes of these operations. The period of intense artillery fire opened on October 21, in weather favourable to aerial observation. On October 23 a 400 " crump " caused a big fire in Douaumont Fort and both right and left of the fort the German positions had been most satisfactorily ploughed up. In order to make assurance doubly sure a feint attack was delivered with the object of making the expectant enemy reveal all his hidden battery positions. Over 130 batteries were thus located and the French guns in successful counter-battery firing silenced sixty of them before the attack was launched.

The time given for the assault was 11.40 on the morning of October 24. The general plan of the operation provided for two distinct phases of the battle. The first period was to carry the French on to the line formed by the Haudromont quarries, the trenches north of Thiaumont farm, the north-eastern spur of Vaux-Chapitre Wood, the trenches in front of Vaux Fort, and those in front of Damloup battery.

The second objective given to the troops, which was to be reached after a brief interval allowed for rest, was the general line formed by Douaumont Village and Douaumont Fort, the north-eastern edge of Vaux Pond and the Damloup battery.

The men, placed at the top of their fighting trim by the weeks of careful preparation they had undergone, strengthened in their confidence by the extraordinarily thorough work of their artillery, had been further inspired by the Orders of the Day issued to them on the eve of the attack. General de Passaga, who commanded in the centre, had thus addressed his men:

" Officers, non-commissioned officers and men: It is nearly eight months since our hated enemy the Boche tried to astonish the world by a thunder-stroke in the capture of Verdun. The heroism of the *poilus* of France has barred his road and annihilated his best

CHASSEURS ALPINS ON THE WAY TO VERDUN.

[French Official photograph.

SENEGALESE TROOPS OF THE FRENCH ARMY AT VERDUN.

troops. Thanks to the splendours of Verdun, Russia has been able to inflict upon the enemy a bloody defeat and to take nearly 400,000 prisoners.

"Thanks to the defenders of Verdun, England and France are beating the enemy every day upon the Somme, where they have already taken nearly 60,000 prisoners.

"Thanks to the defenders of Verdun, the army of Salonika, the army of the Balkans, are beating the Bulgars and the Turks. The Boche is now trembling before our guns and our bayonets; he feels that the hour of punishment is near.

"It is our division which has the special honour of giving him a resounding blow which shall show to the world the decadence of the German Army. We are going to wrest from the enemy a fragment of the soil where so many of our heroes lie in their shrouded glory.

"A division will fight upon our left which is already illustrious; it is composed of Zouaves.

A DEJECTED OFFICER OF THE PRUSSIAN GUARD WHO SURRENDERED AT THIAUMONT.

SHELL-HOLES ON THE VERDUN FRONT FILLED WITH WATER.

'Marsouins,' Moroccans, and Algerians. The honour of retaking Douaumont Fort is disputed among them. May our fine comrades know that they can count upon us to help them, to open the gate for them, and to share their glory.



DOUAUMONT FORT.

Photographed from a French aeroplane and showing the results of shell-fire.

"Officers, non-commissioned officers and men, you will hang the Croix de Guerre on your Flag and on your Pennant. With your first stroke you will bring your renown to the level of that of our most famous regiments and battalions."

General de Salins, whose troops had to carry Hardaumont quarries and Douaumont Fort, in his Order of the Day said:

"To a division already rendered illustrious by its brilliant feat of arms on the Yser. at Hill 304, at Vaux-Chapitre, and at Fleury, has been given the signal honour of retaking Douaumont Fort. Zouaves, Marsouins, Tirailleurs, and Senegalese will compete in courage so as to inscribe a fresh victory upon their glorious banners."

Heavy fog shrouded the Meuse Valley when the troops went over their parapet to the attack. The fog which, with an army less disciplined, with a staff less skilled, might have proved disastrous was really a benefit to the French, hiding as it did their movements from the enemy observation trenches. The advance was made by the compass, quietly at the walk, and with perfect regularity. The liaison between regiment and regiment, brigade and brigade, was maintained without a break along the whole front.

A brief but admirable description of the battle as seen by a French officer appeared in *L'Illustration*. It will serve as a general

introduction to a more detailed description of the fighting:

From the slopes of Souville I have seen victory climb and crown Douaumont. Our modern battles afford no spectacle; they are cruel and mysterious. There are big empty spaces dotted with shell holes and cut with long furrows which mark the soil as the veins make marble patterns on the hands. There are columns of smoke from bursting shells, a line of shadows that creeps close to the earth and disappears. The ruins of a village burst into fire, a barrage fire lights up as though it were the footlights of a theatre and covers with uncertainty the drama which is being enacted behind the curtain thus conceived. That is all. Those who are in the battle never know anything more of it than one episode, the fighting can be followed in the command post where it is brought into the dug-out along telephone wires transmitted by optical signals, brought in upon the wings of pigeons and carried by dispatch riders. But the victory of October 24—I saw it before me as though it were a living being.

Souville Hill is the only one of all the heights around Verdun which reaches the altitude of Douaumont. Between these two rival heights rises Fleury Ridge. Beyond, upon the crest, lies the Fort of Douaumont. I so often looked at this landscape of hill and ravine that I had it in my eyes when on the morning of October 24 I took my post at Souville, but my eyes looked for it in vain. A thick fog prevented my seeing anything except the nearest tortured slope and here and there a mutilated tree trunk.

The fog, however, was by no means inert. It seemed as though it was being stirred about and laboured by the constant and invisible flight of shells. Their whistling was so continuous that instinctively I looked up as though I had expected them to form a vault of steel above my head. Our artillery was pounding the enemy's positions, and I recalled the terrible days of the end of February when the shells were rushing upon us. This time it was the opposite impression that I got, an impression of our definite superiority. The guns with their thousand voices gave a prodigious concert in the fog, and I tried to analyse its skilful orchestration, to identify the strident plaint of the "75's," and the big bass of our heavy howitzers. I asked myself if we would attack in spite of the obscurity? Would it not be disastrous and prevent the guns from accompanying our advancing troops with their fire? On the other hand, might not the fog increase the elements of surprise? Knowing the hour fixed for the attack, I looked at my watch, and while waiting I gradually grew more and more anxious, with the fear of postponement of our trial and the adjournment of our hopes. I knew that the operation had been minutely arranged and that our troops had been marvellously trained, but I also knew the disproportion of the forces to be engaged and the daring of the undertaking. Three divisions entrusted with the duty of dislodging seven divisions from formidably organized positions! It was a daring undertaking, but one conceived in the proportions of a masterpiece, and one which was to be carried out so precisely that once it had been executed it seemed quite simple.

I had upon me the Order of the Day of General de Passaga, in which he stimulated his men by recalling the prowess of the neighbouring division. I took it out of my pocket and I chewed it over and over again as a horse does his oats. During the long wait it was to me a song accompanied by the orchestra of guns. On the positions which I knew so well I reviewed the divisions ready for attack. From Haudromont quarries on my left to Douaumont Fort in front of me lay Guyot de Salins' division with its Zouaves, its Tirailleurs, and the famous colonial regiments from Morocco which retook Fleury on August 17. To the right lay the Chasseurs of Passaga's division, and still further to the right, towards Vaux and Hardaumont, the tantassins of Lardemelle. I imagined them for I could not see more than fifty yards in front of myself. I also imagined and not without anxiety, the German order of battle, the number of battalions in first and second line, the trenches, the supplementary defences, the redoubts, Thiaumont work,

A SHELL-CRATER OUTSIDE VERDUN.
The Cathedral towers can be seen in the distance.

Haudromont quarries, and at last, and above all, Douaumont Fort. How could our men get the better of such human and material obstacles ?

Every now and again I pulled out my watch. Eleven o'clock ! Eleven-twenty ! Eleven-forty ! The time fixed ! Had the attack, which I ought to have seen rise up and roll down the ravine and then sweep over the opposing slope, had it been launched ? Had the artillery lengthened its fire ? It was impossible to know. At eleven-fifty on the right I heard the tick-tack of machine guns. If machine guns were in action the attack must have been launched. If machine guns are firing our men have been seen and are meeting with resistance. Then I heard them no more. The roar of the guns drowned everything and again I go through uncertainty and anxiety. At the command post where I went from time to time news was at last coming through. The start was magnificent. The first objective is reported to have been reached already. The men are organizing their positions. They are going to get on the move again. They are off.

An aeroplane-motor hums over my head. The pilot is flying so low that it looks as though he is going to touch me. I see the enormous bulk of his machine loom grey through fog. He comes down still lower. I was told later on that the pilot had been able to shout out "En avant" to our men and that a conversation had thus been exchanged between heaven and earth.

Towards two o'clock a strengthening wind begins to worry the clouds, following them, chasing them away, turning on those which take their place, and finally rending them and putting them to flight just as a storm drives clouds off a mountain pass. In the intervals of their flight first a slope, then a crest, appears. At last I begin to see. I recognise Fleury crest, the ravine of Chambitoux, the slopes of Douaumont, and then Douaumont itself. The clouds are now flying so fast that in a second their ranks are broken and the landscape stands out with the astonishing clearness which precedes or follows bad weather.

Through my artillery glasses I could count the shell holes. They are all full of water. What a time our men must have had if they went through there ! The landscape is not dead. Over there on the slopes of Douaumont earth-coloured men are moving about. To the left and to the right they are marching in Indian file. They are advancing, climbing, and gradually getting nearer their objective. At last there is one whose silhouette stands out upon the sky as clearly as in a shadow show. Others are going down a gorge. They are going to be seen. They will be mown down. Don't show yourselves like that. It is crazy. They are moving, and turn, describing a vast circle around conquered Douaumont as though they were dancing a "farandole" of victory. I want to shout. I must have shouted, but I did not hear the sound of my own voice in the noise of bursting shells, for the German riposte had not been long in coming and shells are bursting. I must have shouted for my teeth shut upon some earth splashed up into my open mouth by a shell, which had just fallen close to me. Douaumont is ours. The formidable Douaumont, which dominates with its mass, its observation points, the two shores of the Meuse, is again French.

This graphic description may be completed by that given by the special correspondent of *The Times* with the French Army, in a dispatch dated October 25 :

There are two ways of looking at the brilliant victory gained yesterday by the French at Douaumont. You may say that Verdun wanted more breathing-space, more elbow-room, before settling down for the winter, for there is no denying the fact that the Germans were uncomfortably close. In that case it has already

ANNAMITES.

TUNISIAN TIRAILLEURS.

secured a great part of its objective. As the result of one day's magnificent fighting it has reconquered a strip of territory which it took the enemy months to win.

They have made a wonderfully satisfactory start. They have proved that they have the power of conducting successful offensive operations on a large scale on two widely removed sectors of the line at one and the same time. That will give the enemy food for thought.

From what I saw at Verdun on the day preceding the advance, and on the day itself, it was perfectly evident that our Allies have at their command behind the lines in advance of the fortress an immense reserve store of guns. Over a breadth and depth of many miles the whole country was swarming with troops, and guns and ammunition and aeroplanes were everywhere. The fact that the battle was going on all day over a front of about five miles made no difference whatever to the streams of convoys moving to and fro along the roads leading to Verdun from the south. The men in billets in the various villages, the Annamite and Senegalese and French road-menders, the thousands of soldiers busied in a thousand and one different ways in the block of country behind the line where the regiments engaged in the attack were fighting, were all going on with their ordinary work for all the world as if nothing out of the common was on foot. There seemed to be quite as many troops marching away from the scene of action as towards it. There was no extra excitement, no fuss, no disorder, no hurrying up of reserves. Everything had been carefully and systematically prepared well in advance of the day. All that was necessary had been done. Some days before the attack, General Nivelle's army had been strongly reinforced. The rest depended on the thin blue line in the front trenches, the incomparable work of the gunners, and the daring of the airmen.

The actual artillery preparation began rather more than a week ago. Then came a succession of wet days, as the result of which the men whom I saw coming back from the trenches were plastered with mud from head to foot and had become a line of khaki instead of a line of blue. The attack was consequently postponed till one or two bright days (cold enough, even before the arrival proper of winter) made it once more practicable. On Monday, when I arrived at Verdun, the French guns and aeroplanes were particularly active. The resumed preliminary bombardment was in full swing. The air was clear, the sky was blue, a rather cold sun was shining brightly, and, though towards evening a thick mist rose from the Meuse and hindered accurate observation of the effects of the gun-fire, the rest of the day was admirably suited to the French plans. Those in the know were very chary of giving any but the vaguest hints of the nearness of the coming event.

But the Germans themselves must have been uncomfortably aware of what was in store for them. About a third of the batteries with which they bombarded Verdun up to and beyond the beginning of the Somme offensive had been displaced, or at all events had for a considerable period of time been silent. With the rest they replied to the incessant fire of the French guns with all the vigour at their command and sometimes with the nervousness born of apprehension. On the evening before, for instance, owing to an entirely groundless alarm of an infantry attack, they suddenly opened a barrage fire with no fewer than 83 batteries, all firing at once.

All day long on Monday and till late in the evening, when I was obliged to come away, the fierce duel went on, the French shells falling on the ridges north and north-east of the town, the German round the French batteries on the nearer slopes of the ridges and in the valleys and ravines between them. In Verdun itself only two or three at the most exploded while I was there. The enemy had other things to think of than the additional mangling of those shattered ruins, and as for bombarding the citadel, they might as well try to shell the moon.

But outside the town on those northern heights, on and behind which half a million German soldiers

WRECKED CASEMATE OF DOUAUMONT FORT.

and what was left of the Crown Prince's military reputation have perished, the continual roar of the guns and the flashes and smoke clouds of the shells were—both in themselves and for what they might mean—a magnificent and cheering sound and spectacle. And all the time overhead the aeroplanes, the splendid, dauntless, far-seeing eyes of the French Army, were calmly carrying on their invaluable part of the common work, sometimes poised apparently without motion high in space, utterly disdainful of the black smudges of shrapnel bursting all round them as a German battery burst into a furious rapid bombardment, sometimes whirring noisily as they darted swiftly towards earth to deliver their messages.

I saw, on the way up to Verdun, a fight, sharply defined against the clear blue sky, between two crows and a graceful strong-winged buzzard. The crows were plucky enough, but their movements were slow and heavy compared with the flight and lightning turns of their more active opponent, and when after 10 minutes' wheeling and manœuvring for position they gave up the contest and flapped clumsily away, leaving the buzzard master of the air, the result of the struggle of the birds and that between the French and German aeroplanes seemed to be a real augury of the air victory which the Allies are gaining over Verdun no less than over the Somme. The French buzzard is sometimes wounded to the death, but it is the German crow that has been forced to beat a retreat, and most of his flapping nowadays is behind the security of his own lines, from which the information that he can collect is of little value. Whereas the French airman takes photographs of the enemy's trenches and positions, which show the condition to which they have been reduced by our guns, not only from the French, but also from the German and therefore unconcealed side of them.

On Tuesday, the day of the attack, the weather changed again, to the disadvantage of our Allies. The sun was hidden by a thick blanket of clouds, the air was thick and heavy with moisture, and a river mist, added to an occasional drizzle of rain, blotted out the outlines of all but the nearest hills. All the conditions seemed to be as unfavourable as possible to an infantry attack, and it seems to me more than probable that that was the view taken by the enemy.

But this time there was to be no holding back. The attack was carried out as it had been arranged. Now was the moment when the excellence of the French airmen's work was put to the proof. Bad as the actual day was for their purpose they brought down three enemy aeroplanes in the Verdun district. As defensive fighting that was good. But it was what they had done before the day that counted in the attack. The position and the state of every German battery and trench had been accurately noted and mapped for the information of the staff and the battery commanders, and no amount of mist could make any real difference to the French gunners.

I watched the battle, first from a high position about five miles to the west of Verdun, from which, if the day had been fine, there would have been a good panoramic view of the whole front of the attack. But the day was not fine, and as the wind was blowing away from the batteries to the enemy's position, the sound of the cannonade, even of the guns in the valley close below, was dulled and almost inaudible. The effect of the breeze and of the heavy atmosphere was like putting cotton-wool in one's ears. Only the flashes of the guns, the thin wisps of smoke from their muzzles, and the dark columns as the shells, French or German, exploded, showed that a battle was going on, and all that, of course, you may see at any time on the Verdun front. That was at about 12 o'clock, 20 minutes after the infantry had begun their advance. From that particular spot, because of the weather, it was hopeless to think of seeing anything of what was going on, and permission to go anywhere on the right bank of the river was not to be had.

But there was another look-out, much nearer Verdun, though still on the same side of it, from which it was possible to get a better view, and when I got there, still early in the afternoon, the mist slowly cleared away, and one after another the ridges beyond the

town which mount up, one behind the other, from the hole in which Verdun lies, began to show themselves. Highest of all, when at last it became visible, was the ridge of Douaumont itself, and between it and Verdun two other lines, one stretching from Souville, just behind the French lines before the attack began, the other nearer still, from the Côte de Belleville to the Côte de Froideterre on the left. The ground in between these ridges and the ridges themselves is much broken by a number of valleys and ravines, especially the Ravine de la Couleuvre, the Ravine de la Dame, the Ravine Chambitoux, and the Ravine des Fontaines, in that order from left to right, that is to say, from north-west to south-east, and all these ravines run nearly at right angles to the lines of the ridges. But the general effect from that particular standpoint is that of three almost straight outlines of long, low hills rising one behind the other, and culminating in the bare crest from which the Fort of Douaumont dominates the whole position.

That was the scene of Tuesday's great battle, as the result of which, after seven hours' severe fighting, the French once more gained the mastery of the fort which has cost so many hundreds of lives, and undid the whole of the work which the Germans have done since February 25.

On the left of the five-mile front the attack began from what was the most advanced and most northerly point of the French line, at the Côte du Poivre and the quarries of Haudromont, about two miles east of the Meuse at Vacherauville. Between this point and Thiaumont, a distance of a mile and a half, the first advance carried the French infantry about a mile to the road running west from Douaumont to Bras, up the ravines of Couleuvre and La Dame. In the next section troops starting from Fleury moved almost directly north towards Douaumont, up and to the left of the Ravine Chambitoux and took the Bois de la Caillette, so that the way to Douaumont was now open on both sides, and further to the right the attack was pushed forward in a straight line between Douaumont and Bezonvaux till it nearly reached the Fort of Vaux midway between them.

As far as I can gather, the French Generals themselves were astonished by the rapidity of the advance, and during the afternoon extended their objective

VAUX FORT AFTER THE FRENCH BOMBARDMENT.

to include the capture of Douaumont. Artillery and infantry fought together in perfect combination with magnificent courage and resolution. That, for one who has seen them lately, was a foregone conclusion. The French have recently been described as a tired Army. Nothing could be further from the truth. Their *entrain* is as fine as it ever was and their experience immeasurably greater. Personally I have seen no tired troops among them. Even the mud-caked *poilus*, fresh from a long night in the trenches, some of them nursing frostbitten feet, are full of go and determination, and when you see them after a few hours or days *en repos* behind the lines, with clean uniforms and faces, they look as if nothing could stop them.

On Tuesday nothing did. It was beautiful to watch the regularity of the advance. In all directions, from behind and in front and from both flanks, the batteries were pouring their hurricane of steel on those long, low hills in front. Gradually, as the afternoon wore on, the explosions of the French 75-shells and the double German barrage-fire behind and upon or in front of the attacking troops moved steadily farther and farther up the ravines and slopes. On the crests of the farther ridges, from Haudromont to Douaumont, and well past it to the right, huge pillars of black smoke kept shooting up from the ground, and two or three times a dense volume of white smoke, coloured red by flame, shone out for some time against the sky as a giant incendiary shell set on fire some explosive or inflammable material. And all the time in the middle distance, between the French field batteries and the burst that outlined the position of Douaumont and the retreating Germans, shell after shell churned up the ground over which the infantry fight was advancing, and filled the air with yet other clouds of earth and stones and smoke. Steadily, foot by foot and trench by trench, but with extraordinary rapidity, those splendid French infantry advanced, driving the enemy before them—for, remember, when the attack began the opposing trenches were, as always, close up to each other—and, taking 3,500 prisoners by the way, till at last, after a final severe struggle round Douaumont Fort, they shot all of its defenders who refused to surrender and won it back for France.

MACHINE-GUN CREW.

GRENADE THROWERS.

In a day or two I hope to be in a position to describe the condition of the fort from personal observation. But meanwhile, with the sound of those guns and the sight of the bursting shells moling their way steadily forward up the hills still fresh in my memory, it seems to me that this last triumph of the French is something more than a mere proof to the enemy that the Allies can strike in two places at once. For it carries with it the more significant and hopeful corollary that in two places at once the enemy can be and have been forced to give way. Their powers of resistance are visibly weakening. At Verdun, as on the Somme, the day when the war of fixed trenches will be over is approaching.

Supposing, however, to put the case at its best from the enemy's point of view, that the taking of Douaumont and the advance on each side of it were only an isolated and momentary triumph. Supposing that Douaumont were to be taken from the French again, as it has been taken and retaken before, and that the Germans were to muster sufficient forces to renew the attack on Verdun, could they ever succeed in reducing it? I think not. They have the citadel to reckon with. A great deal has been proved, and still more has been written, during this war about the inability of fortresses to withstand the destructive action of modern artillery fire.

But the citadel of Verdun is the triumphant exception to the rule. By the courtesy of General Dubois, the officer in command of the defence of the city, I was able the other day to see something of its extraordinary strength, and of the alterations which have been made in it, during the bombardment, to make it still stronger. Of what these alterations are, and of the points in which its strength consists, I will say nothing, except the one fact that its interior *écoutes* or galleries are more than four miles long, and can, therefore, house a very large number of men, as well as material and provisions sufficient to keep them for a very long period. It might conceivably be invested. It could never be destroyed

MACHINE-GUN SECTION.

by bombardment. It is interesting to Englishmen as the strong place in whose vaults, protected above by about 15 yards of solid rock, a large number of our fellow-countrymen taken prisoners in the Napoleonic wars were confined. It is far more interesting as the one fortress which is proof against the most violent bombardment.

I asked General Dubois to give me in a few words his own idea of the strength of the place, and this is what he wrote:

"The most striking thing at Verdun is the pitiable and lamentable failure of the German effort against all the military organizations of the town. Their present certainty that they will soon be definitely

AMBULANCE CAR ON ONE OF THE LIGHT RAILWAYS AT VERDUN.

GERMAN PRISONERS PASSING SOME OF THE DUG-OUTS NEAR VERDUN.

compelled to retire (this was written the day before the advance on Douaumont) leads them from time to time, as has happened again within the last few days, to redouble the fury of their bombardment. But it is trouble lost. During eight months nothing has given way, nothing has been seriously injured in the vitals of the defences. The old *enceinte* of Vauban and the citadel itself are unharmed, in spite of the storm of 380 shells and projectiles of other calibres which have been showered upon them. Quite the contrary—and it is hardly necessary to say so—the whole time which has passed since the beginning of the attack has been made wonderful use of in putting Verdun in a state of solidity of resistance of which the Germans

[*French Official Photograph.*

DRESSING-STATION IN THE CASEMATES OF DOUAUMONT FORT.

have no idea. This considerable reinforcement of the means of defence would have very much surprised them if their assault had succeeded. Lastly, the bombardment itself—a detail which is not without its piquancy—has on more than one occasion facilitated the execution of important works. A 380 shell is sometimes very valuable; it can do the work of 50 men for eight days! That is the way in which the Germans, without suspecting it, have collaborated in the defence of the fortress. It is also one of the reasons, and not one of the least original, why they will never take Verdun."

That was the spirit in which Frenchmen who were in a position to know talked about Verdun—with, as I can testify, the fullest reasons for their confidence—before the taking of Douaumont. It looks now less than ever likely that their confidence will be put to the proof. But it is I think worth remarking that all the time that weak-kneed pessimists were doubting the power of the French to hold Verdun both they and the Germans were reckoning without its citadel. And the citadel is still there, unhurt and almost unscratched, infinitely stronger than Troyon or Liouville or any of the other forts that the Germans have pulverized. For it cannot be pulverized. You could no more break it down by bombardment than you could smash the Crystal Palace windows with a pea-shooter.

The general course of the battle on the first day was divided, as we have seen, into two phases. In a similar way the story of this extremely successful operation which was later to serve as the immediate justification for General Nivelle's appointment to command the French Army on the Western Front falls naturally under two headings, the battle of Douaumont and the battle of Vaux. The operations around Douaumont were very much more easy than those around Vaux, and much more decisive, since it was largely the success of the Douaumont fighting which rendered inevitable the fall of Vaux Fort in the last stages of the engagement.

Along the Douaumont front held by General de Salins and General de Passaga fortune was varied. On the extreme left the 11th Infantry Regiment, which had been added on to reinforce the division, was instructed to carry the Haudromont quarries. Here they had to conquer a natural position of quite exceptional strength, they had to work through a maze of redoubts, fortified works, defy quantities of machine guns in positions in which they could not be reached by artillery fire, and when the position was carried they had to continue fighting in the quarries themselves with the

A STREET IN VERDUN.

EFFECT OF INCENDIARY SHELLS ON VERDUN.

A CAPTURED TRENCH AT DOUAUMONT.

REST AND REFRESHMENT.
The waterproof boots are useful if not elegant.

grenade. Here the German counter-attack was quicker off the mark than anywhere else along the line, and with the capture of the quarry the 11th Regiment, for a time at any rate, had to be content.

Meanwhile on the right General de Passaga had also made good progress. His division had been given, as its first objective, the railway line between Fleury and Vaux, the southern portion of Caillette Wood, the Fausse-Côte battery, and the northern and eastern slopes of the Vaux-Chapitre ridge. General de Passaga's task was extremely difficult. He occupied a re-entrant in the French line, and had considerably more ground to cover than his neighbours, and ground of an even more difficult nature, the clay slopes of Fleury being extremely awkward for the movements of troops. The first objective, nevertheless, was reached in spite of all these obstacles with mathematical precision. After the pause for rest and control which had been provided for in the General Staff plan, the division had orders to carry the turret on the eastern side of Douaumont Fort, and to proceed to the west of Vaux pond. General Ancelin, who commanded the left brigade of de Passaga's division, moved out of the trenches at the head of his men, and met a soldier's death. His place was taken by Colonel Hutin, who had

already met the enemy in the successful Cameroon campaign.* He carried his men without a halt right through to the pause before the second objective. Just before the second movement began the clouds and the fog began to disperse, and when the lifting weather gave occasional glimpses of Douaumont Fort the men dashed forward with almost dangerous impetuosity.

The eastern battery and the turret, which were the limits fixed to this brigade's action, were soon reached, and from the conquered positions the victors were able to watch the success of the operation directly in front of the fort and to the west. In the records of one of the regiments which took part in this portion of the fighting there is a pardonable but complete absence of military severity and official style.

"The spectacle," it said, "was grandiose. The Colonials swept like a rising tide over the fort, inside which fighting still continued. To the east we could see the Chasseurs climbing the slopes of La Caillette and the Fausse-Côte, while an unending grey column of prisoners climbed over the Chambitoux ridge towards Fleury. We were all deeply moved, and looked at each other, scarcely believing the evidence of our eyes, and when the capture of the fort was confirmed we went through an unforgettable moment."

The right-hand forcep had also found its grip at the roots of the Douaumont molar. It remained now for the specially prepared troops to exploit the advantages gained, to push on by frontal attack and gain the inside of the fort, where every preparation had been made for a desperate resistance.

In the attack upon Douaumont Fort the system of pincers, first applied in the Artois offensive of May, 1915, was again adopted. It consisted of driving in upon each side of a strong position pincers of infantry and of gradually forcing the tooth out of the enemy's jaw. Salins' division had to put in the left forcep, and it had as its first objective the Ravine de la Dame, and as its second the Ravine de la Couleuvre on its left, and the Thiaumont and Douaumont villages on its centre and right. By two o'clock everything had worked so smoothly, the arrangements for liaison had proved themselves so perfect, that all the objectives given had been

A CAMP IN A WOOD NEAR VAUX.

* See Vol. VIII., pp. 304-5.

THE BOIS BOURRU, BETWEEN VERDUN AND MORT-HOMME.

carried. In fact, here as elsewhere along the front, the objective given had been passed, and putting into action for the first time on any scale new tactics, once the troops had reached the line given to them, bodies of men were pushed on beyond it into the enemy positions with the object of destroying guns and material. In the centre of Salins' division progress was a little slower owing to the extraordinarily bad nature of the ground. Here again, on a small scale, the pincers principle was applied. Thiaumont work was surrounded and Thiaumont farm reached almost at the same moment, and by 2.45 Douaumont village was again French, and the troops were throwing up their defences beyond its north-eastern out-

PARTY OF GERMANS CAPTURED IN A TRENCH AT VAUX.

skirts. The Fort of Douaumont, the great molar of the German jaw, had the left forcep firmly settled down at its root.

The honour of carrying the fort had been given to three battalions of the Moroccan Colonial Regiment, which had earned this

to increase the efficiency of their heavy gun bombardment, to evacuate certain portions of their line at points which ran too close to their artillery targets. The Germans, taking advantage of the fog, pushed through, and when the first of the three Douaumont battalions

PRISONERS FROM THIAUMONT AT VERDUN CATHEDRAL.

distinction by its fine conduct at Dixmude and Fleury. It met with unexpected resistance at the very outset of the battle, having to recapture portions of its own line before it was able to start off for the fort. The incident was curious as an illustration of the surprise which even a modern battle may contain. The French had found it necessary, in order

advanced, it found that it had to clear out its own trenches with grenades before it could get going. It did not take long. The Modat battalion reached its first objective without much delay due to this incident, and dug itself in, while the Croll battalion swept past, and pushed right beyond the fort, leaving it to be carried by Major Nicolay's battalion.

These men for weeks before had concentrated the whole of their thoughts and actions upon the recapture of Douaumont Fort. In the replica of the fort erected on the training ground in the rear they had fought the action time after time in anticipation. Each man knew the exact spot for which he was to fight; each man knew the nature of the obstacles he would have to overcome. The battalion, moreover, had been specially equipped for its task.

It moved out in thickening fog, and had, like most of the troops throughout the day, to rely upon the compass for its direction. Disaster nearly overtook the men. An error in the compass, caused probably by the attraction of a revolver or some other piece of metal, misled them, and they were moving far from the direct line of advance when suddenly the fog lifted a little, and two German prisoners who came in pointed out the rising height of Douaumont in the distance. The men had been strung up to such a pitch that when they found themselves in front of the goal there was an extraordinary pause, and a feeling almost religious in its intensity, which is well described in Major Nicolay's report, swept through them.

"The Marsouins, dragging one foot after another from the mud, pushed forward to try their luck. There was no gunfire on their line, no infantry resistance. There was a heavy Boche barrage fire, but far in the rear, in the Ravine des Vignes. It was close upon three o'clock, Dorey's detachment had entered the fort without firing a shot, and was installed to the south-west of the quarters and turrets, in excellent condition, neither firing nor being fired upon. We could no longer think of methodically adopting the order of battle which had been originally foreseen. The Boches, without any doubt, were aware of our arrival, and we had to attack them as quickly as possible, before they had recovered from their panic. The men, moving forward under a low-flying aeroplane showing the three colours of France, advanced to the ditch, its officers at its head, and their rifles at the rest, and then climbed up the steep slope of the rampart through the 'gorge.' When they reached the top of this rampart they saw before them the gaping openings of the lower casemates, and in front of them the courtyard in extraordinary upheaval. Before the chaos which had fallen upon the great fort, a symbol of will and of power, the fort which had been so marvellously retaken, the leading sections of the columns came to a halt, and gazed. The battalion leader, who had stayed behind for a moment at the bottom of the moat in order to control the movement, reached the head of the battalion at this moment, and, while acknowledging to the full the sanctity of this unforgettable sight, gave the order to attack the machine-guns which were beginning to get into action from the casemates. The resistance put up by the Germans was brief, and the Grenadiers soon cleared out the last of the garrison from the underground caverns of the fort."

The next day General Nivelle sent the following Army Order to the troops under General Mangin's command:

"Officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the Mangin Group. In a few hours, by a magnificent assault, you have wrested at one blow from your powerful enemy the ground bristling with obstacles and fortresses to the north-east of Verdun which took him eight months to win in fragments and at the cost of desperate efforts and great sacrifice. You have added fresh and striking laurels to those which cover the colours of the Verdun army. On behalf of that army I thank you. You have deserved well of your country."

General Nivelle had also added to his own laurels as a scientific artilleryman. It was with a reputation gained in the use of the 75 c. gun that he made his way at Verdun in the earlier stages of the battle. It was with the prodigal and scientific use of artillery of the heaviest description that the successes of this October battle were gained.

M. Louis Béraud, describing the fort on October 26, wrote from the fort itself:

"Around me there is a most frightful din, and great traffic through the tunnels of this redoubtable fortress, which are still intact. You can even hear the hum of electric motors through the shouting of the countless fatigue parties bringing in food and munitions. The French are moving in. But through it all there is the horrible smell which spoils the pleasure of victory. In the casemates everything goes to show the speed of our attack and the rapidity of the German defeat. Arms and clothing lie in heaps on the beds, the tables are still covered with food. Everything was, there is no doubt, perfectly quiet and orderly when our Marsouins made their irruption. From the outside the fort looks like a huge heap

GENERAL MANGIN,
Commanding the French forces which drove the Germans out of Douaumont and Vaux.

of black earth ; the moats and ditches no longer exist, and there is nothing but a frightful chaos of stones and of mud, in which you have to search for a hole which once was an entrance. The work of our artillery was tremendous. There is not only not a yard, but literally not a square inch, of ground between the first German line and the fort which has not been torn up by shellfire. It is impossible to imagine destruction on such a scale."

The fort consisted of two storeys, covered with a tremendous cuirass of sand and armoured cement. This shield had completely defied the efforts of the German bombardment in February, but beneath the repeated blows of the great French 16-inch howitzer shells it gave way in three places. Two casemates and one of the first-storey corridors were pierced, and the upper works, such as observation stations, turrets, counterscarp walls, etc., were completely destroyed. The moat was filled up, and the outer tunnels were blocked by the tremendous fire concentrated upon the fort. In three days 400 tons of steel and high explosives fell upon it. No less than 71 of these huge missiles were flung upon the fort. Twenty-two of them fell in the immediate neighbourhood of the fort, 23

[French Official Photograph.

SOME OF THE PRISONERS TAKEN ON OCTOBER 24.

inside the outer wall, and 26 upon the fort building itself.

This tornado of shell stirred the ground up as though it were a whisk going through cream, leaving it twisted and mangled in fantastic shapes until it resembled a stormy sea suddenly frozen into immobility.

When the victorious French troops had finally disposed of the last German lurking in the underground caverns of the Fort, the perils and hardships of the day were by no means ended, but the men in organizing, amid all this chaos, a position capable of defence were cheered in their work by the prospect of complete victory. During the following days counter-attack followed counter-attack. On October 25, at 8.30 a.m., and again at half-past two in the afternoon, two attacks were launched against the Fort and the front immediately to the east of it. Both broke down under the French artillery and rifle fire. An hour later a third and more powerful assault was defeated with heavy losses in debouching from Hardaumont Wood. A fourth attempt against the trenches south of Chauffour Wood was equally unsuccessful. Douaumont was firmly held.

Meanwhile on the French right General Lardemelle's division, which occupied the front from Vaux Pond to La Gayette, was making slow progress. The ground was more difficult and in some ways more elaborately defended. Here, also, there was no question of surprise. The 50th German Division had been warned to expect an onslaught, as was shown by a variety of regimental and staff orders found on prisoners. The Germans, however, endeavoured to make out that along the whole of the Douaumont-Vaux front the French had struck a blow at space, and that they had voluntarily relinquished their positions. This argument was developed at length in a semi-official statement issued on November 3, which said :—"The projected withdrawal of the first line in the Douaumont-Vaux sector of the front to prepared positions was accomplished on Wednesday night. Although the French, favoured by foggy weather, were able on October 24 to advance just at the time when this withdrawal was in progress, and thus obtained a local success, the methodical retreat of the troops from Vaux Fort was carried out on the night of November 1, without the attention of the enemy being aroused. Moreover, at dawn on November 2, the deceived French opened fire on Vaux Fort and maintained it into the daylight. French assaulting columns made an attack into space and discovered the fort had been abandoned."

The statement then proceeded to develop once again the alternating theories as to the value of the possession of these two forts which the Germans used in propaganda work according as the positions were in French or German possession. "The forts of Douaumont and

of Vaux," it said, "played an important part in the battle of Verdun so long as they remained as French forts in the hands of the defenders. In order to weaken the Verdun position they had to be rendered inoffensive; deprived of their fighting means and largely destroyed, they possessed only a limited value for the assaulting party from a tactical point of view immediately the attack upon Verdun had been interrupted. Further, they gave the French artillery excellent objectives. In consequence of local gains by the French in the neighbourhood of the former fort of Douaumont the importance of Vaux Fort to the German troops had become less than *nil* and there was no reason to make great sacrifices for the maintenance of this advanced position. As also the ground near Vaux was not suited for the west and the south the fort was abandoned and the German battle line was carried back to a more favourable line which had long ago been prepared. It is less visible and less exposed to the enemy's artillery fire. It is well to add that the abandonment of Vaux Fort is devoid of any important effect upon the situation before Verdun."

Only a month before a German general, in a memorandum published by *L'Illustration*, had most thoroughly disagreed with the above argument. "The value of the fort," he wrote, "leaving aside altogether the great political importance of its possession by us, lies in the possibility of our artillery dominating the terrain in front of it, thanks to the excellent observation posts in its armoured turrets. We can only prevent a surprise of our first line by its means. Moreover, to a certain extent, the fort gives our reserves good shelter two kilometres from our first line." General von Lochow, in an order issued on September 18, prescribed that everything possible should be done to reinforce the whole position and particularly the Vaux-Chapitre sector. He ordered that "the first line should be so strengthened as to be able to resist even a strong attack" for which he was evidently prepared, for he proceeds:—"According to the terms of an Order captured by us we may expect with certainty that the enemy will continue his attacks on the right bank of the Meuse." An order issued by General von Zwehl, who commanded the 7th Reserve Corps, dated October 25 (the eve of the attack), reveals anything but an intention to withdraw to "a prepared line" in the rear. This order ran:—"According to information

[*French Official Photograph.*

FRENCH TROOPS AT VERDUN WAITING FOR THE TRENCH TRAIN.

from agents a French attack on the Verdun front is to be expected. Our battle position must be held at all costs. Infantry and machine guns must be ready to repulse French attacks at any moment. The greatest number of grenades must be carried to the front line, the reserves, and machine-gun reserves, at Thiaumont-Hang and Ablain-Schlucht and Minzenschlucht must be prepared to go to the front line at any moment."

In view of these documents the semi-official statement that the French had no resistance to meet, and that the Germans had decided to abandon the positions from which they were driven, sounds singularly unconvincing.

As a matter of fact, both in the Douaumont and in the Vaux-Chapitre sections of the front, the enemy, though obviously tired and demoralized, fought fairly well. The battle for Vaux was the more hotly contested. Here the German defence lay well in front of the fort itself, which had been reduced to a very sorry state by the continuous artillery bombardment. The field defences consisted of a double line of trenches with a supporting line between them, the whole organization covering a depth of some two kilometres. Every available shell crater had been turned into a machine-gun nest. Pivot points of defence were scattered throughout the organization. On the left of this portion of the battle front, that is to say, in the neighbourhood of La Sablière, the first line was carried before night fell on October 24, but only after very heavy fighting. But, broadly speaking, on the whole of the Vaux front the first line and its defensive works were not captured until the evening of the 25th. Progress was extremely slow, each blockhouse, each organized shell-hole, having to be treated as though it were a big fortress. Communications were extremely difficult, and finally a further bombardment of the fort had to be

[French Official Photograph.

SLEEPING QUARTERS OF SOME OF THE VERDUN GARRISON.



[French Official Photograph.

MUSIC DURING REST-TIME.

The French Military Authorities provide bands in the villages around Verdun, primarily for the entertainment of soldiers resting.

carried out. General Andlauer's division, which had relieved Lardemelle's tired troops on October 28, carried the whole of Fumin Wood, and on the morning of November 2 explosions in the fort and other signs of evacuation led to instructions being given for the occupation of the stronghold that night.

A reconnaisance party was sent out and roamed round the fort in darkness, endeavouring to find a way in. Finally a very narrow opening was discovered in one of the machine-gun shelters and a man of unusual thinness crept through it into the fort. His lieutenant took off his uniform and the man managed to pull him in after him. They found the inside of the fort in a state of indescribable confusion. The stores which had been for the most part fired when the Germans evacuated the fort were still smouldering, and the underground chambers resounded with explosions as grenades or cartridges were reached by the fire.

On Friday, November 3, the French troops went forward from Vaux Fort to the end of the plateau overlooking the Woevre plain. On Saturday night and Sunday morning they captured Vaux and Damloup villages. Thus in this portion of the front in less than a fortnight the French restored the front which they had occupied in March before the first German attack upon Vaux, winning back in that time ground which the Germans had struggled for during nearly nine months.

Between October 24 and November 22 the French took over 6,000 prisoners and captured many guns, both heavy and field pieces, and large quantities of stores. They had given the Germans a blow which left them exposed to further attack whenever the French desired to follow up.

That further blow was delivered with almost startling opportuneness just after the launching of Germany's first official peace overtures and on the eve of the appointment of General Nivelle to succeed General Joffre in command of the northern and eastern armies of France on the western front. Four days before the fresh victory of the French at Verdun in the closing days of 1916 the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, had arrogantly stated that "Germany and her Allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, have given proof of their indestructible force by gaining considerable successes over adversaries superior

THE AREA OF THE FRENCH VICTORIES.

to them in numbers and in war material. Their unshakable line resists the unceasing attacks of their enemies' armies."

Four days later—on December 16—the French official communiqué was able to announce that on a front of six miles the enemy line had been crushed in to a depth of two and a half miles and that on the first day of battle 7,500 prisoners had already passed into the cages. The victory thus announced had been in preparation practically ever since the recapture of Douaumont and Vaux Forts. It came as a most admirable answer to the treacherous peace talk of the enemy and was full of splendid promise for General Nivelle's possession of the post of Commander-in-Chief.

It might have been possible after the capture of these two forts to have pushed still farther ahead at once. The command, however, had laid down formal orders on this point. Troops which found the possibility of pushing beyond the objective assigned to them were to do so, but after destroying as much material and guns as they could find were to return to the line marked out and there consolidate their position. This strategy was the result of General Nivelle's scientific method of attack. It was also due, in part at any rate, to his desire to spare his men as much as possible. It was a good example of the military doctrine of the economy of force.

The new front which crystallized after the October-November fighting still left the enemy in possession of several extremely useful observation points on Ridges 329, 342 and 378, from which access to Douaumont Fort and other points upon the line could be controlled and rendered difficult. It was necessary in order to derive full benefit from the October-November success to push the enemy far back from these peep-holes beyond Chambrette Farm, Bezonvaux and Hardaumont Wood.

The positions held by the Germans along this line were strong. In front of them extended a large strip of country rendered almost impossible by rain. Their line had been enormously strengthened since the earlier offensive. It rested in the west on Vacherauville, passed over the high Pepper Ridge, round Haudromont Wood, Chauffour Wood and the foot of Ridge 342, behind Douaumont, and then formed a salient reaching almost to Vaux Pond in the east

The task before the French was more difficult if possible than that of the capture of Douaumont and Vaux Forts. They had first of all to restore some order in the battlefield they had then swept over, and an immense amount of engineering work was necessary before they could think of resuming the offensive. They had before them defensive works of very much greater depth than those stormed on October 24. In taking Douaumont, once the first line—the crust as it were—had been broken through,



MASS IN A VAULT BENEATH FORT VAUX AFTER THE VICTORY.

the rest was a comparatively easy matter. In this December attack they had to advance from one strong line to another, organized with great skill and offering ambush after ambush to the oncoming troops.

The German front was held by five divisions —the 14th Reserve, the 39th, 10th, and 14th active and the 39th Reserve Divisions. Fifteen battalions, or between 8,000 and 9,000 men, held the first line. The same number was held in immediate reserve and the remaining battalions were "resting" ready for an immediate call.

men had the misfortune to have at their head an aged general — Kruger by name — who thirsted for glory. By steady log-rolling and intriguing he had his elderly reservists removed from the peaceable front they occupied in Alsace to the more glorious region of the Meuse. It was his fate to run up against the doughty veterans of General de Passaga's division, which was nicknamed "la Gauloise," and each of whose regiments bore the name of a famous battle of the Great War.

With General de Passaga's division was

[French Official Photograph.

MORE PRISONERS FROM DOUAUMONT AND VAUX.

There were, moreover, four further divisions close at hand able to reach the front in a night —the Garde-Ersatz, the 30th, and 5th Divisions of infantry and the 23rd Division. It must be pointed out—and here, again, is one of the effects of the Somme upon this portion of Verdun's history—that many of these men were exhausted. The 39th Division, for instance, had been through the northern furnace and had been sent to "rest" in the Verdun sector! One of the most noticeable effects of the Somme fighting was, indeed, that German divisions had to take what rest they could get, not in the rear, but in the front line of a "quiet" portion of the front. The 39th active Division in large numbers found its "rest" in the prison camps of France. Another weak element in the German forces was the 39th Bavarian Division of Reserve. These

another Douaumont division, that of General de Salins. Next him came General du Plessis' division, which had met the German onrushes of February and April. General Muteau's division had yet to gain its spurs in the assault. All these troops went through a period of training similar to that given them for the capture of Douaumont.

On the eve of the attack General de Passaga issued the following Order of the Day:— "Your courage has drawn tears of pride from the eyes of the women of France. Comrades, a fresh exploit is demanded of you. From the heights of Hardaumont the Boche still sees a corner of the glorious field in which he thought to decide the destinies of our country and of the civilized world. To you has been given the honour of carrying the height with the works of Hardaumont, of the Muguet, and

of Lorient. You will push your bayonets well beyond that. You will add to the glory of your flag the lustre of another unforgettable day. Your *fourragères* will speak of the crowning of the work of the Verdun army."

General Muteau, to his division, pointed out the example of the neighbouring division, which had already gained its right to fame in previous assaults. "You will justify," he said, "the honour which has been paid you." He concluded his Order of the Day with this fine phrase: "*A l'heure dite haut les cœurs! Et en avant pour notre chère France.*"

The bombardment of the German line was carried out in spite of great atmospheric difficulties with the greatest possible success.

The tasks of the left and right divisions were very unequal. On the left there were only some seven or eight hundred yards to be gained, whereas on the right the advance had to cover two and a half miles of ground. The morning of the 15th was cloudy, but there was no fog, and visibility was extremely high. At 10 o'clock, without any slackening of the artillery fire, the men got over their parapets along the whole front of the right bank of the Meuse.

General Muteau's troops on the left thoroughly justified the hopes placed in them. Twelve minutes after the attack had started Vacherauville village was enveloped, and by 10.35 the tremendous position of Pepper Ridge had been carried. For Louvement the fighting was much more serious, but here in spite of desperate resistance Louvement village and Chambrettes farm fell into French hands before the day was over. The situation at the end of the first day showed that Pepper Ridge from Vacherauville to Louvement had been carried, but there was an awkward salient in the position. Chambrettes farm had been rendered untenable by German bombardment, and the right was hung up in front of Caurrières wood. During the night the Pepper Ridge salient was pushed back, and by 8 o'clock on the morning of the 16th the line had been completely rectified. This day saw the German resistance in Weimar trench broken down, and Bezonvaux village captured. The fighting throughout this day was extremely fierce and confused. At some points the French went forward with such dash that they had no time to worry about the hundreds of prisoners they left in the rear, and this gave rise to an incident which is worthy of note. The prisoners made at Bezonvaux, who numbered five or six hundred, had to be left in charge of a very small guard while the assaulting troops pushed forward to meet the ever-recurring German counter-attacks. While one of these counter-attacks was in progress the prisoners got the better of their guard and, seizing arms, were preparing to pour in fire upon the rear of the trench when the happy arrival of fresh reinforcements put an end to their enterprise.

On the 17th and 18th the French cleaned up the battlefield by recapturing Chambrettes farm.

General Nivelle, on the afternoon of the first day of this battle, took leave of his staff before taking up his post of Commander-in-Chief in these words: "Gentlemen, I leave you after a splendid day. The experience is conclusive; our method has proved itself. Once again the Second Army has shown more clearly than before its moral and material ascendancy over the enemy. Victory is certain, of that I can assure you. Germany will learn this to her cost."

General Nivelle did not know how complete was the victory his army had gained. They captured 11,387 prisoners, 115 guns, 44 mine throwers, 107 machine-guns, and great quantities of stores. Less than six French divisions beat six German divisions in attack, and, as General Mangin declared in an Army Order, they had given the only reply possible to German peace manœuvres. "To their hypocritical overtures," he wrote, "you have replied by the mouth of your guns and by the point of your bayonet. You have been the proper Ambassadors of the Republic; the Republic thanks you."

The Battle of Verdun, begun on February 21, 1916, had at the end of the year brought the French back almost to the line from which they were first forced, and when General Ludendorff instituted an enquiry into the whole course of the battle it was reported that he came to the conclusion that German defeat had to be admitted.

END OF VOLUME TEN.

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